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Summary 
This study addresses the well-established principle of South African law that a price in a 
contract of sale must be certain or objectively ascertainable. The interpretation given to this 
principle by our courts is examined first, and found to be conservative. 
This approach is thereupon set against the recognition that parties frequently wish to provide 
for the possibility of price adaptation. The notion of price adaptation recognises that the latter 
often contract within a commercial environment fraught with uncertainty, yet wish to agree 
upon a price term which is both flexible and secure. 
An attempt to provide for price adaptation may bring an agreement into conflict with the rule 
of pretium certum. Accordingly, the study addresses the various means by which parties 
attempt to import price adaptation, whilst, at the same time, ensuring that their agreement does 
not fall foul of the latter rule. The courts may be of help through the implementation of terms 
or, as in the case of certain European jurisdictions, through their power to modify agreements 
following a drastic change in circumstance. Particular attention is given, however, to price 
adjustment clauses and reference in contracts to the standard of reasonableness. The 
development of price adaptation techniques depends upon the astuteness of courts in their 
striking down of agreements on the basis of pretium certum. 
The study concludes with an analysis of the American approach to cer\ainty of price. 
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Opsomming 
In hierdie proefskrif kom die gevestigde beginsel van die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg dat die 
prysbepaling ingevolge ' n koopkontrak bepaald of objektief bepaalbaar moet wees, 
onder die loep. Ten eerste word die bantering van hierdie beginsel in die Suid-
Afrikaanse regspraak ondersoek, en tot die slotsom gekom dat die benadering 'n 
konserwatiewe een is . Die sienswyse van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg word vervolgens 
gekonstrasteer met die behoefte van die partye aan ' n aanpasbare prys, wat daaruit 
spruit dat kontrakte dikwels in 'n kommersiele omgewing wat gekenmerk word deur 
onsekerheid, gesluit word. Afgesien van sekerheid aangaande die prys, bestaan daar 
ook 'n behoefte aan soepelheid. 
Pogings om voorsiening te maak vir prysaanpassing mag die ooreenkoms bedenklik 
maak vanuit die oogpunt van die vereiste van pretium certum. Die proefskrif 
behandel verskillende metodes waardeur partye te werk kan gaan om prysaanpassing 
moontlik te maak sonder om die geldigheid van die ooreenkoms in die gedrang te 
bring. Die howe kan in hierdie verband ' n rot speel vir sover dit die toepassing van 
prysbepalings aangaan, of andersins deur middel van 'n jurisdiksie om ooreenkomste 
aan te pas in die lig van veranderde omstandighede. Besondere aandag word gegee 
aan prysaanpassingsklousules en verwysings in kontrakte na die 
redelikheidskriterium. Deurgaans blyk die ingesteldheid van die howe van 
deurslaggewende belang te wees. 
Di e studie word afgerond met ' n regsvergelykende blik op die pos1s1e 111 die 
Verenigde State van Amerika. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1 1 The general requirement of certainty in the South African law of contract 
1 1 1 An established principle 
It is an established principle of South African contract law that there must be certainty with 
respect to the contents of a contract. I Contractants are expected, in other words, to determine 
the obligations to be created by the contract with certainty. This includes both that which is to 
be performed in terms of the obligation, as well as terms concerning its operation.2 
This general principle of our law of contract has been confirmed by South African courts for 
many years.3 The general acceptance of this principle is such that De Wet & Van Wyk, under 
the heading 'Die prestasies moet bepaal of bepaalbaar wees', remark as follows: 
Dit spreek vanself dat waar die prestasie of prestasies waartoe partye hulle verbind, so vaag en 
onduidelik omskryf is dat nie uitgemaak kan word wat die verpligtings is nie, daar uit die 
ooreenkoms geen verbintenisse kan onstaan nie.4 
De Wet & Van Wyk's point is clear: if a contract is so vaguely defined that one cannot 
determine the rights and duties supposedly created, then no rights and duties are created. For 
if one cannot determine the content of the supposed contract, then surely there can be no 
contract. 
Following the spate of recent cases on certainty, however, this topic merits further discussion. 
The chapter below accordingly attempts, firstly, to place certainty within the theoretical 
framework of the law of contract. 
1 1 2 Consensus: the requirement of an ascertainable agreement 
I Wessels Contract 22, 137; Vander Merwe eta! Contract 161 ; Lubbe & Murray Contract 307; De 
Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 83-84; Joubert General Principles 179-185; Christie Contract I 04-
1 13 ; Hutchison Wille's Principles 424; Kahn Contract 92-101; Lubbe 1989 TSAR 159; Beck 1985 
SALJ 660; Davids 1965 SALJ 108. 
2 Lubbe 1989 TSAR 159. 
3 See, for instance, the recent Appellate decisions Westinghouse Brake & Equipment Engineering 
(Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering 1986 2 SA 555 at 574; Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC 
Administrators CC 1992 1 SA 566 (A) at 576; and Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics 
(Pty) Ltd 1993 I SA 179 (A) at 182. See in addition inter alia the following: Spiegel v Eilenberg 
(1903) 20 SC 247; Colonial Government v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd (1905) 22 SC 452; 
Colonial Government v Barkly West Bridge Co ( 1908) 25 SC 124; Levenstein v Levenstein 1955 3 SA 
615 (SR); Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA Ltd 1964 I SA 669 (W) ; 
Benkenstein v Neisius and Others 1997 4 SA 83 5 (C). 
4 Kontraktereg 83. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
2 
The view expressed by De Wet & Van Wyk above is one based on common sense. It can 
however also be expressed as one sounding in principle. The first step is to recognise that 
consensus, or reasonable reliance upon consensus, forms the basis of the South African law of 
contractS From this follows that if the content of an envisaged contract cannot be said to be 
certain, there cannot to be said to be consensus, and accordingly there cannot be said to be a 
contract. As observed by Van der Merwe et al, if there is no ascertainable agreement6 
concerning the performances or the parties to the intended obligations, no obligations result. 
In English law, this point has been well expressed by the House of Lords in Scammell and 
Nephew, Ltd v Ouston as follows: 
In order to constitute a valid contract the parties must so express themselves that their meaning 
can be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty. It is plain that unless this can be done 
it would be impossible to hold that the contracting parties had the same intention; in other 
words, the consensus ad idem would be a matter of mere conjecture. 7 
Thus without agreement being ascertainable with a reasonable degree of certainty, it cannot be 
said that the parties are ad idem: that is, of the same mind. Similar sentiment may be found in 
South African cases such as Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA . (Pty) 
Ltd, and in Margate Estates Limited v Moore. 8 
In general, a basis in the requirement of consensus should be regarded as adequate . 
Accordingly, a court might see little point in questioning any justification for the requirement 
of certainty beyond reaffirming that it serves as both a test for, and element of, consensus. 
Nonetheless, it is may be worthwhile to explore the particular link between certainty and 
consensus further, and thereby reveal the deeper rationale underlying the requirement of 
certainty in the South African law of contract. 
1 1 3 Party autonomy 
It has been said that a fundamental principle underlying the South African law of contract is 
that of individual autonomy.9 This notion holds that society is best served when all 
individuals are equally afforded the greatest possible measure of self-realisation and self-
determination in the social and economic spheres.! 0 In the particular sphere of law, this 
5 See Van der Merwe et al Contract chapter 2 as to consensus or a reasonable reliance on consensus 
as being the basis of contract in South African law. Also Lotz Purchase 362. 
6 Or reasonable reliance on agreement; Vander Merwe et al, ibid. 
7 [1941] AC 251. 
8 1964 I SA 669 (W) at 676B, and 1943 TPD 54 at 59 respectively. 
9 See the judgements of Vander Heever JAin Tjollo Ateljees (Eiens) Bpk v Smalll949 I SA 856 (A) ; 
Theron v Joynt 1951 I SA 498 (A); Frumer v Maitland 1954 3 SA 840 (A). Also Lubbe & Murray 
Contract 20; Lubbe 1989 TSAR 170; Lubbe 1991 TSAR 13 ff; Harker 1984 SAL! 130 ff. 
10 E.g. Vander Merwe Die Duiwel 16-17; Lubbe 1991 TSAR 13. On the principle of individual 
autonomy see in general Lubbe & Murray Contract 20-21 and the references cited therein. For an 
exhaustive examination of the notion of individualism and its influence on contract, see Atiyah Rise 
and Fall part II , chapters 8-16. Also Friedman Society chapter 4, and the references in Lubbe 1991 
TSAR 13 to Nieuwenhuis Drie Beginselen van Contractenrecht (1979). 
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principle presupposes, in tum, that society is best served by permitting individuals to provide 
for themselves the consequences of their legal acts. A contract is consequently seen as a 
mechanism available to individuals whereby this can be achieved. Here individuals must 
enjoy freedom of contract: the decision whether and with whom to contract, and on what 
terms, is to be left to the discretion of the contracting parties.!! Secondly, related to the 
freedom of contract, and flowing likewise from the principle of autonomy, is the contractual 
requirement of consensus. The notion of consensuality maintains that contractual liability is in 
principle dependent on the concurrence of the intentions of the parties to be legally bound to 
each other.l2 Consequently it is only when there is consensus (i.e. a concurrence of this 
intention) that the law can be sure that effect is being given to the parties' true intentions, and 
consequently (and presumably) their interests. The role of the courts in such a system is thus 
subsidiary; its function is chiefly to ascertain whether the minimum requirements demanded 
by society for the creation of liability have been achieved, and if so, to enforce the obligations 
arising from such liability. 13 
Against this background, it can be seen that the principle of individual autonomy lies behind 
the requirement of certainty, in that certainty is a necessary element for the establishment of 
the existence of consensus. Where there is no certainty, the law cannot be sure if the parties 
share consensus; accordingly, it cannot be sure if by giving effect to the supposed agreement 
(i .e. by attaching to it contractual liability) it will be giving effect to the intention of the 
parties. This point has already been made by Scammell and Nephew, Ltd. v Ouston.I4 This 
same point, however, is also constantly stressed by the courts when they warn that it is not 
their task to make the contract for the parties.15 Here, however, the emphasis differs . For on 
this view, if the courts were to give effect to the supposed agreement before them which is 
characterised by terms which the contractants have failed to set out with sufficient clarity, the 
court will necessarily have to intervene and supply the missing terms themselves . Thus here 
the emphasis is not on the courts giving effect to a wrong contract, or one never intended by 
the parties, but rather, on giving effect to a contract made not by the parties but by the court 
itself. Wherever one places the emphasis, the effect is the same: the contract is no longer the 
parties' . This clearly conflicts with the principle of individual autonomy.16 
Nonetheless, just as much as the principle of individual autonomy serves to instruct the courts 
to reject contracts with uncertain terms (for not to do so and to rather intervene and supply 
certain terms itself would be to make the contract for the parties, or, alternatively emphasised, 
such rejection is demanded by the requirement of an ascertainable consensus) , so too it 
II E.g. Lubbe & Murray, ibid. , at 21 ; Lubbe 1991 TSAR 170. 
12 E.g. Lubbe & Murray, ibid.; Atiyah Rise and Fa/1405-408 ; Friedman Society 122-124. 
13 Lubbe & Murray, ibid.; Lubbe 1989 TSAR 170. 
14 Above. 
15 See for example Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd !964 I SA 669 
(W) 676; Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 3 SA 506 
(A); Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Hall 1968 3 SA 23 I (W); Bellville-Inry (Edms) Bpk v Contintental 
China (Pty) Ltd !976 3 SA 583 (C) 592. Also e.g. Christie Contract I 08; Lubbe 1989 TSAR !59; 
McKendrick Contract 47-48; Beck 1985 SALJ662 . 
16 See e.g. Lubbe & Murray Contract 307 and Lubbe 1989 TSAR 170-171 for affirmation of the link 
between autonomy and certainty. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
requires courts, wherever possible, to uphold contracts. l7 If a contract contains terms which 
may be found to be certain, then this must be found. For after all, autonomy requires that, 
wherever possible, it is the intention of the parties to be contractually bound to which effect 
should be given. This approach was stated by Price J in Hoffmann and Carvalho v Minister of 
Agriculture as follows; 
Where parties intend to conclude a contract, think that they have concluded a contract, and 
proceed to act as if the contract were binding and complete, I think the Court ought rather to try 
to help the parties towards what they both intended rather than obstruct them by legal subtleties 
and assist one of the parties to escape the consequences of all that he has done and all that he 
has intended ... 18 
In this regard, our courts have also found the leading English case of Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos 
Ltd helpful.l9 Thus in the words of Lord Tomlin: 
[T]he problem for a court of construction must always be so to balance matters, that without 
violation of essential principle the dealings of men may as far as possible be treated as 
effective, and that the law may not incur the reproach of being the destroyer of bargains .20 
And per Lord Wright: 
Businessmen often record the most important agreements in crude and summary fashion ; 
modes of expression sufficient and clear to them in the course of their business may appear to 
those unfamiliar with the business far from complete or precise. It is accordingly the duty of 
the court to construe such documents fairly and broadly, without being too astute or subtle in 
finding defects; but, on the contrary, the court should seek to apply the old maxim of English 
law, verba ita sunt intelligenda ut res magis valeat quam pereat. That maxim, however, does 
not mean that the court is to make the contract for the parties ... 21 
Thus to refuse to make contracts for parties but also to endeavour to uphold contracts, is to 
give full effect to the principle of autonomy. This represents a key tension in the law in this 
area.22 Application of the latter may be difficult: ascertaining terms and thus upholding the 
contract may at times not be easy. To fail to attempt to do so, however, and thus invalidate the 
contract on the grounds of vagueness would be to lose sight of the fact that agreement has 
indeed been reached. This judicial distancing23 by the courts from the fact that the parties 
17 Christie Contract I 05; Beck 1985 SAU 661 ; Kahn Contract 92; Hawthorne 1992 THRHR 638 ; 
Hutchison Wille's Principles 424; Wessels Contract§ 138. 
18 194 7 2 SA 855 (T) 860. Also e.g. Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 I SA 413 (A) 428; 
Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another 1986 4 SA 523 (C) 529; Globe Electrical Transvaal (Pty) 
Ltd v Brunhuber and Others 1970 3 SA 99 (E) I 05; Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation 
of South Africa Ltd, above, 670; Novick and Another v Comair Holdings Ltd and Another 1979 2 SA 
116 (W) 131; Lindner and Another v Vogtmannsberger and Another 1965 4 SA I 08 (0) II 0. 
19 [1932] AllER 494 (HL), (1932) 147 LT 503. See e.g. Globe Electrical Transvaal (Pty) Ltdv 
Brunhuber and Others, above, at I 05; Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of South 
Africa Ltd, above, at 671 . 
20 4991. 
21 503H-J. 
22 See e.g. Beck 1985 SAU 661; McKendrick Contract 48 ff. 
23 Beck, ibid. , at 662. 
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have indeed reached agreement, no matter how cumbersome this may be to determine, is 
apparently to be avoided to the same extent as is the case of a court supplying the parties with 
the content of their contract. In the latter case, autonomy is no less threatened by the courts 
giving effect to contracts which essentially are no longer the parties'. 
I I 4 Certainty as a separate requirement 
It has not yet been finally decided whether certainty of content constitutes a distinct and 
substantive requirement for the validity of a contract, or whether it is merely an incident of 
some other requirement for contractual validity.24 
Some modem writers tend to treat certainty as a distinct requirement, as would appear to be 
the view of the courts.25 Other commentators view it as merely an incident of the requirement 
of consensus,26 while certainty has also been treated as a necessary element of offer and 
acceptance. 2 7 
The tendency to subsume certainty under the rules of offer and acceptance appears doubtful. 
Firstly, as commented upon by Vander Merwe et al , the issue of certainty may arise even in 
the context of contracts which do not reveal a discernible offer and acceptance.28 Secondly, 
although it is required that offer and acceptance must result in certain terms, the existence of 
an offer and acceptance is itself not a substantive requirement for a valid contract, but rather 
constitutes the facts from which consensus may commonly be inferred.29 This view could 
therefore be seen to serve the standpoint that certainty amounts to nothing more than an 
element of the consensus required between the parties. This latter standpoint holds that 
without certainty with respect to the content of an envisaged contract, the parties cannot be 
held to be ad idem. 
In the light of the discussion above at 1 1 2,30 much can perhaps be said for this latter 
approach. In particular, consensus has been said to comprise (a) an agreement by the parties 
on the consequences they wish to create by the envisaged contract (that is, the contents of the 
contract, namely, the rights and duties), (b) an awareness of this agreement, and (c) an 
24 See here in general the discussion in Van der Merwe et al Contract 161. 
25 Compare e.g. De Wet & VanWyk Kontraktereg 93; Joubert General Principles 179 -185 ; Wessels 
Contract§ 422 ff; Beck 1985 SALJ 660; Davids 1965 SALJ I 08; Lubbe & Murray Contract 20, 307. 
Regarding our courts see e.g. Colonial Government v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd (1905) 22 SC 
452; Levenstein v Levenstein 1955 3 SA 615 (SR); Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation 
ofSA (Pty) Ltd 1964 I SA 669 (W). 
26 Hosten et al Introduction 384. 
27 Van Rensburg et al LAWSA V par 130; Kahn Contract 92 ff; Kerr Contract 83 ff. 
28 Contract 161 n 6. 
29 Van der Merwe et al , ibid ., at 42; Lubbe & Murray Contract 307. A distinguishable offer and 
acceptance is moreover useful in demarcating the line between pre-contractual contractual 
negotiations and the final conclusion of a binding contract, and thus determines the point up until 
which a party may withdraw. Furthermore, where a contract is said to be concluded i.e. in terms of the 
rules of offer and acceptance, may also determine which court has jurisdiction in the event of 
litigation. See here Vander Merwe et al, ibid. 
30 Also Ankon CC v Tadcor Properties (Pty) Ltd 1991 3 SA 119 (C) 124. 
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intention to bind themselves in law to these consequences)! Element (a) is clearly a 
prerequisite for the existence of elements (b) and (c). Thus if there is in fact uncertainty with 
regard to (a), that is, the contract ' s content, how might it at all be said that the parties could 
reach consensus? It appears, therefore, that certainty is an indispensable element of consensus. 
Moreover, one encounters no suggestion as to in what manner or way certainty might be 
indispensable outside of the context of the role it plays as a necessary element of consensus. 
It will , however, be admitted that most authorities, while never attempting to set out their 
reasons for doing so, do nonetheless treat certainty as a separate requirement. This may well 
simply amount to the pragmatic recognition by these writers that certainty, whether viewed as 
a separate requirement or not, is a vital component of any contract. It is thus possibly best at 
this stage, while the question remains unanswered, to agree with Van der Merwe et al that, 
irrespective of the approach taken, lack of certainty presents an obstacle to the creation of 
contractual obligations.32 
1 1 5 The test for certainty 
The test for certainty is whether the rights and duties created by the contract are capable of 
enforcement by the courts.33 It is furthermore said that this is the only test for certainty, and it 
applies irrespective whether the contract is written or not.34 The court will, in establishing 
whether the requirement of certainty has been met, take into consideration all the express and 
tacit terms of the contract, including those established by custom, as well as any other terms, 
such as naturalia, implied by law.35 Where necessary, and subject to the parole evidence rule, 
reference may be made to extrinsic evidence to establish the true content of a contract.36 
It is suggested that, on the one hand, this test follows from the subsidiary or supplementary 
role that the law, and the courts in particular, are required to play by the principle of 
individual autonomy. It has been said already that the function of the court is chiefly (i) to 
ascertain whether the minimum requirements demanded by society for the creation of liability 
31 This division is taken from Vander Merwe et al Contract 14. 
32 Vander Merwe et al, ibid., at 161. 
33 Estate Fuchs v D 'Assonville 193 5 OPD 165; Colonial Government v De Beers Consolidated Mines 
Ltd ( 1905) 22 SC 452; Patel v Adam 1977 2 SA 653 (A) 666; Lindner and Another v 
Vogtmannsberger and Another 1965 4 108 (0) 11 0; Caltex (Africa) Ltd v Robin Rissen & Co (Pty) 
Ltd 1965 2 SA 154 (W) 156; Dijkstra v Janowsky 1985 3 SA 560 (C) 564. Also Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 162; Lubbe & Murray Contract 314; Wessels Contract § 422, § 426; Beck 1985 SALJ 660; 
Hawthorne 1992 THRHR 638; Lubbe 1989 TSAR 171 . 
34 See Vander Merwe et al, ibid. 
35 Lubbe & Murray Contract 314; Vander Merwe et al Contract 162; Hawthorne 1992 THRHR 641 . 
See the case law cited in the footnote immediately below. 
36 Ibid . See in particular the approach of the court in Lindner and Another v Vogtmannsberger and 
Another, above, at 11 OE- I 11 H, and the remarks of the court in Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and 
Another 1986 4 SA 523 (C) at 529E. See in addition Caltex (Africa) Ltd v Robin Rissen & Co (Pty) 
Ltd, above, at 156G; Pattison and Another v Fell and Another 1963 3 SA 277 (D) 279A-280B; Turner 
Morris (Pty) Ltd v Riddell 1996 4 SA 397 (E) 405E-F; Du Preez v Nederduitse Gereformeerde 
Gemeente, De Deur 1994 2 SA 19 I (W) 196F-197C; and the additional authorities cited in Lubbe & 
Murray, ibid. , at 314. 
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have been met, and if so, (ii) to enforce the obligations arising from such liability.37 With 
regard to the test for certainty and point (ii) there can be little dispute. If the courts are to 
enforce the obligations arising from contracts established between parties, it stands to reason 
that they must be in a position to do so. In other words, the content of a contract must be 
certain enough for a court to enforce. The test for certainty, accordingly, is, in this sense, 
understandably a practical and pragmatic one.38 
Point (i), however, is less self-explanatory. If certainty is a m1mmum requirement (as, 
perhaps, a required element of consensus) demanded by society for the creation of contractual 
liability, why precisely is its test whether it is enforceable by the courts? Why in particular is 
this so in the light of the importance of individual autonomy in our law of contract, and the 
emphasis placed on the importance of giving effect to the intentions of the parties? Should 
not, for instance, the minimum requirement be whether the parties regard terms of a contract 
as sufficiently certain so as to allow them to deduce what performance is required of 
themselves and each other? 
For it is possible that the contents of many contracts are defined so poorly that the courts, in 
applying the prescribed test for certainty, would find them impossible to enforce. Many of 
these contracts however, no matter how vague their terms may be, at least to outsiders, are 
satisfactorily performed.39 These contracts simply never come to the attention of the courts . 
Do, therefore, no obligations result from such contracts, because they would not be regarded 
as enforceable by the courts? After all , if certainty - as determined by the enforceability of the 
courts test - is a minimum requirement before contractual liability attaches to the agreement, 
then no contractual liability should follow. Do such supposed contracts accordingly fail 
because they would not pass the test set of certainty set for all contracts? The answer, surely, 
would be no.40 But then what is the nature of this test? Why should it apply to some 
agreements and not others? Can it at all be said to be a substantive test against which all 
agreements should be measured? Would there be any justification, for instance, in regarding 
the enforceability by the courts test as (merely) an attempt to produce an objective, uniform 
measure against which certainty can be judged in those (relatively few) cases where the 
certainty of the contract ' s content is disputed and thus where this dispute comes up before the 
court? 
These questions are merely raised at this stage. Hopefully, possible answers will emerge in the 
course of this study. Importantly, however, such questions lead one to identify that here too 
3 7 See the discussion under 1 1 3 above. 
38 See again the remarks by De Wet & VanWyk cited at 1 1 1 above. Also Scammell and Nephew, 
Ltd v Duston [1941] AC 251 per Lord Russell of Killowen (cited in e.g. Pattison and Another v Fell 
and Another 1963 3 SA 277 (D) 279B-C): 'It is a necessary requirement that an agreement, in order to 
be binding, must be sufficiently definite to enable the Court to give it a practical meaning ' . Also 
Hutchison Wille 's Principles 424, where it is said that the reason for the rule on certainty is that 
clearly no court can enforce an obligation if it is unable to determine the rights and duties of the 
parties, and Corbin On Contracts 525. 
39 See the observations by Beck in 1985 SALJ 661. 
40 See Enyati Resources Ltd and Another v Thorne NO and Another 1984 2 SA 551 (C) at 560B 
where the court stated that ' [t]he law, I am inclined to think, might justifiably be labelled an ass were 
it to strike down as void for vagueness or uncertainty a contract which the parties thereto have full y 
performed to their mutual satisfaction ' . 
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there exists a fundamental tension in our law in this area. This tension arises from the fact that 
there can exist a discrepancy between what the parties might view as terms in an agreement 
sufficiently certain as to be enforceable (or in their view perhaps, exigible) and what the court 
might think in this matter. In our law, for better or for worse, where this view determines the 
content of the test for certainty in the law of contract, the latter view is held to be decisive . 
1 1 6 Attaining certainty 
It is generally accepted that parties can attain certainty in two ways: the parties firstly may 
themselves define the content of a contract fully and exhaustively, or alternatively they may 
identify an external standard by which the precise content of the contract may be objectively 
ascertained.41 This is in accordance with the maxim id certum est quod certum reddi palest: 
that is certain which can be made certain.42 Thus in Boland Bank Bpk v Steele it was said: 
Die fundamentele terme van 'n kontrak moet of by wyse van uitdruklike ooreenkoms bepaal 
word of bepaalbaar wees aan die hand van 'n objektiewe feit (wat ook gewoonte of gebruik kan 
insluit) of deur ' n derde persoon.43 
The identified external standard must apparently by itself be capable of determining the 
content of the contract, and no further reference to the parties should be necessary .44 The 
ostensible ratio underlying the recognition of ascertainability alongside immediate certainty is 
that it may at times be impracticable or undesirable for the parties to define immediately the 
rights and duties arising from the contract.45 
1 2 Certainty of price in contracts of sale 
1 2 1 The development of a general law of contract 
Up until this point, the requirement of certainty has been considered within the context of the 
general principles of contract. A general law of contract is, however, a relatively recent 
phenomenon. For legal systems with a history in the Roman law of contract, it was only from 
approximately the 18th century that it could be said that there existed a general law of 
41 Lubbe & Murray Contract 314; Vander Merwe et al Contract 162; Wessels Contract§ 426; 
Hutchison Wille's Principles 424; Joubert General Principles 179; Hawthorne 1992 THRHR 638. 
Confirmation may likewise be found in numerous decisions of our courts. For specific authority that 
this is a general principle of contract (as opposed to the position pertaining to terms in specific 
contracts such as sale, for which see 1 2 3 below) see amongst others Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd 
v NBC Administrators CC 1992 I SA 566 (A) 5761; Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v 
Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 555(A) 5740; Lindner and Another v Vogtmannsberger and 
Another, above, at 11 OF; Grobler v Naude 1980 3 SA 320 (T); Djikstra v Janowsky 1985 3 SA 560 
(C) 564H-I. 
42 Digesta 12 I 6; Digesta 45 1 74. 
43 1994 I SA 259 (T) 2741 . 
44 See in particular Lubbe & Murray Contract 314; Van der Merwe et al Contract 162-163. 
45 Vander Merwe et al, ibid., at 162. 
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contract.46 Before this , the maxim ex nuda pacta non oritur actio held sway. In its purest 
sense, this meant that no pactum or contract was enforceable4 7 if it failed to fall within one of 
the specific forms of contract, which together formed a recognised numerus clausus. Pure 
Roman contract law was consequently a law of contracts, not contract.48 It was from the 
specific rules pertaining to these specific forms of contract, however, that the law, during the 
course of centuries, gleaned the principles that were made applicable to all contracts.49 
Today, however, the development and acceptance of the latter is such that Lubbe & Murray 
are able to observe that the ' general principles apply to all contracts, irrespective of the 
context in which they are concluded ' .50 At the same time, nonetheless, there is also 
recognition that there continues to exist in South African law a number of specific contracts, 
such as sale, lease and suretyship, and which have largely developed directly from the specific 
contracts of Roman law. 51 While these specific contracts are governed by general principles, 
it is acknowledged that they are to a certain extent subject to special rules.52 This study 
accordingly focuses on one such specific contract, viz. that of sale. 
1 2 2 Why certainty of price in the contract of sale? 
The contract of sale, or emptio et venditio , has long been recognised in South Africa as an 
example of a specific contract existing in our law.53 Its origins are clearly to be found in both 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law,54 and it has further been remarked upon how little the basic 
South African contract of sale has changed in the last three hundred years, that is, since 
Roman-Dutch times.55 Moreover, in accordance with the general principles of contract, the 
terms of a contract of sale are also expected to be fixed with certainty. One of the essential 
terms of this type of contract is a price; 56 thus price in a contract of sale is likewise subject to 
46 Zimmermann Obligations 539. For an analysis of the development towards a general law of 
contract in civilian systems, see in general Zimmermann, ib id. , at 537-545 . See also Joubert General 
Principles 24-35 for a South African slant. 
4 7 That is, no action was given. 
48 Joubert General Principles 24. 
49 See for instance, Zimmermann Obligations 53 7-8 on the glossators and their early attempts to sift 
Roman contracts (as found in the Digesta) into a rational scheme. See thereafter 540-545 for the 
contribution of commercial practice and canon and natural law to the eventual acceptance of a general 
law of contract based on consensus. See also 32 where Zimmermann states, with reference to his plan 
of treatment regarding contract of the civilian tradition, that his discussion would commence with the 
special contracts before it focused on the general doctrines, as this progression from the concrete to 
the more abstract and general would appear to accord best with the way the Roman lawyers 
developed their law of contractual obligations. 
50 Contract 20. 
51 See for example Lotz Purchase 361 on the position of sale. 
52 Lubbe & Murray Contract 20. Also De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 5; Hahlo & Kahn Legal 
System 122-123 . 
53 See the standard textbooks on sale, including those by Mostert, Joubert & Yiljoen, Mackeurtan, 
Kerr and Norman . See also Lotz Purchase 361 ; Lubbe & Murray, ibid ., at 20; and Hahlo & Kahn, 
ibid ., at 123 . 
54 See inter alia Mostert et al Koopkontrak 4; Lotz, ibid. , at 361. 
55 Lotz, ibid. 
56 See Lotz Purchase 362 for a discussion on the mild controversy as to what constitutes the tl ~a/6. 
essentialia of a contract of sale. J' t~ 
- ~ . ... 
• 
•• • 
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certainty.57 Furthermore the contract of sale is , in this highly commercialised world, a 
commonly encountered and greatly utilised legal tool ; the importance of it operating 
effectively as such, speaks for itself. What follows therefore is an examination of the 
principles governing certainty of price in the South African law of sale. 
1 2 3 The rule of pretium certum 
Price is an essentiale of a contract of sale: nulla emptio sine pretia esse potest. 58 In the words 
of Corbett JA: 
It is a general rule of our law that there can be no valid contract of sale unless the parties have 
agreed, expressly or by implication, upon a purchase price. 59 
Accordingly, without agreement on price there can be no valid contract of sale, although the 
.agreement may be enforceable as some other type of contract. 60 As required of all contractual 
terms in general, the price in a contract of sale must furthermore be certain: 
The Roman requirement that the purchase price must be certain - in the sense of being at least 
ascertainable by reference to some objective standard - has never been questioned in South 
African law.61 
Thus parties attain certainty of price by either making price immediately certain or by 
providing for its ascertainment by reference to objective standards. 62 This, in principle, is 
likewise no different from the general provision governing contractual terms. 
57 See the discussion at I 2 3 below and the authorities cited there. 
58 Institutiones Justiniani 3 23 I. 
59 Westinghouse Brake and Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 555 (A) at 
574B. Also e.g. Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 1992 I SA 566 (A) 576; 
Adcorp Spares P.E (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch (Pty) Ltd 1972 3 SA 663 (T) 667; Burroughs Machines 
Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 I SA 669 (W) 670; Reymond v Abdulnabi and 
Others 1985 3 SA 348 (W) 349. In general Wessels Contract§ 4442; Kerr LAWSA XXIV par 13 ; Lotz 
Purchase 362; Mostert et al Koopkontrak 6; O'Donovan Mackeurtan's Sale 28; Belcher Norman 's 
Purchase 2. 
60 See Vander Merwe et al Contract 200. 
61 Lotz Purchase 367. See the authorities cited by Lotz and in addition the authorities cited in the 
footnote immediately below. 
62 Stead v Conradie en Andere 1995 2 SA Ill (A) 123; Westinghouse Brake and Equipment (Pty) 
Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 555 (A) 574; Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille 
Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 I SA 669 (W) 670; Reymond v Abdulnabi and Others 1985 3 SA 
348 (W) 349; Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another 1986 4 523 (C) 526; Aris Enterprises 
(Finance) (Pty) Ltd v Waterberg Koelkamers (Pty) Ltd 1977 2 SA 425 (A) 434; SA Reserve Bank v 
Photocraft (Pty) Ltd 1969 I SA 610 (C); Adcorp Spares PE (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch Ltd 1972 3 SA 
663 (T); Hattingh v Van Rensburg 1964 I SA 578 (T) 582. Also Wessels Contract § 4446; Kerr 
LAWSA XXIV par 16; Kerr Sale 29, 33 ; Belcher Norman 's Purchase 65 ; O'Donovan Mackeurtan 's 
Sale 45 ; Joubert General Principles 179; Mostert et al Koopkontrak I 0; Lotz Purchase 367; Coaker & 
Zeffertt Mercantile Law 188; Van Jaarsveld Handelsreg 298. 
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The statement that the parties themselves may set a certain price has given rise to few 
problems. Usually this would be done expressly, as when the price is to be found in a deed of 
sale, or when expressed as a term in an oral contract after prolonged negotiations between the 
parties. 63 There is however no reason in principle why a tacit term pertaining to price might 
itself not be sufficiently certain. This might occur where two parties agree on a sale and, 
whilst failing to expressly mention a price, are ad idem on the price because they both know 
precisely the value of the item because of its unusual character or value. 
More problematic however, has been the rule that a price may be regarded as set when the 
parties agree to make the price ascertainable or determinable. The flexibility that can be given 
to the parties without consigning their contract to a fatal vagueness is a vexed question. 
Writing generally with regard to the validity of contracts in which the parties have provided 
an external standard for the determination of the content of performance, Hawthorne has 
observed that methods of ascertaining performance have been accepted in case law, and are 
still in the process of evolving.64 It is noted by Hawthorne, however, that there has yet to be 
recognised a set of principles by which a particular method of determination or ascertainment 
may be evaluated. Accordingly, as a result of this absence of clear guidelines, parties who 
make use of a method which provides for the later ascertainment of performance, and who do 
not provide for immediate certainty to be afforded to that term, run the constant risk of their 
contracts being declared void for vagueness. 65 
It would appear that the statement that with regard to methods employed to achieve the later 
ascertainment of contractual terms in general, our law is still evolving, and that it lacks at 
present a coherent set of principles, applies equally to the ascertainment of price. Indeed 
Hawthorne regards this as particularly true of contracts of sale and lease where, she notes, it is 
common practice to relate the amount payable to external factors.66 This, moreover, might 
appear from the fact that, as a possible result of the absence of such principles, our law's 
approach to the problem has been, to date, a very casuistic one. This casuistry is apparent 
from a glance at leading textbooks on the law of sale. Mostert, Joubert & Viljoen's Die 
Koopkontrak, Kerr's The Law of Sale and Lease, the most recent edition of Norman 's 
Purchase and Sale in South Africa, and the volume on sale in the Law of South Africa67 are 
all content to list various methods of price ascertainment used by parties in practice and to 
state whether these have been accepted by the courts or not. Recent editions of Mackeurtan 's 
Sale of Goods, likewise, treat ascertainment in as casuistic a manner, and state simply that 
what is important is that it should be possible to ascertain the price by the method agreed 
upon.68 For principles, one looks in vain. 
But to what extent is such casuistry, to complete Hawthorne's point, indeed dangerous? For 
on a second glance at the standard works on sale, one notes the richness of case law on the 
63 See e.g. Kerr Sale 33. 
64 Hawthorne 1992 THRHR 638. See also Beck 1985 SAU 662. 
65 Hawthorne, ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Mostert et al Koopkontrak 11-12; Kerr Sale 34; Belcher Norman's Purchase 65; Kerr LAWSA 
XXIV par 16. See also similar treatment in textbooks on contract in general such as Joubert General 
Principles 179, and Hutchison Wille's Principles 530. 
68 O'Donovan Mackeurtan's Sale 45; Hackwill Mackeurtan's Sale 15. 
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point of ascertainment of price. One might expect, then, that over the years, a set of case law 
has accumulated which, whilst never having set out the principles applicable with the 
coherency required of by Hawthorne, provide adequately of sound precedent, to cover either 
directly or by analogy all questions of law arising in the field of ascertainment of price. One 
would expect, further, that particular cases themselves have come to be identified as leading 
cases in this field , having themselves elucidated principles which consequent decisions have 
recognised as sound, and to which later courts continue to tum to for guidance. Is it not, 
therefore, through this very diversity of South African case law, and the influence of leading 
cases, that the factors to be taken into consideration by the modem purchaser or seller - and 
his or her lawyer - in their drawing up of contracts and their accompanying agreement on 
price, have been indicated adequately? This possibly depends upon one's view on the 
correctness of the approach taken by South African courts to this issue, and the principles 
such cases divulge. Accordingly, an examination of a leading case on the ascertainment of 
price - if not perhaps the leading case - may give one an indication of the manner of thinking 
upon which much of South African case law may be expected to have been based. 
1 2 4 The Burroughs case 
Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA. (Pty) Ltd69 is a case cited with great 
frequency by our courts with regard to the ascertainment of price. It deals explicitly with the 
problem, and at considerable length. It may be expected, therefore, to demonstrate the correct 
approach to be taken when faced with the issue of pretium certum. 
In casu, the plaintiff sued the defendant for the alleged contract price of certain machinery 
sold to the defendant. In defence it was denied, inter alia, that there was a contract of sale in 
that there could not be said to have been a fixed contract price. It was this question, namely, 
whether there was a price or not, upon which the court chiefly focused its attention. 
With regard to price, the contract document included, firstly, the following phrase, which the 
court identified as Part II: 
To be delivered to the undersigned as soon as possible, transportation charges pre-paid, which 
the undersigned agrees to purchase for the sum of£ I ,3 71 , 12s. (one thousand three hundred and 
seventy-one pounds twelve shillings). 
This figure was also to appear elsewhere in the document alongside the printed words 
' approximate nett total ' . Thereafter the document provided for the following two clauses, and 
which were referred to by the court as Parts III and IV: 
Part III 
It is not possible for Burroughs Machines Limited, hereinafter called the Company, to quote a 
firm price for the new equipment offered on this order. We are informed by our factory that the 
price quoted as ' approximate ' is not final and is subject to change at any time prior to delive ry, 
69 A bove. 
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to provide for possible changes 111 manufacturing costs, and fluctuations 111 the rate of 
exchange.70 
Part IV 
Any increase in respect of any taxes, tariffs or rates, imposed prior to delivery, shall be borne 
by the purchaser. 71 
The court, at outset, 72 set out the principles of law which it evidently believed to be 
applicable in this case. The first of these is that there can be no valid contract of sale without a 
price, and that the fixing of price could in tum either be done expressly by the parties or by 
their ' agreeing upon some external standard by the application whereof it will be possible to 
determine the price without further reference to [the parties] .' 73 Secondly, as apparently a 
corollary to the first , the court stated that there could be no valid contract of sale if ' the price 
[was] to be fixed by one of [the parties] or his nominee.' 74 
In applying this law to the facts , the court clearly regarded the contract to have provided for 
ascertainment of the price by way of an external standard, that is, that it attempted to provide 
' machinery for fixing the price ' ,75 and that the parties had not themselves attempted to 
provide expressly for an original, fixed price.76 The court ruled however that the price-fixing 
machinery had failed to indicate 'with sufficient clarity ' 77 the circumstances under which, 
and to what extent, the approximate price, which was itself never intended to be a firm or final 
price, would be adjusted. The circumstances referred to included changes in manufacturing 
costs, 78 fluctuations in the rate of exchange, 79 and references to rates and taxes. 80 The court 
looked at various possible price adjustments that it believed could conceivably result from the 
ascertainment clauses, and, because the possibilities appeared so many, held the terms 
constituting the price-fixing machinery as ' too vague for enforcement'. 81 The court 
consequently concluded that the parties had failed to reach agreement on a vital term of the 
contract, namely, price, and that therefore there was no contract of sale at all. 82 
The case appears accordingly, at first glance, to be a classic tale of a price ascertainment 
mechanism gone wrong. The price-fixing machinery failed to achieve the certainty required 
by the court for a material term; it gave rise to too many possibilities with regard to price. 
Faced with all these possibilities, no court could know what price to enforce; as Colman J 
remarked, ' [i]t is to be regretted that [the contract's draftsman had] not devote[d] equal care to 
70 6720. 
71 672E. 
72 670C-F. 
73 6700. 
74 670E. 
75 6750. 
76 See for example 675H. 
77 673A. 
78 6738. 
79 6748. 
80 674F. 
81 675A. 
82 6768. 
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the necessary task of ensuring that the amount of the purchase price would be clearly reflected 
or indicated' . 83 As evidence of this lack of care the court spent some considerable time 
sketching the many consequences it believed could result from what it regarded as the loose-
endedness of the clauses regarding the price ascertainment mechanism. 84 
The case, therefore, does indeed appear to be a model for the proper approach to pretium 
certum : the law, that a price must be certain or ascertainable, is carefully set out;85 the court 
then makes it clear that the parties have elected to make the price ascertainable by way of 
price-fixing machinery;86 and this machinery is then gauged against the standard test fo r 
certainty, viz. whether it results in a term enforceable by the court.87 The outlook is decidedly 
throughout that of the court ' s, with the latter in its role as curator of the unquestioned 
requirement of certainty. It is little wonder then that the case is cited so frequently as 
precedent with respect to this area of the law of sale. 
And yet one finds the case strangely disquieting. 
For the first question is to ask why, in the first place, the defendant found himself in court. 
This was apparently because he was allegedly in breach88 - for failing to pay the purchase 
price of the bought machinery. Considering that the case chiefly concerns whether there was 
certainty with respect to the purchase price, the ordinary bystander (ignorant of the 
complexities of our law) could reasonably expect the defendant ' s alleged failure to pay to be 
as a result of his inability to determine the exact price to be paid by him. But this, of course, is 
hardly the case. For whatever reason he is allegedly in breach, it is not because of an inability 
to determine what he owed in terms of the contract. The court notes89 that the plaintiff was 
not claiming anything more than the approximate price set out in the contract, which, he says, 
'was presumably acceptable to both parties' . In this obiter remark, the court (as well as a 
complete lack of any indication whatsoever in the rest of the judgement that the defendant, 
during the duration of the contract, was in any doubt as to what he was expected to pay) 
indicates that, in so far as the parties are concerned, there existed no problem whatsoever as to 
the quantum of the price. The defendant throughout the duration of the contractual 
relationship clearly knew what was expected of him. And yet this supposed uncertainty as to 
this very same price is then permitted to render the entire contract void. It is little wonder then 
that the court terms its conclusion, which it believed it was obliged to follow,90 as 
' unfortunate ' .91 This is especially so if one considers that the court gave some considerable 
attention to the correct approach to be taken when concerned with commercial documents and 
83671H. 
84 6738- 676A. 
85 6700-E. 
86 See for example 673A. 
87 See for example 675A; 6768-C. 
88 669G. 
89 676C. 
90 ' (8]ut I must apply the facts and the law, as I find them .. .' at 676C. 
91 676C. 
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the required degree of certainty,92 and that it had stated itself that it should 'not lightly hold 
the document to be ineffective ' .93 
It is in such a case, accordingly, that one questions whether the courts take into adequate 
consideration the discrepancy that can exist between the court's view of what is enforceable, 
and hence certain, and the view of parties as to what is certain, or, from their perspective, 
capable of implementation. In the Burroughs case, there is no indication whatsoever that the 
parties failed to regard the contract as capable of implementation. Contrary to the view taken 
by Colman J, a strong argument could be made out that on its correct interpretation, the figure 
of£1 ,371 ,12s. was a binding price, provisional only in the sense that it was subject to possible 
(but not inevitable) change. Parts III and IV are clearly more in the nature of escalation 
clauses (i.e. clauses that provide for later adjustment to an original price), rather than clauses 
to be considered in the initial determination of the original price. This is particularly so on a 
reading of Part I, read with Part II. Clearly, unless there occurred some change in, for 
example, manufacturing costs, respondent was to pay the sum of £1,3 71 , 12s. The later sum 
appears to constitute a great deal more than, as in Colman J's view, a mere datum to be used 
in computing the true price.94 In the event, as plaintiff clai~ed only the supposedly 
approximate price (that is, £1 ,3 71, 12s. ), there was no change, and thus there was no reason 
why the latter price should not have stood. Colman J, however, was not unduly interested in 
the fact that there had been no change, and that consequently, the court was open to find for a 
contract enforceable on the price of £1,371,12s. (and thus one which in practice passes the 
enforceability of the courts test). Rather, although on the facts it was a completely 
hypothetical issue as there had been no change in, for example, labour or manufacturing costs, 
the judge appeared more interested in the fact that the method of computation and the data 
required had not been provided for in the event that there was indeed such a change, and 
indeed, what precise circumstances constituted such a change. Thus the requirement of 
certainty takes on a life of its own; it becomes a lawyer's point,95 a convenient means of 
escape for a party from the contractual obligations to which it had intentionally bound itself, 
and the import of which it itself had little doubt. Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille 
Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd, therefore, is a leading case not so much for the clarity it brings, 
but for the issues it raises. Hawthorne's warning would seem to be one to be heeded. 
1 3 The way ahead 
This introductory chapter has attempted to place the requirement of certainty firstly within the 
wider context of the law of contract, and thereafter, within the context of price in the contract 
of sale. It suggests that, in principle, certainty is an indispensable requirement for any 
contractual term on price before the law will recognise the existence of consensus between the 
parties regarding the latter. This in turn gives effect to the principle of individual autonomy 
which underlies our law of contract. Moreover, price is apparently regarded as sufficiently 
certain where it is made immediately certain, or where it is made objectively ascertainable. 
92 670F- 671C. 
93 670G. 
94 675H. 
95 Namibian Minerals Corporation Ltd v Benguela Concessions Ltd 1997 2 SA 548 (A) 557C. 
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At this point, it has furthermore been suggested that our law is characterised by two key 
tensions. The first is that courts are to refuse to make the contract for the parties whilst at the 
same time they must endeavour to uphold contracts intended by the parties. The second 
tension is, essentially, a complication upon the first. This is that, inevitably, the view of the 
parties as to what constitutes a certain price may differ from that of the court. To this a third 
element may be added, viz. that the test of certainty is whether the content of the agreement is 
enforceable by the courts. 
Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd is a leading case on the rule 
of pretium certum in South African law. Before the discussion of this case, it may have been 
supposed that the requirement of certainty of price was a relatively straightforward one; it 
could have been expected, for instance, that in leading case law such as this all possible 
problems arising from this requirement had been resolved. In the Burroughs case, however, 
pretium certum is shown to be a rule pulled by these very tensions, and from the analysis of 
the case in the previous section, it appears that some of these tensions may not necessarily 
have been adequately resolved. 
Clearly therefore, such wrestling with tensions in a case such as Burroughs demonstrates that 
the rule of pretium certum is a question more complex than perhaps initially thought. In 
particular, it recalls the remark, cited earlier, that the rule that the purchase price must be 
certain, at least in the sense of being ascertainable by reference to some objective standard, 
has never been questioned in South African law.96 For if this is the case, one wonders, 
especially in the light of these tensions, why this has in fact been so. There is, however, a 
deceiving matter-of-factness, a self-evidential quality to a statement that observes that 
contractants must agree upon certain terms and that the test for the latter is whether the 
contract is enforceable by the courts. In its evaluation, however, as to whether price is 
enforceable, and thus sufficiently certain, the court is surely obliged to look beyond the 
statement of the requirement and its accompanying test to the rationale underlying the former, 
and the accompanying issues and tensions . 
From our examination of Burroughs, a leading case, one wonders if this is in fact being done. 
In Burroughs for instance, the courts showed a keen appreciation of the first tension; that is, 
that while it must strive to uphold the intended contracts of parties, it must refrain from 
making the contract for them. On the other hand, it appeared to show little appreciation for the 
fact that its perception of certainty of price differed remarkably from the parties, and yet its 
perception formed the test for certainty which it then applied. Perhaps the most obviously 
dissatisfactory element of the judgement is that the 'proper' application of this test then results 
in one party exploiting the rule of pretium certum so as to escape the consequences of his 
liability. One considers therefore whether in fact our courts do demonstrate a sound 
understanding of all that underlies pretium certum. The rule may seem clear enough, as it did 
in Burroughs, but not necessarily its rationale. One may ask, for instance, when a court has 
explicitly questioned why price, if not immediately certain, must be objectively ascertainable. 
This, therefore, is the purpose of this study. Its aim is to provide a better understanding of the 
rationale underlying the rule of pretium certum. Thereafter one is better placed to evaluate its 
practical application to contracts of sale. In particular, this study will ask two questions, viz. 
96 Lotz Purchase 367. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
17 
• when price will be regarded as certain or objectively ascertainable, and 
• why price, if not immediately certain, must be objectively ascertainable. 
As our courts ' approach to pretium certum has been essentially casuistic, these questions will 
likewise be answered primarily by an examination of the case law. This examination will 
reveal the specific factual instances in which our courts have regarded the price set by the 
parties as not being certain or objectively ascertainable. At the same time, it is hoped that the 
reasons why price must, if not certain, be objectively ascertainable, will become apparent 
from a reading of these judgements. As this rationale becomes clearer, it is envisaged that one 
will ultimately be better placed to evaluate specific instances in which the certainty of price is 
questioned, and to suggest the approach to be taken in the application ofthe rule in the future. 
The first step, therefore, is to set out in detail the many examples in our case law in which the 
certainty - or ascertainability - of price has been questioned. This, accordingly, is done in 
Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE APPROACH BY SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS TO 
THE ASCERTAINMENT OF PRICE 
2 1 Introduction 
18 
In Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd Corbett JA held 
that parties may agree upon a price 
by fixing the amount of the price in their contract or they may agree upon some external 
standard by the application whereof it will be possible to determine the price without further 
reference to them.97 
Price, accordingly, must either be certain, or it must ascertainable by reference to an external 
standard and, in an evidently related manner, it should follow without further recourse to the 
parties themselves. At 1 2 3 it was stated that the fact that a price may be set with certainty 
from outset gives rise to few problems. Clearly this is so when two parties agree immediately 
on a fixed amount which is then to be paid by the purchaser; no doubt exists as to what is 
required from the latter. In this chapter, however, the focus is on the more problematic 
alternative, that is, when the parties agree to make their price not immediately certain but 
rather merely ascertainable. In particular, the implications of what it means to require the 
specifically objective ascertainment of price will be considered, with particular reference to 
the approach of our courts . 
2 2 The objective ascertainment of price 
2 2 1 The requirement of objectivity 
It should be apparent already that if the parties choose not to make price immediately certain, 
but prefer to provide for a price that is merely ascertainable, the law does not allow them carte 
blanche as to how price may be later ascertainable. Rather, before the law recognises this 
price, it must be not be in any manner ascertainable but objectively ascertainable. This can be 
seen in the views of modern commentators and our courts who, while not consistent in the 
expression of this requirement, require it, nonetheless, in substance; this can be shown below. 
In expressing the requirement that ascertainment must be objective, it is most usually said that 
reference must be made to an ' external standard' .98 Lotz, however, specifically refers to an 
' objective standard ' ,99 and it has also been said that the price must be ascertainable by 
97 1986 2 SA 555 (A) 574C. 
98 See typically Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 I SA 669 (W) 
670, which has been subsequently followed in numerous other cases, such as Westinghouse Brake & 
Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 555 (A) 574, and Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v 
Corbitt and Another 1986 4 SA 523 (C) 526. 
99 Lotz Purchase 367. See also the recent cases of Stead v Conradie en Andere 1995 2 SA Ill (A) 
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reference to ex1stmg fact or facts. I 00 Likewise, it is said frequently that price should be 
ascertainable without further recourse to the parties. I 0 I While this is often stated together 
with the requirement that reference should be made to an external standard, Kerr simply states 
that a price should be certain or ascertainable without further reference to the parties.! 02 A 
writer such as Hawthorne, on the other hand, indicates that the requirement that no further 
recourse should be made to the parties is, if not wholly independent of the clear requirement 
that reference is to be had to an external standard, by itself an important consideration. After 
observing that the parties may identify an external standard by which performance may be 
determined, the former states that it is important that there should be no need for the parties to 
be consulted in order to ascertain their intention in regard to the proposed performance.! 03 
Similarly, Lubbe & Murray remark as follows : 
When an external standard is established, the maxim ' id certum est quod certum reddi potest ' 
(that is certain which can be made certain) is applicable and it is therefore essential that there 
be no further need to consult parties to clarify their intention .! 04 
It appears, therefore, that by objective ascertainment it is meant that the ascertainment process 
should not require the further input of the parties; price should be determinable simply by 
reference to some external standard. Perhaps here one states the obvious. Nonetheless, while 
general agreement on this requirement seems clear, such unanimity does not tell us why 
precisely ascertainment should be objective; that is, why no further recourse should be 
necessary in order for a price to be deemed adequately ascertainable in the eyes of the law. 
This is examined below. 
2 2 2 Objective ascertainment: removing price beyond the clash of wills 
The reason why price should specifically be objectively ascertainable is, in fact, at first glance 
relatively straightforward. While the answer would not appear to have been given expressly in 
any case dealing specifically with the issue of price, it has already been indicated by the 
application of the maxim id cerium est quod cerium reddi potest within the context of the 
identification of the merx in contracts concerning the sale of land. In Odendaalsrust 
Municipality v New Nigel Estate Gold Mining Co Ltd Van den Heever 1 observed with regard 
to the essentialia of a contract for the sale of land, that the 'contract in itself must place the 
subject-matter of the transaction, the price and the fact of consensus out of range of the clash 
123C, and Boland Bank Bpk v Steele 1994 I SA 259 (T) 275C, where the element of objectivity is 
expressly mentioned. 
I 00 Lee & Honere Obligations 75. See also the sets of external facts to which reference may be made 
in O'Donovan Mackeurtan's Sale 45; Hackwill Mackeurtan's Sale 15; and Mostert eta! Koopkontrak 
I 0-11. 
I 01 E.g. Westinghouse Brake and Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd, above, at 574; 
Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 1992 1 SA 566 (A) 577; Stead v Com·adie 
en Andere, above, at 123 ; Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd, above, at 
670; Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another, above, at 526. 
I 02 Sale 33. 
I 03 Hawthorne 1992 THRHR 640. 
I 04 Contract 314. 
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of will of the parties' .1 05 Strictly speaking Van den Heever J was in this instance referring to 
a written contract, as required by statute for the sale of land. Important, however, is that the 
agreement between the parties must place price beyond the reach of consensus, irrespective 
whether this agreement must be in written form (as in Odendaalsrust Municipality) or is one 
to which no such formalities attach. 
This applies to price in all contracts of sale, and, pointedly, Van den Heever J himself notes, 
following his remarks above, that, consequently, the law does not prevent one from buying at 
a price to be fixed by a third determinate person.l 06 Accordingly, whether one elects to set a 
certain price immediately, or whether one prefers (e.g. by appointing such a third determinate 
person) to provide for the later ascertainment of price by the application of id certum est quod 
certum reddi potest, the matter must be placed beyond the reach of consensus. In other words, 
no further agreement between the parties should be necessary before a final price is indeed 
quantified. For if further agreement is indeed required, the matter is placed once more within 
range of the clash of will of the parties. The parties may never agree on a price and the final 
quantification of price may never occur. In such a case, there is uncertainty as to whether a 
price will in fact be set. Accordingly a key requirement of external or objective standards or 
mechanisms created by the parties to effect a final ascertainment of price would appear that 
they should be able to effect such ascertainment without requiring the further agreement of 
parties. 
At this early stage in this study, the explanation that by requiring an objective ascertainment 
of price, the law wishes to place price beyond the reach of consensus, shall be regarded as 
adequate. There may well be, of course, other reasons which require an objective 
ascertainment, but which, at this stage, may not be as apparent. These will hopefully 
materialise during the course of the discussion. The rest of this chapter, however, will 
comprise an examination of the courts ' approach to ascertainment, and the strictness with 
which the objectiveness of an ascertainment is judged. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on (i) 
price ascertainment by reference to external facts , (ii) price ascertainment by calculation, (iii) 
the ascertainment of price by third parties, and (iv) the possibility of ascertainment by either 
the purchaser of seller, or both parties together. Thereafter, an attempt is made at a 
categorisation of the various situations under which a price will fail for reason of not being 
either certain or objectively ascertainable. In this synopsis, the reasons for that particular 
failure will be given, and it will then be shown whether this failure can be said to properly 
relate to the requirement of certainty, or whether some other consideration forms its basis. 
2 3 Reference to external facts 
2 3 1 General 
A common method whereby parties attempt to make price ascertainable is to include a 
contractual term wherein it is provided that the price can be ascertained by reference to an 
external objective standard. Although the distinction is not overly significant, one may for the 
I 05 1948 2 SA 656 (0) 665 . See also e.g. Grobler v Naude 1980 3 SA 320 (T) 329-330; Clements v 
Simpson 1971 3 SA I (A) 7-8. 
I 06 Ibid . 
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sake of clarity distinguish these cases from ascertainment mechanisms which involve 
formulae in the narrow sense of the word, that is, where the price is determined not by 
reference but by calculation. 1 07 
Examples of the former are accordingly where reference is made in a contract to an 
advertisement containing the sale price published in a magazine.! 08 Likewise price may be 
suitably ascertained when the parties are referred to a document constituting the current price 
list of a certain product. I 09 As common is reference, not to a specific document, but to a 
specific objective standard. This may be done where the parties, for example, agree 
specifically on the usual price, the market price or on even the current value. II 0 Such 
agreement may be express or tacit. 
In all these cases, whether reference to such an objective standard constitutes sufficient setting 
of the price will depend upon whether evidence can be adduced to quantify the price in terms 
of the objective standard. ill Thus it has been stated112 that a formula or reference to an 
objective standard may succeed in some circumstances, but fail in others: success or failure 
will depend upon whether adequate evidence can be adduced to quantify the price. 
Thus in Engelbrecht v Nel a fixed price had been set in a deed of offer of purchase for certain 
immovable property.113 In addition to a price, the deed indicated amounts to be paid in 
instalments each month, as well as a percentage interest to be paid on the ' reducing balance 
per month'. A certain amount which was to be an instalment figure had been deleted and no 
new amount had been inserted, and the figure given for interest had likewise been deleted and 
replaced by the phrase ' bank overdraft rate' . The court held firstly that mode of payment was 
a material term of the agreement and could not be agreed upon later; consequently as there 
appeared to be no agreement on the amount to be paid by way of instalment each month, the 
contract was void for uncertainty. More germane to the issue of the setting of price (or at least, 
prestation), however, was that the court in addition found that the new reference to 'bank 
overdraft rate' failed likewise for uncertainty, in that evidence would be necessary to establish 
what was meant by this phrase. This the court said, 'would amount to a modification or 
supplementing of a material term of the agreement in order to render in enforceable and hence 
be inadmissible ' .114 This approach, however, has been criticised as being too strict.115 As in 
the case of all contracts, the requirement of certainty will be met when the agreement renders 
its consequences objectively certain, and on the admittance of extrinsic evidence, the 
particular bank overdraft rate could presumably have been ascertained.l16 
I 07 See 2 4 below. 
I 08 Coronel v Kaufman 1920 TPD 207. 
109 Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another 1986 4 SA 523 (C). 
110 For example, R v Levitas 1946 TPD 631; R v Deetlefs 1948 4 SA 791 (T) (both usual price); 
Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms) Bpk 1993 I SA 768 (A); Steyn NO v Lomlin (Edms) 
Bpk 1980 1 SA 167 (D) (both market price); Stead v Conradie 1995 2 SA 111 (A) ('huidige waarde'). 
111 Vander Merwe et al Contract 163. 
112 Kerr Sale 34; Joubert General Principles 179. 
113 1991 2 SA 549 (W). 
114 5538. 
115 Lubbe 1991 AS 80. 
116 See e.g. Pattison and Another v Fell and Another 1963 3 SA 277 (D); Clements v Simpson 1971 3 
SA 1 (A). 
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Likewise, in the old Transvaal case of Douglas v Baynes, a decision of the Privy Council, a 
farm was sold for a purchase price which was to consist of a certain number of shares in a 
syndicate which was still to be formed.ll7 The syndicate was subsequently formed, but the 
Council nonetheless held that the price was insufficiently certain in that it consisted of shares 
in a syndicate the nature of whose objects, the extent and the c~aracter of whose operations 
and the adequacy of whose working capital was not ascertainable with precision.ll8 
On the other hand, in Stead v Conradie the court regarded a reference to ' huidige waarde ' as 
entailing ' markwaarde', which, it stated, was objectively ascertainable.119 Likewise in Letaba 
Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v j\..fajovi (Edms) Bpk the court held that 'markverwante pryse ', like 
' markprys ', although not precisely defined, constituted an acceptably sufficient reference .120 
Relating price to market or usual standards, however, may at times be difficult to attain in 
practice. Kerr, for instance, cites the example of the sale at the usual price of an old Master 
painting which had been in a person's estate for 50 years, or of a rare postage stamp which 
had not been on the market for 30 years. Prices paid decades ago will not be sufficient 
evidence of what could be obtained at present. Reference, therefore, to a 'usual price ', which 
is a common enough and generally successful reference, could under these circumstances 
faiJ.121 
A similar problem appears in Steyn NO v Lomlin (Edms) Bpk. 122 In this case, a vehicle was 
sold to the respondent for R45 000 subject to the provision that '[d]ie koper [respondent] 
onderneem om aan die verkoper sand te lewer teen heersende markpryse totdat die voile 
koopsom van R45 000 vereffen is'. It was shown, however, that no 'objektiewe maatstaf soos 
' n heersende markprys ' existed and that the price of sand was probably intended to be 
determined by the later agreement of the parties.123 Although the court noted that a price of 
R45 000 have been fixed , the court clearly regarded the price of sand has crucial in 
determining the price of the vehicle - that is, in determining the 'omvang van respondent se 
teenprestasie' .124 Consequently the court referred to inter alia Margate Estates Ltd v Moore 
and Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd in support of the 
conclusion that no contract had been concluded.125 The case is therefore a good example of 
117 1907 TS 508, 1908 TS 1207. 
118 1213. As to the impression created by this case and Steyn NOv Lam/in (Edms) Bpk (see the text 
below) of exchange and not sale, see e.g. Hackwill Mackeurtan's Sale 19 who states that a contract of 
sale does not cease to be a sale where the parties merely fix a method of payment of the purchase 
price, for example, by the delivery of shares or other property at a fixed value in part payment. 
119 1995 2 SA Ill (A) 1238-C. 
120 1993 I SA 768 (A) 775A-H. At 775C the court reaffirmed the above test in stating that ' solank 
die werking daarvan bepaalbaar is, is daar nie sprake van vaagheid wat aanleiding gee tot nietigheid 
nie '. The case itself concerns rental , but 'markverwante pryse ' specifically related to certain timber, 
the value of which would aid in determining rental. 
121 Kerr Sale 34 n 51. See also Steyn NO v Lomlin (Edms) Bpk, below, where it was found that the 
merx in question (sand from a particular quarry) did not have a 'gangbare prys ' . 
122 1980 I SA 167 (D). 
123 1708-E. 
124 170G. 
125 1943 TPD 54 and 1986 2 SA 555 (A) respectively. 
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the failure of a reference to an objective standard, namely, 'heersende markprys'. 
In Rustenberg Platinum Mines Ltd v Breedt, on the other hand, the respondent ceded mineral 
rights to the appellant for the price of R150 per morgen.l26 It was provided, however, that in 
the event of the appellant at some later stage paying a higher price for similar rights in the 
same district to any other owner, the respondent would be immediately entitled to the higher 
price. In separate judgements, both Van Heerden JA and Harms JA observed that the 
intentions of the parties had been to ensure that cession took place at market price, and in the 
absence of suitable or comparable transactions, had created the above computation machinery . 
Later cessions of mineral rights in the district were thus regarded as indicative of market 
price, and the parties had accordingly provided that the original price should, if necessary, be 
adjusted so as to equal any subsequent price obtained. Both judges regarded the clause as 
being operational for a limited period, viz. a reasonable time, and Van Heerden JA noted that 
the respondent could not raise market relatedness after a lapse of many years. The effect of the 
judgements, therefore, was that the clause was applicable to consecutive cessions made within 
a reasonable period after the original sale, or, in other words, until a market could be said to 
have been established in the area with respect to those mineral rights. The case is an 
interesting one in that it indicates that parties place great stock in the market price, 
presumably as this is, at the least, a satisfactory price for two parties who are both uncertain as 
to for what price they should bargain without the risk of undercutting themselves. If the sale is 
for the market price, both parties would theoretically be in a position to return to the previous 
status quo either by selling the merx to another (and expect to obtain the market price) or 
buying similar items from other sellers in the market (and again, expect to pay the market 
price) . It is also an useful example of a mechanism employed by parties to allow for 
consequent adjustment of the price, while, nonetheless, providing for a fixed price from 
outset. 
An aspect, however, that has created some confusion and where the law would appear 
somewhat at odds, is recognition of a tacit term referring to an objective standard.127 Thus in 
Erasmus v Arcade Electric it was said that where a person buys something from a trader 
without a price being expressly fixed, then a tacit ('stilswyende' ) price will be held to be 
implied, and that this would be the price normally charged by the trader for that article, or the 
price the trader himself paid for it, or failing that, the ruling market price.128 In both R v 
Soller and R v Pearson129 the court also found for an 'implied' price, namely, the usual price 
ordinarily charged, or, if that dealer did not have a usual price for that item of goods, the 
current market price of that article.l30 
What appears here to be dissatisfactory is the courts' tendency to express the possible results 
126 1997 2 SA 337 (A). 
127 See e.g. O'Donovan Mackeurtan's Sale who at 46 recognises this confusion, though , with respect, 
possibly casts little light himself, and also Coaker & Zeffertt Mercantile Law 88-9 for the 
'difficulties' apparently encountered in these situations and their rather haphazard approach to this 
problem. 
128 1962 3 SA 418 (T) 420. This was confirmed obiter in Lombard v Pongola Sugar Milling Co Ltd 
1963 4 SA 119 (D) at 128D as ' a correct statement ofthe law on sale '. 
129 1945 TPD 75 and 1942 EDL 117 respectively. 
130 See Belcher Norman's Purchase 46 and earlier editions of this work. 
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of a tacit term with respect to price as a list of consecutive alternatives, with each alternative 
to be slotted into its appropriate circumstance in the event of the previous alternative being 
inappropriate. Thus Erasmus v Arcade Electric, and especially perhaps Lombard v Pongola 
Sugar Milling Co Ltd, 131 both give the impression, for example, that when goods are bought 
from a trader, and there is no express agreement on the price, one is inevitably obliged to first 
find for the trader's normal or usual price, and failing this (when, for example, the trader has 
no normal price for the article as he seldom keeps it in stock), the price that the trader paid for 
it, and should this also for some reason fail, then finally the ruling market price. The 
impression is then created that where no price is expressly agreed upon and the sale involves a 
trader, the law provides ex lege for an 'implied' price appropriate to those particular 
circumstances. This suggests that price is in these circumstances is determined by operation of 
law, an inaccuracy aggravated by the use ofthe term 'implied'.132 
In as much as Kerr and O ' Donovon133 argue that in cases where no price has been expressly 
set, no such residual provision exists as to a reasonable price, it can to a similar extent not be 
said that such an ex lege provision exists as to a usual price, or the current market price. In the 
absence of express agreement, a price may well be found to be the usual price, or the price 
charged others, or the market price, but then this must specifically be found to be a tacit term. 
The impression created, even if unintentional, that such prices are implied by law, is 
misleading.134 The general principles relating to the determination of tacit terms are as 
applicable here as elsewhere.135 
Finally, it is suggested that the thoroughly pragmatic approach of De Villiers AJ in Lobo 
131 Above, at 420A-B and 1288-D respectively. In addition to the Pearson and Soller cases above, 
Machanick v Simon 1920 CPO 333 at 338 also appears to suggest this approach. With respect to the 
situation where a person buys an everyday article from a shop without asking the price, the court held 
that ' in our modern law it will be held that there was an implied agreement to pay at least a 
reasonable sum, if not the selling price of such articles in that shop' . For a similar approach see also 
Belcher Norman 's Purchase 46 as well as O'Donovan Mackeurtan's Sale 46. 
132 Case law (and especially older case law) frequently refers to 'implied' terms without indicating 
whether by this it is meant terms agreed to tacitly by the parties themselves, or terms implied by the 
law as a matter of course (i.e. naturalia or ex lege terms, or what Kerr Contract 283 refers to as 
residual provisions). See here also Vander Merwe et al Contract 197. For the distinction between the 
two, and on the practice of failing to make this distinction, see Minister van Landbou - Tegniese 
Dienste v Scholtz 1971 3 SA 188 (A) 197, and especially the passage cited from Salmond & 
Williams. 
133 Kerr Sale 30, and O'Donovan Mackeurtan's Sale 46. 
134 Van Jaarsveld Handelsreg 300 notes too that where no price is expressly agreed upon, for 
example, where buying everyday articles such as bread or milk, it is accepted that the parties can 
tacitly agree upon ' die gangbare, gebruiklike of geldende prys'. However while recognising that one 
is concerned with tacit agreements, Van Jaarsveld also inadvertently misrepresents the correct 
situation. At 300, it is stated that '[b]estaan daar geen geldende prys nie, ofkan die gangbare prys nie 
vasgestel word nie, is daar nie 'n geldige koopkontrak '. Strictly speaking, this is not entirely true as 
the parties could have tacitly agreed upon some other objective standard, thereby providing for a 
price, and accordingly a valid contract of sale. Nonetheless it is agreed that most tacit terms regarding 
price will constitute references to, for instance, the usual, current or market price . 
135 See the leading cases of Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 
1974 3 SA 506 (A); Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Hall 1968 3 SA 231 (W); Wilkins NOv Voges 1994 
3 SA 130 (A). Also Vander Merwe et al Contract 197; Wessels Contract§ 261. 
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Properties (Pty) Ltd v Express Lift Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd be taken into account whenever no price 
is specifically agreed upon between the parties.l36 While made primarily within the context 
of lease, and the situation pertaining where there is consensus between lessor and lessee to let 
property but 'at a rental mutually contemplated but not expressed', De Villiers AJ makes clear 
his views are applicable to similar situations such as price in sale, 13 7 and thus states as 
follows: 
The true answer probably lies in an avoidance of dogmatism: the particular circumstances of a 
specific case could result in a conclusion of no contract, or of an intent on the part of the parties 
to be bound by a specific criterion such as a ruling or customary price, rent or remuneration, or 
of an intent to be subject more generally to arbitrium bani viri as to what is fair and reasonable. 
Where the mutual intent to contract is clear, and in the absence of circumstances justifying an 
inference of a de facto intent to be bound by some specific criterion, our courts appear to 
favour an implied intent to be bound to what is fair and reasonable. (my emphasis)l38 
It is clear, therefore, that each case is to be taken on its own merits. It should also be noted, of 
course, that silence as to price does not necessarily indicate that the parties have tacitly agreed 
upon, of instance, the market price. It may well simply be an indication that the parties have 
not reached consensus upon this issue at all , and that accordingly there is not yet a contract. 
The dictum above is also authority, although obiter, for the proposition that parties to a sale 
may agree upon a reasonable price. This proposition is dealt with immediately below. 
2 3 2 Agreement on a reasonable price 
The question as to whether parties may agree, whether tacitly or expressly, on a reasonable 
price has been dogged by controversy. Apart from it not being recognised in Roman and 
possibly Roman-Dutch law, it would appear that there does exist some support in case law for 
the view that sale for a reasonable price is not recognised in our law, although this is regarded 
by Zeffert as sparse.l39 In Erasmus v Arcade Electric, for instance, the court a quo appeared 
to have found that the parties tacitly agreed on a 'redelike prys' .140 The court on appeal 
appears to assume the correctness of this finding as it thereafter states that ' [ s ]elfs al kan die 
nodige konsensus afgelei word ... skep die vraag van pretium 'n groot struikelblok ... '. 141 
The court thus implies that the 'struikelblok' is not whether the parties (tacitly) agreed on a 
' redelike prys ' but whether the latter is enforceable in our law.142 
13619611SA704(C). 
13 7 See here 708D, as well as the citation in the text below. 
138 708G-H. By implied intent, one presumes that De Villiers AJ means that, in such circumstances, 
the courts are likely to find for a tacit agreement to be bound to what is fair and reasonable. 
139 Zeffertt 1973 SALJ 114. For an examination ofthe position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law see 
Zimmermann Obligations 255, and Lotz Purchase 368 and the sources referred to by these writers . 
See also Adcorp Spares P.E. (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch 1972 3 SA 663 (T) for a treatment of our 
common law authorities. 
140 1962 3 SA 418 (T) 419G. 
141 419H. 
142 See, however, O'Donovan Mackeurtan's Sale 47, and De Wet & Yeats Kontraktereg 218 n (f) 
who doubt whether the case was at all concerned with sale at a reasonable price and therefore 
applicable. For other possible authority in favour of the non-recognition of sale at a reasonable price 
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The chief objection to the recognition of sale at a reasonable price, however, would seem to be 
the fear that no content can be ascribed to it. Thus in Adcorp Spares P.E. (Pty) Ltd v 
Hydromulch the court contrasted a usual price with a reasonable one, and submitted that as to 
the former, it referred to a factual position which could be proved, in contrast to a fair and 
reasonable price which was dependent on opinion.143 Likewise, in Lombard v Pongola Sugar 
Milling Co Ltd the court spoke of the 'serious difficulties' it might encounter in determining 
reasonable remuneration or reasonable price.144 
This, however, has been disputed. 
On the one hand, it has been suggested that although one may not have a 'sale' at a reasonable 
price, such an agreement will be enforceable as an innominate contract. Thus the court in 
Adcorp Spares P.E. (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch stated the following: 
Such an agreement to deliver against payment of a fair and reasonable amount of money would 
in my view, be actionable as an innominate contract. Such a contract will have its own elements 
of risk and obligations as to delivery which would not necessarily coincide with such elements 
in a contract of sale . 145 
The logic in this recognition is presumably that the common law authority prohibiting the 
acceptance of a reasonable price pertained only to the specific Roman contract of sale: the 
terms of an innominate contract do not fall within the scope of the prohibition. Consequently 
both Lee and O ' Donovan opine such agreements to be enforceable as innominate contracts, as 
'[t]here is no reason why they should not, as an action lay under the Roman law' .146 
see Adcorp Spares P.E. (Pty) Ltd v Hydromulch , above; Trook tla Trook's Tea Room v Shaik 1983 3 
SA 935 (N); Lombard v Pongola Sugar Milling Co Ltd 1963 4 SA 119 (D); and Hattingh v Van 
Rensburg 1964 1 SA 578 (T) 583. For the views of writers who submit there to be no authority for the 
recognition of sale at a reasonable price see inter alia Mostert et al Koopkontrak 11; Van Jaarsveld 
Handelsreg 299 n 134; Belcher Norman's Purchase 67. For writers taking the contrary view, see the 
writers referred to in the notes below, as well as Erasmus, Van Warmelo & Zeffertt 1975 SAL! 267. 
For an exposition of authorities in general see also Vander Merwe et al Contract 163 n 19 and Lubbe 
& Murray Contract 315 . 
143 Above, at 668F-H. 
144 Above, at 128F. 
145 Above, at 668H. 
146 Lee Introduction 292 and O'Donovan Mackeurtan's Sale 47 respectively (citation from the latter). 
Also Hunt 1962 AS 100. Mostert et a! Koopkontrak 11 n 7 nonetheless criticise O ' Donovan ' s 
approach in that ' dit se nog nie vir ons hoe daar tot bepaling van die prys gekom sal word nie en is 
daarom betekenisloos' . See also O' Donovan, ibid. , at 47 whose n 30 (which suggests that the 
ascertainment of a 'reasonable price' as a term in an innominate contract would cause no problem for 
the courts as it is a reference to an objective standard) applies equally to the ascertainment of a 
reasonable price as a term of a contract of sale, and not merely as a term of an innominate contract. 
The latter writer, however, prefers to maintain the distinction between the two types of contracts as a 
ground justifying the non-recognition of reasonable price in sale. Nonetheless Mostert, Joubert & 
Viljoen's note above (Koopkontrak II n 7), although dismissive of any suggestion that a reasonable 
price may in fact be ascertainable, indicates, correctly it is submitted, the fallacy in distinguishing 
reasonable price in the context of a contract of sale as opposed to within the context of an innominate 
contract. 
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Why, however, this distinction should be made with respect to enforceability is not clear. The 
distinction between an innominate contract and a contract of sale may be relevant with respect 
to various consequences of the contract, for example, the passing of ownership and provisions 
concerning risk, which may or may not coincide. Logically, however, the enforceability of a 
term of a contract should not be affected by the label we attach to that contract. As Hunt has 
stated, it should not matter whether the contract is called a sale or an innominate contract, as 
the fundamental question is rather whether the parties have arrived at sufficiently certain 
terms.14 7 This is surely borne out by the facts in the Adcorp case.148 Why should the court in 
this case on the one hand find an agreement to pay a reasonable price to be too uncertain to 
give rise to a valid contract of sale, yet find it actionable as an innominate contract? Why do 
the numerous difficulties encountered with respect to reasonable price as a term of a contract 
of sale, suddenly not apply to innominate contracts? This denies common sense. 
On the other hand, it has been stated that irrespective of the label we attach to the contract, the 
crux of the question regarding reasonable price remains that of certainty: 
[for] that which can be reduced to certainty is certain and an agreement to pay a reasonable 
price may be capable of being reduced to certainty if the court is able to determine what is 
reasonable in the circumstances of a particular agreement. (my emphasis) 149 
This view would then regard the problem of a reasonable price as no different from any other 
arising as result of the parties referring to some external standard. The sufficiency of any 
external standard by which price must be ascertained is whether sufficient evidence can be 
adduced to quantify the price due in terms of that standard. 150 Thus in this context, the 
question in every case is whether evidence is available to place some monetary amount upon 
what constitutes a reasonable price in the particular circumstances of that case. I 51 
In principle, this approach cannot be faulted. Reasonableness is an external , objective 
standard. Why therefore should the test regarding its application be any different to any other 
14 7 Hunt 1962 AS I 0 I, with whom Davids 1965 SAU 112-113 agrees. 
148 Above, at 668F-H. 
149 Zeffertt 1973 SAU 113. Also Hunt 1962 AS I 0 I who states that it cannot be said 'a priori 
without reference to the particular terms of and circumstances of a transaction that there can be no 
contract where it is agreed to sell for a ' reasonable ' price .. . [t]he terms may nevertheless be 
sufficiently certain '. Also Kerr Sale 35, 239. Kerr and De Yilliers AJ in Lobo Properties (Pty) Ltd v 
Express Lift Co (SA) Pty Ltd 1961 I SA 704 (C) emphasise, furthermore, that the particular intentions 
of the parties must be recognised: it may thus be so that despite having expressly agreed upon a 
reasonable price, the parties intend the usual or market price, which although frequently reflective of 
a reasonable price, need not constitute the same. See the citation from Lobo Properties at 2 3 I above. 
150 See the discussion again at 2 3 I above and in particular Vander Merwe et al Contract 163 n 19. 
151 See here De Franca v Exhaust Pro CC (De Franca intervening) 1997 3 SA 878 (SE), where an 
application was brought that an order be granted for the purchase of an interest in a close corporation 
' at a fair price'. This was regarded as uncertain not, it seems, because of any vagueness that 
inherently attaches to a 'fair price ', but simply because there was no suggestion whatsoever in the 
application ' s papers what would constitute the latter. The court seems to suggest that it could grant an 
order on the basis of a fair price, but then evidence should be adduced so as to make the latter 
determinable. 
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external standard? Recognition that parties may in principle agree upon a reasonable price 
does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that every such agreement is enforceable. The 
recognition of the possibility of a valid reference to a reasonable price is one thing; whether 
such a reference is indeed enforceable is another. As in the case of any other external 
standard, the latter is entirely a question of fact. This is a crucial distinction. There is, 
however, in any case, considerable support for the view that it is possible for a reference to a 
reasonable price to be, to a similar extent to other external standards, reduced to sufficient 
certainty. 
Accordingly, it has frequently been said that the concepts of 'fair' and ' reasonable ' are well 
established concepts in our law and capable of determination. I 52 Thus Wessels regards a 
reasonable price as sufficiently ascertainable to constitute a contract of sale.153 An 
appropriately accommodating approach with respect to such ascertainment has, moreover, 
been demonstrated before by our courts. In Fluxman v Brittain, for instance, the court had to 
determine what a ' moderate ' amount entailed, and held that although it might not be easy to 
determine what constituted a moderate amount at that particular time, such a determination 
was nonetheless possible. I 54 It has likewise been noted that despite the obiter rejection by the 
court in Lombard v Pongola Sugar Milling Co Ltd! 55 of sale at a reasonable price, ostensibly 
because of the difficulties it creates in ascertainment, it nonetheless devoted several pages in 
its judgement in determining what in fact a reasonable price would constitute in the 
circumstances. I 56 
Agreement on ' reasonable ' remuneration is, moreover, well recognised in contracts of 
service, !57 and the general consensus today would appear in favour of the recognition of lease 
at a reasonable rental.l5 8 The Rhodesian Appellate Division tends also toward the recognition 
152 See e.g. Cooper Landlord 56, who states this specifically with respect to price and sale (and not 
rental and lease). Also O'Donovan Mackeurtan's Sale at 47 n 30, who states similarly that the 
ascertainment of a ' reasonable price' (although meant here as a term within an innominate contract) 
involves a reference to objective and external standards, and creates no problems with which the 
South African courts are not familiar in many other contexts. For cases where the courts have had to 
place a value on ' reasonable', see the cases cited by Cooper, ibid. , at 56 n 99. 
!53 Contract § 287. 
154 1941 AD 273. 
!55 1963 4 SA 119 (D) . 
156 Beck 1985 SAL! 671 n 88, who consequently concludes that a reasonable pnce is clearly 
something capable of calculation. 
157 See Elite Electrical Contractors v The Covered Wagon Restaurant 1973 I SA 195 (RA); Inkin v 
Borehole Drillers 1949 2 SA 366 (A); Middleton v Carr 1949 2 SA 374 (A); Angath v Muckunlal 's 
Estate 1954 4 SA 283 (N); Chamotte (Pty) Ltd v Carl Coetzee (Pty) Ltd 1973 I SA 644 (A); Genae 
Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 1992 I SA 566 (A). Zeffertt 1973 SAL! 116-11 7 
and Brassey 1992 AS Ill nonetheless warn that the analogy between reasonable price and 
remuneration cannot be taken too far. Also Beck 1985 SAL! 672. 
158 Lobo Properties v Express Lift Co 1961 I SA 704 (C) especially at 708-9; also, less directly, 
Proud Investments (Pty) Ltd v Lanchem International (Pty) Ltd 1991 3 SA 738 (A) and Genae 
Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC, above. Also Cooper Landlord 56-57; Kerr Sale 
239; Zeffertt 1973 SAL! 115 ; Beck 1985 SAL! 671. Cf. Trook t/a T!·ook's Tea Room v Shaik 1983 3 
SA 935 (N), followed in Amavuba (Pty) Ltd v Pro Nobis Landgoed (Edms) Bpk 1984 3 SA 760 (N). 
Beck (ibid. , at 671-2) regards the Trook case as disturbing but dismisses it as a poor and unreasoned 
decision . 
-- -------------------------------------------------------------~ 
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of sale for a reasonable price, 159 as do other decisions of the South African courts.l60 Sale at 
a reasonable price has, furthermore, been long accepted in overseas jurisdictions. Thus in s. 
8(2) of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 it is provided that where a price is not determined 
by, for instance, the method agreed upon by the parties in their contract, or if price is not 
mentioned at all, 161 the buyer is then obliged to pay a reasonable price. Section 8(3) 
thereafter specifically provides that the question as to what constitutes a reasonable price is a 
question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each particular case. Sale at a reasonable 
price is similarly provided for in§ 2-305 (1) ofthe American Uniform Commercial Code. As 
a number of commentators have inevitably remarked, 162 it would be incongruous should a 
reasonable price be regarded as sufficiently certain to be enforceable in the United States and 
England yet not so in South Africa. 
It would seem, in any event, that one is nearing the final word on the subject.l63 In an obiter 
dictum in Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC (previously NBC 
Administrators (Pty) Ltd), 164 Nicholas AJA, with whom the other members of the court 
concurred, stated the following: 
It is difficult to see on what principle a sale for reasonable price, or a lease for a reasonable 
rent, should be regarded as invalid. 
This dictum, although only obiter, should nevertheless be of persuasive authority. It should 
pave the way for the acceptance of reasonable price in the South African law of contract. The 
significance of this step should not be underrated. Its importance is not merely restricted to its 
inevitable influence on situations where parties do in fact agree on a reasonable price. For if it 
159 Elite Electrical Contractors v The Covered Wagon Restaurant 1973 I SA 195 (RA) where the 
court rejected the contention that cases such Erasmus and Adcorp (see above) established that it was a 
general rule of contract that one could not agree on some form of reasonable charge or remuneration, 
as such a reference lacked sufficient certainty. While intentionally not expressing itself on this issue 
within the context of reasonable price in sale, the court clearly indicated that in the general rules of 
contract nothing could be said against it, and seemed therefore to favour its acceptance. Zeffertt 1973 
SALJ 116 applauds this dec:sion as one ' obviously correct in common sense'. See also Cone Textiles 
(Pvt) Ltd v Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation Ltd 1979 2 SA I 051 (RA) which concerned 
reasonableness in the context of rates and charges. 
160 See e.g. Machanick v Simon 1920 CPO 333 as well as, importantly, Lobo Properties (Pty) Ltd v 
Express Lift Co (SA) Pty) Ltd 1961 I SA 704 (C). The latter case, while dealing essentially with lease, 
specifically suggests that the position with regard to (reasonable) rental may be extended to similar 
situations such as price in sale. See the citation from this case at 2 3 I above. 
161 See here s. 8( I) for the manner in which a price may be fixed in a contract of sale. 
162 E.g. Zeffertt 1973 SAL! 117; Davids 1965 SAL! 113. Davids does, however, following reference 
to English law and the position in the United States of America, cite Corbin on Contract who 
mentions some of the disadvantages encountered in the acceptance of this standard, including that 
' [i]t cannot properly be assumed the only one price or wage is reasonable under the particular 
circumstances of any case' (113). Davids, however, does not regard these disadvantages as any 
greater those encountered in, for example, the determining of what constitutes a usual price. See also 
Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 1992 I SA 566 (A) 577G-578D. 
163 See here the remarks of Brassey 1991 AS 93 and 1992 AS II 0 (albeit with respect to reasonable 
rent). 
164 Above, at 577G-578D. Nicholas AJA cited various authorities in support of this contention. See 
also Kerr Sale 35 ; Lotz Purchase 368. 
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can be shown that the concept of reasonableness is not so uncertain so as to be unacceptable 
within this context, then the objection must be less to its use within other contexts in the law 
of sale. This will be referred to again later. 
2 4 Formulae requiring calculation 
The second broad category which one may for the sake of clarity distinguish, is that 
incorporating mechanisms whereby some calculation is required in order to fix the price. As 
has been stated, any mechanism or method may in general be used to bring about calculation 
provided that it is successful in this task.165 Mechanisms that have been used vary greatly in 
our case law, and the following examples may serve to illustrate this diversity. 
(i) In Bmtwer v Adelford Motors (Pty) Ltd, the buyer, a car dealer, agreed to pay the seller of a 
car a certain amount plus whatever further amount he himself could get on resale of the 
vehicle, up to a certain amount set as ceiling.166 The court regarded this as an acceptable 
price. Similarly, in Transvaal Provincial Administration v Pessen, the court encountered no 
problem in accepting as a valid price a provision in a cession of a lease whereby the 
cessionary agreed to pay to the cedent an amount equal to that which the cedent had himself 
expended in originally acquiring the lease, and in addition a further 20% of any net profit 
which the cessionary might make should he himself subsequently dispose of the lease.167 
(ii) In Warrenton Munisipaliteit v Coetzee , in a public auction for the lease of certain 
premises, a tender was made at 'Rl more than the highest tender per hectare per year' .168 
This tender was regarded as null and void for vagueness in that it could not be said that the 
performance to which the tenderer committed himself was always determinable. This was not 
determinable, for example, where he was the only tenderer or where everyone tendered in this 
manner. Thus whilst strictly concerning the certainty of a term in an offer (i.e. a tender), and 
not agreement on price, this case nonetheless demonstrates again the test for the sufficiency of 
objective standards; that is, whether evidence can be adduced to quantify the price in terms of 
the objective standard.169 
(iii) An early example of the successful application of a price ascertainment mechanism is that 
of Hill Brothers & Co v Alexander & Jones.170 In an action for certain goods sold, the 
defence was led that as no evidence could be shown that a fixed price had been agreed upon, 
the court was obliged to rule that there had been no contract. Gallwey CJ, however, although 
agreeing that there was no fixed price, held that 'our law is not so unreasonable as to lay down 
165 Mostert et al Koopkontrak I 0, 12. 
166 1970 4 SA 286 (E). 
167 1925 TPD 415. Both the Bouwer and Tranvaal Provincial Administration cases bear a striking 
resemble to examples cited in the Digesta, namely Digesta 18 I 7 2 and Digesta 19 I 13 24. 
Reference was consequently made in the Tranvaal Provincial Administration case at 422 and at 428 
to these Roman precedents and authorities. 
168 1998 3 SA 1103 (NC). 
169 See again 2 3 I above, and Van der Merwe et al Contract 163. 
I 70 ( 1891) 12 NLR 202. 
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that the price cannot be ascertainable as the subject of an agreement between the parties.' I 71 
Although clearly the court had difficulty in reconstructing this 'agreement' or mechanism, it 
persevered, stating that it was its duty to give effect to any such agreement that could be 
found. 1 72 The mechanism in casu amounted to a reference to the English market rates for the 
goods in question, subject to fluctuations in that market, and subject in addition to the 
provision that irrespective of the amount of these fluctuations, they were not to exceed local 
prices [i.e. Newcastle, Natal] for similar goods, less 10%. 
(iv) A further early example of a price ascertainment mechanism is to be found in Colonial 
Government v Barkly West Bridge Company Ltd.l73 The contract in question envisaged 
eventual sale by the Barkly West Bridge Company of a bridge, which it had erected and with 
respect to which it had toll rights, to the Colonial Government. The price envisaged was to be 
calculated with reference to data such as the net receipts taken by the company by toll over a 
certain period of time, and involved actuarial calculation. 
(v) In Standard Industries Ltd v Marwick the plaintiff sold to the defendant five tons of 
fertilizer at £12 per ton under a written contract which contained a clause which read: ' In the 
event of price receding before delivery buyer to benefit' .174 The plaintiff delivered the 
fertilizer and claimed £12 per ton as the price. The defendant, however, tendered £50, alleging 
that the word price meant the current market price of a similar fertilizer, and that this had 
since receded to a price of £10 per ton. The court, however, rejected this contention, holding 
that on an ordinary interpretation of the contract, the word price meant the seller's price, and 
not the average market price for fertilizer, and that as there had been no fall in the plaintiffs 
price, he was entitled to a price of£ 12 per ton. 
The case is an interesting one in a number of respects. Firstly, it illustrates how parties may 
include a provision permitting adjustment of an already fixed price under certain 
circumstances. Why parties might agree upon such the provision for such adjustment is 
moreover indicated by the following remarks of Dove-Wilson JP: 
I can quite well understand a purchaser who contracts so long before delivery, stipulating that if 
at the time of delivery the sellers were selling their fertiliser at a lower price he was to be 
entitled to the benefit of it. 
An adjustment clause is also encountered in Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation 
of SA (Pty) Ltd, 175 although whereas the clause in Marwick makes provision for a decrease to 
the agreed upon price, the clause in Burroughs contemplates an upward adjustment. The 
Burroughs case has been examined in some detail in Chapter 1. It may be noted, however, that 
despite the adjustment clause in Burroughs being couched in terms substantially more detailed 
than those to be found in Marwick, the clause in the former was ruled as not providing for 
171 204. 
172 Ibid. 
173 ( 1908) 25 SC 124. This mechanism sets out, in fact, the maximum price that could be paid by the 
buyer (the Colonial Government) in order to compel the seller (the Company) to sell, but did not 
necessarily fix the final price itself; it was open for the parties to agree upon some other price. 
174 (1920) 41 NLR 83. 
175 1964 I SA 669 (W). 
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price with sufficient certainty. 
(vi) Price ascertainment mechanisms may also be found in legislation.I76 
2 5 Price determination by third parties 
2 5 I Introduction 
The third category into which one may conveniently classify price ascertainment mechanisms 
is that entailing references to third parties. It has long been accepted that parties can agree 
upon a third party or parties to determine a price .177 This follows from the general rule that 
agreement on price which is essential for an enforceable contract of sale is obtained not only 
where a certain price is immediately agreed upon but also where it made objectively 
ascertainable. As a general statement of the law, it is usually said further that the third party 
must be identified in the contract, or identifiable. I 78 
The power afforded to a third party to fix a price is not necessarily unlimited. The parties in 
nominating the discretion holder may fix limits within which the price must fall , or may 
prescribe a method, conditions or guidelines which the third will be required to adhere to in 
the exercising of his power.I79 There is, moreover, authority that a third party discretion to 
set a price will in any event always be limited in that it must be exercised reasonably.I80 
It may at times be difficult to ascertain when a power to fix a price has been given to a third, 
and when in fact, whilst appearing to be in favour of the third, the power has actually been 
176 See e.g. Cogen & Co (Pty) Ltd v Pretoria Produce & Milling Co Ltd 1932 TPD 36 and the 
escalation clause included in the legislation under examination, namely, Act 36 of 1925 . Note also 
that a maximum price at which goods may be sold may also be fixed by the statutory-appointed price 
controller in terms ofthe Sale and Services Matters Act 25 of 1964. See also the wartime cases of, for 
example, R v Deetlefs 1948 4 SA 791 (T); R v Soller 1945 TPD 75 ; R v Pearson 1942 EDL 117; R v 
Kramer 1948 3 SA 48 (N) ; and the War Measures Act 13 of 1940. 
177 See in general Kerr Sale 36 and accompanying references to our old authorities. Also Wessels 
Contract 140-141, I 093-1 094; Mostert et a! Koopkontrak 12 ff; Belcher Norman's Purchase 65 ; 
Hackwill Mackeurtan's Sale 16; Van Jaarsveld Handelsreg 299; Hutchison Wille's Principles 530; 
Coaker & Zeffertt Mercantile Law 188. For case law see the numerous references below. 
178 For example, Mostert eta!, ibid., at 13; Kerr, ibid., at 36; Wessels, ibid., at 141; Hackwill , ibid ., 
at 16; Cassimjee v Cassimjee 194 7 3 SA 701 (N); Faatz v Estate Maiwald 1933 SW A 73 , 90; 
Odendaalsrust Municipality v New Nigel Estate Gold Mining Co Ltd 1948 2 SA 656 (0) 663 ; 
Reymond v Abdulnabi 1985 3 SA 348 (W) 349G-350G. 
179 See e.g. the limits set by the parties in Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms) Bpk 1993 1 
SA 768 (A) at 775F-H, within which the third was to determine rental (this case concerns the fixing 
of rental , but is nonetheless applicable to fixing of price). See also Dublin v Diner 1964 1 SA 799 (D) 
at 800A, where the valuers were required not to take goodwill into account when fixing price. For a 
third party required to adhere to prescribed methods and guidelines in determining a price, see also 
Van Heerden v Easson 1998 1 SA 715 (T) at 716. 
180 Bekker v RSA Factors 1983 4 SA 568 (T); Machanick v Simon 1920 CPO 333. See also Rossing 
Stone Crushers (Pty) Ltd v Commercial Bank of Namibia and Another 1994 2 SA 622 (Nm) for the 
principle applied within a slightly different context (viz. valuation of property by a third in order to 
ascertain a reserve price below which the property could not be sold). 
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afforded to one of the parties. In the latter case, the power may be physically exercised by the 
third, but in its capacity as agent or representative of the contract party. In this context the oft-
stated rule apparently applies, viz. that there will be no sale if the price is to be fixed by one of 
the parties or his or her nominee. 181 
2 5 2 Ref erences to third parties in practice 
The following cases serve to illustrate the court ' s approach to price-setting by thirds. 
(i) An early case where it appears that our courts accepted in principle that a price may be 
validly set by third, is that of Searles v Maresky & Gershowitz.l82 In this case, an option was 
given to the plaintiff to purchase a bar on the following terms: ' Goodwill £200, furniture 
about £50, stock about £25, license three-fourths of year' .183 It was inter alia pleaded by the 
defence that there was no valid contract of sale (or option) in that the price of the stock and 
furniture had not been sufficiently fixed. The plaintiffs, however, contended that such an 
objection to the price was merely ' an afterthought' , with the defence well knowing that, as in 
accordance with custom, the price of the furniture and stock would be fixed ' by valuation or 
agreement ' .184 The court, it seemed, agreed with this contention, and with plaintiff s 
argument with respect to price-fixing, and Maasdorp CJ concluded that with respect to the 
price the 'value of the furniture and stock [was] to be arrived at by valuation, if the parties 
cannot agree themselves ' .185 
This case is moreover an early indication in South African case law that a purchaser and 
vendor may (tacitly) agree to reach agreement later on the price, provided provision is made 
for some mechanism (e.g. valuation by a third, provided in this case by tacit adherence to 
custom) which shall ensure that a price is in fact set should for some reason the parties 
themselves fail to reach later agreement.l86 With respect to Searles, it should also be noted 
that the court apparently had no problem with the identity of the party who was to perform the 
valuation. Reference was made only to ' valuation', and not to a valuer. However, it seems 
there was an established custom with respect to valuations under these circumstances, and that 
therefore the custom oi the day would determine who exactly was to perform the 
valuation. l87 In any event, a reading of the case suggests that Maasdorp CJ was not unduly 
impressed with the defence of uncertainty of price; it is clear that he was of the opinion that 
the parties involved were under no delusion as to price, or as to how it was to be 
ascertained.l88 
181 E.g. Kerr Sale 54; Hackwill Mackeurtan's Sale 16; Mostert et al Koopkontrak 13 ; Westinghouse 
Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 555 (A) 670D; Reymond v 
Abdulnabi and Others 1985 3 SA 348 (W) 351 A. 
182 1916GWL431. 
183 433 . 
184 435 . 
185 438. 
186 See the similar mechanism in modern law in e.g. Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms) 
Bpk 1993 I SA 768 (A), and the discussion on agreements to agree in general at 2 6 2. 
187 432, 435. 
188 Maasdorp CJ gives no reasons for his conclusion that the price was to be agreed upon later or 
decided by valuation (438); it would seem then that he would be in substantial agreement with 
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(ii) In Macey 's Consolidated (Pvt) Ltd v TA Holdings the purchase price for a supermarket 
was fixed by means of a valuation done by an independent firm of valuers.189 Similarly, in 
Gillig v Sonnenberg and Dublin v Diner the price of shares which were to be sold, was to be 
fixed by the auditors of the company in which these shares were held.190 In Macey 's 
Consolidated (Pvt) Ltd v TA Holdings reference was made specifically to the name of a firm 
of valuators.191 In Gillig v Sonnenburg, however, the reference was to 'the auditor for the 
time being of the company'. 192 
(iii) In Kirsch v Willetts the price set for a sale of a hotel and furniture was to be fixed by two 
valuers, one of whom was to be appointed by the purchaser and the other by the vendor. 193 A 
similar mechanism is to be found in CM Asbestos Co (Pty) Ltd v King Chrysotyle Asbestos 
Mines (Pty) Ltd and Others where, in an option for certain mining claims, both seller and 
purchaser were each to appoint a geologist, and these geologists, thereafter, were together to 
calculate the purchase price.194 Furthermore, provision had been made that in the event of 
disagreement, the geologists were to nominate mutually a third geologist, whose fixing of the 
price was to be binding. This deadlock-breaking mechanism is not found in Kirsch v Willetts. 
2 5 3 Failure of references to third parties: examples from case law 
The following cases illustrate the circumstances under which references to third parties have 
failed in the past. It will be seen that the approach of case law has been once again a casuistic 
one, and that judgements reflect the view taken by the court in question of the particular facts 
before it. Nonetheless, even on the view that each case should be treated on individual merit, 
some judgements appear to be in conflict. 
(i) In Reymond v Abdulnabi and Others the respondent orally agreed to sell shares in a certain 
company to the applicant for a purchase price 'to be determined by an independent 
auditor ' .195 The court, however, stating the rule that if the determination of the price is left to 
a third party, such third party must be ascertained or ascertainable, found that the independent 
auditor was not an 'ascertainable person' .196 The court contrasted this reference to those in 
plaintiffs counsel at 435. The judgement is mainly devoted to the question whether there had been 
the requisite consent between partners to sell. The contention, in any event, by plaintiff that the 
defence of uncertainty of price was an ' afterthought ' (435) rings true. Plaintiffs counsel (435) 
contended that the plaintiff had tendered an amount and it appears that the defence had admitted this 
to be a reasonable tender. At the time of contracting, therefore, there cannot be said to have been any 
real dispute as to price, and the court, it is therefore submitted, was correct in its dismissive approach 
towards this defence. 
189 1987 1 SA 173 (ZS). 
190 1953 4 SA 675 (T) and 1964 I SA 799 (D) respectively. 
191 Above, at 1740. 
192 Above, at 676H. 
193 1930 EDL 9. 
194 1953 3 SA 43 1 (W). 
195 1985 3 SA 348 (W) 3481. The court assumed there to have been agreement (3490). 
196 349I-350B. 
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Gillig v Sonnenberg and Dublin v Diner, 197 where reference was made to a specific 
company ' s auditors, and indicated that the reference as it stood entailed a reference to many 
auditors, and that consequently this person was not ascertainable without further agreement by 
the parties on this issue. 198 
(ii) In Cassimjee v Cassimjee certain stock, as part of a sale of a general business, was to be 
' taken over [by the purchaser] at valuation'.199 It was averred that the contract of sale was 
void for uncertainty because there was no indication as to how or by when the valuation was 
to be made, and consequently that no price could be determined. The court upheld this 
contention, agreeing that there had been no indication inter alia as to whom the parties 
intended was to make the valuation.200 
This decision may be contrasted with the earlier decision of Searles v Maresky & Gershowitz, 
where the price for stock and furniture was also to be determined 'by valuation' .20 I As 
pointed out earlier, the court had no qualms in accepting this as a valid price 
determination.202 With respect to the Searles case it has been suggested that the court, to its 
credit, was not taken in by a clearly technical defence based supposedly on uncertainty of 
price, or as counsel termed it, an ' afterthought'. The court, aided by the existence of a custom 
which provided for price valuation in these circumstances, recognised that price was not at 
issue between the parties, and thus refused to allow it to become a litigious issue. 
In Cassimjee v Cassimjee, on the other hand, counsel specifically pointed out, and the court 
appeared to note,203 that no dispute had ever been alleged as to the price with respect to 
stock. The court, however, was ofthe opinion that this should have been alleged in plaintiffs 
declaration, and thus stated that ' [a ]s it is, it is quite impossible for the court to enforce the 
contract as alleged' .204 This may well be so, and a court, when required to grant an order 
concerning a contract, will understandably wish to be in a position to place some 
quantification on price. However, where it appeared the parties were in no disagreement as to 
the price term in question (although admittedly this was not alleged in pleadings), it might 
seem somewhat fastidious of the court to find the contract unenforceable on this issue. This is 
particularly so in that the attack based on the alleged uncertainty was one to be found in an 
exception to plaintiffs declaration. It would seem therefore, with respect, to be premature to 
find so strongly for the unenforceability of the contract on this ground, especially if there were 
indications that this would not be a disputed issue if the matter ran to full trial. 
This stricter approach may also be seen in Globe Electrical Transvaal (Pty) Ltd v Brunhuber, 
197 Above. 
198 3500-G. 
199 1947 3 SA 701 (N) 705. 
200 706. 
20 I 1916 GWL 431. See the discussion above at 2 5 2. 
202 To suggest that the court in Searles did not consider the matter, as evinced by the court ' s 
dispatching of the issue in a single sentence at the end of the judgement (438), would probably be 
inaccurate. Counsel for both parties specifically raised the issue and the court was thus obliged to 
consider it. 
203 706. 
204 Ibid. 
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where the applicant held an option to purchase shares in a certain trading company.205 In 
terms of the option, the purchase price was dependent on the value of the company ' s stock in 
hand, which was to be determined by stocktaking. No date, however, was fixed for the 
stocktaking, and the applicant alleged that this was to be agreed upon later between the 
parties, or that it was to take place at a reasonable date. The court noted the importance of the 
date of the stocktaking, remarking that the value of stock in a trading company can fluctuate 
from day to day. Consequently without agreement as to the date of stocktaking, the price 
could not be said to be certain or ascertainable.206 In this regard the court referred to the 
many difficulties that arose if one took into account the various possible dates for stocktaking, 
and doubted how it were possible to fix a 'reasonable' date.207 The court, in finding for 
uncertainty not only with respect to price but also with respect to other provisions in the 
document, concluded that it was not a question of ambiguity or ' a question of balance 
between one meaning rather than another; [i]t [was rather] a question of what the parties 
intended to agree upon when the method they have adopted of expressing their intention 
leaves many points upon which agreement is necessary, completely open and at large ' ,208 
(iii) In Faatz v Estate Maiwald, in a contract involving the sale of certain furniture, the parties 
agreed that the purchase price would be determined in the following manner: each party was 
to appoint its own appraiser; the two appraisers were together to appoint an umpire, and if 
they could not agree upon a common umpire, the magistrate of Windhoek or his nominee was 
to act as such.209 This commission of three was then to fix the price. In casu two appraisers 
were appointed by the parties, and these appraisers thereafter, without appointing a common 
umpire, agreed upon a specific price. Van den Heever J held, however, that despite agreement 
by the two appraisers on price, there was no valid contract of sale. The contract, the judge 
remarked, specifically provided for valuation by a commission of three;2 1 0 furthermore it had 
to be considered that the third member, if he or she had been appointed, might have persuaded 
the two appraisers to come to a different agreement on price.21 I Consequently the price had 
not been set in accordance with the method prescribed by the parties; the price ascertainment 
mechanism had therefore failed for incorrect application. 
(iv) A similar situation was encountered in Heymann 's Estate v Featherstone212 where, in the 
sale of a share in a deceased estate, the contract provided that the price was to be determined 
by two valuers, to be appointed respectively by the purchaser and seller, and that, should these 
valuers fail to reach agreement, the price was to be determined by an umpire, who in the 
interim was to have been appointed by the valuers. The two valuers ultimately failed to agree 
upon a price, and when they approached the umpire for a final binding price, with respect to 
whom they had both assented, they were informed that owing to his public office, he was 
unable to act as umpire. The parties were thereafter also unable to agree upon any other 
person as umpire. The court firstly identified the umpire as ' interposed in substitution of a 
205 1970 3 SA 99 (E). 
206 104A. 
207 1038-E, 104A-D. 
208 I 068-C. 
209 1933 SWA 73. 
21091. 
211 Ibid . 
212 1930 EDL 105. 
- - _ _____ _ _ _ _ _ ________________ ___. 
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machinery, which has proved ineffective' , and consequently found the overall 'method ' which 
was for the ' purpose of arriving at the price ofthe share to be bought ... [as] ineffective ' .213 
The court, it said, could not supply another and thus accordingly there was no contract -
unless, the court remarked, the parties could themselves ' find some way out' _214 
2 5 4 Reasons for the failure of ascertainment mechanisms involving third parties 
As apparent from the section immediately above, references to third parties have not been 
without difficulty. Many problems result simply from the parties' lack of care in providing for 
the nomination of a third party, or from oversight regarding the third party ' s availability, or a 
failure to make the third party sufficiently identifiable. Thus a reference to a third party may 
fail in a manner similar to other objective price ascertainment mechanisms. A reference to a 
third party who is not sufficiently identified is little different to where price is to be 
determined by reference to a price list or advertisement in a magazine, and neither the price 
list nor the advertisement is specified. In all these cases, there is a general breakdown in the 
price ascertainment machinery; it lacks the additional data required for operation. Whether 
such machinery may be fixed, especially in the context where a third party constitutes the 
former, is referred to shortly below. 
There is, however, an additional problem specific to the situation where third parties ascertain 
price, and which cannot be said to be as similar to the examples of breakdown of price 
ascertainment machinery encountered in 2 3 and 2 4. This is when the third party does indeed 
set a price (i.e. there is no general breakdown of the price ascertainment machinery), but he or 
she sets a manifestly unfair price. It is of interest here not so much for being a problem caused 
primarily by the subjective nature of this type of price ascertainment mechanism,215 but 
because case law indicates a greater willingness of the courts in such circumstances to 
intervene, and, so to say, possibly ' fix ' such a price ascertainment mechanism where it has 
' malfunctioned ' in this way. It shall thus be seen if the approach taken in this context may in 
any way find application elsewhere. 
Thereafter, a brief examination will be made of the position in South African contract law 
regarding a general breakdown in third party price ascertainment machinery, and the 
independence required of the third party in the fixing of price. 
2 5 4 I Manifestly unfair price set by a third 
2 5 4 I I Recent developments 
213 107-108, and 109 respectively. 
214 109. 
215 A manifestly unfair price is possibly most usually (and thus primarily) the result of male fides on 
the part of the third, or negligence in the exercise of his or her discretion. See for example the 
allegations in Kirsch v Willetts 1930 EDL 9. Nonetheless a price regarded objectively as manifestly 
unfa ir could result, however, from an objective price ascertainment mechanism. A formul a, for 
instance, may be created so poorly by the parties that it results in a manifestly unfair price. 
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Initially, the law is clear in such circumstances: where a third party appointed by the parties to 
determine a price sets a manifestly unfair price, the parties are not bound by such a valuation. 
Thus in Bekker v RSA Factors it was said that a party would not be bound to the determination 
by a third party if this party had exercised his judgement so unreasonably, improperly, 
irregularly or wrongly that it would lead to manifest injustice or unfairness ('ooglopende 
onbillikheid ').216 This is because in agreeing that a third party or parties should fix the price, 
the parties 'do not intend an arbitrary but a just estimation' .217 
But as to what happens further, as noted by Kerr, is a matter of controversy.218 Two 
consequences are here possible. Firstly, it has been argued that on the setting aside of the 
manifestly unfair valuation, the court may substitute into the contract its own reasonable price 
and hold the parties bound to this. Secondly, it has also been argued that the court may indeed 
determine such a reasonable price, but then the so-called non-aggrieved party (i.e. the party 
not disadvantaged by the unfair valuation) may elect to accept either the court's determination 
or resile from the contract. 
Generally, the courts have subscribed to the second proposition. A line of authority for this 
position is traced firstly to Gillig v Sonnenburg.219 Here, the price of shares sold was fixed by 
a third party at a valuation which was so low that it was alleged to be manifestly unfair. While 
suggesting that after setting aside the unfair price the court could substitute the latter for a 
price of its own, Murray AJP expressly stated that the non-aggrieved party had the option to 
resile entirely from the contract or carry it out on the modified price. This was because such a 
party was entitled to resist a new contract being forced upon him.220 The matter was 
thereafter raised again in Dublin v Diner,221 but the question as to the correctness of the 
216 1983 4 SA 568 (T) 573E-F. The question as to under what precise circumstances a court may set 
aside a valuation is not here at issue. See here especially Butler & Fin sen Arbitration 50 n I 04 for a 
discussion of the approach followed by Bekker v RSA Factors, above, and that followed in modern 
English law (to which see Campbell v Edwards [1976] I All ER 785 (CA)) and in the Zimbabwean 
Appellate Division per Macey's Consolidated (Pvt) Ltd and Another v TA Holdings Ltd 1987 I SA 
173 (ZS). It does appear, however, that the grounds for setting aside a third party valuation in South 
Africa are wider than those permitted in England. In Rossing Stone Crushers (Pty) Ltd v Commercial 
Bank of Namibia and Another 1994 2 SA 622 (Nm) (which concerned the valuation of property by a 
third party in order to ascertain a reserve price below which the property could not be sold) the court 
remarked at 632E-H that common sense dictated that there must be a basis for the setting aside of a 
valuer' s report even if there is no fraud, collusion or capriciousness involved (which is approximately 
the test followed in the Macey case above) and favoured setting aside where the valuation had been 
based on 'entirely wrong assumptions', even though made in good faith. Cf. however Mufamadi and 
Others v Darby! Finance (Pty) Ltd 1996 I SA 799 (A) 804I-J for indications of a narrower test. But 
for the general position that in South African law a manifestly unfair price will not bind the parties 
see generally Kerr Sale 38-39, Mostert et al Koopkontrak 15, Hackwill Mackeurtan's Sale 17. Also 
Gillig v Sonnenburg, above, at 683F; Dublin v Diner, above, at 804E-F, 805B; Total South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd v Bonaiti Developments (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 263 (D) 266H. For an exposition of authority 
in Roman-Dutch law that the parties are not bound to a manifestly unfair price, see especially Kerr 
Sale 38-39. 
217 Machanick v Simon 1920 CPO 333 at 339, adopting Pothier. 
218 Kerr Sale 39. 
219 1953 4 SA 675 (T). 
220 683D-F. 
221 1964 I SA 799 (D) 805A-B. 
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approach taken in Gillig v Sonnenberg was left open; it was, however, followed in Total South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd v Bohaiti Developments (Pty) Ltd.222 In Hurwitz and Others NNO v Table 
Bay Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Another223 the approach taken in Gillig v Sonnenberg was 
once again approved; importantly, however, Marais J in this case sets out the issues of policy 
dictating this approach. 
Thus, in the Hurwitz case, a contract of lease provided that for the first five years rental would 
be the estimated fair monthly rental, and in the event of the parties failing to agree on this 
value each would appoint an independent valuer. The contract further provided that should the 
two valuers not agree, the question would be decided by an umpire jointly agreed upon, or 
failing such agreement, the President for the time being of the Law Society of the Cape of 
Good Hope, whose decision was to be final and binding. In the event, an umpire was required 
to be appointed and it became common cause that his determination of rent was manifestly 
unjust and unfair. Various proceedings were then exchanged, and the plaintiffs applied to 
amend their particulars of claim, which effectively sought a correction by the court of the 
rental and which would then be binding upon both parties. Marais J accordingly rejected this 
application to amend as, were it not to do so, it would be disavowing the defendant of its right 
to resile from the contract when the valuation by the third had been found to have been 
manifestly unfair. 
In his judgement, Marais J firstly identified the chief notions underscoring the divergent 
opinions as to whether following the setting aside of a manifestly unfair price, the parties are 
bound by the Court ' s determination (which was made in the process of it determining whether 
the valuation fixed was indeed manifestly unfair), or whether either of the parties had an 
election to resile from the contract. With regard to the former, the court mentioned the 
reluctance of the courts to 'see contractual expectations founder upon the rocks of 
circumstances beyond the control of the parties ', as well as the assumption that contracting 
parties, as reasonable people, should have no qualms about a court doing what they had been 
content to allow a third party to do.224 With regard, however, to the approach to allow a party 
to elect not to be bound by the Court ' s valuation, Marais J noted that this rested chiefly upon 
the notion that because the Court was not the functionary chosen by the parties for the 
quantification of performance in issue, it was only fair that the party whose performance was 
to be quantified by the Court should be permitted to decide whether to abide by it or not.225 
Thereafter, rejecting the possibility that the parties might have tacitly agreed upon a binding 
power of correction to be granted to the courts, Marais J went on himself to examine whether 
anything could indeed be said for the view that it was an ex lege term of such agreements that 
the parties would be required to abide by the determination ofthe court. 
In sum, this proposition Marais J found most unattractive. The thrust of his finding was that a 
fi xing of a price226 by a court was the making of a new contract for the parties. It was a 
method of quantifying the price 'radically different from what the parties bargained for and 
222 1981 2 SA 263 (D) 266H-267 A. 
223 1994 3 SA 449 (C). 
224 453F-G. 
225 Ibid. 
226 While the contract in casu was a contract of lease, Marais J refers repeatedly to price. 
- ------------------------------------------------------~ 
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potentially prejudicial to both their pockets and their peace of mind' .227 Counsel for the 
plaintiffs had contended that where an unfair and unreasonable price set by a third party was 
set aside by the court, and substituted for by one by the court, the court was merely correcting 
the price to make it correspond with that to which the parties had already agreed, viz. a fair 
and reasonable price. To this Marais J contended that 
[t]he fact remains that the parties had not simply agreed that the price should be fair and 
reasonable. They had specifically agreed that it should be quantified by a named third party. It 
is implicit in that they did not wish to have to resort to a Court for a quantification . If the price 
to be paid is a price to be determined by a Court, it is a price which will not have been 
determined in the way in which the parties agreed it should be determined. In the light of that, 
it seems entirely reasonable that the parties shou ld be free to decide whether or not to accept 
determination ... (my emphasis)228 
As further justification for this view, Marais J also noted that the setting of a price by the 
court was a litigious and adversarial process, which the parties would never have intended rent 
(or price) fixing to be. This process, moreover, was expensive, as it involved legal costs, and 
as subject to potential appeal, carried the potential of yet further delay. While not said so 
expressly, Marais J would clearly seem to suggest that such a process should not be foisted 
upon the parties by the court. The court ' s initial determination of what constituted a 
reasonable price, on the other hand, was not akin to making the contract for the parties as it 
was merely a necessary step in deciding whether the third party ' s assessment was indeed 
manifestly unreasonable.229 
Finally, Marais J appeared to find justification for this 'circumscribed correcting power of the 
Courts' in the principles underlying the doctrine of laesio enormis, but was careful to note the 
power in casu was distinct from the power to be found in the latter doctrine, and thus had 
survived the statutory abolition of laesio enormis.230 
Kerr, however, advocates a different approach.231 He suggests that the question as to whether 
any determination of reasonable price by the courts should be made binding on the parties or 
not should be answered by enquiring what solution comes closest to the parties ' original 
intention.232 He notes that there may be cases of references to thirds where the parties wish 
227 455A. 
228 455E-F. 
229 454H. 
230 456E-G. Interestingly, at 455H Marais J expressly rejects (although, admittedly, 'speaking 
broadly ' ) any inherent power of the courts 'to relieve parties of the obligations undertaken by them on 
the basis of appeals ad misericordiam or nebulous appeals to 'equity'". It is not clear, therefore, upon 
what precise principles Marais J would base the corrective power of courts to set aside an unjust 
valuation (and substitute its own, where this election is made by the respective party), and which is so 
closely akin to laesio enormis. The courts in both Gillig v Sonnenberg, above, at 682, and Dublin v 
Diner, above, at 804A-B, are by contrast both clear that considerations of equity underlie the latter 
doctrine . 
231 For the following discussion, see generally Kerr Sale 48-51. 
232 Institutiones Justiniani 2 I 40: 'Nothing is more in accord with natural equity than to give effect 
to an owner's intention, when he wishes to make his property over to someone else' (Lee ' s 
translation) (quoted by Kerr, ibid., at 48) . 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
41 
the price to be determined by a specific person, and by that specific person alone . This may be 
because of the trust they hold in this party, or the particular skill this person possesses. 
Accordingly, where the court finds for an express or tacit provision that the parties intended a 
determination by the third party originally nominated and no other, then the court would not 
be justified in holding its own substituted price (or one the court has ordered to be determined 
by another third party) as binding upon the parties. To do so here, would be to make the 
contract for the parties. Where however, there is no such express or tacit provision - that is, 
the nominated third is, for instance, simply part of a general class or group, and there is no 
evidence to suggest that they knew him and trusted in his assessment alone within a certain 
field - the parties can then be shown simply to have intended a reasonable determination. Thus 
the nomination of 'the auditor for the time being of the company' in Gillig v Sonnenburg 
indicates that the parties required merely a reasonable determination, and did not regard the 
assessment by a particular person as essential for the determination of this issue; the same 
might also be said for the similar nomination in Dublin v Diner, or the appointment of an 
umpire in Hurwitz and Others NNO v Table Bay Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Another, in the 
latter case not by the parties themselves or their valuers but by the President 'for the time 
being' of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope, whoever he or she may be.233 In such 
cases, Kerr submits there exists a residual (ex lege or naturalia) provision in our law, and this 
residual provision gives effect to this presumed or deduced intention of the parties, viz. that 
the parties intend merely a reasonable, just determination, and not an arbitrary one, and that 
provided such a reasonable determination can be obtained, they wish the contract to continue. 
The courts may then give effect to this ex lege provision by substituting the unfair price set by 
the third for a reasonable and just price set by itself, and thus permit the contract to remain on 
footing . Kerr emphasises in this respect that the court ' s determination of a fair and just price 
will be based upon evidence tendered before the court by the parties themselves;234 
accordingly, the parties supply the court with the information necessary to arrive at such a 
price. Thus in this respect too, the court's perspective of what constitutes a reasonable price 
cannot be said to be foisted upon the parties. 
Moreover, it appears that Kerr finds in the principle of good faith a dogmatic basis for this ex 
lege provision. The writer regards the basis for this approach as, in particular, ' equity, fairness 
and justice', which in tum it appears he regards as an expression of the general remedy ex 
bono et aequo available to a judge in all bonae fidei contracts.235 
233 Ibid. , at 50. It is suggested this also applies to Faatz v Estate Maiwald and Heyman 's Estate v 
Featherstone, above. 
234 Ibid. , at 51. 
235 Ibid. , at 48. Mention is also made that the actiones ex empto and ex vendito were actiones bonae 
fidei, which gave to a judge a general equitable discretion to correct an unfair price set by a third 
party. For support of this proposition see in particular Kerr ' s citing at 40 of Vinnius 3 24 1 (support 
which Marais J in Hurwitz and Others NNO v Table Bay Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Another 1994 3 
SA 449 (C) at 454 found doubtful), and Voet 18 1 23, and his discussion of Voet at 41-42. Note also 
that Wessels Contract 142 states, on reference to Voet 18 I 23 and Digesta 17 2 79, that ' [i]fthe 
arbitrator ' s [meaning here a valuer or third party, and not in the quasi-judicial modern sense of the 
word] decision is given male fide or if it is manifestly so inequitable as to infer male fides , then also 
the Court can be asked ex aequo et bono to determine the object of the obligation ' . Lotz Purchase 368 
is also of the opinion that Voet 18 I 23 finds current application in our law, although in ' somewhat 
modified form ' ; presumably, Lotz refers here to the modern view that the court ' s correction is not 
necessarily binding. Kerr' s interpretation of the old authorities would appear also to find support in 
--------------------------------------------~ 
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Support for the approach taken by Kerr can furthermore be found in the important House of 
Lords decision of Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton.236 For while an English decision, 
the logic of the latter is compelling. In this case, certain options to purchase land had been 
granted to a number of lessees. In each case the option price was to be fixed by two valuers, 
one to be appointed by the lessors, and the other by the lessees, and on the valuers' failure to 
agree, the price was to be fixed by an umpire appointed by the valuers. The lessors, however, 
refused to appoint a valuer, and consequently argued that the option was void for uncertainty. 
Nonetheless, the House of Lords held that the provision for fixing the price by the valuers was 
a decisive indication that the contract was to be construed as an agreement to sell at a fair and 
reasonable price, as valuers were professionals who would be obliged to apply professional 
and hence reasonable standards. Consequently if the intended machinery for the determination 
of price breaks down (as in the failure of a party to appoint a valuer), the court will substitute 
its own machinery and supply its own reasonable price, and enforce the contract accordingly. 
Thus Lord Fraser of Tully belton expressed himself as follows: 
I think the defect lies in construing the provisions for the mode of ascertaining the value as an 
essential part of the agreement .. . In the ordinary case parties do not make any substantial 
distinction between an agreement to sell at a fair value, without specifying the mode of 
ascertaining the value, and an agreement to sell at a value to be ascertained by valuers 
appointed in the way provided in these leases. The true distinction is between those cases where 
the mode of ascertaining the price is an essential term of the contract, and those cases where the 
mode of ascertainment, though indicated in the contract, is subsidiary and non-essential ... 
[W]here an agreement is made to sell at a price to be fixed by a valuer who is named, or who, 
by reason of holding some office such as auditor of a company whose shares are to be valued, 
will have special knowledge relevant to the question of value, the prescribed mode may well be 
regarded as essential. Where, as here, the machinery consists of valuers and an umpire, none of 
whom are named or identified, it is in my opinion unrealistic to regard it as an essential term. If 
it breaks down there is no reason why the court should not substitute other machinery to carry 
out the main purpose of ascertaining the price in order that the agreement may be carried 
out.237 
Mostert et a! Koopkontrak who at 15 suggest that the view that the parties are not bound to any fair 
price determined by the court would be in conflict 'met die bedoeling van die skrywers wat te kenne 
gee dat die hof die prys verminder of vermeerder, na gelang van die geval ' . 
236 [1983] I AC 444, [1982] 3 AllER I (HL). 
237 483E-484A. Also Lord Diplock at 479. This case actually concerned the situation where one of 
the parties had refused to appoint a valuer, and thus concerns the situation where one of the parties 
prevents the third party from fixing a price. In South African law, such a situation is discussed 
separately and is distinguished from the case where the third party does fix a price, but an 
unreasonable one (as above), or from cases where the third party fails to fix a price through no fault 
of either party (e.g. he dies, or refuses to act, and where it seems, as apparent in cases such as 
Heyman 's Estate v Featherstone 1930 EDL I 05 , the law offers no remedy and simply regards the 
contract as incomplete). There is some controversy as to what remedies are available to a pa1ty where 
his or her co-contractant contrives to prevent the third from making his or her determination. Belcher 
Norman's Purchase 66 suggests an analogy may be made with the fictional fulfilment of conditions, 
while Mostert eta! Koopkontrak 14 suggest an action may lie in breach of contract. See in general 
Kerr Sale 37-38. In any event, it is important that while Lord Fraser recognised that such a distinction 
might also be made in English law, he did not regard it of such import to prevent him from applying 
the general principle that where the machinery is not essential and breaks down (and thus whether for 
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It may be noted here that Lord Fraser' s remark above that the appointment of an auditor of a 
company whose shares were being sold may well make such a prescribed mode essential , 
might seem to contradict Kerr's opinion that the determination by the auditor in Gillig v 
Sonnenburg merely reflected the parties' intention to obtain a reasonable determination.238 
This is not necessarily the case; no hard and fast categories can be drawn. It is clear that both 
his Lordship and Professor Kerr regard this as a question of fact: the court must be careful to 
determine the parties' intentions from the facts and circumstances of each case.239 
It is also submitted that these views have similarly been expressed in Lobo Properties (Pty) 
Ltd v Express Lift Co (SA) Pty) Ltd where, in a somewhat different but nonetheless related 
context, De Villiers AJ stated the following: 
Where the mutual intent to contract is clear, and in the absence of circumstances justifying an 
inference of a de facto intent to be bound by some specific criterion, our Courts appear to 
favour an implied intent to be bound to what is fair and reasonable ... 240 
Finally, mention must be made of the most recent decision on the matter. In Van Heerden v 
Easson plaintiff and defendant were the only directors and shareholders of a certain company. 
It had been agreed upon between themselves that in the event of either shareholder wishing to 
sell his shares, these shares were to be sold to his co-shareholder. The price of the shares was, 
moreover, to be determined by a valuation made by the current auditor of the company 'met 
inagneming van die erkende metodes in die bedryf en in samewerking met kundige persone 
op die gebied' _241 Plaintiff at some stage then resigned as director and signed a blank transfer 
form in order to effect the transfer of the shares to the plaintiff. It was then alleged that the 
shares were never valued in terms of the manner prescribed in the parties' agreement, and a 
unilateral valuation ('eensydige waardebepaling') of R80 000 was placed on the shares by the 
defendant.242 Plaintiff then alleged that the valuation had not been made in terms of the 
norms set out in the parties' agreement to this effect, and that the valuation was consequently 
irregular, incorrect, and manifestly unfair. It would appear thus that this unilateral valuation 
had in fact been effected by some other valuer (i.e. other than the one envisaged in the parties ' 
agreement) as the plaintiff requested from the court an order that it not be bound to the 
valuation 'van die waardeerder' .243 Furthermore, the plaintiff requested that the court itself 
determine the value of the shares, as well as that thereafter, the defendant be ordered to decide 
within a certain time period whether to purchase the shares or not, and where electing not to 
so purchase, to return the shares transferred. Thus it is clear that the plaintiff was asking for 
nothing more of the court than that permitted in Hurwitz and Others NNO v Table Bay 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Another.244 
a reason beyond the control of the parties or whether for a reason that can be attributed to the fault of 
one of the parties), the court will in any case substitute its own machinery ( 484B-C). 
23 8 Kerr Sale 50, and see above. 
239 See for instance the careful manner in which Kerr (ibid., at 49) approaches the application of the 
bystander test in such circumstances. 
240 1961 1 SA 704 (C) 708H. See further the discussion of a reasonable price at 2 3 2 above. 
241 1998 1 SA 715 (T) 716E-F. 
242716G. 
243 7170. 
244 1994 3 SA 449 (C). 
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On the other hand, it would also appear that strictly speaking, the situation in casu was not a 
case where a designated third party had fixed a manifestly unfair price. Indeed, an unfair price 
was alleged to have been set, but it would appear this had not been fixed by the auditor of the 
company. In fact, who exactly fixed the price is not entirely clear from the judgement; it may 
indeed have been the defendant himself (which might follow from the allegation of an 
' eensydige waardebepaling'), or alternatively, as suggested above, by some other 
'waardeerder', possibly unilaterally appointed by him. In any event, the fact that the price was 
not set by the agreed upon third party indicates that this is rather a case concerning the simple 
failure of a third party to fix a price (i.e . the breakdown of the third party machinery). This is 
distinguishable from that narrow class of cases falling under the rules to be found in, for 
instance, Hurwitz and Others NNO v Table Bay Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Another, and 
Dublin v Diner,245 where the third party does act, but fixes an unfair price. Be that as it may, 
the court in Van Heerden v Easson freely applied the principles of such latter cases, which 
may suggest that the corrective power held to accrue to the courts in circumstances such as 
found in Hurwitz, Dublin and Gillig, may find application in other circumstances too. This 
will be dealt with in the section below.246 
On the assumption, however, that Van Heerden v Easson is indeed a case appropriate for the 
application of principles as found in Hurwitz and Gillig, it takes matters further on a number 
of issues. Firstly, Hartzenberg R unequivocally distinguished the doctrine of laesio enormis 
from the position where a correction is effected to a price fixed by a third party, and rejected 
the contention that South African case law such as Hurwitz and Gillig found a basis for such a 
correction in the former dactrine.247 While this is no doubt true (a reading of Hurwitz, for 
instance, leads one conclude at most that the court in casu found a relevant basis in principles 
akin but nonetheless distinct from those to be found in laesio enormis248), Hartzenberg R 
does not go any further in examining the dogma behind such a power (such as the principle of 
good faith, as would be suggested by Kerr249) . Secondly, the judge stated also as follows: 
... [I]n die geval van die regstelling van die prys wat vasgestel is deur die derde [is] die prys 
eintlik objektief bepaalbaar en .. . dit [is] bloot vir die derde om 'n redelike vasstelling to maak. 
lndien hy 'n redelike vasstelling maak is die partye natuurlik daaraan gebonde. Is sy vasstelling 
onredelik en dit word vervang met 'n redelike vasstelling is daar baie te se vir die standpunt 
dat die partye steeds gebonde moet wees aan die ooreenkoms. Dit is natuurlik nou bloot in 
beginsel en indien daar nie in aanmerking geneem word dat daar 'n groot tydsverloop kan 
plaasvind tussen so 'n tweede vasstelling en die oorspronklike vasstelling nie, of dat daar groot 
koste verbonde kan wees aan so 'n tweede vasstelling nie. (my emphasis)250 
Thus Hartzenberg R, at least in principle, would hold parties bound to any substitute 
determination of price by the courts, because - and this would appear to be stated likewise as 
the general point of departure - the third party is simply required to make a reasonable 
valuation. This in some measure corresponds to the general point of departure followed by 
245 1964 I SA 799 (D). 
246 At 2 54 2. 
247 718B-720A. 
248 See the discussion of this case above. 
249 See the discussion ofthe approach of Kerr, above. 
250 719C-D. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
45 
Kerr, viz. that in the absence of evidence indicating otherwise, the law (in the form of an ex 
lege provision) may take the parties to have intended a reasonable determination when 
appointing a third to set the price. 
Hartzenberg R thereafter notes that there exists a line of authority opining that following a 
correction by the courts, an election must be given to the other party whether to accept the 
correction and remain bound to the contract, or to resile.251 This the judge found acceptable. 
However, unlike the court in Hurwitz which emphasised that to hold the parties to the 
determination by the court entailed that price was being set by a functionary that had not been 
chosen by the parties,252 Hartzenberg R emphasised reasons that, while raised in the Hurwitz 
case,253 were not significantly stressed. The reason for granting the party an election lay in 
more practical concerns. It did not seem to matter overly to Hartzenberg R that price was 
being set by a functionary not selected by the parties, but that the parties should have a choice 
not to get involved in the long, costly litigation necessary for a court to set such an alternative 
price.254 It might here be argued, as Kerr might appear to do,255 that logically, what amounts 
to a fair, reasonable price will largely already be determined by the court during the course of 
its task to determine whether the price set by the third is indeed a manifestly unfair price. 
Consequently, the fears of court costs and delays would be exaggerated. For in determining 
whether the price set by a third is indeed unfair, the parties will already find themselves in 
court. Admittedly, however, the final and conclusive determination of a substitute reasonable 
price may require additional expense and may take the form of a judicial process separate 
from and additional to the process where the court was merely required to find whether the 
third's price was unfair or not. Conceivably therefore, such an election to resile and thus avoid 
being caught up in further costly litigation to determine a reasonable price, could be exercised 
immediately upon the court's finding of a manifestly unfair price, but before it set about the 
business of determining what exactly constituted a reasonable price in the circumstances. In 
addition, it would also seem that Hartzenberg R envisaged such an election being exercised 
before the matter wound its way to court at all, in the sense that on the parties recognising that 
an unfair price had been set, one of the parties could choose simply to regard the contract as 
void, rather than becoming involved in costly litigation at the conclusion of which he will in 
any event have the election to resile.256 Hartzenberg R also submitted that on these reasons, 
in that they could concern both parties equally, there was no ground for restricting the election 
to resile to one party only (the so-called non-aggrieved party), as would appear to have been 
the position in the past.257 
2 5 4 1 2 Concluding remarks 
The discussions in Hurwitz, Van Heerden and Sudbrook, as well as that to be found m 
251 720B. 
252 Hurwitz and Others NNO v Table Bay Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Another 1994 3 SA 449 (C) at 
453G and 455E-F, and see the discussion of this case above. 
253 Ibid. , at 4540-E. 
254 Van Heerden v Easson 1998 I SA 715 (T) 720C-D. 
255 Kerr Sale 53. 
256 See 7200. 
257 720F-G. 
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Professor Kerr's Law of Sale and Lease, are all valuable, and each offers its own particular 
insight. It is submitted, however, that in principle, the approach of Kerr should be followed, 
not least because it allows the courts, before deciding whether to hold the parties bound to a 
reasonable price it itself has determined, to take the peculiar circumstances of each case into 
consideration. The main objection (to the non-recognition of the election to resile) raised by 
Marais J in Hurwitz, viz. that a functionary other than the one selected by the parties is 
permitted to bind the parties, is dealt with adequately by Kerr's approach, and by that 
followed in Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton. Thus where there is evidence that the 
third party designated by the parties (the functionary) is essential to the process of price 
determination, then the court will not substitute a reasonable price as a binding substitute on 
the parties. However, where the functionary is not important, but rather the result i.e. the 
parties intend simply that a reasonable price must be set, then there is a good deal to be said 
for holding the parties to the reasonable price supplied by the court. The strength of Kerr ' s 
approach is that it is broad and flexible enough to take such intentions specifically into 
consideration. 
Likewise, however, something might well be said for the objections raised in Van Heerden v 
Easson. The ascertainment by the court of a reasonable price to replace that set by the third 
may well entail additional costs and great delay. The parties will be required to tender 
evidence and this may be in complete contrast to the original purpose in making reference to a 
third party, i.e. the ensuring of a speedy and relatively cheap ascertainment of price. On the 
other hand, as pointed out by Kerr, it is surely unfair to allow a party to escape from a contract 
simply because the third party has done a poor job.258 This surely does not conform to the 
parties ' original intention of entering into a binding contractual relationship. What of the 
contractual expectations in this respect? Kerr here cites (amongst three examples all of which 
illustrate the point)259 the case where C buys shares from D so as to enable him to gain 
control of a company. The share price is to be determined by the auditor of the company, and 
he sets a price which is manifestly too low. The seller objects and, as he is not bound to any 
substitute price determined by the courts, is permitted to resile . Must the buyer's remedy lie 
solely in damages against the third party?260 This, after all, will not grant him control of the 
company. Moreover, Kerr notes, share prices fluctuate. The auditor might set a manifestly low 
price, and in the interim, following the date of sale, the shares may increase in value on the 
market. Thus the seller may set the contract aside, obtain restitution of the shares, and 
consequently re-sell them at a profit, thus depriving the buyer of the benefit of his contract. 
It is submitted, therefore, that while the question is a difficult one, the parties should not be 
afforded an automatic right to resile on the setting of a manifestly unfair price by a third party. 
The courts should possess a binding corrective power but before exercising such power, 
should take all factors into account. The courts here should follow the original intentions of 
the parties. In ascertaining this intention, the courts should not only enquire as to whether the 
parties intended the price valuation to be made by a particular third party and no other, but 
also whether the parties placed such stock on a speedy and inexpensive ascertainment of price, 
that they would not be prepared to involve themselves in further litigation. Such an intention 
258 Kerr Sale 51-52. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Kerr does not mention this possibility in his example, but it constitutes clearly some form of 
remedy for the buyer. See e.g. Hackwill Mackeurtan's Sale 17. 
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of the parties may be found, on sufficient evidence, to constitute a tacit term of the agreement, 
and should thus compel the court not to hold as binding its own reasonable substitution where 
this would involve additional expense and delay. 
2 5 4 2 General failure of a third party to set a price 
In cases where a third party has been appointed to fix a price, it may be that for some reason 
no price is in fact fixed by him. Thus a reference to a third may fail as a result of the neglect 
of the parties to identify the third or to make him or her identifiable.26 I Similarly, the parties 
may provide for the appointment of a third party, but may fail to agree upon his or her 
nomination, or may simply fail to make the appointment.262 Alternatively, it may be so that 
even if agreed upon, the third party cannot or will not act.263 In such cases, it has consistently 
been held that the court cannot intervene to appoint another valuer or make a valuation itself, 
and that the contract must consequently faii.264 In Heyman's Estate v Featherstone , for 
instance, the court said that there was no 'possible justification for the court's intervention' , in 
that the parties had prescribed a method whereby a price was to be determined, and that this 
had 'proved ineffective, and the court [could] not supply another' .265 Moreover, a third party 
may fix a price, but not in accordance with the methods or conditions prescribed. In such a 
case too, the court has been of the opinion that no binding or legally relevant price has been 
set, as the fixing was not done in accordance with the method prescribed, and the court has 
refus~d to intervene and substitute its own machinery.266 
In the light of the approach taken by Kerr, and the House of Lords in Sudbrook Trading Estate 
Ltd v Eggleton , as discussed immediately above,267 it is suggested that this approach of the 
courts is due for reconsideration. Thus following the approach of Kerr, one could equally here 
examine the facts and circumstances of the case at hand and ascertain whether any tacit term 
could be implied that would prevent the courts from deducing that the parties, by their 
appointment of a third party, intended simply that a reasonable and fair price be fixed. Thus in 
the absence of indications suggesting a contrary intention, where a third party fails for some 
reason to fix a price, the courts should be permitted to substitute the failed machinery of the 
parties with its own machinery, and thus fix a price. The same circumspection which, it was 
submitted, the courts should apply before holding the parties to a substituted reasonable price 
261 For example, Reymond v Abdulnabi I 985 3 SA 348 (W). For the facts of this case and the cases 
referred to in the footnotes below, see 2 53. 
262 Heyman's Estate v Featherstone I 930 EDL I 05, and Faatz v Estate Maiwald I 933 SW A 73 
respectively. 
263 E.g. the magistrate in Heyman's Estate v Featherstone, above. 
264 Heyman's Estate v Featherstone above, at I 09; Faatz v Estate Maiwald above, at 90; Gillig v 
Sonnenburg I 953 4 SA 675 (T) 679C; Butler & Finsen Arbitration 47; Belcher Norman's Purchase 
65 ; Mostert et al Koopkontrak I3. Here it is important to note the distinction between a third party 
appointed as a price valuer and a third party appointed as an arbitrator. In the latter case, the power of 
the court to intervene is more extensive and governed generally by statute. See in general Butler & 
Finsen, ibid ., at 44-50. 
265 Above, at 109. 
266 Faatz v Estate Maiwald, above, where the two valuers failed to appoint an additional valuer as 
required. 
267 At 2 5 4 1 2. 
-------------------------------------------------~ 
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in the case of an unfair price set by a third, should likewise be applied here. 
This view comes across even more forcibly in the Sudbrook case. In casu, the position was 
exactly that at issue : namely, the envisaged third party had failed to set a price because he or 
she had not been appointed. The third party machinery, in other words, had failed to function. 
Since Milnes v Gery268 the principle had generally been held in English law that in 
ascertaining essential terms such as price, the court will not substitute machinery of its own 
for machinery provided by the parties, however defective that machinery proves to be .269 
This principle was rejected270 and, as evident in the lengthy citing of Lord Fraser above,271 a 
distinction was made between machinery which may be regarded as essential and machinery 
which was to be regarded as subsidiary and non-essential, the function of which was to serve 
towards the ascertainment of a reasonable price. The principle was accordingly stated rather to 
be that where the machinery was not essential, the court will substitute its own machinery if it 
breaks down. As noted earlier, Lord Fraser was moreover not prepared to distinguish the 
situation where the breakdown in machinery had occurred as a result of some cause outside of 
the control of either party, and where the breakdown had occurred as the result of fault on the 
part of the one party; in his view, the principle that a court may substitute its own machinery 
was to apply in both cases.272 
It would also appear, from a study of the facts of the case, that Van Heerden v Easson does 
not concern the case at all of a manifestly unfair price set by a third. As indicated in the 
discussion of this case above,273 it would appear that the price complained of was set by 
some other party, that is, by some party other than the designated or agreed upon third. The 
agreed upon third party, accordingly, had set no price. Strictly speaking, this therefore is a 
case of a general breakdown in third party machinery. Nonetheless, the court clearly foresaw 
some possibility of a corrective power of the courts (i.e. some form of substitution), although 
agreed that the parties in question retained the right to resile and not be bound to any price 
fixed by the courts . Nonetheless, unless the failure to distinguish the two situations in 
question was an oversight on the part of the court, it does strengthen the argument that, 
logically, no distinction should be made where a third party fixes a manifestly unfair price, 
and where he or she fails to fix one at all. In both cases, one has simply to do with the 
breakdown of the third party machinery: the machinery has not operated as envisaged or 
intended. 
One might finally refer to the general pos1t10n in American law. In § 2-305 (1) of the 
American Uniform Commercial Code, it is provided that the parties, if they so intend, can 
conclude a contract for sale even though the price is not settled. It is thereafter specifically 
268(1807) 14VesJun400. 
269 The basis of this principle appeared to be that until the price had been fixed by the parties' 
machinery, there was no agreement for the court to save and enforce! See Milnes v Gery, above, at 
406, and the Sudbrook case at 476 and 482. As pointed out in the latter by Lord Diplock (478C), such 
reasoning involves a fundamental fallacy: a contract is complete as soon as the parties have reached 
agreement as to what each of its essential terms are or when they can with certainty be ascertained. 
270 Indeed, at 479G Lord Diplock regarded it as ' [not] fit for survival in a civilised system of law'. 
2 71 See 2 5 4 I I . 
272 4848-C. 
273 At 2 54 I I. 
--------------------------------
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provided that in such a case the price will be a reasonable one at the time of the delivery if, 
inter alia, ' the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard as set or 
recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded' ,274 Broadly speaking, 
this corresponds to the general position taken up by Kerr, viz. that generally, parties intend a 
third party merely to function as an ascertainer of a reasonable price. Hence, where a third 
party fails to fix the price in American law, the Uniform Commercial Code is happy to 
provide for a reasonable price as a substitute. 
Importantly, however, § 2-305 (4) provides an exception. It is stated thus that ' [w]here, 
however, the parties intend not to be bound unless the price be fixed or agreed and it is not 
fixed or agreed there is no contract'. The rest of the section thereafter provides that in such a 
case, the buyer must return any goods already received or if unable to do so, is obliged to pay 
their reasonable value at delivery, and the seller is obliged in turn to return any portion of the 
price already paid. 
In this respect, point 4 of the Official Comment to § 2-305 is worth citing in full: 
The section recognizes that there may be cases in which a particular person ' s judgment is not 
chosen merely as a barometer or index of a fair price but is an essential condition to the parties ' 
intent to make any contract at all. For example, the case where a known and trusted expert is to 
'value' a particular painting for which there is no market standard differs sharply from the 
situation where a named expert is to determine the grade of cotton, and the difference would 
support a finding that in the one the parties did not intend to make a binding agreement if that 
expert were unavailable whereas in the other they did so intend. Other circumstances would of 
course affect the validity of such a finding.275 
This corresponds closely with the distinction made in the Sudbrook case between essential 
and non-essential price ascertainment machinery. It also emphasises that in the final instance, 
it remains a question of fact as to how essential is the judgement of a particular third party, or 
the ascertainment by a particular type of price machinery. 
2 5 4 3 The independence required of a third party 
The rule is frequently cited that price may not be set by one of the parties or his or her 
nominee.276 It might appear, therefore, that parties may only agree upon an independent party 
to determine price. 
However, it would seem today that for a reference for a third to succeed, it is not expected of a 
third that he or she be entirely independent of both parties; what is expected, rather, is that this 
person gives an honest judgement- an arbitrium bani viri. It is this element that provides the 
objective standard required in price ascertainment mechanisms. In Estate Milne v Donohoe 
Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others the auditor of a company was required to fix the price of 
shares which were to be offered for sale. It was contended, however, that as a shareholder, he 
274 § 2-305 (1) read with§ 2-305 (1) (c) , my italics. 
275 Uniform Commercial Code, Official Text 86-87. 
276 See 2 5 I. 
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was, in terms of the particular conditions of the offer of sale, likewise a potential purchaser. 
Ogilvie Thompson JA, however, expressed himself as follows: 
His function is that of valuer (arbitrator, aestimator), as distinct from that of an arbitrator 
(arbiter), properly so called, who acts in a quasi-judicial capacity ... The arbitrator or 
aestimator need not necessarily be an entirely impartial person. In discharging his function he 
is of course required to exercise an honest judgement, the arbitrium bani viri; but a measure of 
personal interest is not necessarily incompatible with the exercise of such a judgment ... 
Provided, therefore, that in valuing shares pursuant to ... the articles, the auditor exercises an 
honestjudgement, he is not, merely by reason of being a shareholder in the company and thus a 
potential purchaser of the shares offered for sale, in my opinion precluded from discharging the 
function assigned to him by that clause.277 
While therefore this case may be distinguished from that precisely at issue in that the auditor 
took upon more the capacity of a party itself in the sale (as opposed to a nominee or agent) , 
the dictum clearly applies in general to third parties appointed as valuers.278 This has been 
confirmed elsewhere.279 
The reference to Estate Milne v Donohoe Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others indicates, in any 
event, that the legal position where a party itself is granted the power to fix a price may not be 
that dissimilar to that pertaining where a third party, not entirely independent of one of the 
parties in question, is appointed to make the valuation. The recognition that the third need not 
be entirely independent, and thus take (or come close to taking) the position of party agent, 
provided that it exercise its discretion reasonably, has important implications for the 
recognition of price-fixing powers given expressly to parties themselves. This shall be 
referred to again later.280 
2 5 5 Application in the context of other ascertainment mechanisms 
The discussion above suggests that while the nature of the problems encountered by 
277 1967 2 SA 359 (A) 373H-374D. 
278 To what extent a party itself may set a price is examined in detail under 6 4. Aside from the 
requirement that the auditor exercise an honest judgement, the arbitrium bani viri, the court in Estate 
Milne also observed that an additional circumstance served to limit his power to set the price viz. that 
should the purchaser or seller be dissatisfied with the auditor ' s price, the matter could be referred to 
arbitration . 
279 See Van Jaarsveld Handelsreg 299 n 137; Vander Merwe et al Contract 164; Lubbe 1990 AS 
124; Hawthorne 1992 THRHR 643. Also Mayfair South Townships (Pty) Ltd v Jhina 1980 I SA 869 
(T) 874F-875D; Hoffman v Meyer 1956 2 SA 752 (C) 758C-F. In Dublin v Diner 1964 I SA 799 (D) 
it appears (at 799H) that the seller was the sole beneficial holder of the entire share capital of the 
company whose shares he was selling. It is likewise here a moot point whether the auditor of such a 
company can be said to be independent. Cf. also Proud Investments (Pty) Ltd v Lanchem 
International (Pty) Ltd 1991 3 SA 738 (A), where the court accepted that rent could be determined by 
the third party in question, viz. the landlord's auditors; Hawthorne (644) criticises this as saying that 
in effect, this amounts to the rent being ' determined by the lessor'. See also Wessels Contract I 094 
who doubts Voet ' s proposition that a contract is void when a purchaser or vendor is permitted to 
appoint a third party to fix the price. 
280 See in particular 6 4. 
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ascertainment mechanisms involving references to thirds does not necessarily differ greatly 
from those encountered by other price ascertainment mechanisms, the scope for judicial 
intervention appears greater. Substitution by the court of a reasonable price is a possibility in 
cases where the appointed third party sets a manifestly unfair price, and it has been suggested 
that this should be equally so where for some other reason the third party fails to set a price as 
envisaged. In particular it is submitted that the distinction made in English law between 
essential and non-essential price ascertainment machinery may be usefully applied in South 
African law. Where price ascertainment machinery is regarded as non-essential, the primary 
intention of the contractants is not that the machinery in question must effect ascertainment, 
but that the price eventually ascertained is a reasonable one. Importantly, however, the House 
of Lords in Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton indicates that this distinction may be 
made not merely within the context of third party price valuation, but within the context of 
price ascertainment in general. Moreover, the emphasis on such an approach is on giving 
effect to the intention of the parties. Accordingly, there would appear to be scope for the 
application of this distinction in cases where parties attempt to provide for the later 
ascertainment of price by way of reference to an external standard, or by calculation, but for 
some reason fail in this attempt. Provided, therefore, that the intention of the parties continues 
to be borne in mind in similar manner to that evident in the approach of the House of Lords, a 
South African court, in principle, should be similarly entitled to substitute its own reasonable 
price in the event of the failure of the original ascertainment mechanism. In giving effect to 
the parties ' intention of contracting at a reasonable price, the court could not be accused of 
making the contract for the parties. 
2 6 'Recourse to the parties': ascertainment involving the parties themselves 
2 6 1 Introduction 
Thus far, attention has been afforded to the following mechanisms: reference to external facts , 
formulae requiring calculation, and price determination by third parties. As indicated, the 
approach of our law to price ascertainment has been casuistic; this classification, therefore, 
attempts to import a measure of order to this section of the law. 
Common to the above classes, however, is that all make use of mechanisms whereby price 
may be objectively ascertainable. In order to fix a price, in other words, no further recourse 
need in principle be made to either or both of the parties; the essential price determinant in 
each case is an external standard. These classes of price ascertainment mechanism, therefore, 
may be collectively distinguished from that class of mechanism where ascertainment involves 
a subjective element. In the latter case, the ascertainment of price is made dependent upon 
some further decision by one or both of the parties. 
In contrast to its somewhat unstructured approach to objective ascertainment mechanisms, 
South African law appears clear on the topic of subjective ascertainment mechanisms. Thus in 
the recent Appellate Division case of H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd and 
Another, on the issue of the requirement of certainty of price, the court remarked as follows: 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
52 
The principle to be applied was stated by the present Chief Justice [then Corbett JA] in 
Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd281 at 5748-C, as 
follows : 
'It is a general rule of our law that there can be no valid contract of sale unless the parties have agreed, 
expressly or by implication, upon a purchase price. They may do so by fixing the amount of the price in 
their contract or they may agree upon some external standard by the application whereof it will be 
possible to determine the price without further reference to them. There can be no valid contract of sale if 
the parties have agreed that the price is to be fixed in the future by one of them ... This is part of the wider 
general principle that contractual obligations must be defined or ascertainable, not vague and uncertain '. 
Equally so, an agreement to later negotiate and agree on a price is not acceptable ... 282 
This dictum is illustrative, for besides confirming once more the general rule concerning the 
fixing of price (viz. that price must be certain or objectively ascertainable), the court identifies 
two clear instances which have been identified as a practical application of the latter rule. 
Indeed, the manner in which they are cited together with the general rule suggests that they 
take on the status of a corollary to the general rule; they appear to follow directly from that 
part of the rule that states that ascertainment entails reference to an external standard 'without 
further reference to [the parties]' . 
These two instances are, of course, that the law will not regard as enforceable (i) an agreement 
between the parties to agree later on a price, and (ii) an agreement whereby one party is 
afforded the unilateral power to fix the price. As is clear in the above Appellate Division 
cases, and as will be indicated below, there appears a general consensus in South African law 
that such broadly subjective price ascertainment mechanisms may play no role in the 
ascertainment process. 
2 6 2 Agreements to agree 
2 6 2 1 The general approach in South African law, and the underlying rationale 
In an agreement for the sale of goods, the parties may not necessarily immediately agree on a 
price, but may agree instead to agree on a price at some later stage. This has been consistently 
held not to result in an enforceable agreement.283 
28I I986 2 SA 555 (A). 
282 I996 2 SA 225 (A) 233H-I. 
283 H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd and Another, above; Lambons (Edms) Bpk v 
BMW (Suid-Afrika) (Edms) Bpk I997 4 SA I4I (SCA); Titaco Projects (Pty) Ltd v AA Alloy Foundry 
(Pty) Ltd I996 3 SA 320 (W); Aris Enterprises (Finance) (Pty) Ltd v Waterberg Koelkamers (Pty) Ltd 
I977 2 SA 425 (A); Hattingh v Van Rensburg I964 I SA 578 (T); Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt I986 4 
SA 523 (C); Cassimjee v Cassimjee I94 7 3 SA 70 I (N). For the similar position with regard to 
agreements to agree with respect to rent, see also e.g. South African Reserve Bank v Photocraft (Pty) 
Ltd I969 1 SA 610 (C); Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms) Bpk I993 1 SA 768 (A); 
Wasmuth v Jacobs I987 3 SA 629 (SWA). See also the following modern commentators: Kerr Sale 
34; Kerr LAWSA XXIV par 16; Vander Merwe et al Contract 62; Lubbe & Murray Contract 3I7-3I8; 
Belcher Norman's Purchase 65; Mostert et al Koopkontrak 11. For the Roman-Dutch origins of this 
rule, see e.g. Mostert et al, ibid. , at 11 n I. 
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The reason why such an agreement should not be considered enforceable has been indicated in 
a number of cases. 
Thus firstly , in Aris Enterprises (Finance) (Pty) Ltd v Waterberg Koelkamers (Pty) Ltd,284 an 
agreement conferred upon the director of a certain company an option to take over certain 
movables from another party for ' a nominal amount' which was to be fixed by agreement 
between the two parties. The Appellate Division, however, held the option to be of no force , 
observing that the two parties might never agree on such an amount; simply put, either party 
' could not have been compelled to enter upon the discussions or to agree upon any 
amount ' _285 The court noted that it was crucial for the validity of a contract of sale (and 
likewise an option) that a price be fixed or determined by the parties' agreement.286 
Similarly, in Scheepers v Vermeulen , the plaintiff had been granted an option to purchase 
certain immovable property for a specified sum but ' op terme wat tussen die partye 
ooreengekom mag word' .287 Although the duty to negotiate and endeavour to agree in casu 
was not specifically with reference to price but to other terms, the court nonetheless makes an 
observation which is to the same extent applicable to an agreement to agree on price, namely, 
that such agreement affords each party an absolute discretion and the power ' om enige 
kontraksluiting wettiglik te vermy' _288 By simply refusing to come to agreement, in other 
words, either party may at all times avoid entering into an enforceable contract. This same 
point is picked up in Hattingh v Van Rensburg where it was remarked that it is impossible for 
the law to affix any enforceable obligation to an agreement to agree because by the very terms 
of this agreement, either party could refuse to agree to anything to which the other party might 
agree.289 
The problems concerning agreements to agree, would therefore appear to be the following . 
Firstly, an agreement where parties leave over price for later agreement may simply indicate 
that they have not yet reached consensus upon this point, and that they do not intend to be 
bound until they do in fact reach agreement. There is simply no enforceable contract of sale in 
such cases, and were the courts to find otherwise, they would be acting contrary to the 
intention of the parties. In such a case, there is no agreement on the price term: they have (i) 
not agreed upon any immediate price, and (ii) nor have they agreed that price should be the 
284 Above. 
285 434C. 
286 That the court placed particular emphasis on this rule is clear if one considers that all that was 
held to be lacking in the agreement was agreement on a nominal amount. Price, therefore, could not 
have been regarded as overly significant by the parties. The court consequently admitted that it might 
appear at first blush unnecessarily technical or even fatuous to place so much emphasis on agreement 
with respect to price, but noted that the party relying on the agreement had specifically raised the 
agreement as a bar to an action for the recovery of the goods in question, and that accordingly, it was 
important that such an agreement be effective. Moreover, it appeared that for tax purposes, the parties 
intended some price to be set. See in genera1433F-H. 
287 1948 4 SA 884 (0) 887. 
288 892. 
289 1964 I SA 578 (T), at 583A, citing Williston on Contracts. See also Titaco Projects (Pty) Ltd v 
AA Alloy Foundry (Pty) Ltd, above, at 338B (' ... the established principle that an agreement to 
negotiate has no exigible content ... ' ). 
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subject of later ascertainment (whether, for example, by reference to a particular price index, 
or, as in this case, by later, further, agreement between themselves). They have merely 
'agreed' (or rather, acknowledged) that they still have to agree on the price term. An 
agreement to agree in such cases has therefore nothing to do with price ascertainment 
mechanisms. It concerns rather whether the parties have reached consensus on an essentiale, 
namely, the price term. 
The second ostensible problem encountered in agreements to agree directly concerns their 
deliberate (i.e. consensual, in that this is the parties' specific agreement on a particular 
essentiale of their contract, viz. price) employment as price ascertainment mechanisms. This 
problem is that agreement on price cannot be guaranteed, and it is this point that has been 
demonstrated in the references to case law above. It might be argued (as it was indeed in 
Scheepers v Vermeulen290) that the parties have a bona fide duty to negotiate and attempt to 
reach agreement, but ultimately, the parties cannot be compelled to agree. No matter the 
pressure brought to bear on one or both of the parties, a party will, apparently, always be free 
to refuse to agree on a price, and consequently ensure that no contract arises. As Solomon J 
has remarked, '[t]here is nothing automatic in the formation of contracts between bargaining 
parties' .291 
It should be clear, therefore, that at issue in agreements to agree is the question as to whether a 
price will be set. By its very dependence on the overlapping of two independent wills, a price 
-for all the good intentions of the parties- cannot be guaranteed. Such a contract, accordingly, 
is void for uncertainty: the law, aware that no consensus exists at present as to a precise price 
and with a view therefore as to whether price may nonetheless be said to be ascertainable, 
cannot likewise be certain that agreement will ever be reached on price in the future. In sum, 
the law cannot say whether a price is certain or ascertainable. 
It should, however, be noted that an agreement to agree on price will not necessarily always 
result in the nullity of the supposed contract of sale in which this term is to be found. Parties 
may provide for an alternative price ascertainment mechanism in the event the parties fail to 
agree. Typically, parties will provide for recourse to a third party when, following a stipulated 
period of time, they fail to reach agreement on price (or the prestation in question, such as 
rental). Thus in Chelsea West (Pty) Ltd and Another v Roodebloem Investments (Pty) Ltd and 
Another a contract of lease provided that after an initial period, the rental payable and annual 
escalation would be determined by agreement between the parties, and failing such agreement, 
by an expert (whose appointment in tum was to be agreed upon by the parties, and failing 
such agreement, by the president of the local Institute of Estate Agents).292 A similar 
agreement is to be found in Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms) Bpk, where the 
court noted that where the agreement to negotiate a fresh rental stood alone, the contract 
would have been rendered unenforceable. However, the clause providing for determination by 
arbitration on the parties' failing to agree rendered the contract enforceable.293 In these cases, 
of course, the agreement to agree is itself no more enforceable here than in the case of similar 
agreements in, for example, Aris Enterprises or Scheepers v Vermeulen. It is the contract, 
290 Above, at 892. 
291 OK Bazaars v Bloch 1929 WLD 3 7 at 42, in the context of agreements to agree in general. 
292 1994 1 SA 83 7 (C). 
293 1993 1 SA 768 (A). 
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however, which is now enforceable, because the alternative default ascertainment mechanism 
ensures the essentiale in question, such as price, is indeed set, and this destroys any attack that 
may be made on the grounds ofuncertainty. 
Furthermore, parties may reach agreement on certain matters, but deliberately leave 
outstanding matters for later negotiation and agreement. In CGEE Alsthom Equipments et 
Enterprises Electriques, South African Division v GKN Sankey (Pty) Ltd the court confirmed 
that where consequently the parties failed to reach agreement on the outstanding matters, the 
initial agreement might nonetheless stand, provided that the parties intended a binding 
contract by the initial agreement,294 and provided the initial agreement had an independent 
meaningful existence divorced from any terms left over for future agreement.295 Similarly, in 
First National Bank of SA Ltd v Transvaal Rugby Union and Another a clause contained the 
express provision that following the conclusion of a contract, the parties were entitled to 
negotiate in good faith to affect further amendments as would be advantageous to both of 
them.296 Where agreement, however, was not reached during the course of the negotiations, 
the parties would be bound by what was originally agreed upon. 
2 6 2 2 Developments in English law 
In s. 8(1) of the English Sale of Goods Act it is provided that the price in a contract of sale 
may be fixed by the contract, or may be left to be fixed in a manner agreed by the contract, or 
may be determined by the course of dealing between the parties. Section 8(2) thereafter 
provides that where the price is not determined as mentioned in s. 8(1 ), the buyer must pay a 
reasonable price. 
It is a matter of some dispute whether an agreement to fix the price together at some later date 
- that is, an agreement to agree - falls within the ambit of s. 8(1) in that price in such a case 
has been ' left to be fixed in a manner agreed by the contract'. If this is indeed the case, then in 
the event of there being no later agreement on price, s. 8(2) provides for the substitution of a 
reasonable price.297 This would go some way towards the alleviation of the fear as to 
whether, in agreements to agree, a price will indeed be set. 
However, it would appear that s. 8 may not serve the purpose of saving an agreement that 
would otherwise be regarded as too uncertain to be enforced. Fallowing the House of Lords 
decision in May & Butcher v R,298 the general position would appear that an agreement to 
agree later on price will normally exclude any inference that the price should be a reasonable 
one, as would be the case on the application of s. 8(2): a price fixed by a judge is not the same 
as a price agreed upon by the parties.299 In this decision, an agreement for the sale of war 
294 1987 I SA 81 (A) 92. 
295 On this requirement in particular, see Titaco Projects (Pty) Ltd v AA Alloy Foundry (Pty) Lid 
1996 3 SA 320 (W) 337, and Kenilworth Palace Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another v Ingala and 
Another 1984 2 SA I (C) II. 
296 1997 3 SA 851 (W) 856E-F. 
297 See e.g. Adams & Atiyah Sale ofGoods 28 . 
298 [ 1934) 2 KB 17n. 
299 See Guest Benjamin's Sale§ 2-045; Adams & Atiyah Sale of Goods 28; Treitel Contract 53. 
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surplus tentage provided that price would be agreed from time to time. The House of Lords 
held that the contract was incomplete, and confirmed, in its view, the long-established 
principle that an agreement to agree is no contract at all. If the agreement had been silent on 
this point, the Sale of Goods Act may well have provided for a reasonable price, or the court 
may have been willing to imply a reasonable price.300 However, the parties in casu had 
shown this was not their intention by expressly providing for later agreement. Consequently, 
where the parties expressly provide for later agreement on price, the unenforceability of such 
an agreement cannot be saved by the default provisions of a reasonable price in terms of s. 
8(2), or by way of implication. 
It would appear, however, that English writers tend to restrict the application of May & 
Butcher v R to the circumstances of that case, and are prepared rather to take from this 
decision the important point that an agreement to leave important matters over for later 
agreement may indeed indicate that until there is such agreement, there is no contract)OI For 
in holding that the contract was never completed, the House of Lords seems to indicate that, in 
casu, not only did the agreement to agree exclude any implication of a reasonable price, but 
that in so agreeing, they indicated that the contract would not be complete until there was in 
fact agreement on price; that is, they did not intend to be bound until agreement on price was 
reached.302 Whether the intention to be bound only on agreement on price may indeed be 
deduced from the facts, is, it is submitted, questionable. Nonetheless, the principle raised 
cannot be overstated, and has already been referred to under 2 6 2 1. Simultaneously, 
however, while May & Butcher v R is authority for the general principle that agreements to 
agree are unenforceable, this is not to say that all agreements to agree are deemed 
unenforceable. Thus it has been said that where the courts can clearly infer that the parties 
intend to be bound immediately, despite their agreement to agree later on price, the courts 
might be willing to find , nonetheless, for a binding contract;303 before this could happen, the 
court would also have to satisfied that the contract was sufficiently complete so as to be 
enforced, but this would be so if the court allowed for the implication of a reasonable price (or 
the implication of some other term by the standard of reasonableness).304 This is logical as 
the intention to be bound immediately, whilst nonetheless agreeing that price would be 
determined by later agreement, indicates that the parties in such a case intend price 
ascertainment, and have not left over price for agreement later because they have failed thus 
far to reach consensus on this essential term. They have in fact reached consensus on this 
essentiale, the price term, viz. that the actual price will be agreed upon later. Accordingly, 
they intend to be bound immediately by the terms of their agreement, including this price 
term. It is suggested thus that a decision such as May & Butcher v R does not make the clear 
distinction between an agreement to agree later on price because there is no agreement on the 
price term, and an agreement to agree later on price which is in fact the content of the 
agreement on the price term. 
300 See in particular the views of Viscount Dunedin at 21 n, and Lord Warrington of Clyffe at 22n. 
30 I See here Treitel Contract 53; Adams & Atiyah Sale of Goods 28. 
302 See especially Lord Buckmaster at 20n. 
303 Treitel Contract 53-54; Adams & Atiyah Sale of Goods 29. 
304 Treitel , ibid., at 54; Adams & Atiyah, ibid., at 30; and the reference, by analogy, to Pagnan SpA v 
Feed Products [1987] Lloyd 's Rep 601, at 619. 
- -------------------------
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The willingness of the English courts to find for a binding contract appears to be particularly 
so where the parties have agreed on a sale of goods at prices to be agreed upon in the future , 
and the agreement is partly performed or executed (e.g. the goods are already delivered and 
accepted);305 the courts here may be willing to imply a reasonable price, where necessary (i.e. 
where agreement is in fact not reached), so as to make the agreement enforceable. This would 
be so on the ground that the courts will endeavour to uphold contracts intended to be binding 
by the parties, and presumably, because the partially executed nature of the agreement 
indicates this intention to be bound immediately. Naturally too, where the parties agree to 
agree later on price, but provide for arbitration or determination by experts in the absence of 
agreement, there should be no obstacle to the enforcement of the contract of sale. Thus Treitel 
identifies Foley v Classique Coaches Ltd306 as an example of a more generous (with respect 
to the intention of the parties) judicial attitude, though perhaps this case more obviously 
indicates the approach of the English judiciary to take each case its own merits.307 In casu, 
the owner of a petrol station sold land to a motor-coach business on condition that it purchase 
its petrol exclusively from him 'at a price to be agreed by the parties from time to time '. The 
Court of Appeal held that, in the absence of such later agreement, the law would imply that a 
reasonable price was to be paid, and the agreement was consequently binding. The case can be 
distinguished from May & Butcher v R on a number of grounds including that the agreement 
was believed to be immediately binding by the parties and had been acted thereupon, and that 
the contract contained an arbitration clause under which a reasonable price could be 
determined in the event of disagreement. 
The position in English law is also that in principle, as in the case of an agreement to agree, an 
agreement to negotiate is too uncertain to be enforceable,308 and it appears that in Walford v 
Miles,309 the House of Lords was unpersuaded that such an agreement was any more 
enforceable by finding for a duty to negotiate in good faith. A duty to negotiate in good faith 
was found to be repugnant to the adversarial positions of parties involved in negotiations)! 0 
However, there are indications in this decision that the court might adopt a more lenient 
approach to any duty to use best endeavours to reach agreement) I 1 The distinction between a 
duty to negotiate in good faith and a duty to use one's best endeavours, however, is not 
clear.312 Treitel suggests it might lie in that an agreement to use best endeavours refers to the 
machinery of negotiation, while one to negotiate in good faith refers to its substance .3 13 Thus 
according to Treitel, the former might, for example, oblige a party to make himself available 
305 Guest Benjamin's Sale§ 2-045; Adams & Atiyah, ibid., at 29. 
306 (1934] 2 KB 1. 
307 Treitel Contract 53; McKendrick Contract 52. 
308 See the discussion in Treitel, ibid., at 52-54. 
309 [1992] 2 AC 128. 
310 138. 
311 Ibid . 
3 12 See also McKendrick Contract 51 , and the decision in Queensland Electricity Generating Board 
v New Hope Collieries Pty Ltd [1989] I Lloyd 's Rep 205, where the Privy Council recognised an 
agreement whereby the parties 'undertook implied primary obligations to make reasonable 
endeavours to agree' (my emphasis) on certain terms of supply, including a new price setting 
structure, on completion of an initial period of five years (during which period the original price 
setting structure applied). The contract in question did, however, provide for a comprehensive 
arbitration clause, as well as broad criteria for the setting of the new price structure. 
313 Treitel Contract 58. 
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for negotiations, or at least not to prevent the other party from communicating with him (e.g. 
by deliberately failing to pick up his telephone). An agreement to negotiate in good faith, on 
the other hand, might oblige a party not to take up unreasonable or exorbitant positions during 
negotiations, and it is this difficulty in giving a precise content to this obligation, whilst 
acknowledging this party ' s freedom to pursue his own interests, that may make this agreement 
tmenforceable. In any event, it is clear this is not the last word on the matter. 
2 6 3 Unilateral power to determine price 
A party to a contract may not be afforded the power to fix the price by him or herself.3 14 
Where this is indeed agreed upon as the price term or stipulation in a contract of sale, such a 
contract is not enforceable. This is a rule as well recognised as that rendering as unenforceable 
contracts containing agreements between parties to agree later on price) IS Moreover, it a rule 
which has been expressly stated by the Appellate Division to follow from the wider general 
314 Lambons (Edms) Bpk v BMW (Suid-Afrika) (Edms) Bpk 1997 4 SA 141 (SCA) 158F-159A; H 
Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd and Another 1996 2 SA 225 (A); Westinghouse 
Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 555 (A); Burroughs 
Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 I SA 669 (W); Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corb itt 
and Another 1986 4 SA 523 (C); Stead v Conradie 1995 2 SA Ill (A) 123A-I ; Kriel v Hochstetler 
House (Edms) Bpk 1988 1 SA 220 (T); Murray & Roberts Construction Ltd v Final Properties (Pty) 
Ltd 1991 I SA 508 (A) 514G-H; Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd 1993 I SA 
179 (A) 182G; Aris Enterprises (Finance) (Pty) Ltd v Waterberg Koelkamers (Pty) Ltd 1977 2 SA 
425 (A) 434E; Reymond v Abdulnabi 1985 3 SA 348 (W) 349G-J; Cassimjee v Cass imjee 1947 3 SA 
70 I (N) 706; Deary v Deputy Commissioner of Inland Revenue 1920 CPD 541 , 548; Hattingh v Van 
Rensburg 1964 I SA 578 (T). See also e .g. Moster! et al Koopkontrak II ; Coaker & Zeffertt 
Mercantile Lm-v 188; Hackwill Mackeurtan's Sale 16; Belcher Norman's Purchase 66; O'Donovan 
Mackeurtan's Sale 45; Kerr Sale 54; Christie Contract II 0; Joubert Contract 180. 
3 15 It is in a judgement such as Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 
I SA 669 (W), perhaps the locus classicus on pretium certum in South African law, that one is able to 
perce ive the degree to which the rule against price-fixing is regarded as established, perhaps even 
unquestioned . The court itself, of course, had said as much early in the judgement ( ' [i]n our law ... 
there can be no valid contract of sale if the parties have agreed that the price is to be fixed by one of 
them or his nominee ': 670E). Perhaps more indicative, however, is the carefulness of counsel for the 
plaintiff in avoiding taking up on the suggestion, made in fact by the court, that the adjustment 
clauses (Parts II and IV) amounted in effect to a contractual discretion in favour of the plaintiff. See 
here the discussion of the case at 1 2 4. Thus at 673H the court suggests that three different readings 
may be given to the clause providing for increases in manufacturing costs. The third possibility 
mentioned at 673H amounts to a contractual discretion in favour of the plaintiff. At 674A it is clear 
that while counsel was prepared to argue for the first two possibilities (which did not amount to 
contractual discretions), he at no stage attempted to argue for the third possibility, even though the 
court stated that ' the words of the document seem to me to be consistent with all three possibilities'. 
See also at 675H where again counsel raises the possibility that the provisions in Parts III and IV 
amount effective ly to a contractual discretion ' at the option of the plaintiff or in one instance, at any 
rate, of the defendant ' to vary the price . Counsel then neatly sidesteps the dangers inherent in such a 
construction by contending that the discretion was never exercised, thus leav ing behind an unchanged 
- and fixed - original price. 
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principle that contractual obligations must be defined or ascertainable, and not vague and 
uncertain. 3 16 
In 2 2 2 it was suggested that price, if not immediately certain, must be objectively 
ascertainable so as to remove price beyond the range of the clash of will of the parties. 
Equally, this is shown in 2 6 2 1 to be the reason for the non-recognition in our law of 
agreements to agree. Where a final quantification of price requires the further agreement of 
the parties, there is uncertainty as to whether a price will in fact be agreed upon. In the case of 
a party afforded the power to fix the price, however, there would not appear to be the equal 
danger of price being thrust back into the arena of the clash of wills. Here the party afforded 
such a power fixes the price in his own discretion; he or she is not required to reach agreement 
with his or her co-contractant. Indeed, in Odendaalsrust Municipality v New Nigel Estate 
Gold Mining Co Ltd,3l7 the remarks of Van den Heever J that the matter had been placed 
beyond the reach of consensus pertained particularly to a very similar position to that at issue 
here. In this case, a party had been afforded a similar unilateral power, not with respect to 
price, but with regard to another essentiale, viz. the identification of the merx. In as much as 
the party in Odendaalsrust Municipality could, by the exercising of his unilateral power, 
render the identification of the merx certain, so likewise may a party achieve the same in the 
setting of a certain, fixed price. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the ratio behind the rejection of a price-setting power by a party 
to a contract of sale may be found elsewhere. It is may well be, for instance, that the refusal by 
our courts to allow a power to be given one party to determine the price might be traced back 
to a fear of abuse ofthis power by one contractant to the prejudice of the other. Such a power, 
conceivably, might allow one party to fix a price greatly disadvantageous to the other, and 
hold that party to the bargain. Consequently, the uncertainty here may be not as to whether 
there will be eventual determination of price, but with regard to what price will in fact be set. 
This shall be examined in greater detaillater.3 18 
2 6 4 The scope of the prohibition on recourse to the parties 
The courts and modern South African commentators, when referring to objective 
ascertainment, frequently state that no recourse should made to the parties.319 As indicated in 
2 2, this prohibition can be read as the key characteristic of objective ascertainment; where 
recourse must be made in the sense of requiring the further agreement of the parties, price can 
no longer be regarded as objectively ascertainable, as price is no longer removed from the 
clash of will of the parties. Moreover, in the light of 2 6 2 and 2 6 3 above, the requirement 
that a price must be ascertainable without further recourse to the parties may be held to pertain 
specifically to further two situations, viz. (i) in a so-called agreement to agree later on price, 
316 Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 555 (A) 
574C-D, cited at 2 6 1 above; also reaffirmed more recently in H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M 
Group (Pty) Ltd and Another 1996 2 SA 225 (A) 2331 and Lambons (Edms) Bpk v BMW (Suid-Afrika) 
(Edms) Bpk 1997 4 SA 141 (SCA) 158G. 
317 1948 2 SA 656 (0) 665, discussed at 2 2 2 above. 
318 See in particular 6 4 below. 
319 See the discussion at 2 2 above. 
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and (ii), where price is fixed by one of the parties. Aside from certain exceptions, such as 
where the parties agree to agree later on price but provide for its ascertainment by a third party 
in the event of their disagreement, the prohibition may be regarded as a general rule . 
Furthermore, recourse will also not be allowed to the evidence of the parties where this is not 
permitted in terms of the parole evidence rule.320 
This prohibition, however, should not be taken out of context. In particular, it should not be 
used to hold that in the objective ascertainment of price, no reference may be made to the 
parties at all, if by this it is meant that a court may not make reference to the evidence given 
by parties. In Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis, the Appellate Division adopted the view 
that extrinsic evidence should be used ' as conservatively as possible' , and that words should 
first receive a ' linguistic treatment' before evidence of surrounding circumstances and what 
passed between the parties be permitted.321 As noted by Van der Merwe et al, this approach 
has been criticised for its inflexibility.322 In any event, it is clear that even in Delmas Milling 
Co Ltd v DuPlessis, the court recognised that in the event of uncertainty which the evidence 
of other surrounding circumstances cannot resolve, the evidence of the parties on what passed 
between them is permissible.323 Moreover, this same case held that extrinsic evidence of an 
identificatory nature is always admissible as it is not really used for interpretation but 'to 
apply the contract to the facts ' ,324 Thus evidence by the parties with regard to the 
identification of the ' bank overdraft rate' in Engelbrecht v Nel, for instance, would have been 
admissible if the court had persevered further in any attempt to establish the relevant interest 
rate.325 The point, however, is that such evidence has to go further than the mere affirmation, 
in that party's view, of the consensus reached between the parties. This has been confirmed 
recently in Comcorp (Pty) Ltd v Quipmor CC, where at issue was whether a certain document 
subject to a copyright was identifiable with sufficient certainty in a document of 
assignment.326 The court held that while evidence from the assignor, for instance, on the 
consensus between the parties would not be admissible, the assignor could identify the 
particular document in question or identify it as the only one that had been drafted during a 
particular time.327 Thus where it is clear that the evidence of parties will be of little weight 
would be in cases where, on the supposed consensus reached between the parties, it is much 
the case of one party's evidence against the other. Thus in Coronel v Kaufman, a case which 
concerned a written option to purchase property, an offer was made for the option on the 
ground that 'the price will not stand in your way' ,328 This offer had been duly accepted. The 
court found that while a price may be determinable by the application of the maxim id certum 
est quod certum reddi potest, the phrase in question referred to nothing by which that price 
could be made certain. For it held that in the case before it '[t]he price can only be determined 
by the evidence of the parties and if they dispute the price, if the one says it was 8s. a morgen 
320 See 1 1 5 above, and e.g. Clements v Simpson 1971 3 SA 1 (A) at 7F. 
321 1955 3 SA 447 (A) 454-455 . 
322 Vander Merwe et a1 Contract 224, and the references therein. 
323 455 . 
324 454. 
325 1991 2 SA 549 (W), discussed at 2 3 1 above. 
326 1998 2 SA 599 (D). 
327 603G-604A. 
328 1920 TPD 207 at 209. 
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and the other says it was 30s. 6d. a morgen it would be impossible to tell what the exact 
contract was .. .' )29 
In sum, it is suggested that the position is most accurately set out by Van der Merwe et al as 
follows: 
Where the parties intend to make the consequences of their agreement objectively 
ascertainable, reference may be had only to the standard set in the agreement, and a further 
agreement between the parties or the exercising of a unilateral discretion by one of them must 
not be necessary. So, for example, certainty is attained where the parties incorporate into their 
contract details contained in a specified document, or where they agree upon an objective 
standard for determining performance ... [and] [t]he determination of the performance may be 
entrusted to a third party .. .330 
Here the somewhat misleading prohibition on further recourse to the parties is avoided. 
Moreover, the writers indicate that by objective price ascertainment, it not envisaged that the 
parties may agree to agree later on a final setting of price, or that this may be done by one 
party alone. 
2 7 Certainty at issue in various contexts: a synopsis 
Having completed an examination of the approach taken by South African courts to the 
ascertainment of price, it is submitted that in the question of pretium certum arises in the 
following three ways.331 
2 7 I Vagueness 
Firstly , an apparent contract of sale may include a price term which is too vague to be 
enforced by the courts.332 The price term may, for example, be expressed in unintelligible 
language or key words may appear to have been left out of the term. This is the problem of 
certainty in its most literal sense, and possibly arises in primarily two situations. 
(i) In the first place, vagueness might simply reflect the fact that the parties never reached 
consensus on this term, and that they appreciated this. Consequently as they never agreed on 
price, they were unable to include a certain term on price in their agreement. There may, of 
course, be different reasons for this. The parties may genuinely wish to come to agreement on 
price immediately, but may fail to achieve this. In such a case, it is perhaps more likely that 
329 Ibid. 
330 Contract 163. 
331 The division below is not taken from any source in particular. However, it has been influenced by 
the distinction in English law made by writers such as Treitel (The Law of Contract 47-58) and 
McKendrick (Contract Law 52-53) between vagueness and incompleteness, and the systematic 
approach of Furmston (Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contract 44-47). The primary South 
African influence has been Christie (The Law of Contract in South Africa 104-113) who broadly 
follows the approach in Levenstein v Levenstein 1955 3 SA 615 (SR) 619 where Quenet J classifies 
' void for vagueness ' cases into four classes . 
332 On ' vagueness ' see in general Treitel, ibid., at 47; McKendrick, ibid. , at 52 ; Furmston, ibid. , at 
47; Guest Chitty on Contracts§ 123 ; Christie, ibid ., at 111-113. 
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no term (on price) whatsoever will be incorporated into the agreement, rather than (as 
contemplated above) the specific inclusion of a price term which is too vaguely defined to be 
enforced. Of course it may unintentionally 'slip in' or be included as an exercise in self-
deception. Possibly more likely in such cases, however, is where the term on price was agreed 
upon by the parties while in the course of negotiations, which they intended to continue, and 
the term on price reflects the incompleteness of the negotiations; in this case the price term is 
thus intentionally incomplete or vague, pending eventual agreement.333 Agreement may 
consequently never be reached, and the 'contract', with terms incomplete, may nonetheless 
find itself being tested before the court for enforceability. In this case, on application of the 
test for certainty, the courts should find there to be no agreement. Where however the court 
finds the price term to be enforceable, it finds for agreement that is not to be found; it creates 
a price. If it consequently holds the contract as enforceable on this (new) term, it makes the 
contract for the parties. The question here is what price has been fixed by the parties, and the 
answer must be: none. 
(ii) In the second place, the parties may agree on a price term which is too vague to be 
enforced by the courts. In such a case, the parties may believe that they have completed their 
negotiations; in their view, they have agreed upon price. However, they have expressed their 
agreement in such language or form that it cannot be said with certainty what they have 
agreed upon or what their agreement means.334 Usually this will occur where parties attempt 
to make price ascertainable. Thus parties may refer to some standard or formula by which, 
apparently, price is to be ascertained. The form or language in which such reference is made, 
however, may be so vague that the court is unable to attribute any reasonable meaning to it, 
and the court will then hold that no certain price has been fixed by the parties. 
This, of course, should not be done lightly; the courts, before holding that there is no price, 
must take all factors into consideration, including possible tacit terms, naturalia, custom and 
all surrounding circumstances.335 This is especially so in the light of the principle that where 
the parties intend to enter into binding contractual relations, effect should be given as far as 
possible to this intention, and the court should not be seen to place legal technicalities in the 
path of the achievement of this intention.336 Where however the court, despite diligent 
attempts to ascertain price, is unable to resolve the uncertainty, the agreement must be held 
unenforceable on the ground that it cannot be said that the parties were in fact ad idem on the 
aspect of price. This must be the conclusion even where the parties believe that they were in 
333 This is approximately the case of, in Levenstein v Levenstein, Quenet J's third class of vagueness, 
viz. 'continuing negotiations broken off in media' . As to this, see Christie Contract 105 and 36-38. 
Here, however, it should be noted that while this term (i.e. the price term) in particular may be 
unenforceable, agreement on other aspects may have already been reached to the extent that a 
contract may be said to enforceable; see e.g. CGEE Alsthom Equipments et Enterprises Electriques, 
South African Division v GKN Sankey (Pty) Ltd 1987 1 SA 81 (A) and Kenilworth Palace Investments 
(Pty) Ltd and Another v Ingala and Another 1984 2 SA 1 (C). 
334 E.g. Furmston Contract 47. 
335 See 1 1 5 above. See also Treitel Contract 47-48. Here it is said that in English law, vagueness 
may be resolved in certain circumstances by the courts by (i) reference to custom, (ii) the implication 
of reasonableness, (iii) a duty on one party to resolve vagueness, and (iv), where possible, the 
ignoring of meaningless and vague phrases where such phrases are severable from the main contract 
without effecting the latter' s vitiation. This appears likewise in Guest Chitty on Contracts § 124-128. 
336 See above. 
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agreement: the courts will not make a bargain for the parties if, although they thought they 
were contracting, they nonetheless failed to reach an agreement on an important term of their 
proposed bargain.337 The question in this case, therefore, is again what price has been fixed 
by the parties. The answer is, once more, none - even though, it might be added, the parties 
believed that they had reached agreement. 
Whilst not entirely on the point of the ascertainment of price, the facts of Titaco Projects (Pty) 
Ltd v AA Alloy Foundry (Pty) Ltd express this scenario well.338 In casu, while it was common 
cause between the parties (an· engineering company and its subcontractor) that an agreement 
in 'principle ' had been reached with regard to the manufacture of certain brass electrical shoes 
by the subcontractor, the court incisively demonstrates that the specification of the copper to 
be used in the manufacture of these shoes had never been agreed upon.339 Thus even if the 
parties had thought they had reached agreement, and had expressed themselves as being in 
agreement on this term, the fact could not be hidden that there had, in fact, been no agreement. 
There is also, however, a second ground upon which to found unenforceability. This ground 
would be not to argue that the parties were never ad idem, but that this agreement is simply 
not ascertainable by the court: agreement lies in the mind of the contractants, and who can 
know this mind?340 Thus for example, a written contract may include a specific price, but in 
illegible handwriting. The court is unable to resolve the uncertainty in any way, even 
following recourse to extrinsic circumstances. It would surely be going to far to argue, to 
paraphrase Levenstein v Levenstein,34I that the vagueness in this case justifies the implication 
that the parties were never ad idem. Clearly they were ad idem. Thus the contract of the 
parties fails here not because they were never at consensus, but that their agreement simply 
fails the test of certainty: agreement must be of such ascertainable quality as to be enforceable 
by the courts.342 
33 7 Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd !964 I SA 669 (W) 676B; 
Titaco Projects (Pty) Ltd v AA Alloy Foundry (Pty) Ltd 1996 3 SA 320 (W) 3380; 
338 1996 3 SA 320 (W). 
339 331 F-H. 
340 ' [T]he intent of a man cannot be tried, for the Devil himself knows not the intent of a man ' : Chief 
Justice Brian, cited in Vander Merwe Die Duiwe/!3. 
341 1955 3 SA 615 (SR) 619. 
342 In such as case, there may well be an argument for the recognition of the enforceability by the 
courts test as a substantive test in itself, that is, a test not needing to find its justification in, for 
example, the theory of individual autonomy, but grounded purely in pragmatism. The contract fails 
not for reasons based in theory and principle but (if not exclusively then primarily) for a reason based 
on practicality: the contract is unenforceable simply because its content is unenforceable by the court. 
See I I 5 above, and the citation from Scammell v Guston [ 1941] AC 251. On the other hand, to state 
that the consensus reached was not of sufficiently ascertainable quality might simply be another way 
of saying that the parties were never ad idem - that is, possessing the level or degree of consensus 
required by the law. From this it would seem to follow that within this level or degree of consensus 
required there must be some minimum form of expression of the agreement i.e. the consensus 
recognised by the law must in some way be able to be recognised outside of the minds of the parties. 
This would then be reflected in the requirement that price must be objectively ascertainable. Thus if 
price is not objectively ascertainable, then there cannot be said to be consensus as recognised by the 
law. 
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In sum, both (i) and (ii) entail a contract where, as described by Quenet J in Levenstein v 
Levenstein, 'the vague and uncertain language justifies the implication that the parties were 
never ad idem')43 The distinction between (i) and (ii) is not overly significant. In (i) the 
parties, if honest, would probably be heard to say that they knew they were not ad idem. In (ii) 
the parties may think themselves to be ad idem, but in fact are not; or, at least, have not 
attained a quality of consensus recognised by the positive law. 
2 7 2 Incompletion 
The second situation where certainty may be said to be at issue probably accounts for most 
cases where a contract of sale has been declared void for want of certainty of price. This 
situation also pertains primarily where the parties choose not to make price immediately 
certain but provide for its later ascertainment, whether by way of reference to third parties, to 
external standards such as market prices, or to the further agreement of the parties themselves. 
Likewise, the contract of the parties fails here not because the parties were never at consensus, 
but that their agreement was not of such ascertainable quality as to be enforceable by the 
courts. In particular, the agreement between the parties must be objectively ascertainable. 
This situation may be distinguished from that pertaining to the first situation mentioned 
above, viz. vagueness. In the situation in casu, the manner in which ascertainment is to take 
place is not unclear; the contract may make very clear to what external standard or formula or 
third person reference is to be had. The provision providing for ascertainment is not so vague 
that the courts are unable to place a meaning on it. Rather, at issue is that once more, in some 
way during the course of the ascertainment process, the fixing of price becomes dependant on 
the further agreement of the parties.344 In this way, it is 'incomplete'. Thus in cases such as 
Reymond v Abdulnabi and Heyman's Estate v Featherstone it was clearly agreed between the 
parties that price was to be fixed by third parties.345 In both cases, however, before the third 
party could in fact fix a price, the respective courts held that the further agreement of the 
parties would be required: in the former case, the precise identity of the third party had still to 
be established; in the latter, the originally appointed third party was unable to act and the 
parties were obliged to agree upon a replacement. Likewise, in Engelbrecht v Nel the 
reference to 'bank overdraft rate' was regarded by the court as an insufficiently certain 
reference to the interest to be paid, and that recourse would be required to be made to the 
parties to establish what was meant by this phrase.346 In all these cases, price is, apparently, 
still not placed beyond the reach of the clash of consensus; the further agreement of the 
parties is needed and this cannot be guaranteed. This is also patently clear in the traditional 
case of an agreement to agree later on price, such as Scheepers v Vermeulen.34 7 Hence it is 
not certain that a price will ever be fixed. In this sense price is said to be uncertain. 
Accordingly, the question here is whether a price will be fixed, and the answer is: we cannot 
be sure. 
343 1955 3 SA 615 (SR) 619. This is the second class of contract void for vagueness described by 
Quenet J. See again Christie Contract 111-113 . 
344 In general, Treitel Contract 50 ff, and the discussion at 2 2 above. 
345 1985 3 SA 348 (W); 1930 EDL 105. 
346 1991 2 SA 549 (W). 
34 7 1948 4 SA 884 (0). 
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It may, of course, be difficult to determine whether a particular price term should be regarded 
as 'vague' (in the sense of point (ii) in 2 71 above) or 'incomplete'. In Engelbrecht v Nel, for 
example, the court suggests that further evidence would be required so as to establish what 
was meant by the phrase 'bank overdraft rate'. This suggests that the phrase is vague. On the 
other hand, this could be regarded as a case of the parties reaching agreement, but not of such 
ascertainable quality as to be recognised by the law i.e. in the court's eyes, the interest rate 
was not objectively ascertainable. As suggested above, most cases of apparent uncertainty of 
price can probably be explained in the latter manner; there are probably few cases where the 
parties think they are agreeing on price and draw up a price term to this effect, only to 
discover that the language or formula they used in the price term is so ambiguous and vague 
that even upon the court taking recourse to their and other evidence, no price can be arrived at. 
On the other hand, it is probably often the case that parties specifically agree on a price term, 
not realising that, in the court's eyes, the agreement they reach is not adequately (i.e. 
objectively) ascertainable . Thus most cases of prices in contracts which fail the rule of 
pretium certum are 'incomplete' and not 'vague'. 
2 7 3 Uncertainty inherent in discretions 
Finally, there is a third situation in which certainty of price is apparently at issue. This occurs 
once again where parties attempt to provide for the later ascertainment of price, and in 
particular, by allowing the price to be determined by someone in his or her discretion. This 
person may be a party to the contract,348 or a third party. Here, again, it may be that certainty 
in its literal sense is not applicable; the reference to the third party, or to one of the parties to 
the contract, may not be vague in the least. To a similar extent to 2 7 2 above, a contract in 
such cases might also be ' incomplete ' : the reference to a third party may fail or the buyer or 
seller, appointed to fix price in his or her discretion, might fail to do so and consequently, 
barring the intervention of the courts, the further agreement of the parties might be necessary 
in order for a price to be set. Rather, the distinguishing feature of such cases is simply that it 
involves the exercise of a subjective discretion, and before this discretion is exercised, the law 
cannot know what price will be set. In this sense, price is uncertain; consequently, the 
fundamental question in this case might be what price will be fixed. Accordingly, the fear 
present in these circumstances is one regarding a possible abuse of this power by that party. 
This fear materialises in the recognition that a manifestly unfair price may be set by a third 
348 In general, Furmston Contract 46, and the discussion at 2 6 3 above. This situation also 
corresponds somewhat with Quenet J's first class of contract void for vagueness, viz. where 'the so-
called contract is not enforceable because the promise is ' dependent on a condition which in fact 
reserves an unlimited option to the promissor" ; Levenstein v Levenstein I955 3 SA 6I5 (SR) 619. 
This covers the situation pertaining above, i.e. where a party is afforded a power to fix the price; see 
here Christie Contract II 0 who does indeed discuss the latter situation under Quenet J's first class . 
However, the statement by Quenet J, above, is also wide enough to cover the so-called si voluero 
condition, and, indeed, may have been intended primarily to address the latter situation. This might 
appear particularly from the remark of Quenet J that in the first class (of contract void for vagueness) 
there is uncertainty as to whether the promissor will ever acknowledge the existence of an obligation . 
As to the si voluero, see 6 4 I below and particularly Lubbe 1989 TSAR I 59. 
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party, such as in Gillig v Sonnenberg.349 It also materialises in the apparently well established 
rule that a party to a contract may not fix the price. 
2 8 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the approach of our courts to the objective ascertainment of 
price. In particular, it has demonstrated when courts regard a price as being objectively 
ascertainable. 
At the beginning of this chapter, it was suggested that the primary reason for requiring a price 
to be, if not immediately certain, then objectively ascertainable, was that in this way price 
would be placed beyond the reach of the clash of consensus. The moment that price is no 
longer objectively ascertainable, then if a price is to be set, recourse must once more be made 
to the parties, and a further agreement obtained from them. One cannot, however, be sure that 
a further agreement will result. Accordingly, a contract of sale containing a price which is not 
objectively ascertainable is 'incomplete' : it is not certain whether there is a price. 
Thus the simple definition of a price which is objectively ascertainable is one in which price 
can be determined without, ultimately, being dependent on a further agreement between the 
parties. What this chapter has demonstrated is that the extent to which a court will go in 
attempting to ascertain price without conceding that ascertainment is dependent on further 
party agreement, may differ from case to case. Thus a court which is careful not to be seen to 
make the contract for the parties may not go far in such an attempt, fearing that to go further 
will result in it implying terms never intended by the parties. On the other hand, a court which 
recognises that the parties intend to be bound by the contract, and recognises that, in terms of 
the principle of autonomy, effect should be given to the intentions of the parties wherever 
possible, may be inclined to go further. In this respect, the path a court chooses to take may 
have important repercussions. As seen in a case such as Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille 
Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd,350 a price may, at first glance, not appear objectively 
ascertainable. A failure to appreciate, however, that, in the view of the contractants, price is 
fully exigible and that, with diligence, one could find for an enforceable price, may lead to 
contractants escaping the consequences of their liability. Case law is replete with instances of 
parties raising defences on the basis of the nebulous ground of uncertainty of price, and the 
consequent invalidity of the contract upon which they are being sued; these are often indicated 
during the discussion in this chapter. 
Accordingly, Hawthorne would appear to be right: parties who make use of a method which 
provides for the later ascertainment of price, and who do not elect to make price certain form 
outset, run the risk of their contracts being declared void for uncertainty. This is a result of our 
casuistic system; each case is treated on its own merits, and one court ' s view of objective 
ascertainment may differ from another's. And where there might appear to be an appropriate 
factual precedent, the court will simply distinguish. All things considered, it does seem to be a 
fairly unpredictable situation. 
349 1953 4 SA 675 (T). 
350 1964 I SA 669 (W), discussed at I 2 4 above. 
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This then leads us to a rather obvious question. If the business of objective ascertainment is 
such a tricky one, why do the parties to a sale not content themselves with an immediately 
certain price? If the risk of failure in objective ascertainment is such a high one, why do they 
persevere? This question has thus far received little attention in this study. But this question is 
hurried on by another, and this one then must surely be as follows. If it can be established why 
parties to a sale insist upon choosing to provide for the later ascertainment of price, should, 
and does, this motivation on the part of the parties play any role in the courts ' judgement as to 
whether the method chosen results in the sufficient certainty of price? In answering this 
question, the focus of this study inevitably moves from an examination of when price may be 
said to be objectively ascertainable, to an examination of, perhaps, when it should be. 
Accordingly, we turn our attention to the concept of contractual adaptation. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CONTRACTUAL ADAPTATION 
3 1 Introduction 
A key paradigm upon which classical contract theory is based is that of the discrete 
contract.351 A relatively simple definition of a discrete transaction is that of a contract where 
no duties exist between the parties prior to their contracting and where all the duties the two 
parties accrue in terms of the contract are determined at the time of contracting) 52 Goldberg 
highlights the elegance and simplicity of the discrete transaction as follows: 
Prior to their contract, Smith has no duty to Brown; at the time they enter their agreement, in a 
single joint exercise of their free choice, they determine their respective duties to each other for 
the duration of the agreement; completion of the promised performance terminates that party ' s 
obligations .. .353 
In practice, a discrete transaction envisages a contract concluded between two strangers who 
meet in a market place and bargain for the exchange of a homogeneous commodity before 
disappearing, the deal done.354 Thus what a discrete transaction essentially describes is that 
type of contract which classical contract law regarded as typical, that is, as the model of 
contract towards which the rules of classical contract law were orientated.355 
The discrete transaction in turn came to be used as a cardinal feature of early economics and 
law studies, and in particular, in what Veljanovski and Williamson have described as the 
market-based approach to the economic analysis of law.356 Thus Richard Posner and 
Anthony Kronman, for example, use models of contract which are essentially discrete.357 In 
more recent years, however, scholars have shifted attention to models of contract which do 
not fit snugly within the discrete transaction paradigm. Thus the so-called relational model has 
351 See e.g. Eisenberg Relational Contracts 296; McKendrick Regulation 308. 
352 Macneil Economic Analysis 61 ; Williamson Contract Analysis 40, 42-43. See also McKendrick 
Regulation who at 308-309 usefully summarises the 'ingredients ' of a discrete transaction, identified 
by Macneil, as comprising the following: (i) a clearly defined beginning, duration and termination; 
(ii) clear and precise definition of the subject matter of the transaction, its quantity and the price; (iii) 
the substance of the exchange is planned at the moment of formation of the contract; (iv) the benefits 
and burdens of the contract are clearly assigned at the moment of formation ; (v) there is little 
emphasis upon interdependence, future co-operation and solidarity between the parties; (vi) the 
personal relationship created by the contract is extremely limited, and (vii) the contract is created by 
the single exercise of bilateral power. 
353 Victor Goldberg, cited by Macneil Contractual Relations 61 . 
354 See e.g. again Eisenberg Relational Contracts 296. 
355 Ibid . 
356 Williamson Contract Analysis 40. These writers specifically identify Richard Posner (Economic 
Analysis) with the market-based approach. 
357 Williamson Contract Analysis 40, 42. See here Posner Economic Analysis and Kronman & 
Posner Economics. 
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been developed by a number of scholars to describe contractual relationships which cannot be 
described as 'sharp in by clear agreement, sharp out by clear performance' )58 
In this study, it is not necessary that the relational model is examined in detail ; in any event, 
both Eisenberg and McKendrick have in two recent and separate articles summarised the 
contributions of various scholars to the development of this model.359 Accordingly, a few 
observations will suffice. Thus the first is that some difficulty has been encountered in 
providing an adequate definition of the relational model,360 and it is this difficulty, in fact, 
which reveals to us to the first feature characterising this model. This is that the model, as often 
as not, is defined negatively; that is, by contrasting it directly with the discrete model and 
effectively stating it to be what it is not.361 Thus Macneil simply lists the features of a discrete 
transaction which in turn he says are not present in a relational contract.362 Bell, on the other 
hand, refers to a long-term contractual relationship which, he says, 'may be contrasted with a 
discrete, one-off contract, where performance is more or less instantaneous, and there need be 
no prior or subsequent dealings between the parties' ,363 
The second particularly characteristic feature is that, invariably, a relational contract 
encompasses some form of contractual relationship between the parties. This should not be 
taken to mean that relational contracts are inevitably long-term; while they often are, 'temporal 
extension per se is not the defining characteristic' of a relational contract.364 Rather, it means 
that the relationship extends beyond the single moment of exchange which characterises the 
discrete transaction, however long or short this may in fact be. Eisenberg, accordingly, adopts 
the straightforward definition that a relational contract is a contract which involves not merely 
an exchange, but a relationship, between the contracting parties (and that, conversely, a 
discrete contract is all exchange and no relationship). He then goes to point out that, on this 
definition (and especially if one bears in mind that the relevant relationship need not be long-
term) , most contracts are in fact relational, and not discrete.365 This is clearly so if one 
considers that a contract need extend only beyond pure exchange by, for instance, the simple 
agreement between the purchaser and seller that delivery should take place the next day, and 
the contract already begins to take on the vestiges of the relational. Moreover, a contract which 
traditionally would be characterised as discrete, such as the buying of foodstuffs in a 
supermarket, may in fact be shown to be relational when one shows that the buyer returns 
regularly to the same supermarket.366 Important for present purposes, therefore, is that this 
shift in focus has led to the general observation that the typical contract encountered in contract 
law does not necessarily exhibit the characteristics of the discrete contract. 
358 Williamson Contract Analysis 42, citing Macneil. See e.g. McKendrick Regulation 307-310. 
359 These have both been published in Beatson & Friedmann (eds) Good Faith and Fault in Contract 
Law ( 1995) at 291 and 305 respectively. 
360 See e.g. the remarks of McKendrick Regulation 307; Eisenberg Relational Contracts 291 ff. 
361 Noted by McKendrick Regulation 307. 
362 McKendrick Regulation 308-309. 
363 Bell Long-term Contracts 195. 
364 Goetz & Scott Principles 153. 
365 See in particular Eisenberg Relational Contracts 297. 
366 Eisenberg Relational Contracts 297. 
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One of the factors, however, which has contributed in particular to this observation has been 
the insights offered by, in the words of Veljanovski and Williamson, the transaction cost 
approach.367 By itself, it is not a model; undoubtedly though, it has contributed to scholars' 
thinking on the relational model. Rather, as an analytical approach to the economic analysis of 
law, it notes the contributions of the market approach to one's understanding of contract, with 
its use of the discrete transaction as its paradigm transaction, and suggests that contractual 
relations are not generally of this well-defined kind.368 Whereas, in any analysis of contract, 
the emphasis in the market-based approach is on the technical features of contract, namely, the 
role played by legal forms and rules, it has been suggested that this results in too narrow an 
understanding. Such an approach, evidently, neglects to recognise the role played by the non-
technical aspects of contract, that is, the role and influence exerted by the particular trading 
environment governing the duration of the contractual relationship, and the role played by the 
parties themselves, through their peculiarly human attributes.369 In sum, this approach 
attempts to take note of a more diverse array of, in the parlance of law and economics, so-
called transaction costs. 
It is important to note from outset that the concept of a transaction cost has long since been 
employed as a tool in the economic analysis of the law, and is not confined to the transaction 
cost approach.370 In the transaction cost approach, however, the emphasis on transaction costs 
is greater than in, for example, the market-based approach. It is, in fact, the former approach' s 
preoccupation37I with transaction costs which this study finds most useful. For in particular, 
by an analysis of the causes of transaction costs, scholars such as Williamson demonstrate the 
complex forces at work in contractual relationships. This, as shall be seen, permits a more 
realistic appraisal of the typical contractual environment. 
3 2 The transaction costs approach 
3 2 1 Transaction costs 
Transaction costs, in the context of the law of contract, have been described as 'the costs of 
running the contractual relation' .3 72 They have been identified as the costs of bargaining, that 
is, the costs of finding transactors, of negotiating the transaction, and policing and enforcing its 
terms.3 73 Thus they refer to the costs that must be incurred by parties should they elect to 
engage in contractual relations with others. Likewise, they have been said to constitute the 
friction encountered by contractants engaged in activities in the wider market place which 
leads them to prefer one set of rules for settling a dispute or solving a problem than to 
367 Identified again in Williamson Contract Analysis 40 as an approach associated with Ian Macneil , 
Victor Godberg and Oliver Williamson. 
368 Williamson Contract Analysis 39, 42. In particular, the market-based approach has been 
commended for disclosing the economic basis of contract. 
369 Williamson Contract Analysis 40-42. 
370 See e.g. its use as a conceptual tool in Posner Economic Analysis, chapter 4. Also Minda Legal 
Movements 90. 
371 Williamson Transaction-cost Economics 233. 
3 72 Macneil Contractual Relations 62. 
3 73 Stephen Economics 3 I. 
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another. 3 7 4 Two sets of factors have been identified as the primary causes of transaction costs, 
namely, human characteristics, which is treated firstly below, and thereafter, environmental 
characteristics. 3 7 5 
The first human characteristic of relevance is that of bounded rationality. This refers to the fact 
that whilst not irrational, human behaviour is characterised by a limited rationality ; we are 
bound by the very ordinary capacities of our brains and are able to receive, store, retrieve and 
process only a limited amount of information. Consequently, contractants may be 
overwhelmed by the complexity of circumstance, and not make the rational decision they 
originally intended to make. Many studies, both legal and economic, tend to overestimate 
human capability and regard the human mind as hyper-rational. 
Opportunism, on the other hand, observes that human behaviour is not merely largely self-
interested, but is characterised by cunning and guile. Contractants make false or empty 
promises in the hope of eliciting favourable reactions, cut comers for own advantage and 
seldom hesitate to bluff. While this is a generalisation and does by no means apply to all 
contractants, transaction costs are incurred by the precautions taken and the methods used to 
sort out those who are opportunistic from those who are not. Moreover, in contrast to bounded 
rationality, which suggests that decision-making by contractants may be less sophisticated than 
often thought, opportunism may be said to counter this: decision-taking may be roguishly 
calculated. 
Encountered alone, these human characteristics may not create extraordinary transaction costs. 
Paired however, with environmental circumstance, and the minefield that is contracting is 
exposed. 
Uncertainty-complexity is the first such environmental dynamic. The environment within 
which contractants are obliged to negotiate and barter, is fraught with uncertainty and 
complexity.376 The world, after all , is a perplexing, capricious place, and the commercial 
world no less so. On the one hand, this may serve to trigger an unanticipated, irrational 
decision by a party; the foresight and shrewd decision-making so usually characteristic of a 
particular party may vanish in the baffling, confounding, intricate onslaught. On the other, poor 
decisions taken as a result of this capitulation might never be exploited by co-contractants were 
it not for their opportunism. 
374 Stephen Economics 184. 
3 75 This analysis is the original work of Oliver Williamson (see Contract Analysis 61 ), and usefully 
summarised in Stephen Economics 184-193. The discussion of the influence of human and 
environmental characteristics is drawn primarily from these two works. 
3 76 Goetz & Scott Principles !54: 'Complexity and uncertainty each play conceptually distinct roles , 
although they frequently operate in combination. For example, suppose a homeowner attempts to 
write a contract providing for the care of his fine home garden during a summer when he is out of 
town. Uncertainty is represented by the difficulty of determining in advance the climatic conditions, 
incursions of the gypsy moth, wind-borne powdery mildew, etc. Complexity is involved in specifying 
to the gardener exactly what responses should be made in each case: how much to spend on sprays, 
whether to water, when a diseased plant should be cut down to prevent infection of adjacent ones, and 
so on' . 
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The so-called small numbers condition is a second environmental characteristic of relevance. 
This refers to both the frequency of the particular transaction, as well as the number of 
potential contractants it may involve. Opportunism, for instance, is discounted where the 
transaction is of a recurring nature. No co-contractant revels in being taken for a fool for a 
second or third time; consequently, as a cause of transaction costs, diminishment of 
opportunism corresponds with the increasing number of bonds established between parties, and 
their moves towards a greater, more settled, relationship. A large number of potential co-
contractants, likewise, makes more competitive the process by which terms are agreed upon 
between parties. In order to win co-contractants from the grasp of others, a party may be 
forced, in an act to gain favour, to show his or her hand, and thereby limit any opportunistic 
behaviour he or she may have considered. 
Finally, the transaction atmosphere may contribute to the incurring of transaction costs. In 
Japan, for instance, opportunism may be frowned upon in an atmosphere of mutual respect and 
co-operation; the opposite, on the other hand, might be expected in the United States, with its 
emphasis on individualism. South Africa, with a culture which encourages the giving of 
favours , might regard opportunism as the norm. 
Williamson goes on to make a very interesting classification of transaction types, and 
thereafter charts what he refers to as the relevant governance structures pertaining to each) 77 
This is not important for the purposes of this study. What is important is that the transaction 
cost approach reveals a host of factors at play in any contractual relationship. The portrayal of 
the latter as lineal in relationship is shown to be simplistic; it involves, on the contrary, a web 
of intricacy. 
3 2 2 Contingency 
For the sake of convenience, it is suggested that the full range of forces which are said to be the 
cause of transaction costs - opportunism, bounded rationality, uncertainty-complexity and so 
forth - may be said to combine, in whatever combination or form or manner, to result in an 
inability to anticipate, or a difficulty in anticipating, what shall be termed contingency, that is, 
a turn of events which serves to turn a contract upside down: the collapse of the Australian 
wool market, the outbreak of war in the Far East, the rapid and unexpected introduction of 
information technology in a co-contractant's firm, or yesterday's stroke of tactical genius by 
the senior partner now regarded as today's blunder. 
Contingency, of course, is a transaction cost. The change in circumstance caused by 
contingency may have a decisive bearing on the contractual relationship, and exact its own 
expensive price. Crucially, it may cause the balance originally established by the parties 
between their reciprocal performances to be upset. One party may have agreed to pay to 
another a fixed sum in exchange for a particular commodity still to be manufactured by the 
latter. Two months later, thanks to some intervening contingency, the commodity is found to 
be practicably worthless. Yet pay the party must. 
377 Contract Analysis 49-55; Stephen Economics 189-193. 
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Accordingly, contingency, it has been said, may have the result of giving the contract ' a 
different appearance from that which the parties wanted to give it at its conclusion, and which 
they had wanted to realise through the inter-play of the obligations arising from their 
agreement ' ) 78 Consequently, in their engagement with each other, one or both of the parties 
will incur costs either in their exposure to contingency, or in their attempts to provide for it, 
that is, to prevent it from upsetting the contractual balance they may have so delicately created. 
This, of course, is not that easy. 
On the one hand, given the bounded rationality of the parties, and the inevitably limited 
information at their disposal as to, for instance, the future, the precise scope and nature of all 
future contingencies (with respect to which adaptation will be required) cannot be anticipated. 
Moreover, even if anticipated from outset, it may often be that the adaptation required will not 
be evident until the actual materialisation of the contingency)79 On the other hand, 
contractants would be ill-advised to ignore such possibilities. Here the opportunism of parties 
must be borne in mind. Where an unanticipated change in circumstance does arise, it will avail 
a party little to maintain the naive belief that his of her co-contractant will refrain from 
exploiting the opportunity in the event of it being offered. Where unrestrained by, for example, 
the application of the judicial concept of bona fides ,380 the co-contractant may well find 
himself fully entitled to gloat in the bonanza that Fate, in the form of a sudden and unexpected 
market fluctuation, has brought him. 
It should be noted, furthermore , that contingency, as a transaction cost, works closely in 
tandem with time. The longer the period the parties are involved in a contractual relationship, 
the greater the likelihood that circumstance - different from that under which the parties 
originally contracted or anticipated - may be expected to change. Here one sees how the 
relational model of contract reflects the contractual environment more realistically than its 
discrete counterpart: it envisages that relationships do develop between parties beyond the 
mere exchange of performance. It is during the course of these relationships - which the 
discrete or classical contract does not predict or foresee - that contingencies may develop. Thus 
these risks to which contractants are exposed, of an increasing likelihood of being burdened 
with an unwanted contingency as their contractual relationship continues, have been called the 
' bruises of time ' )81 It should be apparent therefore, that contractants might attempt to import 
measures whereby such 'bruises' might be minimised. 
In what way, therefore, may the parties organise in advance for the modification of the rights 
and duties to correspond with the change in circumstance? The law of contract, in this respect, 
plays a role. It has been said to be a transaction cost-minimising mechanism)82 It fulfils this 
role in two respects. 
Firstly, the law itself, by various methods, may provide for such modification. This may be 
effected, for instance, by the implementation of specific legislation, or by within the general 
3 78 Fabre, cited by De Lamberterie Long-term Contracts 221 . 
379 Williamson Contract Analysis 43. 
380 See e.g. Van Huyssteen & Vander Merwe 1990 Stell LR 244. Also 53 2 below. 
381 Fabre, cited by De Lamberterie Long-term Contracts 221 . 
382 Stephen Economics 156-157; Botha 1992 Stell LR 324. 
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rules of contract, such as the rules concerning the interpretation of contracts or the doctrine of 
supervening impossibility. Secondly, the parties may themselves draw up agreements to 
govern certain contingencies, and these may be incorporated into contracts. In these roles it 
may be successful; at other times it may be less so. Important here however, is the collective 
name to be given to all mechanisms falling within the ambit of contractual law which attempt 
to counter the negative effects that may be inflicted upon a contract party or parties as a result 
of the materialisation of contingency. These mechanisms, accordingly, shall be said to 
constitute forms of contractual adaptation; that is, a specific form of transaction cost-
minimising mechanism that pertains particularly to contingency. 
The concept of contractual adaptation, therefore, that is, of controlled planned contractual 
adaptation in the face of a contractual relationship involving contingency, is consequently 
afforded further attention. 
3 3 The contractual adaptation model in practice 
Thus far, the concept of contractual adaptation has been largely explored in the abstract. Much 
will therefore be gained if specific reference is made to contracts encountered in practice which 
exhibit, or require, a measure of adaptation. Contracts requiring, if not incorporating, some 
form of adaptation may be said to include the following arrangements.383 
3 3 I Deferred pe1jormance contracts 
The characteristic feature of this type of contract is that, even if the contract involves a once-
off transaction, the date for performance is deferred and cannot take place at the time of 
conclusion of the contract. Difficulties may then arise if circumstances change after conclusion 
of the contract but before performance. A good example of 'gap' problems is where two parties 
conclude a contract of sale but delivery of the goods is only envisaged six months later. In the 
interim, the market for those goods could crash, the exchange rate could fluctuate wildly and 
the labour force involved in the production of those goods could embark upon a wildcat strike. 
On date of delivery, the market value of the goods could be out of all proportion to the price 
already agreed upon.384 Consequently, in such arrangements, the parties may wish to be 
383 This classification is taken from Bell Long-term Contracts 196-198. 
384 Bell Long-term Contracts 196 also refers to the example of a contract of option. Strictly 
speaking, of course, the date of performance is not necessarily deferred in a contract of option . 
Performance is immediate by the one party, in exchange for the contract price, undertaking to keep 
the substantive offer open. It is the giving of this undertaking that constitutes performance. 
Consequently, it is rather the exercise of the right created by the option contract, namely, to accept the 
substantive (as distinguished from the option) offer, that is deferred, or, more accurately, that could 
be deferred; this is in the case where, in an option involving the sale of property granted for a period 
of five years, the option-holder decides three years into the option to purchase the property, thereby 
exercising his right of option . The exercise of the right created in terms of the option does, however, 
correspond with the date of conclusion of the substantive contract (viz. the contract of sale) envisaged 
by the option contract (in its capacity as a pactum de contrahendo). Unless it may in some way be 
provided otherwise, the price 'agreed' upon for the substantive contract will be the same as 
incorporated in the original option. With respect to the latter, price is fixed the moment the offer of 
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unspecific about many of the details of the contract, including price. Alternatively, the parties 
may wish to create some mechanism whereby price, for example, may be adapted closer in 
time to the date of performance. One may note further, that this type of problem is encountered 
in both short-term and long-term contracts: the 'bruise of time' refers here not to the period of 
the length of the overall relationship between the parties, but the period between contract 
conclusion and performance, irrespective of the duration of the relationship within which the 
contract is encountered. 
3 3 2 Contracts with a long performance time 
This class incorporates those contracts which require a considerable period of time to be 
implemented, or the period envisaged for performance is long-term. Examples are construction 
contracts and lease agreements, whether of movables such as office equipment or of 
property.385 Difficulties arise here where changes in circumstances occur during the 
performance of the contract. These contracts too offer scope for contractual adaptation. 
3 3 3 Long-term contracts 
Parties may find themselves in an arrangement whereby over a long period of time, they are 
continuously entering into a series of contracts with each other, or involving a series of acts of 
performance.386 In these circumstances, there may be a strong incentive to maintain this 
relationship . The relationship may, for instance, involve transactions which are very 
transaction-specific.387 This entails that transactions between the parties involve resources 
(both human and physical) which are very specialised, or idiosyncratic. The seller of certain 
goods, for instance, might be the only seller of those goods in the country, whilst the purchaser 
might be one of the few users of those goods.388 Likewise the seller of the goods might, in 
manufacturing the goods, have to invest heavily in specialised equipment in order to 
option is accepted, as price is a term of the substantive offer which forms the content of the option 
contract. Consequently, one encounters a similar gap (as referred to in the text above) between the 
moment of setting of price (at the moment the offer of option is accepted) and the moment when price 
becomes judicially relevant in the sense that it can be acted upon. As in the example given in the text 
above, a great deal can happen during this period. 
385 On this characteristic of lease, see Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Thorburn 1990 2 SA 870 (C) at 
874A. 
386 Bell Long-term Contracts 197; Williamson Contract Analysis 52-53. See also, in general , 
Macneil Contractual Relations 61 ff. 
387 Williamson Contract Analysis 52-53; Bell Long-term Contracts 199. 
388 Of course, such a so-called bilateral monopoly may in itself be sufficient to create the necessary 
will in both parties to maintain the relationship, in that each is dependent on the other, as sole supplier 
on the one side and sole buyer on the other. See e.g. Bell Long-term Contracts at 20 I as to these 
binding 'non-legal' forces. The situation as sketched here of a bilateral monopoly could, on the other 
hand, lead to what has been termed 'unified governance' or ' vertical integration' (Williamson 
Contract Analysis 53-54; Goetz & Scott Principles 154-155); that is, where a single party spans both 
sides of the transaction, namely, as both seller/supplier and purchaser. Macneil (Contractual 
Relations 65) calls this the 'penultimate relational pattern in modern contracts[,] the large firm itself . 
See his example at this reference, and how this may typically result. 
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manufacture the latter, and the expense of this investment might not be transferable to other 
contracts because the use of this equipment is severely limited, namely, in the manufacture of 
those goods only. Both parties, therefore, have an interest in maintaining the relationship. At 
the same time, however, they will be conscious that, given the long-term duration of the 
relationship, contingencies might arise which may well upset the balance of mutual .reciprocal 
performance which they originally created. If the relationship is to continue, the balance must 
clearly be restored. It is apparent therefore that adaptation in these circumstances is required. 
3 3 4 Conclusion 
From the above, 1t 1s observed that adaptation is required with respect to a change of 
circumstance which may result during one of the following periods: the period between the 
conclusion of a contract and the performance envisaged therein; the period during which 
performance takes place; and the period during which the contractants are overall engaged in 
relationship. 
3 4 The principal problems of contracts requiring adaptation and their relation to 
certainty 
3 4 1 Introduction 
It should at this stage be clear that contingency presents a special area of concern to the 
contractant in the types of contracts referred to above. In particular, it affects the planning and 
specificity of obligations undertaken by parties. These become that much more difficult in 
these contracts, in relation to the discrete contract, because of the added complexities and 
uncertainties that contingency brings)89 How do parties plan for such contracts? How can 
they risk specifying the duties each will incur, well-knowing that some unanticipated change in 
circumstance might make nonsense of their expectations? 
3 4 2 Certainty and adaptation: the crux of the matter 
It is at this point that the requirement of certainty clashes with the concept of contractual 
adaptation. The requirement of certainty demands that the content of contracts be determined 
with certainty and reasonable precision. This includes terms which in all likelihood will be 
affected by the materialisation of contingencies, as referred to above. In this respect, the parties 
evidently have a number of choices. 
Firstly, parties remain open, of course, on the establishment of the contractual relationship, to 
fix terms with precision from outset. This would then comply with the requirement that all 
terms in a contract should be certain. This occurs, for example, whenever the parties 
immediately agree upon a fixed price, without providing for some form of price adjustment 
clause; the allocation of risk is, accordingly, likewise fixed from outset. On the materialisation 
of a contingency therefore, and depending upon this risk allocation, one or both parties stand to 
3 89 Bell Long-term Contracts 198; Goetz & Scott Principles 153-154. 
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lose. The market value of the goods in question may in the interim increase, to the benefit of 
the buyer, or plummet, to his or her detriment. This, however, was to be expected, and, indeed, 
was bargained for. It consequently offers a reasonable strategy to parties who are content with 
a speculative element in their bargain. Likewise, it may be an approach utilised by parties who, 
though not in favour of any agreement with an overly speculative nature, transact within a 
contractual environment noted for its stability and not volatility; any speculative element is 
thus kept to a minimum.390 In this respect, the paradigm of the classical contract, i.e. a discrete 
spot sale under market conditions, springs to mind.391 
On the other hand, not all parties are content to include a speculative element in their 
agreements, or have the good fortune to contract under stable environments. Thus, secondly, 
contractants may apparently invest a great deal of resources in the prediction of contingencies, 
and expend further resources in the creation of precise contractual mechanisms, which, while 
without infringing upon the requirement of certainty, are nonetheless capable of effecting 
adequate adaptation to that particular affected term to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. 
The extent to which this can be achieved successfully, is doubtful.392 The costs of planning 
and creating such mechanisms in such attempt will usually be very large, and the possibility is 
naturally that some aspect has been overlooked.393 
Alternatively, parties may forsake certainty and create mechanisms which respond to the 
change in circumstance as it materialises. It would be here be argued that it is simply not 
possible to provide from outset and with precision for all possible contingencies. Specificity is 
here the antithesis of the required adaptation: the contingencies with respect to which 
adaptation is required are of an unknown nature; mechanisms created to effect adaptation can 
therefore not be too limited and specific in scope if they are serve any use at all. It has 
accordingly been stated that, under such circumstances, 'the degree of specificity with which 
contractual obligations should be determined long in advance may well be less, at least from an 
390 See here Trakman 1983 Modern Law Review 48-49 who argues that the practice of allocating 
risks from outset is a frequent one, and one employed deliberately. This point is made, nonetheless, 
not in order to suggest that this is necessarily the best approach to contingency, but that parties are 
frequently happy with this approach. Trakman 's concept of initial risk allocation is, however, a wide 
one, and covers not only those situations where the parties have agreed upon fixed terms, but also 
where they have provided for some form of later modification or adjustment to the contract. 
391 It follows, therefore, why a discrete contract is characterised by a clear and precise definition of 
the subject matter of the transaction, its quantity and the price, as noted by McKendrick Regulation 
308-309, cited in the second footnote to this chapter. 
392 Doubtful, that is, in the sense of achieving successful adaptation no matter the type and effect of 
the contingency. Of course, parties may attempt to provide for adaptation under certain circumstances 
only, and appreciate that by the creation of precise contractual mechanisms, all contingencies cannot 
be provided for; here again, the parties in such circumstances accept a certain speculative element in 
their agreement. See again Trakman's point in the footnote immediately above. 
393 One might refer here to the additional costs of lawyers, draftsmen, actuaries, analysts and gypsy 
soothsayers. In addition one cannot discount time costs incurred in the prolonged negotiation of such 
an agreement, and the disadvantages of a highly cumbersome contractual document, with its very 
intention to cover all loopholes a cause of inflexibility. Ultimately, such an attempt to allow with 
precision for all eventualities amounts to nothing more than speculation. 
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economic point of view, than in one-off instantaneous contracts' )94 In short, contractual terms 
should not be characterised by certainty, but by flexibility . 
Yet this, as stated, is from an economic point of view. The law places a somewhat higher 
premium on certainty. Certainty of terms, firstly, is vital for the establishment of consensus. 
The establishment of consensus in turn serves to assure the law that, because the law only 
gives effect to arrangements brought about by consensus, it is giving effect to the intentions of 
the parties. Policy, after all , is not served by the law placing the full weight of judicial 
machinery behind contractual terms which, for want of certainty, cannot be said with any 
substantial degree of confidence to have been intended by the parties. Consequently, judicial 
enforcement of certainty (as a requirement) is demanded by the very contractants themselves 
who desire the security of knowledge that they will not be compelled to perform in terms of 
some contractual provision with respect to which they did not agree. The requirement of 
certainty, therefore, although appearing at first glance as a hindrance, can by no means be 
jettisoned altogether. 
It is left , therefore, to Williamson to provide the proper perspective on contractual adaptation 
and certainty. Williamson states that that which is required is ' some way for declaring 
admissible dimensions for adjustment such that flexibility is provided under terms in which 
both parties have confidence' (my emphasis) .395 
It is in this short statement that one discovers the crux of the problem: the need for flexibili ty in 
the face of daunting contingency coupled with the security required of by parties as 
traditionally provided by the requirement of certainty. Flexibility, of course, constitutes the 
purpose of adaptation. Security, on the other hand, performs a different role, and is demanded 
in two respects . 
Firstly, and in the sense most closely tallying with the traditional role of certainty, it refers to 
the confidence of the parties that the adjusted term will provide adequately for both parties ' 
individual expectations and intentions, and not for consequences the parties would have had no 
intention of ever agreeing upon. The requirement of certainty had always provided for this role : 
no legal effect was given to terms with respect to which it could not be said the parties had 
agreed upon with certainty. Contractual adaptation must therefore likewise fulfil this role if it 
is to gain the confidence of the courts who have proved over the years to be particularly fond 
of the certainty requirement. 
Secondly, it refers to security of tenure, that is, that both parties may be confident that despite 
the adjustments, the contract will continue to be binding. These two aspects of security are, 
therefore, interdependent: without security of tenure, the parties will care little if the adjusted 
term does or does not reflect adequately their individual intentions; a party dissatisfied with the 
adjustment may always refuse to be bound. Likewise, without a reciprocal confidence in a 
satisfactory performance by the adjustment mechanism, the parties will be most reluctant to 
hitch security of tenure to the adjustment agreement. The business world, it might be said, likes 
to gamble on a sure thing, and its inhabitants are not generally prepared to bind themselves to 
consequences with respect to which they are not entirely convinced. 
394 That is, than in the case of the discrete contract of classical law: Bell Long-term Contracts 198. 
395 53. 
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In sum, therefore, flexibility and security may be said to constitute the essentialia of 
adaptation. It is accordingly these dimensions that remain to be explored within the context of 
sale. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: PRICE ADAPTATION IN THE CONTRACT OF SALE 
4 1 A refocus on sale: the link between price adaptation and objective ascertainment 
Thus far, attention has been drawn to the requirement of contractual adaptation with respect to 
contractual terms in general. The focus of this study, however, is the contract of sale, and more 
particularly, the requirement of certainty of price. In the context of sale, the price agreed upon 
is the term perhaps most susceptible or reflective of changed circumstances. Price in sale 
reflects, in terms accessible and understandable (that is, by way of monetary terms), the value 
placed by the parties on the exchange of resources about to take place. In the event of a 
contingency affecting the value of this exchange consequent to a price being fixed, the role 
price plays in this respect is likewise affected. In the event, it shall either, in the view of one or 
both of the parties, reflect too high a value to be placed on the exchange, or too low a value. 
The upsetting of the balance between the reciprocal performances by the parties is thus most 
keenly evident in the parties' opinion as to the accuracy of price (in its role as the measure of 
the value to be placed on the exchange) consequent to the materialisation of the contingency. 
Of course, such an upsetting of this balance may be regarded as a natural risk of the market. By 
agreeing on a fixed price, the parties may allocate the risk of a consequent decline in the 
goods' market value to the purchaser, and an increase to the seller. The parties may be happy to 
do this not only where delivery and payment follows immediately upon conclusion of the 
contract, but also where performance is delayed. This speculative element may be a significant 
and intentional element of their deal, holding out as it does the possibility of greater profits for 
one of the parties. This may be most attractive to a party who thinks, for instance, that she has 
read the markets better than her co-contractant. On the other hand, this apparently speculative 
nature of fixing price from outset may occur within an environment characterised by stability . 
Consequently, the costs involved in providing for contingency may be regarded as 
disproportionate to the, apparently, negligible risk of contingency, and deemed as not worth 
incurring. In this case, the parties may again be happy to set a fixed, invariable price at outset, 
as this is regarded as not overly speculative. Prolonged negotiations over complex adjustment 
clauses may seem a pointless and costly exercise in the light of the actual risk of a dramatic 
change in circumstance. Price adaptation, consequently, should not always be seen as 
indispensable from the viewpoint of the parties. As far as contingencies are concerned, there is 
always room for a little calculated speculation. 
On the other hand, it is clear from the previous chapter that not all parties are content to fix 
price from outset, or are happy to contract under such speculative circumstances. 
Consequently, there is, at the least, some need for contractants to be able to provide for an 
adapted price; that is, a price that may be adjusted to meet the new circumstances. 
Of course South African law, as we know, requires that the price in a contract of sale be certain 
or ascertainable; or effectively, that a price be capable of being determined with reasonable 
precision. As would follow from the previous chapter with respect to terms in general, there 
exists likewise, and prima facie at least, difficulty in reconciling the flexibility that is required 
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on the part of price in order to be responsive to changed circumstances or contingency, with the 
certainty required in terms of this well-known rule. Contractual adaptation, therefore, if it is to 
be successfully implemented within the South African law of sale, must by some means 
provide for adequate consideration of the latter rule. 
This, however, leads us directly to an important point. For it is, in fact, in a statement of this 
very rule that the concept of price adaptation can be shown not to be too far removed from the 
traditional outlook on price-setting. For in the rule that price need not only be immediately 
certain, but also objectively ascertainable, the law provides immediately for some measure of 
price adaptation: that is, it permits parties to provide for a later determination of price, possibly 
closer in time - for example - to actual performance, following conclusion of that intervening 
time period in which all contingencies may be expected to arise. Of course it is not argued here 
that all cases where price is made to be not certain but merely ascertainable are cases of 
attempted contractual adaptation. Parties may prefer to make price ascertainable simply 
because at the time of contracting, they do not know the exact price but know that it is 
obtainable, by way, for example, of reference to an outside document or by mathematical 
calculation, or because they cannot reach agreement and may prefer to delegate this 
responsibility to a third party. Nonetheless, the fact that the later ascertainment of price may 
result in price being determined closer in time to actual performance, and consequently result 
in a price more responsive to contingencies that may have materialised in the interim, indicates 
that the concept of price adaptation is by no means foreign to the traditional outlook on price-
setting. It is, after all, under the rule of that price may also be objectively ascertained that 
commercial practice has managed to obtain the acceptance of price escalation clauses, which 
have already been studied to some extent under the discussion of what is meant by objective 
ascertainment, at 2 4. Hill Brothers & Co v Alexander & Jones, Standard Industries Ltd v 
Marwick and Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd, for example, all 
contain provisions by which the parties clearly intended to provide for an ascertainment of 
price closer to any consequent appearance of contingency.396 
Price adjustment or escalation clauses, as well as a host of other means by which parties 
attempt to provide for price adaptation, will be discussed in the following chapters. The rest of 
this short chapter, however, focuses upon the particular circumstances under which price 
adaptation in a contract of sale may be required. These, after all, may differ from the 
circumstances under which contractual adaptation in general is required, as suggested in 3 3. 
For it is only when clarity exists as to when price adaptation is required, that one may move on 
to an analysis of how this is in fact achieved. 
4 2 Sale distinguished from other contracts requiring adaptation 
In Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Thorburn one encounters the followiqg: 
[A] distinction [may] be drawn between two types of contract, namely contracts like sale which 
purport to define the rights and obligations of the parties and put a definite limit to them once 
396(1891) 12NLR202;(1920)41 NLR83; 19641 SA669(W). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
82 
and for all and contracts like lease which can endure for an indefinite time and which can 
define the ;ights and obligations of the parties for an indefinite period.397 
In this dictum , it would seem to be suggested that in a contract of sale an attempt is always 
made to define terms with certainty from outset. This would be misleading. For should this be 
so, there would be no room for the concept of price adaptation within sale: price would have 
had a definite limit placed on it once and for all; there would be no allowance for adjustment. 
The dictum is thus a generalisation. While it is true that in accordance with the requirement of 
certainty, parties to a contract of sale do often purport to define terms such a price with 
certainty, to maintain this is always so would be to deny that written above in connection with 
price adaptation, and moreover, would probably be to read the dictum out of context. It is 
clear that parties do not always attempt to define the contents of their contracts, such as price, 
with precision; they wish frequently to make provision for future contingency. 
On the other hand, the dictum is an useful one. It indicates that the contract of sale does not 
necessarily involve the establishment of a relationship between buyer and seller that extends 
beyond the instantaneous exchange of certain goods. Such a situation may well in fact 
represent the norm - if, for instance, the norm may be said to be represented by that 
transaction occurring most frequently. Consider, for example, the purchasing of groceries in a 
supermarket. Purchaser and seller negotiate briefly, meet to agree, effect exchange, and then 
disappear, frequently in a manner as anonymous as that in which they first met. In contrast, 
contracts such as lease involve invariably a relationship of some kind. Performance in these 
contracts is not, and cannot be, instantaneous. It extends over a lengthy period of time, and 
may endure indefinitely. Performance in a contract of service, for example, only ends on the 
completion of the contracted work; performance in lease, by the same measure, only 
terminates on the eventual termination of the lease. Consequently, throughout this period of 
performance, a relationship subsists. 
This serves to aid one ' s examination of adaptation with respect to sale in two respects . 
Firstly, the first time period (that is, the period in which contingency may arise) that may be 
highlighted as requiring adaptation in sale is that ofthe period (or 'gap ' ) between conclusion 
of the contract and performance. The performance envisaged in sale (namely, the moment 
when the seller delivers the merx in exchange for the agreed price) may be relatively 
instantaneous, but the period between conclusion of the contract and this moment of exchange 
is open nonetheless to unexpected change in circumstance. This may be contrasted with 
contracts of lease and service where it is usually during performance that circumstances may 
be expected to change. Given that performance in sale is invariably not an enduring affair, this 
is seldom, if ever, a period of concern to the parties to a sale. Accordingly, the focus with 
respect to contractual adaptation in the contract of sale shall be centred on the first of the time 
periods mentioned above, namely, the period between conclusion and performance, and not 
on the second, namely, the period of performance. 
Secondly, although correct in indicating that contracts such as lease invariably involve a 
relationship of not insignificant length between the contractants concerned, the dictum above 
is misleading should it be held to suggest this to be never the case in sale. For albeit that buyer 
397 1990 2 SA 870 (C) 873J-874A. 
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and seller do not necessarily, or even usually, form a relationship beyond that of the 
instantaneous exchange of goods, it is conceivable that such a relational contract might be 
entered into. If such a relationship can indeed be shown, then the third time period relevant to 
adaptation is also relevant, namely, that period during which a relationship subsists between 
buyer and seller. This relationship exists, in any event, even during the period (however brief 
this may be) between the conclusion of the contract and performance. However, it may also 
involve a relational period extending beyond this. This is demonstrated in two examples, the 
first of which is provided by Macneil. 
Macneil refers to the example of a smelter requiring coal for his smelting operation. The first 
phase in the contractual relationship created between them is that of the smelter making a spot 
purchase of 500 tons of coal from (at this stage) a stranger in a market of many sellers; this is 
the paradigm of a discrete transaction, that is, a transaction that starts sharply, is short-lived 
and ends sharply, either by clear performance or clear breach.398 Gradually, however, the 
relationship between smelter and coal merchant becomes more intricate. The smelter, firstly, 
becomes a regular client; thereafter he makes orders of coal in advance . Soon they agree on a 
year contract for the supply of coal, and then specifically agree on a quarterly price escalation 
clause. A hardship clause is thereafter incorporated, and the parties agree to lengthen the 
period of contract to twenty years . Agreement on a joint venture follows shortly thereafter, 
and ultimately the parties merge.399 
Important in the above example is that intrinsic throughout is that of a contract of sale. Until 
the moment the parties merge the transaction is, at its most basic, a sale of coal by the 
merchant to the smelter, and the moment of performance remains that instant when the coal is 
delivered and the money paid over. Performance remains therefore essentially instantaneous, 
and adaptation is required for that period between agreement on price and later delivery. 
Mechanisms created to implement adaptation for this period, and encountered in Macneil ' s 
example, are that of the escalation and hardship clauses. 
At the same time, however, it is clear that a relationship has developed. After each transaction, 
smelter and merchant do not disappear. Rather, they are engaged in a long-term relational 
contract. Between individual transactions of coal (where the period requiring possible 
adaptation is viewed as that period between agreement and delivery), and thus throughout the 
whole duration of the relationship, contingencies may arise which, although perhaps not 
directly affecting price immediately, may - because of the relationship that has developed 
between the two - affect any agreement on price in the future . Adaptation may be required thus 
for this period too. 
398 Paraphrased from Macneil Contractual Relations 65. 
399 Macneil indicates (66 ff) how the erosion of discrete characteristics of transactions commences 
almost immediately. The moment in fact that buyer and sel ler cease to be to each other nameless 
businessmen in a vast market and begin to interact beyond (and even before) the instant of exchange 
(by, for example, the sel ler stockpiling coal in anticipation of the buyer placing an order, or the buyer 
placing an order in advance), one gradually moves into the realm of the relational contract, and with 
it, the need for adaptation . 
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This is shown likewise in a case such asH Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd 
and Another,400 which, again in essence, concerns a contract of sale for cosmetic goods 
between a buyer and a seller. This 'sale', however, is a good deal more complex than that. In 
terms of the parties' agreement, the appellant had been appointed, for a period of five years, 
' the exclusive sales agent, distributor and purchaser' for South Africa of the goods in question, 
and which it was to purchase from the respondent. In turn, the latter agreed not to sell such 
goods to any other distributor, and to supply the appellant with stock each year. Throughout 
this period of time, consequently, the affairs of the respondent and seller were to be tightly and 
inseverably linked; forecasts of the amount and type of stock required were to be frequently 
exchanged, and increases in price were apparently to be agreed upon, in the light of current 
market conditions. But no matter the complexity of the agreement, it remained essentially a 
contract of sale, and it was precisely on the question as to how the parties had attempted to 
provide for the adaptation of price, over the course of this lengthy period, that the parties found 
themselves in court. 
Thus a contract of sale is not necessarily as clear-cut a phenomenon as Diners Club SA (Pty) 
Ltd v Thorburn might make it out to be. While it may often involve the instantaneous exchange 
of goods, with no period thereafter in which a contingency may upset the balance of 
performance, this is not necessarily the case. Frequently it may find itself at the core of an 
intricate, lengthy relationship. At the least, therefore, an adaptation mechanism created to aid 
adjustment within the context of sale, may be created with either of the following in mind: a 
change in circumstance that may materialise during the period between the conclusion of a 
particular agreement between the parties and performance thereof, and a change in 
circumstance that may materialise during the period during which the relationship exists as a 
whole. 
4 3 The envisaged approach to price adaptation in the contract of sale 
This chapter has confirmed that the concept of contractual adaptation within the contract of 
sale is a relevant one; this is particularly so with regard to the implications it holds for the 
later modification of price where the balance established between performance and counter-
performance, as reflected by price, is threatened by a change in circumstance caused by a 
contingency. In particular, this contingency may arise consequent to the conclusion of a 
contract of sale but before its performance, or during the period in which the buyer and seller 
are engaged in a relationship. It has moreover been shown that in the rule that price need not 
necessarily be immediately certain, but also objectively ascertainable, the concept of price 
adaptation already finds a foothold. In 2 4, in our encounters with price adjustment clauses, it 
has already been seen how parties may make use of this rule to provide for the later 
determination of price closer in time to actual performance. In hindsight now, this appears to 
be an obvious means of importing price adaptation. 
But is this the only means by which price may be adapted? More pertinently, is it only 
through price adjustment clauses that this foothold into price adaptation may be exploited? In 
the following two chapters, therefore, an attempt is made to provide an overview of the 
various techniques and methods used to provide for adaptation of price; some of these may 
400 1996 2 SA 225 (A). 
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directly flow from the rule that price may be objectively ascertainable, others less so. But the 
question throughout is how one arranges for the modification of price, and the flexibility this 
requires, whilst ensuring that, if at all possible, the requirement that price be certain is 
likewise respected. As should be evident from the discussion at 3 4 2, this is by no means an 
easy task. Throughout this overview, therefore, the three essentialia of adaptation will 
consequently be kept in mind, viz. (i) the flexibility to adapt to the change in circumstance, 
(ii ) the security that despite this flexibility, one is not being bound to a price with respect to 
which one would not have had any intention of agreeing, and (iii) security of tenure, that is, 
that throughout the process of adaptation, the contractual relationship remains on a sound 
footing. Thus the various techniques and methods used shall be evaluated to the extent each 
satisfies the peculiar demands of each of these essentialia, and accordingly, a conclusion shall 
be reached as to its specific usefulness as a price adaptation method. The approach taken in 
thi s evaluation, moreover, is a simple one, and is borrowed from De Lamberterie.401 Thus, 
following the latter ' s cue, an examination may firstly be made of price adaptation tools 
provided by the law itself, whether this be by means of specific doctrines, through the 
medium of the courts, or by legislation. Thereafter, one may examine the techniques used by 
the parties themselves to provide for, in advance, the possible modification of price. Chapter 5 
concerns, therefore, price adaptation ex lege, and Chapter 6, ex consensu. 
40 I Long-term Contracts 221. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: ADAPTATION TOOLS PROVIDED BY THE LAW 
5 1 Introduction 
In this chapter, consideration is given to the means by which the law itself provides for some 
manner of price adaptation. Whilst the doctrine of supervening impossibility might appear to 
lie closest at hand, especially when the need for price adaptation results from a dramatic 
change in circumstance, it appears that the law, through the medium of the courts, have 
provided for other subtler means too. A brief examination will also be made of the way in 
which modification of price by the courts is a direct possibility in various European 
jurisdictions, and the extent to which this may be plausible in South African contract law. 
5 2 Supervening Impossibility of Performance 
South African contract law has traditionally provided for a change in circumstance by way of 
the doctrine of supervening impossibility. This doctrine holds that when, as a result of events 
occurring subsequent to the conclusion of the contract, it becomes impossible for a party to 
perform in terms of an obligation, that obligation becomes extinguished.402 
It is usually said first , however, that impossibility of performance only extinguishes the 
obligation in question when the impossibility is absolute (objective). Traditionally, this would 
be held to mean that performance must be objectively impossible - that is, impossible for not 
just the debtor, but the world at large. As has been pointed out, however, objective 
impossibility should not be taken too literally.403 Thus in South African law, whether 
performance is possible is determined by reference to a standard of society ("n 
verkeersmaatstaf404), and that accordingly, impossibility will include cases of actual 
physical405 or legal406 impossibility, as well as cases where performance is physically 
possible, but cannot reasonably be expected to be rendered.407 Furthermore, while the point 
of departure remains that mere difficulty in performance, or the fact that performance has 
become more expensive, will not amount to impossibility,408 it has also been stated that 
402 See in general Lotz LAWSA XIX par 258 ; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 172-177; Van der 
Merwe et al Contract 383-387; Lubbe & Murray Contract 764-774; Joubert General Principles 293-
296; Hutchison Wille's Principles 497-499. 
403 Lotz LAWSA XIX par 258. 
404 De Wet & VanWyk Kontraktereg 174. Also Vander Merwe et al Contract 136, 384. 
405 Where, for example, the obligation was to deliver property, and the property is destroyed by fire 
before delivery. 
406 See the facts of Bekker v Duvenhage NO 1977 3 SA 884 (E) . 
407 Van der Merwe et al Contract 384; at 136 n II the authors indicate that in this context factors 
such as practical and economic expediency and fairness play a role. 
408 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 174: 'Difficultas praestandi is nie gelyk aan onmoontlikheid 
nie '. Reference is then made to Voet 22 I 29. Also Lotz LAWSA XIX par 258 and the facts of 
Yodaiken v Angehrn & Pie/1914 TPD 254, and Hersman v Shapiro & Co 1926 TPD 367. 
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application of the above standard of society may nonetheless regard a situation where to 
perform ' may be so difficult and lead to such economic or other hardship' as amounting to 
circumstances of objective impossibility.409 
Secondly, termination of the obligation will not follow where the impossibility to perform is a 
consequence of the fault of the debtor. 410 This is sometimes phrased by saying that the debtor 
is released when prevented from performing by vis maior or casus fortuitus. 411 It can thus be 
seen that the ratio for excusing the debtor lies in the fact that the resultant impossibility was 
unavoidable; if the debtor could have taken reasonable precautions to avoid the impossibility, 
there is clearly no vis maior or casus fortuitus, and his failure to do so means that he is at 
fault. It can thus be seen that the doctrine (and thus in particular, the prevailing view of what 
should constitute impossibility for a debtor) is in fact the expression of our law's views on the 
equitable allocation of risk under such circumstances. 412 Thus if the debtor was responsible 
himself for the impossibility (i.e. he is at fault), his duty to perform in terms of the obligation 
is not extinguished; his failure to perform amounts thus to breach of contract. The risk of 
impossibility thus remains with the debtor at fault. However, in cases where there is objective 
impossibility and which cannot be attributed to the debtor, the law regards it as inequitable for 
either of the parties to be allocated the risk of impossibility, and thus the obligation is 
terminated. This can likewise be seen again in the next major 'rule' usually cited, that is, a 
debtor is not released from performance which has become impossible if he himself has taken 
on the risk ofimpossibility.413 
It may further be noted that Kerr, in the context of this doctrine, nonetheless declines to make 
use of the term of impossibility, unless used in a specific context where traditional physical 
impossibility is intended. This would be, for example, where after the conclusion of a contract 
of sale but before delivery, the merx is physically destroyed. Kerr states that the doctrine may, 
after all , also be invoked where there occurs only partial or temporary impossibility, or where, 
while performance may not be said to be impossible, the form of performance that is possible 
is so different from that which was contemplated as not to be within the scope of the 
409 Vander Merwe et al Contract 136. 
410 De Wet & VanWyk Kontraktereg 172; Lotz LAWSA XIX par 258; Hutchison Wille's Principles 
497-498. See also e.g. Benjamin v Myers 1946 CPO 655 ; Bischojberger v Van Eck 1981 2 SA 607 
(W). 
411 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 172. Vis maior and casus fortuitus may be said to consitute a 
turn of events, emanating from nature or man, and which are irresistible and beyond the control of the 
ordinary person, and which in turn may be unforeseen or unforeseeable: Van der Merwe et at 
Contract 384; Lotz LAWSA XIX par 258 n 9; Hutchison Wille's Principles 498. Also e.g. Peters, 
Flamman & Co v Kokstad Municipality 1919 AD 427; Bayley v Harwood 1954 3 SA 498 (A). 
412 Lubbe & Murray Contract 770 n 2. 
413 See inter alia De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 174-175 ; Lotz LAWSA XIX par 258; and the 
facts of e.g. Hersman v Shapiro & Co 1926 TPD 367. Note here Lotz's submission in LAWSA XIX par 
258, that is, that in all cases of (objective) impossibilty, the obligation is terminated, irrespective 
whether the debtor was responsible for the impossibility or if he has undertaken this risk himself: for 
performance in terms of that obligation is simply impossible. Any consequent liability for the debtor 
(i .e. because he was at fault or undertook the risk himself) arises in terms of a ne·w obligation which 
follows from his not performing in terms of the previous (since rendered impossible) obligation. Cf. 
Lubbe & Murray Contract 772 n 8. 
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contract. 414 The above writer would appear therefore to make a clear link between the set of 
rules present in our law providing for termination of an obligation (and known ostensibly as 
the doctrine of supervening impossibility) and the concept of a change in circumstance, so 
inherent in any discussion of price adaptation. 415 Be that as it may, it should be noted that 
whatever label we attach to the particular circumstances which must be present before one 
might invoke the doctrine in question, the fundamental content of the doctrine of objective 
impossibility, or whatever label this might be, cannot be regarded as being in doubt. As 
pointed out above, the doctrine is not limited by any absolute use of the concept of 
impossibility. It has moved beyond a literal interpretation of the latter, to recognise that in the 
sphere of performance, few things are impossible in an absolute sense, but take up positions 
along that line which we might term degree of difficulty. As observed by De Wet & Van 
Wyk, objective impossibility is determined by reference to "n verkeersmaatstaf , and this 
standard, it has been said, encompasses both instances of physical impossibility as well as 
where performance is physically possible but cannot reasonably be expected to be 
rendered. 416 The substance of this test is therefore supple enough to cover any situation Kerr 
should have in mind, though it is a different question whether the courts in applying this 
standard are prepared to go to the extent Kerr would seem to be prepared to go in the 
application of his own test. 417 The general position remains that difficulty in performance, or 
the fact that performance is now more expensive, is no justification for the invocation of the 
doctrine .418 It may however be arguable that, if in particular one bears in mind that the 
doctrine of supervening impossibility does not always entail instances of literal impossibility, 
it may be more useful to rename the doctrine in such a manner so as to place greater emphasis 
on the fact that the contract has been overtaken by a change in circumstance. Consequently it 
would be the extent to which there has been such a change that would determine whether the 
doctrine may indeed be successfully invoked. Furthermore, there are also suggestions that our 
law may do well to develop its outlook regarding changes in circumstances or supervening 
impossibility upon some other basis, such as the concept of good faith. 419 
414 Kerr Contract 164. Accordingly, Kerr notes at 165 and 404 that he regards the modern rule as 
asking whether, despite the kind of performance envisaged in the contract being physically possible, 
it is in fact ' vitally different from what should reasonably have been within the contemplation of the 
parties when they entered into the contract '. Kerr takes this test from Williston. 
415 Consequently, in Contract 403 , Kerr refers to an 'absence during the currency of the contract of 
the circumstances necessary for the operation of the contract ' . 
416 Van der Merwe et al Contract 136, 3 84. 
417 Kerr (Contract 407-410, especially 403 ft) has suggested that our law has reached the stage 
where it is prepared to regard obligations as terminated under circumstances which in English law 
would be said to constitute frustration of the contractual purpose, but this has been criticised; cf. 
Lubbe & Murray Contract 773 . 
418 See above . 
419 That is to say, for example, that the enforcement of a contract under circumstances not envisaged 
at the time of contracting would amount to a breach of good faith. This approach draws from the 
increasing recognition of good faith as a principle applicable to all contracts. See here Lubbe & 
Murray Contract 773-774; Van der Merwe et at Contract 387; and see Christie ' s favourable 
comments regarding this suggestion in Christie Contract 19. See also the discussion of good faith in 
South African contract law at 5 3 below, and the recent publication by the South African Law 
Commission of its proposed Bill on the Control of Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or 
Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms, referred to in the final footnote of this chapter. There is al so 
the possibility of basing an approach upon the so-called clausula rebus sic stantibus, the basis of 
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For all this debate, however, a final factor begs here for consideration. Whatever the precise 
circumstances under which the doctrine of supervening impossibility may be invoked, or 
whatever label we attach, it should be apparent that its usefulness as an adaptation tool is 
limited. For the result of a successful plea is discharge of an obligation; South African courts 
have no discretion to alter or modify the contract before them. The debtor is completely 
released from his obligation, and where such an obligation is not severable from the balance 
of the contract, this may entail that the entire contractual relationship is thereby severed. 
Therefore, in only one sense is contractual adaptation truly served, viz. the security enjoyed 
by the parties in knowing that at least under such changed circumstances, they do not remain 
bound to contractual consequences they did not contemplate or perceive. Flexibility, on the 
other hand, is provided in the sense that the parties are cut loose from an obligation no longer 
appropriate to the new circumstances, and that they are accordingly free to agree afresh on 
new obligations. This, however, may count for little if it is considered that the parties enjoy 
little security of tenure. Any variation that may be agreed upon is dependent once more upon a 
fresh co-operation between the parties; the parties are not compelled to agree upon new terms 
while remaining contractually bound. 
Nonetheless, this lack of security of tenure must not be overstated. Where parties find 
themselves in a long-term relationship and a so-called bilateral monopoly has emerged, the 
need of both parties to remain in contractual relationship may ensure that both parties have the 
will not only to enter into renegotiations but also to carry it through to completion and fresh 
agreement. Thus following frustration ' s threat of termination, the parties renegotiate 
modification themselves. This, accordingly, has been said to be an important consequence of 
the English doctrine of frustration, which like the South African law on supervening 
impossibility, only allows for termination by the courts.420 However, in the absence of such 
constraining forces typical of bilateral monopolies, supervening impossibility provides for 
little in the way of security of tenure. 
Accordingly it is possible that a buyer may be hard hit by a change in circumstance, for 
example, by a dramatic increase in post-war inflation, and thus find the doctrine of 
supervening impossibility at his disposal. However, given the ali-or-nothing summarily 
extinctive nature of the latter remedy, he may fear the use of the doctrine more than the price 
increase itself, because it might thereby terminate a contractual relationship, with respect to 
which he greatly values and requires continuously to be safeguarded by contract. In this 
respect , the doctrine of supervening impossibility offers little in the nature of price adaptation. 
which is said to be that a person would be bound by the contract, or bare pact, only where the related 
circumstances have not changed subsequent to the conclusion of the contract or pact; Visser 1984 
SALJ 64 7. Such a clausula could be based on an actual supposition in the contract between the 
parties, viz. that the initial conditions wi ll not change, and thus be of a consensual nature; see here 
e.g. Van der Merwe et al Contract 202-203 , 386-387. Alternatively, it could also be regarded as a 
general ex lege term, but this wou ld not seem to have been received into Roman-Dutch or modern 
South African law; see here Visser 1984 SALJ 647 ff; Zimmermann Obligations 579-582; Lubbe & 
Murray Contract 773 ; Zimmermann Good Faith 257. It could also be based on a legal fiction; Van 
der Merwe et al Contract 387. The clausula lives on, however, in modern form in various foreign 
jurisdictions; see for example the discussion of German law at 54 2 below. 
420 See in particular Bell Long-term Contracts 214-215, and the discussion of English law under 53 
below. 
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5 3 The role of good faith and other adaptation tools employed by the law 
The shortcomings of the doctrine of supervening impossibility as an adaptation tool have been 
indicated above; in the face of a change in circumstance, justice may in many circumstances 
be better served by a modification of terms and not by total extinction. Nonetheless, it is 
perhaps the only doctrine existing in South African law which has been developed expressly 
for the situation of changed circumstances, and with respect to which there is some clarity . 
This however, is not to say that the law has been passive in developing other methods of 
ensuring mere modification, and not total extinction. When this has been done however, it has 
been done indirectly so, and sometimes even dishonestly. 
5 3 1 Adaptation: common tools of the trade 
Traditionally, South African courts have been reluctant to interfere openly with the private 
autonomy of the parties to a contract; to do so, would be to make the contract for the 
parties.421 Accordingly, aside from the rules relating to supervening physical or legal 
impossibility (but which only allow for termination), the courts have ostensibly refrained from 
modifying contracts that come before them, despite, for instance, some change in 
circumstance. Nonetheless, by way of, for instance, the application of fictions , the use of 
implied terms, and the readiness of the courts at times to subject the interpretation of contracts 
to an objective test, or to find for supposedly tacit terms by means of an objective test, South 
African courts have frequently ensured that contracts are in fact modified so as to result in the 
just enforcement of contracts.422 The theoretical basis for this judicial activism is said to be 
found in the notion of good faith.423 Furthermore, by fitting such modifications under the 
guise of well-established legal precepts, the courts thereby continue to maintain that they are 
not interfering with the autonomy of the parties.424 
That our courts are habitually if not somewhat dishonestly inclined towards modifying 
contracts, is well documented. In 1953, for instance, Findlay & Kirk-Cohen revealed much 
421 See the discussion at I I 3 above. 
422 See e.g. Van Huyssteen & Vander Merwe 1990 Stell LR 245 ; Zimmermann Good Faith 242-245. 
423 Lubbe & Murray Contract 469; Zimmermann Good Faith 241, 243. 
424 Similar judicial activism is a feature of English law, and finds particular expression in the 
doctrine of implied terms. Considering that, for example, it was stated in Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v 
Hall 1968 3 SA 231 (W), at 2360-E, that the South African and English authorities on implied terms 
are identical, it is not surprising that judicial activism is a feature common to both. On the covert 
nature of this type of judicial activism, see the remarks of Lord Denning in George Mitchell 
(Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [ 1983] I All ER 108 (CA) at 113 (cited also in 
Zimmermann Good Faith 243 n 192). For criticism see inter alia Trakman 1983 Modern Law Review 
who at 44 states that ' [t]he fictions surrounding the implied terms doctrine grew more extensive in 
nature as judges sought to objectify the intention of the parties, without, at the same time, admitting to 
judicial interference with the autonomy of written agreements ' . With regard to English law, and the 
manner in which it has, by way of interpretation, attempted to fulfil the reasonable expectations of 
contractants, see the recent article by Steyn 1997 Law Quarterly Review 433. On implied terms in 
English law in general, see Guest Chitty on Contracts 553 ff. 
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judicial interpretation in South African courts to be fictitious interpretation.425 This in turn 
was not to be regarded as interpretation at all, but judicial modification. The need for fictitious 
interpretation, the writers stated, usually arises out of some completely unexpected event, and 
which may cause the contract to operate with gross unfairness in one direction or another. 
Traditionally, discharge for physical or legal impossibility was to provide for such a turn in 
events, but that it was clear that justice required in some cases something less than the 
complete discharge of the contract. Open modification has never been an option for South 
African courts; accordingly, they seek to modify by way of 'interpretation'. This then is 
achieved by all manner of means : the generous use of implied terms, assumptions as to the 
intention of the parties, and the making of equity to 'creep in through the "surrounding 
circumstances" which did not really surround the parties when they made their contract but 
were there merely as potentialities of which they were quite unaware' .426 The writers noted 
further that while fictitious interpretation had been subject to much criticism,427 it was at that 
stage only under such a cloak that the principles of contractual modification were being 
developed. Accordingly, far from decrying what would one could regard as a dishonest use of 
judicial power, the writers applauded its use, and with foresight one is now compelled to 
recognise, suggested that such judicial modification, even under the guise of interpretation, 
was to be regarded as indication of the road ahead.428 
Overlapping with, and indeed as part of, fictitious interpretation, is the willingness of our 
courts to find for tacit terms on the basis of an objective test. Tacit terms, of course, are 
regarded as the unexpressed provisions of a contract but are derived nonetheless from the 
common intention of the parties, and are inferred from the express terms of the contract and 
the surrounding circumstances.429 Strictly speaking, therefore, a tacit term must represent the 
actual intentions of the parties, even if this representation is unexpressed (i .e. it is tacit). 
Frequently however, whilst contracting, the parties lack any particular intention with respect 
to a set of circumstances, simply because the eventuality of this set of circumstance appearing 
did not cross their minds. Accordingly, they could hardly be expected to have an actual 
intention with respect to something which they did not even think about.430 Accordingly, the 
test for a tacit term has become objectified. The courts apply the officious bystander test,431 
and the enquiry is no longer necessarily what the parties actually intended but what reasonable 
parties must be taken to i1ave intended in the circumstances of the case.432 Thus while the 
425 In their article entitled ' On Fictitious Interpretation ' published in that year's edition of the South 
African Law Journal. 
426 Findlay & Kirk-Cohen 1953 SALJ 147. See also Zimmermann Good Faith 243 on judicial 
activism by way of contractual interpretation. On reconciling party autonomy with fictitious 
interpretation, see again the remarks of Lord Denning in George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney 
Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] I AllER I 08 (CA) 113 . 
427 Findlay & Kirk-Cohen 1953 SALJ 145. 
428 Findlay & Kirk-Cohen 1953 SALJ 152. 
429 See, typically, Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 3 
SA 506 (A) 531-532. Also e.g. Van der Merwe et al Contract 197; Zimmermann Good Faith 244; 
Joubert General Principles 66 ff; Lubbe & Murray Contract 414-419; Hutchison Wille's Principles 
459-460. 
430 Vander Merwe et al Contract 198; Vorster 1987 SALJ592-593. 
431 On the officious bystander test, see the references cited by Joubert General Principles 68-69. 
432 See here e.g. Vander Merwe v Viljoen 1953 I SA 60 (A) 65 ; Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v 
Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 3 SA 506 (A) 532; Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd v Hall 1968 
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tacit term must be compatible with any intention revealed expressly in the contract, it is also 
deduced from such objective criteria as business efficacy and the likely intentions of the 
reasonable party in those circumstances. Consequently, the courts, to the extent that such 
modification is reconcilable with, for instance, reasonableness and business efficacy, has a 
certain leeway to vary.433 
It should be clear therefore how the courts, through interpretation and the finding for tacit 
terms, may choose to modify the terms of a contract. It is possible to conceive therefore of the 
situation where a court may find for a tacit term permitting renegotiation of price, and final 
third party arbitration on failure of the latter, in the event of a dramatic change in 
circumstance resulting in a gross imbalance between performance and counter-performance. 
Nonetheless, the possibility should not be exaggerated; the intention of the parties as 
expressly stated, or determinable and not merely imputable, remains it seems, the point of 
departure, and any interpretation with respect to a tacit term, is obliged to take proper 
recognition of the latter. 434 
Finally , it should also be noted that, potentially, the courts also possess an ability to find for 
implied or ex lege terms in a contract. Implied, or ex lege , terms are those unexpressed 
provisions of a contract that the law itself implies as a matter of course and without reference 
to the actual intentions of the parties; they do not derive from the consensus (or imputed 
consensus between the parties in the case of tacit terms) but are imposed from without.435 
Terms which are implied ex lege into a contract are also referred to as the naturalia of that 
particular contract. With regard to an implied term or naturale pertaining particularly to 
changes in circumstances, the clausula rebus sic stantibus springs here to mind, although this 
clause provides traditionally only for termination of obligations, and not mere modification. 
As indicated earlier, there appears little likelihood of the clausula itself being recognised as an 
implied term within all contracts.436 Nonetheless, the possibility of the courts recognising as 
an ex lege term, or as a naturale of a certain type of contract, a provision allowing, for 
instance, for modification of price in the event of a dramatic change in circumstance, does 
exist. As Zimmermann has noted, existing naturalia do not represent a numerus clausus, and 
new naturalia may be developed and existing ones extended or restricted so as to adjust the 
law to changing circumstances.437 
As stated above, it is said that the principle of good faith may be said to underlie these 
methods of judicial modification. It is thus necessary to examine the role that the principle of 
3 SA 231 (W); Van den Berg v Tenner 1975 2 SA 268 (A). For a crisp exposition of our law on tacit 
terms see Wilkins NOv Voges 1994 3 SA 130 (A), particularly at 136H-137C, and 14IC-E. 
433 See here in particular the discussion in Vander Merwe et al Contract 198-200, and Zimmermann 
Good Faith 244. 
434 Van der Merwe et al Contract 199. See especially the caveat by Nienaber JA in Wilkins NO v 
Voges 1994 3 SA 130 (A), at 141C-E. 
435 On terms implied by law see in general Van der Merwe et al Contract 196-197; Zimmermann 
Good Faith 245; Joubert General Principles 65 ff; Lubbe & Murray Contract 422 ff; Hutchison 
Wille's Principles 459. Also e.g. Minister van Landbou-Tegniese Dienste v Scholtz 1971 3 SA 188 
(A), A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker 1981 3 SA 406 (A); Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v 
Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 3 SA 506 (A). 
436 See 5 2 above. 
437 Zimmermann Good Faith 245 . 
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good faith itself might play, that is, outside of the guise of the methods discussed above, in the 
possible adjustment of contractual terms by the courts. This is accordingly examined 
immediately below. 
5 3 2 Good faith and price adaptation 
The majority judgement of the Appellate Division in Bank of Lisbon & South Africa Ltd v De 
Ornelas438 was received critically and controversially;439 in its wake, nonetheless, was 
dispatched the exceptio doli generalis . The exceptio had appeared, to some extent, a suitable 
remedy where a contract was sought to be enforced under circumstances that were not 
envisaged at the time the contract was made, and the enforcement of which would result in 
inequity. 440 As such, it would prima facie seem to have possessed some potential as a price 
adaptation tooi.441 Whereas, however, its demise was much lamented, it is possible a decade 
later to observe perhaps that its passing has hastened the discussion of the role that good faith 
might play as a general principle of South African law. We may yet be thankful to the court in 
Bank of Lisbon, for in forcing the legal community to search for alternatives to the exceptio, 
the decision ensured the discussion would happen sooner rather than later.442 Furthermore, it 
need hardly be said that a general principle in the form of bona fides, with its well-established 
pedigree in both legal history and modem international law, would prove a far more flexible 
instrument in the hands of the courts than the exceptio doli generalis, whose career in South 
African law was itself somewhat chequered. Accordingly, the possibility is raised of the 
principle of good faith serving as a mechanism for price adaptation. 
That good faith is regarded today as a highly important concept in the South African law of 
contract, there can be little doubt. Its presence in our law has been traced many times through 
both Roman and Roman-Dutch law as well as through decisions of our courts for close on a 
century.443 It has been said repeatedly that in modem South African law all contracts are 
438 1988 3 SA 580 (A). 
439 For criticism of the decision, and discussion of the exceptio (ironically, controversial enough 
before the Lisbon decision), see amongst others Van der Merwe, Lubbe & Van Huyssteen 1989 SAU 
235 ; Erasmus 1989 SAU 676 ff; Lewis 1991 SAU 262 ff; Zimmermann Good Faith 254-255 ; Kerr 
Contract 483 ff, 488 ff; Lubbe & Murray Contract 391 . 
440 See here Lubbe & Murray Contract 389. Also Christie Contract 18-19 as to its suitability in cases 
of changed circumstances. 
441 This, nonetheless, cannot be overstated. The exceptio was essentially a procedural defence, and as 
such, its effect was to preclude reliance on an agreement. Nonetheless, some commentators did claim 
that the exceptio gave the court an equitable discretion to modify unconscionable contracts; see the 
references in Lubbe & Murray Contract at 390. 
442 Note the correct prediction made by Van der Merwe, Lubbe & Van Huyssteen 1989 SAU 242: 
' Both judgements in Bank of Lisbon v Ornelas have brought South African law to the point where an 
analysis of bona fides, at policy and technical levels, has become unescapable ' . Cf. also Christie 
Contract 18. 
443 For a recent discussion of the development of good faith in our courts, see the judgement of 
Olivier JA in Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suide!ike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA), 
especially at 318H-324E. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
94 
bona fidei, and that good faith is an informing principle of South African contractuallaw.444 
In the most recent judgement by an appellate judge on the matter, bona fides is regarded as 
applicable within contractual law in that it constitutes "n onderdeel van die algemeen-
geldende open bare be lang beginsel'. 445 What is less clear, however, is how it operates and 
what its precise functions are.446 No comprehensive treatment of this problem has yet been 
attempted, and it would seem that at most, this is being attempted by the courts in a piece-
meal fashion, and through the framework of existing legal concepts.447 It has however been 
said that at the very least, one can be sure that good faith has not yet become a general 
principle ' allowing courts to alter the agreement of the parties merely because they consider it 
reasonable to do so' .448 In the light of this, it would seem that for the indeterminate future , 
the extent to which the principle of good faith will be allowed to operate so as to permit direct 
interference by the courts in the operation of contracts will be revealed in a rather casuistic 
manner. In Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO Olivier AR would 
have the Supreme Court of Appeal refuse to enforce a contract of surety on the grounds of 
good faith, the latter seen as an expression of public policy; it may happen, therefore, that at 
some stage the court goes further and, not being satisfied in merely ensuring that a term of a 
contract is not enforced, finds in its duty to treat contracts as bona fidei the power to modify 
the contract itself, and thus ensure its continued existence - much, of course, to the horror of 
party autonomists. This day however has not yet come. Judging by the powers of courts in 
foreign jurisdictions, this must nonetheless be considered a possibility . The doctrine of 
Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, which serves as an instrument for court-controlled (i.e. ex 
lege) price adaptation in German law, developed precisely from the German courts' extensive 
interpretation of§ 242, that is, the provision in the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) requiring 
contractants to perform in good faith.449 Consequently, under certain circumstances German 
courts today are able to adjust terms in contracts, and may thus revise prices hit by unforeseen 
contingencies. This astonishing development in German legal history did, however, take place 
in the turbulent hypher-inflationary days of the 1920's, and was accelerated by the 
legislature's failure to take any action itself. Thus, unless the legislature intervenes and passes 
legislation along the lines of, for example, art. 6:258 of the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek 
444 In particular, see the judgements of Jansen JA in Tuckers Land & Development Corporation (Pty) 
Ltd v Hovis 1980 I SA 645 (A), and Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas and Another 
1988 3 SA 580 (A) 611 G-617H (minority judgement). See also the following Appellate Division 
decisions : Paddock Motors (Pty) Ltd v !gesund 1976 3 SA 16 (A); Magna Alloys and Research (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 4 SA 874 (A); Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality 
1985 I SA 419 (A); Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 I SA I (A); Botha (nmv Griessel) and Another v 
Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd 1989 3 SA 773 (A). As to the opinion of our writers, see especially 
Zimmermann Good Faith 217 ff; also, inter alia, Vander Merwe et al Contract 230-234; Lubbe 1990 
Stell LR 7; Carey Miller 1980 SAU 531; Van Huyssteen & Vander Merwe 1990 Stell LR 244. 
445 Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA) 322C, 
where Olivier JA also remarks that ' [d]it blyk ook dat daar ' n innige verband bestaan tussen die 
begrippe bona fides, open bare be lang, open bare beleid en justa causa'. The judge thereafter refers to 
certain previous decisions of the Appellate Division in support of this opinion. It appears that little 
distinction can be made between the above concepts; see Zimmermann Good Faith 259 n 326 and the 
references given there. 
446 See the comments by Lubbe in 1990 Stell LR 19-20. 
447 Vander Merwe et al Contract 233 . 
448 Zimmermann Good Faith 241 . 
449 See the discussion of German law at 5 4 2 below. 
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(BW),450 it is likely that the extent to which our courts will judge themselves to be permitted 
to directly intervene in contracts on the basis of good faith will be revealed in a somewhat 
more leisurely fashion. 
It is submitted, nonetheless, that should such a power be deemed a development worth 
encouraging,451 South African law is well-placed. It has only just begun to exploit the rich 
potential offered by a principle which not only boasts an immaculate South African legal 
pedigree, but - most usefully- has been the object of extensive examination for many years in 
many European legal systems. A doctrinal basis for direct judicial modification would thus 
appear closer at hand than, for instance, in the case of England.452 Thus it is most significant 
that a French academic has looked to the possible application of art. 1134 al. 3 of the French 
Civil Code as a possible solution to the impasse in France where very little provision is 
allowed for direct adjustment or modification of contracts by the courts.453 
How, however, court-controlled price adaptation could be attained by the operation of the 
good faith principle in South African law is not of course clear. On the one hand, on the 
ground that good faith requires a certain co-operation between parties, a positive obligation of 
co-operation or collaboration could be held to rest on contractants.454 Consequently, the 
parties could be obliged to enter into a period of negotiations with a view to reaching some 
agreement satisfactory to both. It might then be that a party could be obliged to accept a 
reasonable price adaptation proposed by the party hit by an unforeseen change in 
circumstance.455 If a party refuses to accept such a proposal and insists on performance -
which on a strict interpretation of the contract he would be entitled to - this insistence could 
be regarded as an abuse of right, and not permitted. What the implications of such a finding 
would then be are uncertain; our law has no theory on the abuse of rights . But perhaps the 
court would find itself here in the position to adjust the contract, particularly if justified by 
legislation. 456 
It suffices to say, however, that there does exist the potential in South African law for courts 
to revise prices. It would of course be a great responsibility of the courts, and would require 
great trust.457 Nonetheless, the experience of courts in, for instance, substituting their own 
price in cases of manifestly unfair prices set by the thirds indicates the task might not be 
450 See the discussion of Dutch law at 54 3 below. 
451 See the discussion at 5 5 below. 
452 See the discussion at 5 4 5 and 5 5 below. 
453 De Lamberterie Long-term Contracts 234. Article 1134 al. 3 requires all agreements to be 
performed in good faith ; on this impasse, see the discussion of French law at 5 4 5 below. Certain 
Flemish writers in Belgium appear also to look towards justifying court-effected revision or 
modification of contracts on the basis of good faith , so as to circumvent the restrictive operation of 
imprevision; Herbots Contract 185 . 
454 See De Lamberterie Long-term Contracts again at 234. 
455 See here Speidel 1981 Northwestern University Law Review 404-405, and e.g. arts. 1467-1469 of 
the Italian Civil Code. 
456 See now, in fact, the South African Law Commission 's proposed Bill on the Control of 
Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms, referred to in the 
final footnote of this chapter. 
45 7 Note the remarks of Van Huyssteen & Van der Merwe in 1990 Stell LR 251. 
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inappropriate.458 For at present, otherwise, there exists little room for our courts for 
contractual modification, save where bringing contracts to a complete end (which little serves 
price adaptation) or under the guise of contractual interpretation. 
5 4 Changes in circumstances: a brief comparative synopsis 
5 4 1 Introduction 
A glance at various European legal systems reveals that, in general, European legal systems 
have moved a considerable way in creating clear solutions to the problems created by drastic 
and sudden changes in circumstance, and the consequent upsetting of the balance established 
at contract between performance and counter-performance. That the origins of the clausula 
rebus sic stantibus may be traced back to the middle ages459 indicates the problem not to be a 
new one in the minds of European jurists. It is further interesting to note that many of the 
solutions to be found in modern European law take the form of a distinct provision in 
legislation. This is unlike the South African position, where any distinct doctrine concerning 
adjustment in the light of a change of circumstance cannot be said to exist at all, or at most, 
has been argued to be an extension of the rules relating to supervening impossibility. 
Furthermore, the European provisions in question often specifically address the question of 
contractual performance which has not become (physically or legally) impossible, but 
' merely ' difficult (though, of course, often where difficult only to some substantial degree), 
and thus often provide for contractual modification, and not only termination. 
54 2 Germany 
In German law, there is no general provision in the BGB concerning the effect of a 
fundamental change in circumstance. Rather, the usual basis for relief can today be said to be 
provided by the doctrine of the collapse of the underlying basis of the transaction ( Wegfall der 
Geschaftsgrundlage). While a distinct doctrine in its own right, and a doctrine effectively 
developed by the German courts, its origins have been said to lie in the so-called corrective 
function of Treu und Glauben (good faith), and accordingly it is still formally treated under 
the discussion of§ 242 (i.e. the general provision on good faith in the BGB).460 As a modern 
version of the clausula rebus sic stantibus, the doctrine's more recent development may be 
traced in the Prussian General Land Law of 1794, and in the theories advanced by the 
Pandectist Bernhard Windscheid, and by Paul Oertmann. 461 It is the latter jurist who has 
provided modern German courts with a name and language for its interventionist approach, if 
458 See 2 54 I above. 
459 See especially Zimmermann Obligations 579-582. 
460 See here in particular the discussion on good faith in German law by Whittaker & Zimmermann 
in their introductory chapter entitled 'Good Faith in European Contract Law: Surveying the Legal 
Landscape ' in Whittaker & Zimmermann (eds) Good Faith in European Contract Law, forthcoming 
in early 2000. 
461 For a synopsis of the doctrine 's development, and for much of the discussion below, see inter 
alia Zweigert & Katz Comparative Law 211-212; Markesinis et al Obligations 516-520; Lorenz 
Contract Modification 360-362, 365-375. 
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not necessarily the substance behind the doctrine. 
The doctrine of Wegfall der Geschdftsgrundlage may be said to be the consequence of the 
failure of the drafters of the BGB to include a specific provision on the influence of changes 
in circumstances. The failure to include such a provision was initially compensated for by an 
expanded application of the rules in the BGB relating to supervening impossibility of 
performance. In the period from approximately 1904 until the 1920's, impossibility as found 
in various articles in the BGB came to encompass not only cases of traditional impossibility 
but also ' economic impossibility'. Thus a debtor could be released from performance if the 
supervening event had made performance so difficult that commercial men would regard the 
extraordinary difficulty as amounting to impossibility, and in another line of decisions from 
the same period, the Reichsgericht (Imperial Supreme Court) permitted release under 
economic impossibility when to require performance would have been to 'ask too much ' 
(unzumutbar). Even the rule that a seller could not be released from his obligations on account 
of a price increase was qualified when the court allowed for the 'defence of ruination' 
(Einrede der Existenzvernichtung) - that is, when to hold to the original prices would have 
been to bring about the seller's immediate bankruptcy.462 
However, it soon became clear that while the concept of economic impossibility had its uses 
in affording certain relief in the inflation-ridden period of post-War Germany, its usefulness 
was limited. For in that it was linked to the traditional concept of impossibility, as expressed 
in various provisions of the BGB, a successful plea invariably resulted in termination of the 
obligation. Accordingly, in offering only discharge, and not merely adjustment, it failed to 
offer a party, hard hit by a drastic change in circumstance, the opportunity for relief whilst 
simultaneously maintaining the contractual bond between the parties.463 This, of course, and 
as mentioned above, is precisely the deficiency crippling the doctrine of supervening 
impossibility in South African law as a possible ex lege mechanism for achieving price 
adaptation under changed circumstances. 
Following this dissatisfaction with the concept of economic impossibility (and the fact that it 
was conceptually too vague), the search for a possible solution was given impetus by the 
publication in 1921 by Paul Oertmann of his monograph entitled Die Geschdftsgrundlage; 
Ein neuer Rechtsbegriff Oertmann's theory was first alluded to in a decision of the 
Reichsgericht in 1922, and in the famous landmark case of RGZ 107, 78, which followed the 
year after. In the latter case, the Reichsgericht ordered the owner of mortgaged property464 to 
pay to the mortgagee an additional sum over and above the nominal value of the mortgage so 
as to offset the extraordinary devaluation of paper money which had occurred in Germany 
following the conclusion of the mortgage contract in 1913. This decision, apart from making 
reference to Oertmann's theory (and thus ensuring that this theory, even if in name only, 
would continue to find expression in decisions of the German Supreme Court up until the 
present), found justification for its abandonment of nominalism, in the final resort, in the 
462 On economic impossibility and the decisions of the Reichsgericht during this period, see 
Zweigert & Kotz Comparative Law 212-214; Lorenz Contract Modification 365-368; and Markesinis 
et al Obligations 520-523 . 
463 Markesinis et al Obligations 523 . 
464 Interestingly, the property in question was situated in Luderitz, Namibia, 111 what was then 
German Southwest Africa. This is an additional reason for visiting the town. 
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principle of good faith (Treu und Glauben). Thus it stressed that the principle of nominalism 
was to be disregarded 'if as a result of an especially heavy depreciation of legal tender, not 
foreseen at the time when the currency regulation was passed [i.e. 1 June 1909], it would lead 
to results which can no longer be reconciled with § 242 BGB'. Judicial intervention is thus 
!inked directly to the principle of good faith operating in German contractual law. This so-
called corrective use of the principle of good faith, arising as it does from as broad and general 
a statement on good faith as § 242, may well be indicative to South African contractual law, 
struggling (as it would appear we do) with equally general notions of good faith; admittedly, 
of course, such notions in South African law are uncodified. Bland it may be, but § 242 has 
borne much fruit in Germany.465 Secondly, RGZ 107, 78 stressed that intervention was only 
justifiable in the most serious of disruptions, and each case was to be judged in the light of its 
own facts and in accordance with the principle of good faith. The Reichsgericht also 
confirmed that the solution lay in adjustment of the contract, and not in termination, and 
accordingly sent the case back to the court below with precise instructions as to determining 
the amount of revalorization. This option continues to be utilised, as German courts held that 
' in law it is a basic premise that contracts should be performed'. 466 As later decisions have 
indicated, this emphasises the belief of the courts that they do not regard themselves as 
intervening in these cases but merely helping to bring about the natural result of the 
contract.467 An order to discharge the contract is, of course, likewise possible; as it has been 
said, good faith may also require the total release from contractualliabilities.468 
As mentioned, Oertmann' s theory consequently became famous as it was seized upon by the 
Reichsgericht and cited in numerous leading cases thereafter. However, a modern evaluation 
of the Wegfall doctrine is apt to regard Oertmann's contribution as essentially decorative : he 
has served to provide the German Supreme Court with phrases to dress up its material 
findings. Accordingly, modern viewpoints suggest the basis of the doctrine can be found in 
the courts ' allocation of risk between the contracting parties, and this depends very much on 
the facts of each case.469 Accordingly, even RGZ 107, 78 tends to be regarded today as 
primarily of historical significance. However, it is a striking example of a way in which a 
general provision such as good faith was boldly applied by the courts in order to permit 
adjustment of contracts hard hit by changes in circumstance. 
Thus today German courts continue to approach problems of altered circumstances on the 
basis of the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, irrespective of whether, as has been 
claimed, this tends to obscure the issue truly being grappled with by the courts, viz. proper 
465 See here the comments of Markesinis et al Obligations at 511 , and that generality has been its 
very strength. On the other hand, it has also led to its abuse, particularly during the period of National 
Socialism. Today, however, it is the fundamental values of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) which 
permeates the German legal system (including the entire body of private law which is required to be 
interpreted in the spirit of the fundamental rights), and no longer the fascist ideology of the 1930 's 
and early 40 ' s: see here again the introductory chapter entitled 'Good Faith in European Contract 
Law: Surveying the Legal Landscape ' in Whittaker & Zimmermann Good Faith. 
466 BGH JZ 1952, 145, 146 (translation supplied in Markesinis et al Obligations 528). 
467 Markesinis et al Obligations 532. 
468 BGH MDR 1953, 282 (translation supplied in Markesinis et al Obligations at 582). 
469 Zweigert & Kotz Comparative Law 215; Markesinis et al Obligations 519 and the references 
cited there; and Lorenz Contract Modification 370. 
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allocation of risk.470 Essentially, the basis of the transaction (die Geschaftsgrundlage) 
consists of those circumstances which (i) have been presupposed by the parties at the time 
they entered into the contract, which (ii) are so important to one of them that he would not 
have contracted in their absence, or would have concluded it differently, and (iii) the 
importance of which the other party would have had, in good faith, to acknowledge.471 In the 
event of an unforeseeable change resulting in these circumstances falling away, adjustment or 
termination is justified. Thus in a contract of sale, a circumstance fundamental to the contract 
may be that the value of money will not substantially change. In the event of inflation, this 
value does alter. Normal inflation however, will not allow for adjustment in terms of the 
doctrine: the change in circumstance (as caused by normal inflation) was foreseeable . In the 
event of dramatic and unforeseeable inflation following, for instance, an unexpected war, 
adjustment will be allowed; the change was unforeseeable. Phrased in the language of risk, it 
would be said here that the balance between performance and counter-performance has been 
disturbed to such an extent by an unforeseeable event that the change in circumstance can no 
longer be regarded as being covered by the normal contractual taking of risks by one of the 
parties: a party would generally not undertake the risk of dramatic and unexpected inflation. 
By holding him to this risk, his interests are gravely jeopardized; accordingly, adjustment is 
permitted so as to allow for a proper allocation of risks. 
Finally, this is not to say either that by permitting a court to interfere and allow adjustment of 
a contract makes for ideal price adaptation. Markenisis et a! document the considerable 
burdens placed on the German courts as, in the aftermath of RGZ 107, 78 , huge numbers of 
contracts came up before them for revalorization, that is, contractual modification.472 
Naturally, the solution closer at hand would be a negotiated settlement between the parties 
before rushing off to court. Nonetheless, in the absence of other self-initiated price adaptation 
mechanisms, it does allow a party to force the other to court so as to import the necessary 
adjustment while maintaining their mutual contractual bond. How healthy this contractual 
relationship would be after each has had his day in court is another question. 
5 4 3 The Netherlands 
As in the case of the German BGB, the new Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW) contains a so-
called good faith clause, viz. art. 6:248, which regulates the legal consequences of contracts 
by reference to, inter alia, good faith (redelijkheid en billijkheid). In addition, however, in art. 
6:258 it also contains a specific provision dealing with change in circumstances, and which is 
likewise based upon redelijkheid en billijkheid. Article 6:248 (first paragraph) thus provides 
that the court, at the demand of one of the parties, may modify the effects of a contract or set 
it aside in whole or in part on the basis of unforeseen circumstances which are of such a nature 
that the co-contracting party, according to the criteria of reasonableness and equity 
(redelijkheid en billijkheid), might not expect that the contract be maintained in an unmodified 
4 70 Zweigert & Ki:itz Comparative Law 216. 
4 71 This outline of the doctrine is taken freely from the German report to Case 25 in Whittaker & 
Zimmermann Good Faith . See also, for concise statements in English regarding the essence of the 
doctrine, Foster German Legal System 247, and Schwenzer Contracts 181 . 
472 Markesinis et al Obligations 526-528. 
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form.473 
It has been noted that the expression 'unforeseen circumstances' should not be interpreted 
literally. The test is not what circumstances the parties have foreseen or could foresee . Rather, 
the circumstances are 'unforeseen' when the parties have failed to make provision for the 
change in circumstances in their contract, that is, when the contract itself neglects to make 
sufficient provision therefor.474 Where provision has been made, then such circumstances 
have been made a part of the contractual allocation of risk.475 Furthermore, modification or 
the setting-aside of the contract must be effected by the court. A court may attach a condition 
to its order (e.g. restitution or the payment of a certain amount of money by one party) and the 
order may be of retroactive effect. 
There is, moreover, a certain degree of overlap between art. 6:258 and, for instance, the 
provisions in the Burgerlijk Wetboek concerning impossibility (force majeure). The latter 
provisions follow a more subjective approach to impossibility, that is, a debtor can invoke 
impossibility following his failure to perform (even where performance was not objectively or 
absolutely impossible, but merely onerous or difficult), provided this failure to perform did 
not result from his fault or was at his risk.476 Thus it may be difficult to distinguish a 
situation where, as a result of unforeseen circumstances, a party would not expect the contract 
to be maintained in unmodified form (i.e. art. 6:258), from that situation where performance 
has become practically too onerous for the debtor as the result of an event not due to his fault , 
and falling beyond his sphere of contractual risk (impossibility).477 This of course merely 
indicates that an increasingly subjective approach to supervening impossibility, as might 
appear to be the trend in South African law, offers some relief in cases where previously a 
change of circumstance falling short of objective impossibility would find no relief at all. An 
approach along the lines of impossibility of course, even if subjective, nevertheless cannot 
match the price adaptation potential of a clause such as art. 6:258, with its provision for 
modification. 
During the period of post-War 1920's inflation, and in contrast to the position of the German 
courts, the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) refused to intervene in cases where as a result 
of unforeseen circumstances the equilibrium between performance and counter-performance 
had been gravely upset. Gradually however, and in anticipation of art. 6:258 and the new 
Burgerlijk Wetboek, the court has altered its position.478 Thus while the Hoge Raad has 
required extreme caution in the application of art. 6:258,479 the wide, general discretion 
afforded the courts, with its emphasis on the redelijke en billijke expectations of the parties, 
permits, it would seem, greater opportunity for revision and modification of contracts (and 
thus court-initiated price adaptation) than, for instance, in the case of Germany.480 
473 Hartkamp & Tillema Contract 63, 124-125; Fokkema & Hartkamp Obligations 97. 
474 See in general Hartkamp Asser's Handleiding 319-333; also Hartkamp & Tillema Contract 63 , 
125 ; Fokkema & Hartkamp Obligations 97 . 
475 See e .g. the Dutch report to Case 25 in Whittaker & Zimmermann Good Faith. 
476 Hartkamp & Tillema Contract 120. 
477 Hartkamp & Tillema Contract 125-126. 
478 Hartkamp & Tillema Contract 63 ; Fokkema & Hartkamp Obligations 97. 
4 79 Hartkamp Asser's Handleiding 319 ff. 
480 See here in particular the Dutch report to Case 25 in Whittaker & Zimmermann Good Faith, and 
- ------------------------------------~ 
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5 4 4 The Nordic countries, and Greece, Spain and Italy 
The legal systems of the Nordic countries, in particular, Sweden, Finland, Norway and 
Denmark, are characterised by close co-operation, and together may be said to constitute the 
distinctive Nordic family of law. A feature of this co-operation is that they share, certainly 
greatly in substance if not always in interpretation, a joint Contracts Act. This was passed 
initially in Swedenin 1915, and in later years by the other three states. In this act one finds s. 
36, which provides that an agreement may be set aside wholly or in part or may be amended 
in so far as it would seem unreasonable or in conflict with good commercial practice to invoke 
it.481 This provision grants a Nordic court a wide discretion regarding the adjustment of 
contracts. Thus in the context of inflation-induced price rises, the travaux preparatoires 
indicate that a general change in the balance between performance and counter-performance 
will not justify adjustment; nonetheless, the inflation need not be unexpected, and thus even 
' normal ' inflation may at times permit an adjustment, if the effect of the inflation is 
unreasonable and the parties did not specifically deal with this issue in their contract.482 
Moreover, s. 36 may be used to adjust an indexation or adjustment clause agreed upon by the 
parties, where this clause is consequently not considered appropriate in the light of the actual 
changes in circumstance that subsequently occur.483 
Other jurisdictions permitting modification by the courts in the event of a change in 
circumstance gravely affecting the equilibrium between performance and counter-
performance include Greece, by way of art. 388 ofthe Greek Civil Code, and Spain, where the 
High Court, despite a lack of a legislative basis, permits modification under stringent 
circumstances.484 In Italy, arts. 1467-1469 of the Italian Civil Code provide for parties 
engaged in (specifically) long-term contracts and where performance for one of the parties has 
become excessively onerous due to extraordinary and unforeseeable events. In such a case, a 
party may demand rescission of the contract, but the other party can avoid this by offering an 
equitable modification of the terms of the contract. Rescission will also not be granted if the 
supervening difficulty falls within the normal risks of the contract. 485 
5 4 5 Jurisdictions with little scope for modification by the courts: England and France 
Finally, it may be noted that in two major legal systems in Europe, that is, in England and 
France, very little provision is made for judicial adjustment of contracts in the event of drastic 
changes in circumstance. 
the observations of Simon Whittaker and Reinhard Zimmermann in the Interim Comparative Analysis 
to Case 25 , ibid. 
481 On s. 36 of the joint Nordic Contract Act, and on its application to facts , see the Finnish, Swedish 
and Danish/Norwegian reports to Case 25 in Whittaker & Zimmermann Good Faith. 
482 See in particular the Swedish report to Case 25 in Whittaker & Zimmermann Good Faith. 
483 Ibid. 
484 See the Greek and Spanish reports to Case 25 in Whittaker & Zimmermann Good Faith. 
485 Zweigert & Kotz Comparative Law 220; Lorenz Contract Modification 363. 
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In England, provision for changed circumstances in made under the doctrine of frustration . In 
Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham UDC486 the House of Lords formulated the test for 
frustration as being whether the changed circumstances would make performance of the 
contract ' radically different ' from the obligation originally undertaken by the parties. While 
this test is today also satisfied in conditions other than that those envisaged by factual or legal 
impossibility, or of frustration of purpose along the lines of the Krell v Henry coronation 
cases,487 it is still doubtful whether frustration would be found in cases where performance 
has merely become more onerous or expensive.488 The point of departure remains that the 
parties are to look after themselves. In any event, the doctrine of frustration would appear to 
be of limited use in the context of price adaptation, as it allows only for termination of 
obligations, and not modification.489 However, in cases where both parties have committed 
resources to the continuing contractual relationship, and stand to lose on its termination, the 
threat of frustration may force the parties to renegotiate and reach a solution themselves .490 
Bell , for instance, states the effect of a frustrating event is to alter the starting points for the 
renegotiation of terms, and suggests that this is the primary function of the law's intervention 
(i.e. its threat of termination) . Thus in long-term contracts, the threat of termination urges the 
parties tovvards new agreement, and this fear-inspired pragmatism is reflected in the paucity of 
litigation to be found on this issue .491 This, however, will apply generally only in cases of 
long-term relationships; that is , where there is no so-called bilateral monopoly, this threat will 
be felt less . 
486 [ 1956] AC 696. 
487 Krell v Henry (1903] 2 KB 740. 
488 See the English report to Case 25 in Whittaker & Zimmermann Good Faith , for an application of 
thi s test. There is , however, some authority that frustration may operate when circumstances change 
to the extent that prices are driven up to ' unheard of levels ': Tradax Export SA v Andre & Cie SA 
[ 1976] 1 Lloyd 's Rep 416 . For a general (and inevitably casuistic) discussion of frustration and its 
operation, see inter alia Guest Chitty on Contracts 1016 ff; Furmston Contract 574 ff; Treitel 
Contract 778 ff. 
489 Treitel , for example, recognises this weakness : Contract 781 . While frustration brings about the 
discharge of the obligation , and that accordingly restitution should then result, the Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act of 1943 has granted to the English courts a general , albeit limited, power 
of adjustment on termination, so as to afford a more equitable restitution . Use of this discretion may 
at times seem to result in a remedy more akin to modification of an existing contract than to 
restitution of a discharged contract : thus , in terms of s I (3 ), where the court is of the view that one 
party has partly performed after the contract is deemed to have been discharged, it may order the 
party so benefitted to pay to the performing party a sum which it considers to be just with regard to 
this part of the performance. Thus, with respect to the price paid for this part of the performance (i.e. 
the part performed, that is , after the contract was held to have ended), the court, by ordering the 
payment of a reasonable price, has effectively allowed for modification . See further Bell Long-term 
Contracts 214-215. Section 1 (2) of the above Act also allows the court, in its reasonable discretion , to 
deduct from any amount payable by one party as restitution, expenses incurred by that party before 
the discharge of the contract, and which were incurred for the purpose of performance ofthe contract. 
See also Dawson 1982 Juridical Review 88-89. 
490 See Bell Long-term Contracts 214-215 . It is perhaps for this reason - that is, that the Eng! ish 
approach leads to both parties solving the situation themselves, rather than them making recourse to 
the courts- that Zweigert & Ki:itze (Comparative Law 227-228) would appear impressed by (as they 
see it) the realistically commercial solutions reached by the English courts and parties in cases of 
changed circumstances. See here generally 55. 
491 Bell Long-term Contracts 2 15 . 
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In French law, the position is likewise restrictive. Since 1876, the Cour de cassation has 
rejected revision pour imprevision (doctrine of revision for unforeseeability), holding that it is 
not the task of courts to modify private contracts (that is, in circumstances not justifying 
termination in terms of force majeure), no matter how equitable this might appear to be. 492 
An exception to this was established, however, by the French administrative courts in 1916, 
where impnivision was permitted in the case of a contract where a public service was at stake. 
In strict private law, however, the position remains restrictive. Businessmen are accordingly 
required to provide for themselves the allocation of risk in the event of changed 
circumstances, or, alternatively, revert apparently to arbitration.493 The failure of French law 
to provide for imprevision within the sphere of private law has been criticised.494 There have, 
moreover, been suggestions that a solution may be found in the application of art. 1134 a!. 3 
ofthe French Civil Code.495 
5 5 A case for price adaptation by the courts? 
In this chapter, an examination has been made of the mechanisms provided by the law itself in 
order to allow for an equitable allocation of risks in the event of changed circumstances, or in 
the context of sale, in order to provide for price adaptation. In this respect, the role played by 
the law in various jurisdictions differs greatly, and the position in, for instance, Nordic 
jurisdictions may be compared with that in South African and English law. 
At first glance, it may appear that the situation in England (or South Africa for that mater) 
should be intolerable: provision is only made for termination in terms of the doctrine of 
frustration (or supervening impossibility in South Africa), and the parties are expected to 
provide for price adaptation mechanisms themselves. On the failure of the latter, parties may 
at most make recourse to frustration; the courts possess no general power of adjustment.496 
This consequence has been criticised;497 the law here is afforded little role as a fall-back or 
stop-gap. It has been said, therefore, that there has been revealed 
a serious defect in English commercial law: the inability of courts ... to adapt a contract to 
uncontemplated fundamental changes of economic, political or social nature, if the parties 
intend to abide by their contract and to implement it.498 
492 Civ. 6 March 1876, Canal de Craponne, DP 1976.1 .193 note A. Giboulot. See also Nicholas 
Contract 208-21 0; De Lamberterie Long-term Contracts 228-232; Zweigert & Kotz Comparative 
Law 217-220; Lorenz Contract Modification 358-360; and the French report to Case 25 in Whittaker 
& Zimmermann Good Faith . 
493 Zweigert & Kotz Comparative Law 220; Lorenz Contract Modification 359-360. For a detailed 
examination of the options available to French businessmen, see De Lamberterie Long-term 
Contracts , passim. 
494 See De Lamberterie Long-term Contracts , passim, and the French report to Case 25 in Whittaker 
& Zimmermann Good Faith. 
495 That is, the article providing that contracts 'doi vent etre executees de bonne foi ' (that is, should 
be performed in good faith). See again De Lamberterie Long-term Contracts 234. 
496 Treitel Contract 781 ; Bell Long-term Contracts 214. 
497 E T . I .b.d 
.g. re1te , 1 1 . 
498 Schm itthoff 1980 Journal of Business Law 91 . 
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On the other hand, this defect, if it is indeed one, would appear not to be a matter of 
extraordinary concern for the English lawyer. A reading of Bell indicates that few cases on the 
issue come up before the courts. Clearly, solutions are being found. Moreover, a lawyer such 
as McKendrick finds himself in disagreement with this criticism, and in a recent article499 has 
argued that in English law there exists little need for judicial modification by the courts in the 
event of changing circumstances. 
McKendrick's arguments against judicial modification are chiefly two. These are (i) that the 
granting to the courts of a flexible, discretionary power to adapt the contract to meet the new 
situation would create an unacceptable degree of uncertainty, and (ii), that the courts would be 
incompetent in their attempts to do so. If there is to be adjustment, this should be provided for 
by the parties themselves: ' [ c ]ontracting parties and their lawyers then know where they 
stand'.500 This certainty is lost where this task is foisted upon the courts,SOI who, moreover, 
are not trained as businessmen. McKendrick also refers approvingly to the views of Dawson 
and his analysis of American law,502 and the notorious attempt by an American court in 
Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) v Essex Group Inc503 to adjust the price agreed upon 
in a contract hit by changed circumstances. Consequently, he places grave doubt upon the 
competence of the judiciary to engage in such an adjustment.504 As a further objection, 
McKendrick raises a question of policy: to permit a party to cry unfair and run off to the court 
for an equitable adjustment would, not withstanding the objections already raised, also place 
insufficient weight on the bargain initially struck by the parties.505 
499 'The Regulation of Long-term Contracts in English Law', published in Beatson & Friedmann 
( eds) Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law ( 1995). 
500 McKendrick Regulation 329. Also 314, 332 . 
50 I That is, perhaps, at least until a significant body of case law has accumulated; see McKendrick 's 
remarks in a slightly different context at ibid ., 325. But even here, in the light of the struggle for 
clarity regarding the doctrine of frustration (or for that matter, supervening impossibility in South 
African law) McKendrick would no doubt be sceptical of any certainty emerging that could be, at any 
rate , comparable to the certainty the parties themselves could obtain by the inclusion of their own 
prOVISIOnS. 
502 Dawson 1982 Juridical Review 86. 
503 499 F Supp 53 (US Dist Ct, WD Pa, 1980). 
504 McKendrick Regulation 331. Also 314, 325. For strong criticism of a court ' s ability to effect 
revision or modification of contractual terms see Dawson 1982 Juridical Review I 04-105 , and 
Trakman 1983 Modern Law Review 46-4 7. 
505 Regulation 314. While this would appear to be an argument based upon the principle of pacta 
servanda sunt, it must also be remembered that contractual adjustment, as performed by the courts or 
the parties, does not terminate the initial agreement, it merely modifies it. Moreover, while it could 
then be argued that the modified contract after modification is so different from the initial bargain 
struck (e .g. the price could now be radically different) that it would appear not to be a case of pacta 
servanda sunt, this outlook might be too superficial. If the balance between bargained-for 
performance and counter-performance which has been upset by the change in circumstance can be 
regarded as part of the substance or content of the initial contract, then by later modification, this 
balance has been restored. Consequently, following modification, a bargain more akin in substance to 
the initial bargain, though different in outward form or appearance (e.g. the actual price may now be 
greatly different), will be enforced, as this balance has been restored. In this sense then , modification 
adheres to pacta servanda sunt. 
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By contrast, McKendrick places great stock in the abilities of the parties themselves to draw 
up their own provisions, and he refers to the wide range of sophisticated devices available to 
them for inclusion in their contracts. He indicates further that English lawyers have substantial 
experience in their creation and implementation,506 and suggests that the role of the courts in 
the context of contractual modification is primarily supportive: no more is demanded of the 
courts than that they be not too astute in striking out such clauses on the grounds of 
vagueness.507 The devices he refers to, and the attitude he requires of the courts shall be 
referred to later in the study.508 
Aside from these views, there are other possible pointers to this apparent lack of concern in 
English law regarding the absence of a provision for express judicial modification, or 
opposition hereto. Thus, Bell is of the opinion that, in any event, English courts are generally 
receptive to mechanisms employed by parties to make provision for contingency, and are 
willing to help if a specified mechanism for dealing with such situations breaks down.509 
McKendrick too is able to point to certain recent decisions which have displayed the kind of 
interpretative benevolence which he favours . 510 Secondly, by application of the doctrine of 
implied terms, English courts are able to import reasonable terms into contracts under the so-
called presumed intention of the parties, and in this way fill gaps in the contingency planning 
of parties. 51! For while the well-worn rule is that the English courts will not easily imply a 
term into a contract, and not simply because it is reasonable to do so, a case such as 
Staffordshire Area Health Authority v South Staffordshire Waterworks Co512 indicates a more 
flexible approach to the implication of terms. McKendrick also recognises this possibility . 513 
Furthermore, as Bell points out, the threat of frustration, and resultant termination, encourages 
parties to enter into renegotiation and make adjustments to the required performances 
themselves, rather than have discharge foisted upon them by the courts. That such a threat 
does seem to encourage parties to reach agreement on modification - at least parties involved 
in long-term relationships - is reflected, says Bell, in the paucity of litigation to be found in 
English law on this problem.514 Perhaps even more illuminating, however, is the opinion of 
English jurists that the possibility of adjustment or modification by the court is even more 
likely to encourage parties to renegotiate and make the compromising adjustment themselves . 
The viewpoint of contractants hit by changed circumstances and faced with modification by 
506 See e.g. McKendrick Regulation 323. 
507 Ibid., at 311 , 332-333 . 
508 As examples of the wide range of devices available to contracting parties to adapt their contract 
to changing conditions, McKendrick (Regulation 322-329) refers to force majeure clauses, hardship 
clauses, and intervener clauses. These and other devices are discussed in Chapter 6 below. 
509 Bell Long-term Contracts 215. See for instance the helpful attitude adopted by the House of 
Lords towards price ascertainment mechanisms in Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton [ 1983] 1 
AC 444, [ 1982] 3 All ER I, discussed at 2 5 4 above. 
510 McKendrick Regulation 317-318 cites with approval, for example, the Privy Council decision of 
Queensland Electricity Generating Board v New Hope Collieries Pty Ltd [1989] I Lloyd 's Rep 205 , 
and a decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court, viz. Banque Brussels Lambert SA v 
Australian National Industries Ltd (1989) 21 NSWLR 502. 
511 Bell Long-term Contracts 219. 
512 [1978] I WLR 1387. 
513 McKendrick Regulation 313 n 28. 
514 Bell Long-term Contracts 215. 
- - ____ ___ _ _ ___ _____ ___.. 
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the courts would apparently be: ' We will end up going to court: this is what it will do ; let us 
do the same ourselves'. 515 This seems to support McKendrick's opinion that in England at 
least, businessmen are not overly confident in the competence of the courts to affect 
modification. 
The position in English law on agreements to agree and agreements to negotiate in good faith 
has been broadly sketched in 2 6 2 2. McKendrick, for one, believes that a clause whereby the 
parties expressly agree, for instance, to renegotiate the contract in good faith in the event of an 
occurrence which causes exceptional hardship to one of the parties, can serve a very useful 
purpose.516 Here the parties choose to express themselves in co-operative language; 
consequently, such a clause should, if possible, be enforced by the courts. As shall be seen in 
Chapter 7 below, such clauses are already recognised in the form of, for example, hardship 
clauses. A development, however, which McKendrick refuses to encourage is the possible 
recognition of any general ex lege duty to bargain in good faith . Speidel , for instance, has 
argued that a party to a long-term supply contract, advantaged by a change in circumstance 
which has upset the initial bargain struck between the parties, should have a legal duty to 
accept an ' equitable ' adjustment proposed in good faith by the opposite party.51 7 
McKendrick's difficulty in this lies in how a party could conceivably be in bad faith on the 
ground that he or she has refused to give up the rights he or she is entitled to in terms of the 
express provisions of the contract. Perhaps McKendrick's argument is essentially this: 'As 
parties we can agree to renegotiate a new agreement in good faith. But pray, permit us to 
agree not to do so too'. 
With regard to possible objections to judicial modification that could be grounded in policy, 
the most frequently encountered one would be that which is raised typically by the party 
autonomist. The latter might argue that by permitting a court to adapt a contract, the courts 
can be seen as making the contract for the parties, and that therefore the parties will no longer 
be responsible themselves for the consequences of their contracts. Furthermore, it could be 
argued that judicial modification places a premium on lack of awareness or insight, because if 
judicial revision is permitted, parties who were able to foresee potentially disruptive 
contingencies and provided against these, are deprived of the benefit of their hindsight. 518 An 
objection may possibly also be made purely on the grounds of practicability, and specifically 
within the South African context. As it is, our courts are over-burdened; it might consequently 
be naive to think that our courts would not be flooded by litigation as parties attempt to escape 
bad bargains, and that this would not further tax our over-extended system. 
In sum, McKendrick' s thesis is the following: there is less need to grant the courts a broad 
power to adjust once it is recognised that the parties themselves - if they take legal advice -
515 Harris & Tallon Long-term Contracts 239-240, reporting on the viewpoints of English 
participants in a research programme concerning Anglo-French contract law. 
516 McKendrick Regulation 315. 
517 1981 Northwestern University Law Review 404-405, and McKendrick, ibid. See now also the 
South African Law Commission 's proposed Bill on the Control of Unreasonableness, 
Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms, referred to in the final footnote of thi s 
chapter. 
518 Harris & Tallon Long-term Contracts 237. 
----------------------------------------------------
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
107 
can make provision in their contract for adjustment.519 And what of provisions constructed 
by the parties but which, in the viewpoint of one of the parties, proves to be inadequate in the 
actual event of a change in circumstance?520 Or parties who are unable to take legal advice, 
or who are unduly optimistic, or trusting in the relationship with the other party, and for this 
reason fail to implement sufficient measures themselves? McKendrick is in such cases 
adamant: no special provision should be made. The contract remains binding on the terms 
agreed upon, unless the supervening event is of such gravity that the disturbance qualifies as 
frustration, or as a supervening impossibility in terms of the South African doctrine. The 
parties ' solution lies in renegotiation. 521 Yet, as already pointed out, in contractual 
relationships falling outside of so-called bilateral monopolies (and in the absence of the 
parties ' own agreed upon measures), there may be little incentive for one of the parties to 
renegotiate. As he or she is not utterly dependent on the continuation of the contract, he or she 
may be quite content to accept termination where the change in circumstance satisfies the 
requirements of frustration (or supervening impossibility). On the other hand, in 
circumstances where the circumstances do not satisfy the requirements of frustration, but 
merely make performance for the other party onerous, the first-mentioned party may insist 
upon performance, and make no effort to compromise. For if the buyer defaults , the seller 
sues for damages . This no doubt puts an end to the relationship between them; but then, this 
relationship may be less important to the party hit to a lesser degree by the change in 
circumstance. Thus renegotiation is by no means inevitable. Nonetheless, McKendrick 
maintains that no special provision should be made in the above circumstances. For while he 
recognises that this may appear unnecessarily harsh he submits that to give the courts a power 
of adjustment would create too much uncertainty and would entail disadvantages which 
outweigh the advantages.522 
5 6 Conclusion 
The above chapter has sketched the various provisions provided by the law itself, in various 
jurisdictions, to provide for contractual modification in the event of changed circumstances. 
While the discussion has not focused on provisions relating specifically to the modification of 
price, the provisions referred are often used in this context; accordingly the discussion casts 
light on price adaptation ex lege. 
It is, however, important to recognise that while in Chapter 3 a case has been made out for 
price adaptation, in that it is - in the very least - an ideal often pursued by contractants in 
practice, it does not necessarily follow that an equal case may be made out for price 
adaptation affected by the law itself, i.e. ex lege. This point has been made strongly by 
McKendrick, who emphasises the uncertainty that judicial modification brings into the 
commercial world. On the other hand, the presence of provisions permitting judicial 
modification in many European legal systems, attests to the acceptance of the courts 
themselves adjusting contracts under certain circumstances. As has been said by Harris & 
519 McKendrick Regulation 329. 
520 For example, an agreement to renegotiate in good faith, which though 'implemented ' , fails to 
yield results , or where, on the refusal of one party to negotiate, is also found to be unenforceable. 
521 McKendrick Regulation 331 . 
522 Ibid ., at 332. 
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Tallon, if the purpose of modification by the courts is to re-establish the contractual 
equilibrium and not permit one of the parties to profit from a situation which was not foreseen 
when the contract was signed, then it is the notion of fairness which justifies this role of the 
courts.523 This notion of fairness can be seen as fundamental in the justification of many of 
the modification provisions referred to above.524 
It is submitted therefore that while McKendrick is correct in identifying the parties as bearing 
the primary responsibility for contractual adjustment, there may nonetheless be place under 
certain circumstances for modification by the courts. This is seen if one takes a pragmatic 
view of the role played by ex lege adaptation mechanisms. The role of the courts here is 
generally a modest one; that is, supportive and supplementary. The point of departure may 
thus remain that the parties themselves are in the best position to make provision for 
contingencies.525 As Zweigert & Katz state, the reference should always firstly be made to 
the express contract of the parties.526 Have the parties themselves expressly allocated the 
risks, or provided for mechanisms whereby contingency may be satisfactorily provided for? 
At the same time, however, there is recognition that contractants will not always be able to 
foresee and predict contingency and provide for appropriate measures, or even if foreseen, it is 
recognised that it may be too costly, or even impossible, to agree upon their own effective 
measures, and that, moreover, such measures often fail. Thus the law's role is thus to fill in 
this gap, to provide a fall-back so as to ensure that the contractual relationship can continue 
and, following adjustment or modification by the court, in a form providing once more for 
equilibrium between performance and counter-performance owed by the respective parties.527 
That the courts ' role here is primarily supplementary can be seen in the various provisions to 
be found in overseas jurisdictions providing for judicial modification. In all cases a party has 
no right to court modification; on the contrary, conditions are always set and the existence of 
certain factual circumstances always required before the court will intervene. In essence, a 
threshold is set; a court will not modify before a party demonstrates the presence of these 
circumstances. While the ease in which these conditions and circumstances may be satisfied 
varies from one jurisdiction to the other, it is indicative that the solution will normally lie 
firstly with the parties themselves, before recourse is made to the courts. It is also indicative 
that should the courts in England or South Africa be granted a power to modify contractual 
terms, it need not necessary comprise the broad, discretionary power which McKendrick 
seems to fear. A threshold may be set high enough where, whilst demonstrating that it is 
expected of the parties to provide for the problem themselves and to regard recourse to the 
courts as a final resort, provision is made nonetheless for judicial modification where not to 
do so would result in grave inequity. From the observations of McKendrick, it is clear that, in 
any event, great care should be taken in the setting of any such threshold. In South African 
523 Harris & Tallon Long-term Contracts 237. 
524 In addition to the position in German, Dutch and Nordic law referred to above, see again De 
Lamberterie Long-term Contracts 234 who finds in art. 1134 al. 3 of the French Civil Code (i.e. the 
article requiring all agreements to be performed in good faith) a possible solution to the impasse 
currently found in French law concerning imprevision. 
525 See here also Trakman 1983 Modern Law Review 4 7-49 who argues strongly that businessmen 
plan for contingency to a greater extent than is often appreciated. 
526 Comparative Law 228 . 
527 Harris & Tallon Long-term Contracts 23 7; Bell Long-term Contracts 216; Zweigert & Kotz 
Comparative Law 228. 
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law, this threshold could be based upon the principle of good faith.528 
528 Of very recent significance has been the publication by the South African Law Commission of its 
proposed Bill on the Control of Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in 
Contracts or Terms; this was published on the Internet towards the end of 1998, at 
http ://www.law.wits.ac .za/salc.html. Key to this proposed Bill is the proposal that a Court may 
determine whether contractual terms are unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive, and thereafter, 
as a consequence, issue appropriate orders. Appropriate orders clearly make provision for the ab 
initio avoidance of a contract as well as its modification by the court. Of great relevance to price 
adaptation, however, is the proposed s. 4, which is based substantially on the Commission on 
European Contract Law' s Article 2.117 (for which see Lando & Beale Principles of European 
Contract Law 113). This section does indeed provide for possible modification by the courts in the 
event of a change in circumstances, but only following an obligatory period of negotiations between 
the parties, and where the change in circumstances results in performance becoming ' excessively 
onerous '. Thus it appears the emphasis remains on the parties reaching a solution themselves, whilst 
likewise, a high threshold would seem to have been set before the contract may in any way be 
modified by the courts. While this had come too late for substantial discussion in this study, and is by 
no means yet law, the proposed Bill is undoubtedly a remarkable development; consequently, s. 4 is 
cited in full : 
' 4.( I) In the application of this Act the circumstances which existed at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract shall be taken into account and a party is bound to fulfil his or her obligations under the 
contract even if performance has become more onerous, whether because the cost of performance has 
increased or because the value of the performance he or she receives has diminished. 
4.(2) If, however, performance of the contract becomes excessively onerous because of a change of 
circumstances, the parties are bound to enter into negotiations with a view to adapting the contract or 
terminating it, provided that: 
(a) the change of circumstances occurred after the time of conclusion of the contract, or had already 
occurred at that time but was not and could not reasonably have been known to the parties; and 
(b) the possibility of a change of circumstances was not one which could reasonably have been taken 
into account at the time of conclusion of the contract; and 
(c) the risk of the change of circumstances is not one which , according to the contract, the party 
affected should be required to bear. 
4.(3) If the parties fail to reach agreement within a reasonable period, the court may: 
(a) terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be determined by the court; or 
(b) adapt the contract in order to distribute between the parties in a just and equitable manner the 
losses and gains resulting from the change of circumstances; and 
(c) in either case, award damages for the loss suffered through the other party refusing to negotiate or 
breaking off negotiations in bad faith .' 
-- ------------------------------------------------A 
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CHAPTER SIX: ADAPTATION TOOLS PROVIDED BY THE PARTIES 
6 1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 has demonstrated the means by which price adaptation may be effected ex lege. In 
this same chapter, McKendrick was shown to be of the view that - at least in English law -
there is no need to imbue the courts with a power to modify contractual terms such as price, as 
the parties themselves could agree on provisions providing for changes in circumstance. In 
this chapter therefore, it shall be seen the means by which parties, by the incorporation of 
particular provisions in their contracts, or by the structuring of their contractual relationship, 
may themselves provide for price adaptation. The discussion begins thus firstly with the so-
called force majeure clause, because - as shall be seen - it is possessed with qualities that may 
be found under a doctrine such as frustration or supervening impossibility, as well as those 
typical of the most well-known of ex consensu price adaptation mechanisms, the price 
adjustment clause. For while both are the result of agreement between the parties, price 
adjustment clauses provide more specifically for adaptation, as opposed to the extinction of 
the obligation, which is normally the consequence of a force majeure clause. Accordingly, the 
discussion moves on to a discussion of the price adjustment clause itself, before analysing in 
some detail the possibility of price adaptation being effected by a single party in his or her 
discretion alone. Finally, it shall be seen how the particular contractual relational structure 
entered into by the parties may import some measure of price adaptation. On conclusion of 
this chapter, and in view of that already discussed under Chapter 5, an overview will 
accordingly have been given of the diverse array of methods whereby price adaptation may be 
achieved, whether ex lege or ex consensu. 
6 2 Force majeure clauses 
Modern commercial contracts frequently contain so-called force majeure clauses, a typical 
example being the one found in Channel Island Ferries Ltd v Sea/ink UK Ltd: 
A party shall not be liable in the event of non-fulfilment of any obligation arising under this 
contract by reason of an Act of God, disease, strikes, Lock-Outs, fire , and any accident or 
incident of any nature beyond the control ofthe relevant party.529 
Generally, a force majeure clause is a contractual term whereby the parties themselves 
provide for the situation where performance, subsequent to the conclusion of the contract, 
becomes impossible owing to some supervening event (i.e.force majeure), rather than leaving 
the consequences of such an occurrence to be determined by the doctrine of supervening 
impossibility (in South African law) or frustration (in England). The advantage in doing so 
would be that the application of the latter doctrines by the courts are inevitably characterised 
by some degree of uncertainty, or are too narrow in scope in application; accordingly, the 
parties may determine with greater precision when and to what degree a party is excused from 
529 [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep 323. 
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performance in the event of supervening impossibility, and may thus provide for a very much 
wider range of circumstances the existence of which would bring the clause into operation.530 
In general, aforce majeure clause excuses a party from performance; a party hit by an event 
which in terms of the clause may be regarded as force majeure may obtain the right to 
terminate the contract.531 Accordingly , the broad remedy afforded by aforce majeure clause 
is similar to that provided by the law itself in the doctrines of supervening impossibility and 
frustration. Accordingly, the observations made with regard to the limitations of the latter 
doctrines in any price adaptive role apply, in general, likewise here; little further discussion is 
therefore necessary. It should be recognised, however, that as a force majeure clause is the 
product of the agreement between the parties, the parties may provide for remedies not found 
in terms of the latter doctrines. Accordingly, as noted by McKendrick, force majeure clauses 
frequently provide for an extension of time in which the performance hit by contingency may 
be rendered, or may provide for the suspension of the contract for a period before resorting to 
the more drastic remedy of termination.532 Such interim relief may afford the necessary 
opportunity for the parties to restore the equilibrium between performance and counter-
performance before the contractual relationship is ended. Accordingly, where aforce majeure 
clause does not merely provide for termination, but some measure of adjustment, the 
distinction between aforce majeure clause and a hardship clause, as discussed below, may be 
difficult to draw in practice.533 
6 3 Price adjustment clauses 
6 3 1 Price adjustment clauses: their development from the rule of pretium certum and their 
classification 
Price adjustment clauses are perhaps the contractual mechanisms most commonly used by 
parties to provide for the effects of contingencies on their agreement on price. Typically, they 
provide for contingencies that may arise during the intervening period of time between the 
conclusion of contract and the moment of actual performance. In this study, they have been 
encountered before, but have enjoyed consideration only for the extent to which they have, in 
the view of the courts, successfully provided for the objective ascertainment of price. Their 
role as specifically price adaptation mechanisms is examined for the first time in this section. 
From the fact, however, that they have for many years been under the scrutiny of our courts, 
indicates the close link between the rule that price, if not immediately certain, may be 
objectively ascertainable, and the development of techniques to provide for price adaptation. 
Following both Bell and De Lamberterie, price adjustment clauses moreover may be divided 
broadly into two categories, namely those that result in price being adjusted automatically 
530 See the discussion by McKendrick Regulation 323-327; Atiyah Introduction to Contract 243-
244. 
531 See e.g. the recent Court of Appeal decision in J Lauritzen AS v Wijsmu!ler B V (The Super 
Servant Two) [1990] 1 Lloyd ' s Rep 1. That the point of departure is excuse, and not modification, see 
also UNIDROIT art. 7.1.7, and the accompanying commentary. 
532 McKendrick Regulation 326. 
533 See here also Atiyah Introduction to Contract 244. 
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(objective adjustment), and those that require the further decision of the parties (subjective 
adjustment).534 This distinction between objective and subjective or party-controlled price 
adjustment, however, should not be overstated, for as shall be seen, some adjustment clauses 
comprise both elements. Nonetheless, the distinction is important because in strict law, a 
clause providing for adjustment of price by one party alone, or on the further agreement of the 
parties together, will not be permitted. This follows directly from the rule that the 
determination of price may not be left to the discretion of one of the parties or to his or her 
nominee (a unilateral power of price adjustment), and nor may it be made dependent upon the 
later agreement of the parties (the bilateral adjustment of price). Thus particular care is 
required in drawing up price adjustment clauses where adjustment depends upon further 
recourse to the parties. In this section, attention is given firstly to the standard price 
adjustment clause, that is, a clause which generally provides for the automatic adjustment of 
price. Hardship and intervener clauses are thereafter discussed; these are price adjustment 
clauses which, whilst making adjustment dependent on further recourse to the parties, are 
well-recognised in commercial law. Finally, the usefulness of the price adjustment clause is 
demonstrated in an analysis of an English decision, viz. Superior Overseas Development 
Corporation and Phillips Petroleum (U.K.) Co Ltd v British Gas Corporation ,535 and the 
discussion concludes with observations on the role played by price adjustment clauses in price 
adaptation. 
6 3 2 The standard price adjustment clause 
A price adjustment clause which provides for the automatic adjustment of price constitutes the 
standard form for price adjustment clauses. As its effect is to set a new price, it follows that, 
as a general rule, if a price adjustment clause is to be certain of passing the test on certainty of 
price set down by the courts, it must provide for a price that is objectively ascertainable. Thus 
the defining characteristic of an objective price adjustment clause, therefore, is that 
adjustment is calculated by way of reference to an external standard, and not by the further 
decision of the parties. Adjustment may, for example, be index-based; a price increase (or 
decrease) may follow on reference to some published price index figure, such as the weekly 
wage index or the consurr.er price index.536 Alternatively, adjustment may be provided for 
proportional to the relevant manufacturing cost increase of decrease,537 or may simply be 
determined by a third party. The contingencies with respect to which adjustment clauses are 
created are numerous and varied, and include the following: changes to rates of exchange, 
freight , insurance, landing and clearing charges, taxes and other tariffs and duties, and labour, 
manufacturing and material costs caused by, for example, the imposition of costly 
governmental safety and environmental regulations or the rise in price of some 
commodity.538 
534 De Lamberterie Long-term Contracts 222; Bell Long-term Contracts 203 . 
535 [1982] I Lloyd's Rep 262 (CA). 
536 See e.g. Superior Overseas Development Corporation and Phillips Petroleum (U.K.) Co Ltd v 
British Gas Corporation [ 1982] I Lloyd's Rep 262 (CA). Other examples include reference to the 
Eng! ish market (Hill Brothers & Co v Alexander & Jones ( 1891) 12 NLR 202) or to the gold price or 
to some foreign currency (Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd v Marden [ 1979] Ch 84). 
53 7 Standard Industries Ltd v Marwick ( 1920) 41 NLR 83. 
538 See e.g. Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 I SA 669 (W); 
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Adjustment clauses are commonly encountered, and the remarks by a party under cross-
examination in Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) 
Ltd,539 namely, that 98% of that party's clients encountered no problem with the escalation 
clause included in contracts with that party, indicates possibly how widespread and acceptable 
they have become in practice. Adjustment clauses, moreover, may be very sophisticated; 
Savage and Lovemore Mining (Pty) Ltd v International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd contains, for 
example, a South African example of a very specific price adjustment clause created for the 
peculiarities of the coal trade. 540 
The construction of an automatic price adjustment clause is, however, from outset a delicate 
task. This is so in that it presupposes not only that the parties have accurately anticipated the 
contingencies the contract will encounter, but also that the mechanism invented to provide for 
such contingencies, namely, the adjustment clause, will do so effectively. American case law, 
accordingly, contains some dramatic examples of unsuccessful attempts at price adaptation. In 
Missouri Public Service Co v Peabody Coal Co, for example, an index-based price escalation 
clause failed to reflect radical increases in coal production costs, despite never having failed 
before, whilst in Eastern Air Lines v Gulf Oil Co a price escalation clause failed in a similar 
manner. 541 The disastrous consequences, on the other hand, of a failure to provide for price 
adjustment can be seen in the famed Westinghouse uranium saga of the 1970's, where a 
uranium seller declined to include a price adjustment clause and proceeded to contract on the 
basis that it would supply uranium over a considerable period of time at the fixed price of 
approximately $10 a pound. The price of uranium thereafter increased drastically, and the 
uranium seller stood to lose billions of dollars if held to the agreed price.542 Furthermore, 
while McKendrick concedes that it may be very difficult to foresee the precise event which 
will later prove to disrupt the contract, and thus construct price adjustment clauses around 
this, he suggests that 'the risk of disruption can be allocated at a broader level of generality'. 
Thus while one may not foresee the precise cause of an abnormal increase in price (and 
McKendrick lists here as possible causes hyper-inflation, labour shortages, scarcity of 
supplies, exchange rate fluctuations, and the outbreak of war), provision may nonetheless be 
made for any resulting abnormal increase in price, in terms of the contract. If then there is a 
dispute between the parties as to whether a particular event falls within the definition of ' an 
abnormal increase in price' , and thus whether it triggers off the adjustment clause planned for 
such circumstances, the parties may turn to the courts for interpretation.543 
Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 555 (A); Hill 
Brothers & Co v Alexander & Jones, above; and Savage and Lovemore Mining (Pty) Ltd v 
International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd 1987 2 SA 149 (W). See also Dawson 1982 Juridical Review 97-
103 for examples from American law. 
539 Above, at 574G. 
540 1987 2 SA 149 (W) 1881-189F. See also Cape Provincial Adminstration v Clifford Harris (Pty) 
Ltd 1997 I SA 439 (A) 442F-443D for a further example of a price adjustment clause, although in the 
context of an engineering contract. 
541 583 SW 2d 721 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1979) and 415 F Supp 419 (US Dist Ct, SD Fla, 
1975) respectively. See Dawson 1982 Juridical Review I 00-10 I for a discussion of these cases. 
542 For a discussion of this case (the trial court was not required to publish its reasons for its finding 
that the seller was liable as a settlement was then reached) see Dawson, ibid ., at 97. 
543 McKendrick Regulation 311. 
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6 3 3 Price adjustment clauses requiring further recourse to the parties 
6 3 3 1 Hardship and intervener clauses 
The subsection above has looked at price adjustment clauses which, apparently, make do with 
an entirely objective adjustment of price. Whilst termed the standard form of an adjustment 
clause, not all price adjustment clauses conform to the latter pattern, and some place greater 
emphasis on internal adjustment; that is, adjustment effected by the parties themselves . In this 
regard, a good example is a commonly encountered clause to be found in commercial 
contracts, viz. the hardship clause. 
Typically, a hardship clause will define in general terms what constitutes 'hardship' , and will 
the lay down a procedure to be followed by the parties in the event of such a hardship 
occurring. The distinguishing feature here is that this will generally entail provision for either 
party to call for renegotiation of the terms of the agreement, including price, and the 
consequent imposition of an obligation on both parties to use their best endeavours to 
renegotiate the contract in good faith in order to alleviate the hardship.544 
By itself, such a clause could be struck down for uncertainty. Agreements to agree or 
negotiate are not generally recognised in South African (and possibly English) law.545 A 
party may refuse to negotiate or the parties may simply be unable to agree; consequently an 
adjusted price might never be agreed upon. Accordingly, hardship clauses typically also 
provide for intervener clauses. These provide for the intervention of a third party (e.g. an 
arbitrator or a panel of experts) in the case of a failure to agree on an adjustment. Such an 
intervener clause ensures that a price is indeed fixed and thus rescues the agreement from any 
possible fatal categorisation as a pure agreement to agree. Moreover it serves likewise as a 
sanction: should parties fail to reach a new agreement, they know that the issue may be 
removed from their own hands and that they are then obliged to subject themselves to the 
decision of another. Such a sanction encourages fresh agreement.546 Bell would seem to 
suggest, furthermore, that an intervener clause might provide for the intervention of the courts 
in a similar manner to, for example, a panel of experts.547 McKendrick remarks that this is 
currently not permissible because of the maxim that the courts may not make the contract for 
the parties, although he finds questionable the distinction between an arbitrator in this role on 
the one hand, and the court on the other.548 In such a case, however, public policy possibly 
dictates that the courts should not be required to play such a role. For while a possible role 
might be made out for the courts as a final stop-gap determinant of price on the grounds of 
good faith or fairness where no other provision has been made by the parties for 
544 McKendrick Contract 232; McKendrick Regulation 330. See also Macneil Contractual Relations 
64 for his example of a hardship clause incorporated within the development of the relationship 
between the smelter and the coal merchant, as referred to at 4 2 above. 
545 See generally 2 6 2. 
546 See the opinions of English jurists referred to above at 5 5 regarding the loss of control over price 
adjustment to the courts. 
547 Bell Long-term Contracts 205. 
548 McKendrick Regulation 3 19 n 48. 
------------------------------------------------------------
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adjustment,549 this might not necessarily be the case where the parties make express 
provision for the courts to act as third party intervener. Recourse to the courts should be 
undertaken as a last resort. Parties should not be encouraged to require specifically the courts 
to play such a role when alternatives such as arbitrators and experts are clearly within the 
parties ' contemplation; the courts should not be required to carry this additional burden. 
The application of hardship and intervener clauses shall be seen in the discussion of the 
Superior Overseas case below. Firstly, however, we note the form of hardship clause 
suggested by UNIDROIT for inclusion in international commercial contracts. 
6 3 3 2 The UNIDROJT Principles 
An excellent example of a hardship clause which parties may adopt is to be found in the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.550 While art. 6.2.1 provides 
that where the performance of a contract becomes more onerous for one of the parties, that 
party is nevertheless bound to perform, arts. 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 provide an exception in the case 
of hardship. Article 6.2.2 provides the definition of hardship and is worth citing: 
There is hardship where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the 
contract either because the cost of a party's performance has increased or because the value of 
the performance a party receives has diminished, and 
(a) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party after the conclusion of the 
contract; 
(b) the events could not reasonably have been taken into account by the disadvantaged party at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract; 
(c) the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party; and 
(d) the risk ofthe events was not assumed by the disadvantaged party. 
Article 6.2.3 thereafter provides for the effects of hardship: 
(I) In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request renegotiations. The request 
shall be made without undue delay and shall indicate the grounds on which it is based. 
(2) The request of renegotiations does not in itself entitle the disadvantaged party to withhold 
performance. 
(3) Upon failure to reach agreement within a reasonable time either party may resort to the 
court. 
( 4) If the court finds hardship it may, if reasonable, 
(a) terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be fixed, or 
(b) adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium. 
It is important to note, firstly, that where the parties adopt a clause such as art. 6.2, the parties 
may keep as point of departure the approach that despite performance being rendered onerous, 
the parties remained obliged to perform. It is thus only when the occurrence of events results 
in hardship as defined in art. 6.2.2 that a party may call for renegotiation and, in the event of 
549 See again 5 5. 
550 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts. 
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this not succeeding, intervention by the court. Furthermore it is clear that the hardship clause 
suggested by UNIDROIT is not intended to operate where the parties themselves have 
provided in some other way for the allocation of risk in those particular circumstances (art. 
6.2.2(d)). The concept of reasonableness is likewise afforded a significant role, and upon 
failure of renegotiations, recourse may be made to courts. However, as indicated in the 
accompanying commentary provided by UNIDRIOT, parties may find it appropriate to adapt 
the content of the UNIDROIT article to take account of the particular features of their own 
transactions. 551 Thus provision could be made instead to recourse to arbitrators, especially in 
the light of any reluctance by the courts to take upon this role where it could be avoided. 
UNIDROIT art. 6 also provides for termination by the court if necessary, and thus this 
provision does overlap to some extent with the force majeure clause provided by UNIDROIT 
in art. 7.1. 7. However, as noted in Comment 6, the purpose of invoking hardship will be 
primarily for the renegotiation of contractual terms so as to allow the contract to be kept alive 
although on revised terms. 
6 3 -1 Superior Overseas Development Corporation: price adjustment, hardship and intervener 
clauses in practice 
6 3 4 1 Introduction 
The English Court of Appeals decision of Superior Overseas Development Corporation and 
Phillips Petroleum (U.K.) Co Ltd v British Gas Corporation is a particularly useful judgement 
with respect to price adjustment clauses.552 Firstly, it provides valuable insight into the 
construction of standard price adjustment clauses, as well as with respect to hardship and 
intervener clauses. Moreover, it indicates why a hardship clause might in certain 
circumstances be preferred over an automatic price adjustment clause, and, conceivably, vice 
versa. Accordingly, it affords a glimpse of the feelings and fears of contractants stalked 
constantly by the threat of contingency. An examination of the aspects of the case concerning 
price adjustment clauses follows in some detail. 
6 3 4 2 The facts of the case 
On the facts of the case, Superior Overseas (the sellers) entered into a contract of sale for 
North Sea natural gas with British Gas Corporation for the minimum period of twenty-five 
years. Article X of the sales agreement provided for periodic price review on the basis of 
various price adjustment clauses. The first six clauses in Article X created mechanisms which 
were to offset the effects of inflation on capital and operating costs, and to ensure that the 
price of natural gas remained competitive in relation to other competing fuels. With respect to 
inflation, an adjustment of 25% was permitted by reference to three published index figures , 
namely , wholesale prices, weekly wage rates and capital goods prices. In the event of such a 
reference proving unsuitable, reference would be made to a committee of experts. Provision 
was thereafter provided for a review of this adjusted figure, in order to determine whether the 
adjusted price ensured that gas would maintain a competitive position with respect to its 
551 Comment 7. 
552 [1982] I Lloyd's Rep 262 (CA). 
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competitors. Reference to a committee of experts was likewise provided for in the case of 
dissatisfaction with the review procedure. 
Clause 7 of Article X, however, was the primary object of the court's attention. This clause 
provided that in the event of any substantial change in the economic circumstances relating to 
the agreement during the contract period, and in the event of either party feeling such change 
to be causing it substantial economic hardship, then at the request of that party, the parties 
would meet to consider any possible adjustment to price in fairness to the parties. If, however, 
the parties had not reached agreement on an adjustment within a certain time period, the issue 
would be resolved by a committee of experts. In the event, clause 7 was utilised by the parties, 
but there was no agreement as to what was meant by 'substantial' hardship, and it was with 
respect to this issue that the parties wound their way to court. 
Most interesting, however, are the court ' s remarks with respect to the various adjustment 
clauses. The earlier clauses of Article X, the court stated, were concerned with the usual 
vagaries of the economic situation and for which adjustment adequately could be made. 
Clause 7, however, was created in order to deal with the 'wild card' of the economic situation, 
namely, that the parties had failed to foresee some other factor which could serve to falsify the 
assumptions upon which they were contracting. Consequently they sought to counter such 
contingency on an ad hoc basis by incorporating clause 7, which in the words of Lord 
Donaldson, constituted the ' ultimate safety net' ,553 and with respect to which the court 
observed the following: 
But the agreement was made to cover a period of 25 years certain and thereafter until 
determined by notice. It seems probable, therefore, that cl. 7 is designed to adjust price to avoid 
substantial economic hardship to any party which might arise as a result of substantial 
economic change which might arise over a period of twenty-five years and which could not be 
foreseen at the time of making the agreement ... [and] was to deal with those [vagaries of the 
economic situation] that were unforeseen or unusual and probably not covered by the earlier 
clauses.554 
6 3 4 3 The advantages of party-managed price adjustment as revealed in Superior Overseas 
The remarks cited above from Superior Overseas Development Corporation and Phillips 
Petroleum (U.K.) Co Ltd v British Gas Corporation indicate the different roles envisaged for 
the two broadly distinctive types of adjustment clauses, viz. automatic or objective, and 
subjective or party-managed adjustment clauses. In this respect, the reference to an 'ultimate 
safety net' is particularly illustrative. It suggests that the price adjustment clause most 
responsive and reflective to change in circumstance is that in which the role of final 
determinant, of the precise adjustment to be made, is reserved for the parties themselves. The 
affording of ultimate control or adaptation of price to the parties (as opposed to the affording 
553 269. Lord Donaldson's judgement is rich in metaphor. At 268 the Lord Justice refers to the 
effects of inflation and competition as mere 'jokers' in comparison to unforeseen contingency which 
is regarded as a ' wild card '; at 269 the earlier adjustment clauses are regarded as an 'agreed price 
autopilot', again in comparison to the 'manual override' of clause 7 which could be invoked in storms 
of such severity that the autopilot alone could not succeed in keeping the joint venture on course. 
554 Per Lord Waller at 265 . 
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of this control to an automatic price adjustment clause) may, in other words, be said to result 
in the most refined and flexible response to contingency. This, in any event, is the perspective 
of the two major corporations involved in the Superior Overseas case. In their choice of a 
hardship clause as the ultimate safety net, they indicate that on the failure of standard 
automatic adjustment clauses to provide adequately for substantial changes in circumstance, 
they believed they could rely upon an appropriate response being obtained from a 
renegotiation and agreement on the matter by the parties themselves. 
The point is made so as to highlight the advantages to be gained with respect to a more 
supple, flexible response to contingency. If contingency may be seen as cause for the 
reconstruction of a term such as price, then an automatic adjustment clause provides for 
reconstruction in abstract and in advance. Price adjustment afforded in the final instance by 
one or both of the parties, on the other hand, amounts to reconstruction on site : the approach 
of the party or parties is ad hoc; they adapt the price as the contingency materialises, and 
avoid thus projection into the future. Moreover, automatic price adjustment clauses are, 
inevitably, the products of the parties themselves . Their inherent flaw lies in their dependence 
on data, which in turn is provided by the parties themselves. Contractants on the other hand 
are able to take advantage of other data not possible to be taken into consideration by even the 
most sophisticated of price ascertainment machinery. One might here refer to the intricate 
detail of background knowledge known to the parties alone, of previous experience, of 
observations of business trends, and even the possession of commercial intuition or a 
' business no us ' . 
At 2 6 2 2, reference was made to developments in English law regarding a more ready 
acceptance of the agreements to agree or negotiate. Similar developments may follow in 
South African law. In the meantime it may be recognised that by the incorporation of 
intervener clauses, parties may, for instance, safely agree to renegotiate price in the event of 
some supervening event upsetting the equilibrium between performance and counter-
performance; for intervener clauses provide the necessary safeguard ensuring the ultimate 
ascertainment of price in the event of no agreement. Furthermore, definitions of hardship or 
abnormal increase in price, or whatever concept the parties may wish to use in their hardship 
clause, may be phrased in broad, general terms. Any dispute therefore as to whether a specific 
occurrence has indeed resulted in hardship or an abnormal increase in price may be referred to 
the courts for interpretation. This should not prove unduly difficult for the courts if the parties 
list typical broadly foreseeable events that, in their view, could result in such a hardship, and 
then provide in addition a general ' wrap up ' provision allowing provision to be made for 
hardship resulting from similar events.555 Alternatively, use could be made of the concept of 
reasonableness, as in UNIDROIT art. 6.2.2. The Superior Overseas case demonstrates, in any 
event, that the courts may undertake this interpretative role, as in casu, the actual issue at hand 
was the interpretation to be given 'hardship'. 
Finally, it may be pointed out that in many long-term relationships, and especially those 
constituting relationships of so-called bilateral monopolies, economic reality dictates that the 
parties reach agreement.556 In a relationship such as the one to be found in Superior 
555 See here McKendrick Regulation at 311 and 326 and the point made above at 5 5 that the risk of 
disruption can be provided at a broader level of generality. 
556 On bilateral monopolies see 3 3 3 above. 
- ------ - -----------------
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Overseas, the parties locked themselves into contractual relationship for a m1mmum of 
twenty-five years, in the highly specialised environment of the drilling for, and sale of, North 
Sea natural gas. Huge costs would be invested by both sides into the performance of highly 
specialised or idiosyncratic transactions. Should therefore the contractual relationship be 
broken, both parties may stand to lose heavily: investment costs may not be easily, or even 
possibly, transferred from one contractual relationship to another. To a greater or lesser 
degree, parties in such relationships find themselves in a position of mutual dependency. Thus 
in addition to the sanction provided by an intervener clause (that should they not agree on 
adjustment, the matter is removed from their control), the need for a relationship based on 
continued co-operation will often encourage parties to effect the necessary adjustments 
themselves. 
6 3 4 4 Additional South African developments 
South African law itself has seen the employment of various mechanisms in order to exploit 
the advantages to be found in allowing the parties to renegotiate an adjustment in price while 
remaining on a contractual footing. Thus in Chelsea West (Pty) Ltd and Another v 
Roodebloem Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another a contract of lease provided that after an 
initial period, the rental payable and annual escalation would be determined by agreement 
between the parties, and failing such agreement, by an expert (whose appointment in turn was 
to be agreed upon by the parties, and failing such agreement, by the president of the local 
Institute of Estate Agents).557 A similar agreement is to be found in Letaba Sawmills (Edms) 
Bpk v Majovi (Edms) Bpk, where the court noted that where the agreement to negotiate a fresh 
rental stood alone, the contract would have been rendered void. However, the clause providing 
for determination by arbitration on the parties ' failing to agree (i.e. an intervener clause) 
rendered the contract enforceable.558 
One might finally note again that in First National Bank of SA Ltd v Transvaal Rugby Union 
and Another a clause contained the express provision that following the conclusion of a 
contract, the parties were entitled to negotiate in good faith to affect further amendments as 
would be advantageous to both of them.559 Where agreement however is not reached during 
the course of the negotiations, the parties would be bound by what was originally agreed 
upon. While such a clause would offer little in the way of price adaptation (as a failure to 
agree would result in the continued enforcement of the unadjusted price) it is interesting in its 
explicit reference to negotiation in good faith. 
6 3 5 Price adjustment clauses: the final word 
The selection of an appropriate price adjustment clause lies with the parties. In principle, they 
are encountered in contracts of sale as an extension of the principle that a price need not be 
immediately certain, but may be also objectively ascertainable. In that they provide for 
modification of price in the event of contingency, they serve as adaptation mechanisms. 
557 1994 I SA 837 (C). 
558 1993 I SA 768 (A). 
559 1997 3 SA 851 (W) at 856E-F. 
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Automatic (or objective) price adjustment clauses are frequently encountered and provide for 
adjustment without the need for further recourse to the parties. Party-managed or subjective 
price adjustment clauses, on the other hand, tend to be more responsive to changing 
circumstance in that they provide for adjustment as the contingency arises, and do not rely on 
adjustment mechanisms that have been constructed in advance of the envisaged contingency. 
Unless provision is made for the final adjustment of price by objective means (e.g. an 
intervener clause), this type of adjustment clause may, however, fall foul of the rule that a 
price must be certain of objectively ascertainable . The mutual dependence of parties engaged 
in long-term, highly idiosyncratic relationships may, moreover, ensure parties reach 
agreement themselves on price adjustments. 
In the above discussion of subjective or party-controlled price adjustment, the mechanism has 
been bilateral, that is, both parties adapt price by agreeing on an adjustment. In this regard a 
hardship clause is a typical example. The question that must follow is whether a power to 
adjust price may be afforded to a single party alone. Considering the apparently established 
rule that a party to a contract may not determine price in his or her discretion, this may seem 
unlikely. Given, however, the manner in which contractants have employed intervener clauses 
alongside hardship clauses so as to enjoy the adaptation opportunities proffered by the latter, 
the apparently fixed rule against unilateral price determination may likewise not be 
insurmountable. The question is, accordingly, whether such a unilateral power of price 
adjustment has indeed a role to play in price adaptation, and if so, if it may fulfil any such role 
in a manner and form acceptable to the law. This is examined immediately below. 
6 4 The adjustment of price by a party to the contract 
6 4 I Introduction 
That a party to a contract may not fix the price himself appears to be a well-established 
principle of our law. This was indicated in Chapter 2.560 Moreover, this rule would appear to 
have a sound basis in both Roman and Roman Dutch law, particularly in Voet 18 I 23 , which 
in turn relies on Digesta 18 1 35 1 and Digest a 45 1 108 1.561 The scope of this study does 
not include an examination of the historical basis of the above rule. However, it must be 
mentioned that in recent years, the common law basis for the rule against price-fixing by a 
party to the contract has been the subject of critical scholarship. 
Thus in connection with the possible reasons for our common law writers appearing so 
' unanimously ' in favour of the rejection of unilateral price-fixing powers,562 Kerr, firstly, 
states the following with respect to this rule: 
No reason is mentioned in the Roman or Roman-Dutch authorities or in Pothier - the rule is 
560 See 2 6 3 above. See in particular Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 555 (A) 574C-D, cited at 2 6 I above; also reaffirmed more recently 
in H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd and Another 1996 2 SA 225 (A) 2331 and 
Lambons (Edms) Bpk v BMW (Suid-Afrika) (Edms) Bpk 1997 4 SA 141 (SCA) 158G. 
561 For further common law authorities, see Kerr Sale 54 n 214. 
562 Kerr Sale 54-55, 58-59. 
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merely stated to be what it is said to be.563 
Secondly, an incisive analysis of the common law basis of the rule has been made by 
Lubbe. 564 As a result, Digesta 45 1 108 1 is shown to concern the effect on contractual 
validity of a so-called si voluero clause, and thus is shown to have nothing to do with a 
situation where a party is granted a discretion regarding the content of a contract (e.g. the 
determination of the price), as opposed to where a party is granted a discretion regarding 
whether a contract actually exists (i.e. the proper scope of a si voluro clause, and which 
results in the nullity of the agreement). Lubbe thus demonstrates that there has been a 
' misplaaste beroep op die leer oor die condicio si voluero' by our common law writers, our 
courts and our modern commentators.565 
Thereafter, Lubbe refers to Digesta 18 1 35 1, and with regard to the dogmatic basis for this 
rule, remarks as follows: 
Op gesigswaarde geneem is D 18 I 35 1 [and related common law texts] eenvoudig 'n uiting 
van die vereiste van pretium certum, wat hedendaags na die algemene vereiste dat die 
verbintenis se inhoud bepaald of bepaalbaar moet wees, herlei sou word.566 
Thus on Lubbe's reading, the requirement of certainty is regarded as the ratio behind the 
Roman and Roman-Dutch view. This conclusion should not surprise. The prohibition against 
the granting to a party to a contract the unilateral power to fix a price has traditionally been 
regarded as one emanating from the requirement in law that the content of an obligation, 
including price, be defined with certainty; this has recently and most clearly been indicated 
again by Corbett JAin the dictum quoted from Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v 
Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd.567 But how or why this link is made is not so clear. 
Accordingly, the next question Lubbe asks, and indeed this study, is why the rule of certum 
pretium should be such an obstacle to the recognition of unilateral powers in favour of 
contractants regarding, in particular, the fixing of price. What indeed could be meant by 
cerium in this context? 
563Kerr Sale 59. 
564 Lubbe 1989 TSAR 159. In the first part of this article, Lubbe indicates how case law cited in 
support of the rule against contractual discretions in favour of a contractant is seldom more than 
obiter in point, and remarks likewise that modern comment on the matter appears generalised (at 
160). 
565 Lubbe 1989 TSAR 165-169. See also Brassey 1992 AS 112 as to the authority of our common law 
writers where, in a discussion of Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 1992 I 
SA 566 (A), which concerns the possibility of reasonable rent and a unilateral power to fix a part of 
rent, it was observed that on this issue, the latter writers' view ' [was] the product of a very different 
age ', and his suggestion that the fact that the Appellate Division had made no reference to these 
writers might well be instructive. 
566 Lubbe 1989 TSAR 170. See also Daube Certainty of Price 21, who maintains that there is much to 
be said for a construction of Digesta 18 1 35 1 that does not condemn the sale as invalid if the price 
was to be fixed by the buyer, which was the usual interpretation favoured by Roman-Dutch writers, 
but merely provides that the sale is imperfectum until the price has been fixed. 
567 1986 2 SA 555 (A), cited at 2 6 I above. See also Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics 
(Pty) Ltd !993 I SA 179 (A) and the citation from Pothier at 185£-F, where once more the 
requirement of certainty appears the origin of the rule against unilateral price-fixing. 
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6 4 2 The effect of a unilateral power to fix price on certainty 
There are three possible answers to this question. The first is to interpret certainty, or rather 
uncertainty, as entailing vagueness. On this interpretation, unilateral price-fixing powers 
require rejection because they result in the content of an obligation being defined so vaguely 
that the obligation would accordingly be impossible to enforce. 
This interpretation, as justification for the rejection of unilateral contractual powers, has been 
rightly rejected.568 A party afforded the unilateral power to determine some aspect of the 
contractual content, such as price or rent, is in this capacity no different from any other 
ascertainment mechanism. By the exercising of this power, and accordingly the fixing of some 
price, precision may be given to the content of the contract. Measured against its ability in 
ensuring sufficient precision is achieved with respect to the contents of obligations, the 
appointment of a party to the contract for this task is little, if at all , different to that which can 
be achieved by a third party appointed to determine a price. In Ben/au Properties (Pty) Ltd v 
Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd, Van Heerden JA remarked that (with italics in the original) 
I must confess to some considerable difficulty in grasping why a price (or rent) to be fixed by 
one of the parties should be regarded as less certain than one to be determined by a third 
party. 569 
The second and third interpretations possible so as to understand the apparent clash between 
unilateral price-fixing powers and the requirement of certainty have been referred to 
already.570 These concern the effect of such powers on the questions as to whether a price 
will in fact be set, and in the event of this occurrence, what this price will be. 
With regard to the first of the latter two questions it may likewise be shown, in a manner 
similar to that employed in demonstrating that unilateral price-fixing powers do not 
necessarily result in unacceptable vagueness of term, that such powers do not necessarily 
result in a complete and 'Jnacceptable lack of certainty as to whether a price will indeed be 
determined. This fear is to no larger extent justifiable here than it is within the context of third 
party price-setting powers. In principle, the law can be no less sure that it will obtain a price 
from a third party than it can be sure when requiring this to be done by a party to the contract. 
While there is some uncertainty with regard to the proper approach of our courts in such 
cases, this has not prevented the recognition of price-fixing by third parties.571 In any case, a 
failure by a party to fix the price when contractually required to do so would amount to breach 
of contract with a possible claim for damages. 
568 See in particular Lubbe 1989 TSAR 171 ; Kerr Sale 58; also Brassey 1993 AS 188; Daube 
Certainty of Price 21. 
569 1993 I SA 179 (A). See also the remarks made in Boland Bank v Steele 1994 I SA 259 (T) 274G. 
570 See 2 7 above . All three of these questions, of course, correspond to the various meanings which 
were proposed to be given to certainty; i.e. vagueness (2 7 I), incompletion (2 7 2), and the 
uncertainty inherent in discretions (2 7 3). 
571 See 2 5. See also Lubbe 1989 TSAR 175, discussed at 6 4 6 2 below. 
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Accordingly, the more apparent way in which the word certainty can be linked to a valid 
rejection of unilateral price-fixing powers, is through recognition of the fact that parties to a 
contract, and the law itself, cannot be sure, or certain, of the actual monetary amount of the 
price finally set. This concerns, therefore, the fear of abuse by the party holding such power of 
the power itself.572 
It is this fear of abuse that could be regarded, possibly, as a legitimate obstacle to any role to 
be played by a unilateral price-fixing power in price adaptation. Price may now be adjusted in 
the event of a contingency, but the party not holding this power cannot apparently be sure if 
his or her co-contractant will not adjust the price greatly to his or her detriment, and yet hold 
the adjusted price to be binding. Accordingly, fear of abuse, in the language of price 
adaptation, concerns security. 
This problem, however, might also appear more apparent than real. For while important 
Appellate Division cases such as Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd and H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd and 
Another573 continue to uphold the broad rule against price-setting by parties, there has also 
appeared alongside a body of case law prepared at most to give effect to merely a qualified 
version of the rule. In doing so , these cases perhaps give an indication that they do not regard 
the problem of abuse as one that cannot be overcome. Curiously , this body of case law would 
appear to have developed quietly alongside the more entrenched and well-known judicial 
statements on this aspect of our law, without overt collision or conflict.574 In fact , it shall be 
argued that in the light of recent judgements of the Appellate Division, this new line of 
thinking has silently surpassed the traditional view, and must now be regarded as the law. And 
this has been achieved without revision of a Dawidowitz, a Deary or a Burroughs,575 
supposedly traditional bulwarks of the unqualified rule. At the least, it has been a quiet 
revolution. 
However, before examining the developing tendency in case law towards the recognition of 
only a qualified form of the Westinghouse rule, it may be useful to state once more the case 
for unilateral price-fixing powers as price adaptation tools . 
6 -1 3 Unilateral price-fixing powers: the case for contractual adaptation 
6 4 3 1 Commercially expedient 
The usefulness of bilateral price-fixing or adjustment powers as a price adaptation mechanism 
was discussed under 6 3. One might assume that this applies equally to where the price-fixing 
572see Zimmermann Obligations 254 as to his opinion that the main objection of Roman lawyers to 
the unilateral fixing of price by parties was that ' the institutional check against the danger of gross 
and unreasonable contractual imbalance (namely negotiation about the price) had been removed '. 
573 1986 2 SA 555 (A); 1996 2 SA 225 (A). 
574 Or likewise, without reference to the analysis by Lubbe in 1989 TSAR 159, which would have 
afforded critical support. 
575 Dawidowitz v Van Drimmelen 1913 TPD 672; Deary v Deputy Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
1920 CPO 541; Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 I SA 669 (W). 
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or adjustment power is enjoyed by one party alone. However, one might ask how a power to 
adjust or fix a price enjoyed by one contractant can ensure an adaptation of price satisfactory 
to both. In the event of contingency, the party holding this power may make an adjustment 
satisfactory to him - but can one expect that such an adjustment will result in adaptation 
satisfactory to them both? 
A number of reasons indicate a somewhat different role played by unilateral powers in price 
adaptation. As one might expect, no one reason alone may be the motivation for a unilateral 
power, and thus they probably tend to overlap. 
Thus firstly , the unilateral power may comprise the final act required for adjustment, and this 
may only conveniently be performed by one party. An escalation clause, so to speak, can 
sometimes not do everything. In many cases, a final human act may be required to effect the 
final price adjustment. One might consider here the escalation clause in Burroughs Machines 
Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd;576 in the event of a change in manufacturing 
costs, provision had been made for a price different from the approximate one. But the 
necessary price change does not follow without more in the event of a change in 
manufacturing cost; it is in the necessary discretion of the seller to establish what this change 
in manufacturing cost is and apply this to the price. 
Very similarly, adjustment may simply be best performed by one party who - alone or to a 
greater extent- possesses the requisite skill or knowledge, or even the capability, required for 
the discounting of the effects of the contingency. The lessor in a long-term lease may be more 
aware of the vagaries of the property market and of increases in rates and property taxes than 
the lessee; consequently, he may be better placed to adjust rental to reflect the effect of the 
latter on the balance between performance and counter-performance established by the 
parties.577 In the context of sale, similar experience and expertise may be enjoyed by the 
seller in a scenario such as in Burroughs, as pointed out immediately above. Cynically one 
recognises that this may only be to the extent that that party's performance is detrimentally 
affected by the contingency. This study does not examine the influence of an imbalance in 
bargaining power between contracting parties; this understandably may be a frequent 
explanation for the incorporation of unilateral powers in favour of one party alone, especially 
in this age of standard form contracts.578 An obvious example of this is a bank's unilateral 
power to adjust interest rates; see e.g. Nedbank Ltd v Capital Refrigerated Truck Bodies 
(Pty).579 However it may well be that a bank is, in fact, far more responsive and sensitive 
than its average client to contingencies in the financial markets within which it trades, and is 
thus better placed to effect adjustments alone. Of course, this raises the issue of controlling 
such a potentially far-reaching discretion; this, however, is treated later.580 One might merely 
observe here, however, that when one considers the highly competitive environment in which 
banks fight for clients, such a discretion might not appear so obviously prejudicial. 
576 1964 I SA 669 (W), discussed under I 2 4 above. 
577 See e.g. Otto 1998 TSAR 605 . 
578 See e.g. Vander Merwe et al Contract 225 and the accompanying references. 
579 1988 4 SA 73 (N). This case is discussed at 6 4 6 I below, along with a general discussion of 
unilateral powers within the context of money-lending contracts . 
580 At 6 4 6 I. 
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Added to this, of course, are pragmatic grounds. Aside from purely objective price adjustment 
mechanisms, the alternative to a unilateral power of adjustment is one requiring the agreement 
of both parties. This amounts, essentially, to an agreement to agree, and irrespective of the 
formal objections the courts might in any event make to this, such an agreement will clearly, 
in some circumstances, not serve the interests of the parties. In the case of adjustment of rates 
in money-lending contracts, there are for the bank the high costs and impracticability of 
negotiating and agreeing afresh with all clients upon an increase in rates in the event of a 
increase in, for example, the repo rate levied by the Reserve Bank.581 Such costs are 
inevitably transferred to the client. Likewise one might consider a long-standing relationship 
between a supplier and a supermarket, with the latter maintaining a standing order for goods 
with a high turnover. It may be for both parties a highly practical option, and one that ensures 
an uninterrupted supply, to delegate to the supplier the power to effect adjustments in the light 
of changes in the market. Moreover, on the occurrence of certain contingencies, time is often 
of the essence. Adjustment of price may be required to be made immediately, and to obtain 
agreement may be time-consuming or, at the least, not immediately physically possible.582 
Businessmen may take a pragmatic approach, and prefer to keep a contract on foot, confident 
of resolving differences following performance; ensuring performance, after all , may be at that 
moment the decisive consideration. In contracts of great complexity, a small difference in 
price either way may not be of extraordinary significance. The parties concerned may view as 
a greater achievement the maintenance of the relationship, and the keeping of overall 
performance on track. Consequently, they may simply wish to remove the adaptation of price 
beyond the sphere of consensus, realising that agreement on the necessary adaptation may not 
only be time-consumingly irksome, but not materialise at all. 
The grounds listed above are by no means exhaustive; other factors too might motivate parties 
to agree upon unilateral powers. They do indicate, however, the established role of unilateral 
powers in modern commerce. There is, however, a further reason why it may be imperative 
that some form of recognition be given to unilateral powers, and this is perhaps easily 
overlooked. This concerns the role of a unilateral price adjustment or determination power as 
a safety net, and its importance is demonstrated in Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) 
Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd.583 
6 4 3 2 The Westinghouse case 
In Westinghouse Brake and Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd, in a contract 
involving the supply of trailer braking equipment, the following clauses, as part of the offer to 
sell which was incorporated as part of the contract, were regarded as terms of the contract: 
The prices quoted are based on ex work costs, transport charges, customs duty and currency 
581 See again Otto 1998 TSAR 615-617. 
582 See e.g. the facts of Dickinson & Fisher v Arndt & Cohn (1909) 30 NLR 172, discussed at 6 4 52 
below. The purchaser was resident in Natal and the seller was a cement merchant in faraway 
Hamburg, and at dispute was an increase in price consequent to the San Franciso earthquake of 1906. 
Perhaps a reflection on the circumstances of a slower age, but nonetheless a suggestion that the 
physical possibility of immediate agreement on variation should not always be taken as given. 
583 1986 2 SA 555 (A). 
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rates, applicable as at today's date and are subject to escalation. 
Clause 3 
This tender is based on the rates of exchange, freight, insurance, landing and clearing charges, 
labour, materials, duties and railway rates ruling on the date of tender. Any alteration to these 
before the delivery of the goods will be for the account of purchaser, notwithstanding our 
confirmation of prices in terms of clause I above.584 
Although apparently never fully canvassed,585 it was apparent that the trial court had 
difficulties with clause 3 in particular586 in that it failed to provide a formula which could 
lead to a mathematical calculation of escalation increases, and thus consequently to a final 
fixed price. The trial court had stated that there was no clarity as to what proportion of the cost 
price of the brake kits represented, for instance, the cost of labour or the cost of materials, so 
that a cost increase suffered by the seller (Westinghouse) with respect to the latter could be 
objectively converted into an escalated price for the brake kits. 
On appeal, this problem was alluded to by Corbett JA. Having set out the law with respect to 
price-setting,587 the learned judge of appeal made the prima facie observation that this 
uncertainty surrounding the new escalated price might indeed vitiate the contract of sale in 
that 'the determination of the amount of escalation might in the last resort be left to the 
decision of [the seller] (him)self.588 Corbett JA, however, noted that this had never been 
specifically pleaded by the purchaser (Bilger Engineering), and that because it had never been 
properly canvassed by both sides, the trial court could not be said to have pronounced upon it 
as an issue. Importantly, the court agreed with Westinghouse that if it had been regarded as a 
triable issue, Westinghouse as seller would have had to have been given the opportunity to 
lead evidence to show the clause was 'capable of commercial application and would give rise 
to a determinable price ' .589 Consequently the court did not regard it as an issue upon which to 
non-suit the seller. 
A glance again at clause 3 might well lead one to agree with Corbett JA that the escalation 
clause in casu appeared, prima facie at least, to amount to a unilateral power in favour of 
Westinghouse - that is, of a discretion or unilateral power being left in the final resort to the 
seller himself. Some form of discretionary exercise is inevitable if a final price is ultimately to 
be fixed consequent to some rise in, for example, labour costs. The trial court's analysis is , it 
is submitted, quite correct in this respect.590 Thus, as pointed out by Corbett JA, there was 
584 Above, at 566A-D. 
585 5741. 
586 569B. The trial court apparently also had doubts with respect to another clause, viz. clause 40 of 
the so-called Armscor conditions; the latter clause would appear to be of similar import to clause 3 
quoted above. See here 567F. 
587 Namely, that the price may be fixed by the parties agreeing upon some external standard by the 
application whereof it would be possible to determine the price without further reference to them, and 
that there can be no valid contract of sale if the parties have agreed that the price is to be fixed in the 
future by one of them (574C). 
588 574H. 
589 574J-575A. 
590 See also 574E-H where the seller set out how the price was to be determined in practice in the 
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indeed the danger of the contract being held unenforceable. Can we, however, be so sure that 
the granting of such a unilateral power was indeed intended by the parties? 
On the one hand, there is the view of the seller, Westinghouse. Under cross-examination, the 
latter admitted that it had not provided for a specific formula for the precise, objective 
calculation of an escalated price, but nonetheless alleged that ' 98% of its customers accepted 
escalation clauses of this nature and were prepared to accept [the seller' s] figure of increased 
costs ' .591 
On the other hand, there are indications in Westinghouse that no such contractual discretion 
was ever intended by the buyer. Corbett JA observed that the trial court had found that the 
buyer had from outset always wanted a ' definite formula for calculating the escalated prices 
and was not prepared to leave it to the appellant [Westinghouse] to determine the method of 
calculation' .592 The trial court explicitly rejected the seller' s testimony that the question of 
the formula had never been discussed between the parties,593 or in other words, that the 
purchaser had not questioned clause 3 and thus consequently could have been held perhaps to 
have tacitly consented thereto . 
Consequently, one may observe as follows: clause 3 amounted either, in the final instance, to 
the affording to the seller the unilateral power to make a final adjustment to price, or, 
alternatively, to an attempt by parties to provide for the entirely objective calculation of any 
price increase. As to which of these alternatives was intended by the parties is, even in the 
case report, uncertain. 
The point is, therefore, that there is a fine line distinguishing the two. A price ascertainment 
mechanism, constructed with the intention that it produce a final fixed price without the 
further input of the parties, may for some reason fail to prove effective. It is often, however, 
its very defect that creates the impression that a contractual discretion has been intended in its 
stead. In Westinghouse for example, it is the uncertainty as to the extent to which the price 
must be adjusted following an increase in a cost component that creates the impression that it 
is precisely this incident of the contract that has been left to the discretion of the seller, 
namely, Westinghouse. 
This demonstrates that a unilateral power to fix or adjust price may slip in, unnoticed by the 
parties. This may be as the result of the carelessness of the parties, that is, an oversight on 
their part. The parties may well have intended a completely objective ascertainment process. 
On the other hand it may result from the fact that a completely objective ascertainment or 
adjustment of price may well be, if not nigh impossible, extraordinary difficult to achieve. 
Ultimately, some form of unilateral act may be required of from a party. 
During the course of the trial (and on the ' discretionary' view of clause 3 taken by 
Westinghouse), it was also claimed that 98% of Westinghouse ' s clients not only accepted 
event of some increase in cost. The seller in any event admitted (574G) under cross-examination that 
no specific formula ex isted for the calculation of the increase per unit (of brake equipment) sold. 
591 574G. 
592 569C. 
593 569C. 
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escalation clauses of the type in question, but in particular, were prepared to accept 
Westinghouse's figure of increased costs. Prima facie therefore, businessmen of the type dealt 
with by Westinghouse were not inclined to quibble with the unilateral power afforded to 
Westinghouse in the final adjustment of price. Of course this may be because they had no 
reason to; in all cases they may have encountered Westinghouse's adjustments as reasonable. 
Yet on the strict view that a price may not be fixed by one party alone, these clients could, 
potentially, all claim their contracts to be void ab initio.594 This is of course quite bizarre.595 
On the other hand, on the view of the respondent, clause 3 does not amount to a unilateral 
power to the seller. On this view, there is nothing at all impermissible about the clause in 
question. Thus on a small difference of opinion as to fact (with regard to which even the court 
appeared uncertain), the effect of clause 3 on the enforceability of the contract in general 
could contrast completely. 
Here, therefore, it is clear that some form of recognition should be given to unilateral powers. 
Their recognition would act as a safety-net for unilateral powers that slip in into contracts, 
often undetected and unintended. For an unqualified rule in the form of that cited in 
Westinghouse will always present a danger, not only to deliberate attempts to shift some 
aspect of price determination or adjustment to one of the parties, but also to those genuine 
attempts to keep price adaptation beyond the sphere of the parties, but which fail in this 
attempt for some or other oversight. If such a fine line distinguishes these two cases, it is 
surely not right that the law can attach to them such contrasting consequences. 
6 4 4 The qualified rule a/Westinghouse and its relation to pretium certum 
How then may it today be said that the general rule on pretium certum as cited in 
Westinghouse , is now a qualified one? This occurs by the observation that case law has 
recognised the imposition of limits on the extent of the powers granted to either the buyer or 
seller, and which thus serve to make the unilateral power in question legally acceptable. 
Broadly speaking, these limits are of two kinds. The first type comprises a broad range of 
objective factors which, in some way or other, demarcate the parameters within which the 
unilateral power is to be exercised. The second limit, on the other hand, is an extension of the 
first. In this form, the demarcating objective factor is not necessarily some expressly created 
limit by the parties, but the concept of reasonableness itself. Operating together or separately, 
it will be shown that they comprise the objective limits upon either party's unilateral powers 
of price determination or adjustment. 
The recognition of such factors constitutes, of course, nothing less than the application of the 
594 Cf. Bonnet en Andere v Snaar Dorpsontwikkelaars (Edms) Bpk en Andere 1978 4 SA 212 (D) 
which seems to suggest that by later conduct, a party may waive all rights that may have accrued to it 
as a consequence of vagueness in a contract, including the right to resile. 
595 See Enyati Resources Ltd and Another v Thorne NO and Another 1984 2 SA 551 (C) at 5608 
where the court stated that '(t)he law, I am inclined to think, might justifiably be labelled an ass were 
it to strike down as void for vagueness or uncertainty a contract which the parties thereto have fully 
performed to their mutual satisfaction ' . See also e.g. Nel v Collett 1943 EDL 5 at 14 on the so-called 
doctrine of part performance and whether a contract void for uncertainty may be rendered certain by 
part performance. 
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general rule regarding price. The general rule regarding price requires that price in a contract 
of sale, if not immediately certain, must be objectively ascertainable. Objective ascertainment 
is consequently now placed within the context of unilateral price adjustment powers: the 
limits placed on unilateral price adjustment or determination powers comprise the external 
standards by which an objective ascertainment of price is possible. 
This recognition that the challenge of placing limits upon a unilateral power is really one of 
determining whether the price can be regarded as objectively ascertainable, can be seen in 
remarks by Grosskopf AR in Stead v Conradie en Andere.596 In this case, the appellant had 
argued that an agreement was void because, amongst other arguments, the purchase price for a 
building had been left to the discretion of one of the parties to the contract, viz. the first 
respondent. The court found, however, that the provision that the first respondent was to 
determine the price on the basis of its current value, and that current value normally meant in 
such a context the market value, meant the price was accordingly objectively ascertainable. 
Grosskopf AR continued as follows: 
So ' n prysvasstelling was dus nie aan die uitsluitlike diskresie van die eerste respondent, as 
een van die kontrakterende partye, oorgelaat nie, met die gevolg dat die kontrak nie om 
daardie rede ongeldig was nie ... Soos in die Westinghouse-saak supra op 574C deur Corbett 
AR opgemerk, kan kontrakterende partye geldiglik ooreenkom 'upon some external standard 
by the application whereof it will be possible to determine the price without further reference 
to them' .597 
Some might find such a link tenuous. Hawthorne, for instance, though by no means critical of 
the developing recognition of qualified unilateral powers to fix prestation, acknowledges that 
the courts are 'stretching the limits of the meaning of the term "objectively ascertainable"'. 598 
Kerr, moreover, appears to be sceptical of any qualification; he chooses to emphasise that, 
following Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd, price 
must be ascertainable 'without further recourse to [the parties]'.599 With this focus, however, 
he perhaps fails to explore the full implications of what it means to require a price to be 
'objectively ascertainable'. 
How then might one explain the long list of cases which, apparently, have consistently refused 
to consider any qualified application of the Westinghouse rule?600 Apart from certain 
suggestions made already,601 the short answer may be that many of our courts and writers 
have until recently not looked beyond the power holder. Attention has always been on the fact 
that a party has been afforded the power to determine or adjust price; little attention on the 
other hand has been afforded to the extent of this party's power. Accordingly the act of 
596 1995 2 SA Ill (A). 
597 J23C-D. 
598 Hawthorne 1992 THRHR 64 7. 
599 See in particular Kerr Sale 36-3 7 and the doubts he expresses with respect to the correctness of 
Murray & Roberts Construction Ltdv Final Properties (Pty) Ltd 1991 I SA 508 (A) (discussed below 
at 6 4 53), in the light of rule enunciated in Westinghouse. 
600 For these cases, see 2 6 3 below. 
60 I That is, an uncritical reliance on common law authorities, confusion with the si vo!uero clause, 
and the fact that many decisions- which in turn formed authority for later cases- examined the point 
merely in obiter; see the discussion above at 6 4 I and Lubbe 1989 TSAR !59 in general. 
- -- --------------------------------------------------------~ 
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ascertainment may be labelled subjective: the price fixed upon is, after all , ultimately 
physically decided upon by one of the parties. The manner, however, in which this act of 
ascertainment is carried out provides the necessary objectiveness; the party exercising the 
power finds him or herself prescribed by objectively ascertainable limits. Accordingly, price 
may said to have been- overall- objectively ascertained. 
6 4 5 Limitations placed on unilateral powers: the approach of our courts 
6 4 5 I Introduction 
In the 1993 Appellate Division case of Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) 
Ltd,602 Van Heerden JA, specifically called upon to examine the issue of unilateral powers 
with respect to the determination of rent, and having made a somewhat brief analysis of 
common law and case law on this and related points, stated as follows: 
Be all that as it may, I shall assume that we are bound by the views of our old authorities; v iz. , 
that a sale (or lease) is invalid ifthe price (or rent) is to be determined by one of the parties to 
the agreement. However, the important point for present purposes is that in their reliance on 
Roman law they go no further than disapproving of a lease where the determination of the rent 
depends entirely on the will of one of the parties ... (italics in the original). 603 
Van Heerden JA, a little later in the judgement, then observed further: 
[that] the rule that the determination of rent- or, for that matter, any prestation- may not be left 
to one of the parties should be confined to the situation where the determination depends 
entirely upon the unfettered will of that party. 604 
Here then, at last, was an authoritative qualification on the rule enunciated in Westinghouse. 
Moreover, it is a reasoned conclusion, and forms part of the ratio decidendi, and shall require 
some analysis. Nonetheless, important as the Benlou judgement undoubtedly is, it can not 
properly be said to enunciate new law, or a completely new approach. The belief that it is only 
unfettered unilateral powers, that is, powers not subject to any objective limitation, that are hit 
by the rule that a price may not be set by one party alone has been one encountered before in 
South African case law. This case law, it seems, has been hidden behind better known 
company such as Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd and 
Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd.605 It is with 
Benlou and other recent cases of the Appellate Division that this approach has now moved out 
of the shadows. The earlier relatively unappreciated period of case law development receives, 
however, our initial attention. 
602 1993 I SA 1 79 (A). 
603 186C-D. 
604 186J. 
605 1964 1 SA 669 (W); 1986 2 SA 555 (A). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
131 
6 4 5 2 Early case law, and the corresponding view of commentators 
An early example of a case recognising a limited form of unilateral powers is the old Natal 
case of Dickinson & Fisher v Arndt & Cohn. 606 In this case, in a contract for the sale of 
cement which was to be shipped from Hamburg to Durban over some considerable period of 
time . the following words appeared in the margin of the contract form: ' All prices subject to 
market fluctuations ' . After approximately one year after having entered into the contract, the 
sellers raised the price of cement, as an apparent response to the world-wide increase in the 
market price of cement following the San Francisco earthquake of 1906. The buyers, 
accordingly, disputed this increase. The court however held that with respect to the phrase 
cited, the 'words mean that the price may be increased at the option of the sellers, Arndt & 
Cohn, upon fluctuation upwards in the market price of cement ... '. 607 It is clear, however, that 
whilst recognising this power of adjustment in favour of the seller, the court viewed it at the 
same time as subject to limitations. In this respect, the court appeared to be of the view that 
before the price could in fact be adjusted, there had to be an increase in market price of 
cement. This had in fact occurred: the general price of cement had risen following the 
earthquake. Secondly, it would appear that even if the sellers were entitled to raise the price of 
cement consequent to a genuine rise in market price, the court was nonetheless of the opinion 
that such a power was still not unlimited. This follows from the court's remark, although 
within a slightly different context, that, following adjustment by the sellers, a claim against 
the buyers could nonetheless be 'for too much'.608 One may thus conclude that the court did 
not regard the sellers as having complete carte blanche. 
There are further a number of other old cases which may lead one to a similar conclusion.609 
Dawidowitz v Van Drimmelen, 610 for example, has been identified as the fans et origo of the 
general rule against allowing a party to be unilaterally responsible for the determination of 
price.611 But despite some dispute and uncertainty as to how this case should be 
interpreted, 612 it is, on one interpretation, authority that only completely unfettered 
606 ( 1909) 30 NLR 172. 
607 183 . 
608 Ibid . 
609 Not discussed here but discussed by Lubbe 1989 TSAR 164-165 is the 'vergete ' Lichtheim v Stern 
1910 WLD 284. From the facts it appears that it concerned a sale of a business whereby the buyer 
was granted a discretion to withdraw from a portion of the bargain where he considered the selling 
price of that portion of the business too high. The court (at 288) held that the seller would be held to 
the buyer's decision if the latter was exercised bona fide. Thus while not specifically concerning a 
unilateral power or discretion regarding the determination of price (and also somewhat obscure), it is 
nonetheless an early decision indicating that a seller could be bound to the exercise of a unilateral 
power (concerning, in fact, an essentiale such as part of the merx) where prescribed by an objective 
limitation- in this case, reasonableness. 
610 1913 TPD 672. 
611 Lubbe 1989 TSAR 163. 
612 Wessels himself, who as judge gave judgement in the case, would appear to regard the case as a 
statement of the law concerning the condicio si voluero; this would appear from Wessels Contract § 
433. From the facts of the case, however, this is surely not so: there was no doubt whatsoever as to 
the existence of the obligation between Dawidowitz and Van Drimmelen, and the defendant clearly in 
no way had a discretion with respect to the continued existence of this. The defendant ' s discretion, at 
most, concerned the content of the obi igation, viz. when he was to pay. 
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discretions should be hit by the rule against unilateral contractual powers. 613 Perhaps if this 
interpretation had been followed from the start, the case would have avoided being designated 
poor authority for the general unqualified rule against contractual discretions. 614 For on this 
view, it was never intended to be authority for the latter. 615 If it can be regarded as authority 
for a qualified rule on unilateral powers, however, little has been made of it. 616 
A further notoriously difficult case is that of Dharumpal Transport v Dharumpal. 61 7 Again, 
on one reading of the case in question, it might well serve as some authority for the view that 
only unfettered unilateral powers should be hit by the rule against price-fixing by parties 
alone. Whether such a view is plausible, however, depends upon whatever view one takes of 
Davvidowitz, as Dharumpal relies for authority upon the former. Nonetheless, the Dharumpal 
613 At 676, Wessels J states the following: 'If a person who claims that he has made a contract 
proves that it depends wholly on his own will what part of it he should perform, then according to my 
view there is no contract; it is void for vagueness'. Whereas Wessels himself in his book The Law of 
Contract in South Africa would appear to regard this as a statement reflecting on the consequence of a 
si voluero condition (see the footnote immediately above), his statements in Williams and Taylor v 
Hitchcock 1915 WLD 51 at 54, and more particularly the facts of this latter case (and indeed of 
Dawidowitz itself) indicate that this statement of law relates to a discretion or power concerning the 
content of a contract (for example, the price to be paid), and not its very existence (which is the aspect 
of a contract affected by a si voluero condition). For in neither Dawidowitz nor Williams and Taylor 
might it be said that a si voluero type condition or term was involved. It is clear, furthermore, that 
Hoexter JAin Murray & Roberts Construction Ltd v Final Properties (Pty) Ltd 1991 I SA 508 (A) 
interpreted Dawidowitz as authority for the view that only completely unfettered discretions or powers 
with respect to the determination of pres tat ion were to be regarded as void, and accordingly, not as a 
statement of law regarding the condicio si voluero. This would also appear to be the interpretation 
given it by the court in Nedbank Ltd v Capital Refrigerated Truck Bodies (Pty) Ltd 1988 4 SA 75 (N) 
at 74A-B. 
614 See Lubbe 1989 TSAR 163. 
615 Cases which have - erroneously, it is submitted - relied upon Dawidowitz v Van Drimmelen as 
authority for the general unqualified rule against unilateral powers include the following: Boland 
Bank Bpk v Steele 1994 I SA 259; Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 
1964 I SA 669 (W); Patel v Adam 1977 2 SA 653 (A); Leyland SA (Pty) Ltd v Booysen & Clark 
Motors (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 480 (W). This may have been done directly or indirectly i.e. by reliance 
on a case which in turn had relied upon Dawidowitz. 
616 Murray & Roberts Construction Ltd v Final Properties (Pty) Ltd 1991 I SA 508 (A) 514G-I 
would appear to be the first case which expressly takes up upon the Dawidowitz qualification, and 
thereafter still be seen to apply it (at SISC-O). On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that 
Dawidowitz is not without fault, and hesitancy in following it is therefore understandable. As Lubbe 
1989 TSAR 163 points out, the entire case is obiter on the issue of unilateral powers, and the 
judgement of De Villiers JP, furthermore , reveals little of substance. Moreover, on either 
interpretation, Wessels J can be shown to have misapplied his statement of law to the particular facts : 
firstly, as pointed out above, it is doubtful whether it could be said that the agreement in question 
included a si voluero condition; alternatively, it is doubtful whether it could be said that the discretion 
regarding payment was unlimited- agreement that the defendant was to pay 'naar gelang van zaken ' 
clearly constituted an objectively determinable limit. This is recognised by Lubbe 1989 TSAR 163. 
Accordingly, this failure of Wessels J to line up the law as he saw it with the facts at hand must surely 
be partly responsible for the confusion and wariness with which the case is regarded - see here, for 
example, the hesitancy of the court in Humphreys v Cassel 1923 TPD 280 287 as to the possible 
correctness of the case. 
617 1956 I SA 700 (A). 
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case clearly accepts that a contractual discretion or power of some sort might validly be 
afforded to one of the contractants, with the qualification being that it be exercised reasonably 
and honestly. From certain later remarks of Hoexter JA, however, the import of which one 
cannot be entirely certain, it might well be that the judge only recognised the validity of such 
a discretion when afforded with respect to some non-essentiale of the contract, and not when 
afforded with respect to, for instance, the merx or pretium. 618 
If this view of qualified unilateral powers may indeed be said to have been the view of 
Hoexter JA, it was a view shared by others. In an insightful article published in 1965,619 
Davids expressed a proposition with respect to which various courts (including those cited 
above) had possibly been edging, but had yet to give adequate and clear expression. 
Accordingly, having drawn from South African and overseas case law and writing, Davids 
was to state that it was indeed permissible to assign a contractual discretion in favour of one 
of the parties, provided it was made subject to an objectively ascertainable limitation. This 
limitation, it was suggested, could even be defined by the concept of reasonableness. 
Up until this time, a sharp, incisive analysis of that at issue within the concept of unilateral 
powers or contractual discretions had been absent in South African law. As indicated in 6 4 1, 
Lubbe has demonstrated that while, in a formal sense, there existed good common law 
authority for the view that contractual discretions led to nullity, such an approach did not 
convince to any substantive degree.620 Firstly, our courts, common law writers and modern 
commentators had mistakenly looked to the condicio si voluero construction. Secondly, a 
basis in the certainty requirement was equally dubious. For as pointed out in 6 4 2, aside from 
where reasons of public policy inherent in the latter requirement express concern regarding 
the control of a discretion, it could not be said that the requirement of certainty itself insisted 
upon nullity as a consequence of contractual discretions.621 Thus Lubbe criticises writers for 
their uncritical acceptance of this view,622 and notes that Wessels is the only writer who 
examines the issue in depth.623 Wessels, of course, had raised this very issue in his extra-
judicial capacity as author of The Law of Contract in South Africa. 624 Having raised various 
arguments that had been proposed by various German Pandectists625 in favour of the view 
that the determination of price may not be left to the discretion of a party, Wessels thereafter 
noted that it had also been held that the determination of price may be left to a party because 
618 See Hoexter JA's comments at 707D. 
619 ' Unilaterally Imposed Terms in Contract ' 1965 SAU I 08. 
620 Lubbe 1989 TSAR 173 . 
621 See again Lubbe 1989 TSAR 170-171. 
622 See the uncritical acceptance of the rule that a price may not be determined by a party to the 
contract, with no attempt at qualification, in e.g. Mostert et al Koopkontrak 11; O'Donovan 
Mackeurtan's Sale 45; Hackwill Mackeurtan's Sale 16; Belcher Norman's Purchase 66; Van Jaarsveld 
Handelsreg 299. For a list of our Roman-Dutch writers who follow a literal interpretation of Digesta 
18 I 35 I (see again the discussion at 6 4 I above) and who therefore do not recognise that a party 
may determine price, see Lubbe 1989 TSAR 173 n 78. See also Kerr Sale 54-55 for the view that 
Roman-Dutch writers adopted this interpretation. 
623 Lubbe 1989 TSAR 173. 
624 2nd edition by AA Roberts, 1951, at § 430-432. On the views of Wessels, see in general Lubbe 
1989 TSAR 171-173 . 
625 Viz., Unterholzner, Maynz, and Arndts, at§ 430. 
----------------------------------------------------
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in such a case the discretion must be exercised arbitrium boni viri.626 Nonetheless, Wessels 
returns to the former view, having been swayed by the view of Voet, who held that price 
could not be left to the decision of a purchaser or vendor. But Wessels takes up this view with 
notable tentativeness: for as Voet agreed with the express provisions of Roman law,627 he 
explained, it would be 'probably the view which would be adopted by our courts'.628 This, 
however, does not convince Lubbe who remarks that Wessels' choice in favour of a 
standpoint discredited in German law and elsewhere 'berus op blote historiese pietas en 
behoort nie genoeg te wees om ons reg te verbind tot ' n benadering wat histories verdag is en 
boonop vanuit 'n praktyksoogpunt onbillike resultate gee nie ' .629 
Aside from the views of Wessels,630 other cases had, prior to the article by Davids, also 
touched upon the issues of objective limitations and the possible role of, for instance, 
reasonableness, but without the clarity of the latter article. 631 It is therefore surprising that the 
views expressed by Davids did not gain greater acceptance or find useful application 
elsewhere. This however, might also be as a consequence that Davids, whilst exposing the 
concept of a contractual discretion qualified by objectively ascertainable limitations, proposed 
one crucial exception: 
There appears to be an exception to this rule, in the case of the essentialia of a contract, which 
must be the subject of agreement by the parties. Thus in a sale one party alone cannot fix the 
price (Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 (I) P.H. A 19 
(W)), since the essentialia of the contract are agreement on the price and the thing sold. 632 
As however shall now be seen, recent judgements of our courts have had little hesitation in 
permitting unilateral powers which, although limited by various standards of objectivity, 
relate nonetheless also to the essentialia of a contract, notably price and rental. 633 
6 4 5 3 Recent judgements of the Appellate Division 
A remarkable aspect of recent case law on the subject is that it is characterised by an 
unexpected forthrightness. Given the issue's history of confusion and uncertainty and an older 
case law noteworthy for a distinct lack of clarity, it is surprising that case law, especially 
decisions of the Appellate Division of the 1990's, has tackled the issue with the confidence in 
which it has done. This is particularly so considering that in this case law, no reference was 
made to the 1989 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg article by Lubbe; this undoubtedly 
would have rendered critical support. Instructive, however, is that little discussion has been 
626 § 431. 
627 Notably, in Wessels ' view, Digest a 45 I I 08 I and Digesta 18 I 35 I. 
628 § 432. 
629 1989 TSAR I 73. 
630 Whose views on this debate appear not to have been discussed at all in case law. 
631 Aside from the decisions already mentioned, see in particular the difficult decision of Machanick 
v Simon 1920 CPO 333. 
632 1965 SAL! 11 0; this would appear to be in agreement with the view of Hoexter JA in Dharumpal 
Transport v Dharumpa/1956 I SA 700 (A) above, and Kerr Sale 59. 
633 See also the criticism by Lubbe 1989 TSAR 173 of this exception made by Davids, and Nedbank 
Ltd v Capital Refrigerated Truck Bodies (Pty) Ltd 1988 4 SA 73 (N) at 74E. 
----- -----------------------------
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afforded in these cases to their older predecessors. Generally, there has been merely reference 
to these cases, and not discussion. In the following decisions of the Appellate Division, 
therefore , one discerns clearly the development towards the recognition of a unilateral power 
to determine prestation - whether in the form of sale price or rental. 
(i) In Murray & Roberts Construction Ltd v Final Properties (Pty) Ltd the appellant had 
obtained from the Development Board of the House of Representatives the exclusive right to 
develop, service and market erven in a particular area. 634 Thereafter the appellant and 
respondent entered into a provisional oral agreement recorded later in a letter whereby the 
respondent obtained the right to build and market houses on the erven concerned. The letter 
indicated that the price to be paid by the respondent for each erf, once a house had been 
constructed upon it, would be 'approximately Rll 500 to R12 000', and that the exact price 
was to be determined by the appellant and the Board.635 
The appellant thereafter repudiated the agreement and was sued for breach of contract by 
respondent. In its defence, appellant alleged that the agreement between the two parties was 
void because the amount payable for the erven had not been fixed with certainty, and had been 
left to the determination of the appellant. 636 
The court affirmed, firstly , what it regarded as undoubtedly a general principle of the law of 
obligations, namely, that a provision leaving it entirely to the will of a party to an alleged 
contract 'to determine the extent of the prestation of either party' makes that contract void for 
vagueness . 63 7 It thereafter indicated that if the amount payable by the respondent had been 
determinable in entirety by the appellant, the contract would be regarded as void. In casu, 
however, the court noted that this amount was to be determined jointly by the appellant and 
the Board. Rephrasing the factual situation in the language of sale, and comparing respondent 
to party A, and the appellant and the Board to fictional parties B and C, Hoexter JA stated as 
follows: 
As a matter of principle it is difficult, I think, to see why such a means of determining the price 
should invalidate the contract. The extent of the buyer's prestation would in that situation not 
depend wholly upon the will of B; and on the face of things, determination of the price would 
then involve a reference to an objective and external standard - the conclusion of an agreement 
634 1991 I SA 508 (A). 
635 514A-B. 
636 Appellant had originally contended that the contract was one of sale and that accordingly it could 
not be said that a fixed price had been set. The construction of the contract in question as a contract of 
sale was, however, rejected by both the court a quo and the Appellate Division (see 513A-E). In the 
alternative, it was argued by the respondent that even if the contract could not be said to be one of 
sale, the amount payable for the erven was nonetheless a material term of the contract, and that 
accordingly, it too could not be left to be determined by one of the parties to the contract, and that it 
had to be determined with certainty. The court accepted that it constituted a material term (515A-B), 
and by its continued reference, nonetheless, to the law of sale, clearly indicated that on the facts it 
made no difference whether reference was made to the law of sale on the matter, or the law 
concerning innominate contracts. Accordingly the case may be cited as authority with respect to 
powers afforded parties to determine or adjust price. 
637 514G-H, relying on Dawidowitz v Van Drimmelen 1913 TPD 672 and Dharumpal Transport v 
Dharumpa/1956 I SA 700 (A). 
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between B and C. I say 'on the face of things' because the possibility occurs to me that in 
practice the answer to the question posed might, in a particular case, hinge upon evidence as to 
(i) the relationship between the contracting parties, A and B, and (ii) the independence and 
competence of the third person, C, who is to determine the price jointly with B. 638 
As appellant's defence was one based on exception, the court was content to accept that the 
Board was such a responsible and independent institution so as to defeat the exception. 
Moreover, the court was of the view that the power afforded the appellant and the Board was 
further restricted by the limits indicated in the contract within which the price was to fall (i.e . 
between Rll 500 and R12 000).639 Accordingly, the provision of a limited price-fixing 
power to one of the two contractants could not be regarded as fatal to the validity of the 
contract. 640 
(ii) Somewhat more cryptic is the Appellate Division decision of Proud Investments (Pty) Ltd 
v Lanchem International (Pty) Ltd.641 In this case, an agreement of lease for a period of six 
years was entered into between the appellant, as landlord, and the respondent as lessee. In 
terms of this agreement, the lessee was obliged to shoulder a portion of the reasonable 
maintenance costs incurred by the landlord during the tenancy of the lease. The agreement 
furthermore provided that in the event of a dispute between landlord and lessee concerning the 
reasonableness of such costs, the issue would be decided upon by the landlord ' s auditors, 
acting as experts and not as arbitrators, and whose decision was to be regarded as final and 
binding. In making such a determination, the auditors were to have regard to whether a fair 
market price had been paid with respect to the costs concerned, and were furthermore entitled 
to call evidence from suitably qualified persons. 
After a period of approximately 16 months, the respondent wrote a letter to the appellant 
whereby it stated that the lease was void for vagueness and of no force or effect, and therefore 
no longer binding upon it. In justification for its stance, the respondent contended that , 
because the portion of maintenance costs to be paid by the lessee constituted rental , the 
agreement afforded the landlord the right to fix the rent, and accordingly failed to provide for 
a fixed or (objectively) ascertainable rent. This contention was upheld by the court a quo. 
The court of appeal, however, found differently. Firstly the court noted that the costs which 
were to be incurred by the landlord and which were the object of the current dispute had been 
identified clearly. One assumes that in pointing this out, the court was indicating that in one 
respect already the landlord's discretion was limited: he had firstly to incur certain specific 
and identified costs. 
Secondly, the court stated as follows: 
The fact that each of the cost items in question is qualified by the word ' reasonable' does not 
brand them as reasonable rental, since clause 9.2 provides the mechanism for the objective 
determination ofthe reasonableness 'of any ofthe operating costs or as to the amount for which 
638 515C-D. 
639slsF. 
640 See also Hawthorne 1992 THRHR 643 for approval of this case. 
64IJ9913SA738(A). 
- -------------------------------------------------
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the tenant is liable ' by the landlord ' s auditors as expert outsiders without any reference to the 
landlord.642 
By this one assumes that it was the court ' s view that the discretion was always limited by the 
fact that a claim could only be made for maintenance costs that had been reasonably incurred. 
This standard was, furthermore , objectively ascertainable because a mechanism had been 
specifically created to ensure the ascertainment of reasonableness, namely, reference to the 
landlord ' s auditors . It is clear, moreover, that the court regarded this mechanism for 
determining reasonableness as itself objective i.e . as expert outsiders and without any further 
reference to the landlord. 
Accordingly, while somewhat cryptic, Proud Investments (Pty) Ltd v Lanchem International 
(Pty) Ltd is nonetheless authority for the view that, provided it is subject to objective limits, a 
discretion or power as to prestation may be validly afforded to a party to the contract. 
Hawthorne, however, criticises the judgement, suggesting that the landlord ' s auditors can in 
no way be regarded as constituting objective limitations upon the landlord' s discretion, and 
regards them instead as ' employees ' of the landlord. Accordingly, on his view , the rental is 
effectively set by the landlord himself.643 
(iii) In Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC (previously NBC 
Administrators (Pty) Ltd),644 the Appellate Division indicated a preparedness to move 
decisively beyond the cryptic conclusions in Proud Investments (Pty) Ltd v Lanchem 
International (Pty) Ltd to affirm unequivocally its willingness to embrace unilateral powers 
with respect to prestation, provided the latter are in fact subject to limitation. 
In casu, a written lease provided for payment by the lessee of rent, and in addition, an 
obligation to pay ' the aggregate of all the landlord' s actual and reasonable maintenance and 
642 7501-751 A. 
643 Hawthorne 1992 THRHR 644. It could, on the other hand, be suggested that the reference to 
' reasonable maintenance' costs is in itself enough to create the necessary limitation upon the 
landlord ' s power. This follows from the view, to be expounded upon presently, that all such powers 
are, in addition to any other limitations, in any event ex lege subject to reasonableness. Accordingly, 
one could view the reference to the landlord's auditors as unnecessary (that is, if we are to follow 
Joubert JA ' s favourable opinion of auditors) as the safeguard of reasonableness already exists (by 
implication of law or by fact - see the later discussion of Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector 
Graphics (Pty) Ltd 1993 I SA 179 (A)). Alternatively, even if one were to adhere to Hawthorne 's 
view of auditors and their perceived partiality, this overriding, ever-present ex lege requirement of 
reasonableness would ensure that the auditors themselves would be obliged to act reasonably at all 
times, and not exercise their judgement in favour of the landlord. There are, nonetheless, indications 
that clause 9.2 envisages, in any event, that the auditors were to act reasonably; this is a requirement, 
incidentally, already demanded of arbitrators and similar third parties (see for example Mayfair South 
Townships (Pty) Ltd v Jhina 1980 I SA 869 (T)). See also Brassey 1991 AS 93-94 who sees this case 
as a yet a further step towards the recognition of reasonable rental , and that consequently the 
reference to the clause 9.2 mechanism (the determination of reasonableness by auditors) was a 
necessary interim measure before the courts could take the next short step forward i.e. the 
ascertainment of reasonableness by the courts themselves. 
644 1992 I SA 566 (A). 
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running expenses' in respect to the premises.645 In disputing the validity of the lease, the 
respondent, as lessee, contended inter alia that because the amount of these expenses had 
been left, in the final analysis, to be determined by the landlord in his sole discretion, the lease 
was to be regarded as void. 
In the court a quo, the trial judge had agreed with this contention. Although specifically 
identifying the qualification placed on the expenses, namely, that they be actually and 
reasonably incurred, the court was nonetheless of the view that the discretion afforded the 
landlord invalidated the lease. 
In this respect , Nicholas AJA differed, and sought to place a greater value on the qualification 
mentioned. Accordingly, the acting judge of appeal stated as follows: 
It is question-begging to say that provided the expenses are actually and reasonably incurred, 
the landlord can without reference to the tenant determine the amounts recoverable under 
clause 6. The first qualification is that the expenses should actually be incurred. The amount of 
these, it is true, is within the control of the landlord . The second qualification is that such 
expenses should be reasonable - reasonable, that is, in relation to both the nature of the 
expenses and their amount. That is something which is to be objectively ascertained and is not 
subject to the will or whim of the landlord. It is therefore wrong to say that under clause 6 the 
landlord determines the amount of the expenses.646 
It is clear therefore that the Nicholas AJA was satisfied that the concept of reasonableness, in 
particular, ensured that the power afforded the landlord could not be abused for the latter's 
gain. It is clear, moreover, that the court in this case regarded reasonableness as a concept 
quite capable of objective ascertainment.647 In this respect, Genae Properties moves beyond 
that intimated by the same court in Proud Investments (Pty) Ltd v Lanchem International (Pty) 
Ltd, where it would appear the court required the presence of some third party (in casu, the 
auditors) to give substance to the concept of reasonableness. In Genae Properties the court 
indicates that this is not necessary, in that it is a concept quite capable of ascertainment in 
itself Brassey would seem correct, therefore, in predicting, consequent to the Proud 
Investments decision, that the Appellate Division, within the context of prestation owed to 
another party, would shortly be prepared itself to shoulder the task of determining 
645 574. 
646 5798-C. 
64 7 In addition to the remarks of Nicholas AJA in the citation above, see also his analysis of the 
problem concerning reasonable rent or price, and his conclusion that the courts have little problem 
giving effect to the notion of reasonableness (577C- 578F). Accordingly, at 577G, the judge remarked 
that he found it difficult to see under what principle one could invalidate a sale for a reasonable price, 
or a lease for reasonable rent. This, however, must be regarded as an obiter dictum, as in casu, the 
court was not of the opinion that the case concerned the issue of reasonable rent per se; rather it 
concerned the payment by the lessee of reasonable expenses, and this the court held (5780-E), was 
objectively ascertainable, and accordingly, not so uncertain an amount so as to render the contract 
void. This argument (i .e. uncertainty regarding rent or the amount to be paid for the maintenance and 
running expenses) served as an additional ground to that discussed in the main text above (i .e. that of 
the lease providing for a non-permissible discretion in favour of the landlord) utilised by the 
respondent. 
-- -----------------------------------------~ 
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reasonableness . 648 
(iv) Of the recent Appellate Division decisions on unilateral powers, Benlou Properties (Pty) 
Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd is perhaps the most important.649 As in the Proud 
Investments and Genae cases, it concerns provisions in a contract of lease, which purportedly 
grant to the landlord certain powers with respect to the determination of amounts to be paid by 
the lessee. Importantly, it is clear likewise, however, that the court in Benlou regarded the 
principles applicable in casu, namely, those pertaining to the unilateral determination of rent 
(or that akin to rent) , to be as applicable as to where a discretion or unilateral power had been 
conferred with respect to price in a sale. 650 
In casu, the lease provided that the lessee was obliged to reimburse the landlord for 
approximately three quarters ofthe increase in certain running costs of the premises, including 
the costs of rates and taxes, wages, repairs, water and electricity, refuse removal and insurance 
premiums. It was argued on behalf of the lessee, the respondent, that these provisions 
conferred upon the landlord a discretion with respect to the amount payable as rent by the 
lessee to the landlord, and that this consequently invalidated the contract. The court a quo 
agreed with this contention. 
In reversing this decision, Van Heerden JA, speaking for an unanimous court, stated that the 
rule that the determination of rent, or of any prestation, may not be left to fall within the 
power of one of the parties, was to be confined to the situation where the determination 
depended entirely upon the unfettered will of that party. 651 
648 1991 AS 94 . Brassey was, in this context, actually predicting a willingness of the courts to take 
upon itself the task of giving substance to a reasonable rent. By analogy, however, he could equally 
have predicted a willingness of the courts to quantify what might constitute a reasonable limit upon 
the unilateral fi xing of rent. 
649 1993 I SA 179 (A). 
650 See the court ' s remarks at 1858-C, and thereafter at 186E, where references to rent and price are 
used interchangeably. As in Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 1992 I SA 566 
(A), there was a dispute as to whether the contested expenses could be said to constitute rent. In both 
cases, the court was prepared to assume in favour of the lessee that such amounts did constitute rent 
(Genae at 576H, Ben lou at 1821). Brassey 1992 AS Ill, within the context of the Genae case, 
criticises this assumption, suggesting that relevant instead is whether the consideration, however it 
mi ght be characterised, was sufficiently certain to make the agreement binding in law. Moreover, 
Brassey questions the willingness of the court in Genae (and by extension, likewise Benlou) to 
approach the possibility of contracting on the basis of a reasonable price in the same manner as that 
done with respect to a reasonable rent : while the two have much in common, they differ in the respect 
that whereas performance in an invalid contract of sale can normally be reversed (i.e. the goods can 
be returned), performance by a lessor in a contract of lease, in that it is consumed as performance is 
made (i .e. the leased premises are occupied), cannot be. Accordingly, Brassey would seem to say that 
the practical need for permitting parties to contract on the basis of a reasonable price, as opposed to a 
reasonable rent, is less: rather than allowing for a reasonable price, an alternative solution would be 
simply to order restitution (i .e. the price and goods are returned). See here also Zeffertt 1973 SALJ 
116-117. Given, however, the complex nature of many sales today, it is questionable whether to order 
restitution and the return of performance is a helpful or easily accomplished alternative. Moreover, 
parties in the commercial world are more likely to wish for effect to be given to their agreements, 
rather than have them terminated . 
651 186J. 
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Van Heerden JA, in reaching this conclusion, makes the most thorough examination of the 
issue hitherto undertaken by our courts. The judgement however, is not particularly 
structured; important questions of law are touched upon in various places in the judgement, 
and invariably returned to, or left hanging. Accordingly, one is obliged to pick and choose 
from various sections in order to attempt to isolate the conclusions drawn. The remarks below 
must be seen as a reflection of this attempt. 
Firstly, it was noted that Roman-Dutch writers may be read as stating that a price (or rent) 
may not be fixed by one party alone.652 Van Heerden JA questioned, however, the apparent 
basis for this conclusion as one derived from the requirement of certainty, and doubted 
whether it could be said that price fixed by a party to the contract could be regarded as any 
less certain than that fixed by a third party.653 Later in the judgement, reference is made to 
English law where, although it is recognised that rent must be determined with certainty, it is 
nonetheless recognised that a party could be afforded the power to determine rent in his or her 
own discretion.654 These remarks, accordingly, may be seen as dismissive of any objection 
raised against discretionary powers by the requirement of certainty (in the sense of 
vagueness). 
Thereafter, and as a second point, the judge of appeal observed that although he was prepared 
to assume that one was bound by the views of the old authorities (namely, that a sale or lease 
was invalid if the relevant prestation was to be determined by one of the parties alone), this 
rule was a qualified one. The old authorities, it was noted, went no further than disapproving 
of a contract where the extent of prestation depended entirely on the will of one of the 
parties.65 5 Curiously, this is not clearly demonstrated by Van Heerden JA. He does, however, 
rely on two decisions of the Appellate Division, which, it is submitted, do indeed support such 
a qualification, although these cases contain likewise little reference to the writings of the old 
authorities . 656 
As further support for his view that only unfettered discretions were to be hit by the rule, the 
judge referred to a number of other points. This included a reference to the approach in South 
African law to pure and mixed potestative conditions, and to the recognition in matrimonial 
law that consent papers may confer a limited discretionary power upon a spouse to bind his or 
her partner patrimonially. 657 Thereafter, the court identified the limitations in casu which 
acted to qualify the power vested in the landlord.658 These numbered three, the first of which 
was the fact that the landlord could only claim a defined share of the increased costs, namely 
74.4%. Secondly, the landlord himself had to incur contractual liability for the increased 
costs, that is, he had actually to incur the costs and expose himself to a claim from the relevant 
652 185C, based particularly on Digesta 18 I 35 I. 
653 1858-F. 
654 1878-D. 
655 186C-D. 
656 Murray & Roberts Construction Ltd v Final Properties (Pty) Ltd 1991 I SA 508 (A) and Theron 
v Joynt 1951 I SA 498 (A). 
657 186F-J; 187E-G. 
658 Strictly speaking, these qualifications were identified by the court (at 1840-H) before the 
discussion of the rule on price-fixing. 
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third parties before he could claim from the lessee. This was a point stressed by the court : a 
failure by the lessee to pay for his three quarter share of the increased costs and the landlord, 
when faced by claims from third parties, would be obliged to foot the entire bill. His 
discretion, accordingly, would not appear so free at all. Finally, a third qualification was noted 
with respect to a cut-off date which affected which expenses were in fact recoverable. 
It would appear that the court regarded these three qualifications as adequate in themselves in 
effectively limiting the power of the landlord.659 There are, however, indications that in 
addition, Van Heerden JA was of the view that the power afforded the landlord was, in any 
event, qualified by the requirement that this power be exercised reasonably. 
Van Heerden JA' s views on the role of reasonableness within this context are not entirely 
clear. The possibility of reasonableness serving as an adequate qualification is first raised 
when, following the judge's rejection of certainty as a rationale behind the rule, Van Heerden 
JA stated as follows: 
As a matter of logic it is also not clear to me why the requirement that a third party must act 
arbitrio bani viri- as to which see Voet 18.1.23 and Machanick v Simon 1920 CPO 333 at 336-
9 - should not also govern the situation where it has been left to one of the parties to determine 
the price (or rent). 660 
Thereafter the judge showed that an agreement conferring upon a party the right to determine 
prestation was well recognised in other jurisdictions, and that this acceptance followed from 
these systems ' recognition ofthe qualifying concept of reasonableness or equity. 66 1 
The possibility of reasonableness serving as an ex lege qualification of a party's power to 
determine prestation, as it did in these overseas jurisdictions, was, however, not dealt with 
immediately thereafter. It is only raised again on Van Heerden JA remarking that there existed 
no reason m policy why a power to determine prestation should be held to invalidate a 
contract. 662 
In this respect, the court noted that to give effect to such a provision served to give effect 
likewise to the intentions of the parties, and that this was the policy of our courts. Thereafter, 
the court distinguished between three situations, and did so as follows: 
An agreement conferring upon A the right to claim from B particularised expenditure incurred 
by the former may be so worded that the extent, and possibly also the nature, of such 
expenditure is wholly within A's unfettered discretion. At the other end of the scale the 
agreement may be so phrased that A is only entitled to recover reasonable expenditure from B; 
i.e. , expenditure which is objectively reasonable .. . More usually, however, such an agreement 
659 See here the remarks (1831) of Van Heerden 1A with respect to Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v 
NBC Administrators CC 1992 1 SA 566 (A), and his observation that, in the latter case, it was not 
held that in the absence of the second qualification identified by the court (i .e. reasonableness), the 
first qualification (i.e. expenses to be actually incurred) was by itself unable to stave off a conclusion 
that the lease was to be regarded as invalid. 
660 185G. 
661 185G-186A. 
662 1871. 
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will be subject to a term implied by law; viz., that A must exercise an arbitrium bani viri and 
that B is consequently only liable in respect of expenditure which a reasonable man in the 
position of A could have incurred. 663 
Brassey accordingly interprets these remarks of Van Heerden JA as holding that, 'though the 
lessor could decide in its discretion what expenditure to incur, there was an implication (either 
of fact or law) that it could only seek recompense for such expenses as were reasonable ... 
[and a ]s a result the discretion was not unfettered .. .' . 664 If such an interpretation is a correct 
one, Benlou Properties holds forth important implications. It suggests that while a 
qualification upon a power afforded a party to determine prestation may frequently, by an 
express or tacit reference to reasonableness, be qualified by the parties themselves (i .e. an 
implication of fact), this in fact, is not strictly necessary. The power in question will, in any 
event, be subject to the ex lege requirement that it be exercised reasonably; stated differently 
and within the context of sale, it is an implication of law that a party afforded the power to 
adjust or determine a price must always do so arbitirio bani viri. 
This is an attractive conclusion. Moreover, given the court ' s earlier remarks as to the logic of 
such a conclusion, and its references to foreign jurisdictions who follow this approach, it may 
well be the correct one.665 However, it is conceded that the court does not state this 
expressly; there is no clear unequivocal statement, as there is to be found in other case law 
regarding a third party, that a contracting party may himself fix or adjust prestation as he is in 
any event subject to the ex lege requirement that he exercise this power reasonably - arbitrio 
bani viri. Van Heerden JA also made his remarks in the context of a power granted to a party 
to claim expenditure from the other; as indicated earlier in the judgement, in having to incur 
expenditure666 himself there exists in any event certain inherent limitations on his supposedly 
free discretion. 
Furthermore, it appears that while such an ex lege implication of reasonableness may 'usually' 
be the case (that is, where this had not been implied already by the parties, either expressly or 
tacitly), the court also recognised that in certain circumstances a discretion or power might be 
so worded that it would fall within the first of the categories mentioned above i.e. fall entirely 
within the unfettered discretion of one of the parties. The court here appears to be making 
provision for the case where the parties have made their intentions clear that they do not wish 
the unilateral power in question to be bound by the requirements of reasonableness. In Benlou 
itself the court indicated a willingness to examine whether the provisions in casu were not 
construed so as destroy any room for the implication of a qualification whereby the landlord 
was always to exercise his power reasonably.667 Effectively, the parties in such a case would 
663 187 J-188C. As authority for this view, Van Heerden JA cited Machanick v Simon 1920 CPD 333 ; 
Dharumpal Transport v Dharumpal 1956 I SA 700 (A); Nedbank Ltd v Capital Refrigerated Truck 
Bodies (Pty) Ltd I 988 4 SA 73 (N); Digesta 18 I 7 pr.; Voet I 8 I 23; and the 7th edition of volume 
two of Windscheid 's Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts at 407. 
664 1993 AS 188. 
665 That is, Van Heerden JA' s remarks at 185G, repeated in the main body of the text above, that he 
failed to see why the requirement that a third party should act arbitrio bani viri should not also 
govern the situation where a party to the contract was to determine or adjust the price. 
666 See I 84D-H, and the discussion above. 
667 See respondent's argument at 188C-D. 
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be excluding by agreement the ex lege terms of a contract.668 Of course, as Van Heerden JA 
notes, such an agreement may well be contrary to public policy, with the result that the 
agreement would be void . 669 
All things considered therefore, it would appear that Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector 
Graphics (Pty) Ltd is authority for the view that in the absence of an intention not to be bound 
by the notion of reasonableness, the courts will permit a contracting party to fix or adjust the 
price, as - as in the case of a third party - the contracting party will , by way of a term implied 
by law, be required to exercise this power reasonably.670 In Benlou, there are indications that 
our law is approaching that stage of development where it can, like overseas jurisdictions, 
safely pass through provisions in contracts whereby the power to determine or adjust 
prestation is afforded to one party alone, confident in the knowledge that, ultimately, the ex 
lege presence of reasonableness will serve to prevent abuse. This, however, has not yet been 
conclusively shown. 
6 4 6 Limitations upon unilateral powers: additional considerations 
In the light of the interesting developments in case law as described above, the following 
points deserve further attention. 
6 4 6 1 Developments in money-lending contracts 
There have been a spate of recent decisions on contractual terms authorising the unilateral 
determination of interest rates in money-lending contracts, and this development has since 
culminated in the publication of a useful article by Otto. 671 Such terms are clearly, to some 
extent, analogous with those authorising the unilateral determination or adjustment of rent or 
price. It is thus interesting to note that, initially, this development in money-lending contracts 
has somewhat mirrored the development in contracts of sale and lease, as sketched above and 
to be traced in a case such as Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd. 
This development appears therefore, firstly, in Nedbank Ltd v Capital Refrigerated Truck 
Bodies (Pty) Ltd.672 In this case, it was pleaded in a particulars of claim that an overdraft 
668 See Vander Merwe et al Contract 201 . 
669 188C. 
670 For a recent Appellate Division judgement expressly following Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v 
Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd 1993 I SA 179 (A), see Stead v Conradie en Andere 1995 2 SA Ill (A) 
122J-123D. This case, however, did not touch upon the issue of reasonableness as a qualification 
upon a unilateral power. At issue, on the other hand, was whether the determination of the price at 
which a certain building was to be alienated lay within the exclusive discretion of one of the parties to 
the contract. In terms of the contract, the ' huidige waarde' of the building was to determine the basis 
of the price, and the court interpreted this as meaning the building's market value. This in turn, the 
court observed, was objectively ascertainable, and accordingly, served to qualify the power afforded 
that party. The contract, consequently, could not be invalidated on this ground, a conclusion with 
respect to which the court relied upon Benlou. 
671 'Kontraktuele bedinge wat eensydige rentekoersvasstellings deur banke magtig ' 1998 TSAR 603. 
672 1988 4 SA 73 (N). 
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agreement between a banker and his client included, as either an express or alternatively as an 
implied term, a provision that it was within the discretion of the banker to increase the rate of 
interest from time to time. It had then been queried in the court a quo whether such a power 
afforded the banker was enforceable in law. On coming before the Judge President, Milne JP 
held that the provision in question was valid and enforceable, in that the discretion afforded 
the banker was not unlimited: firstly , the rate of interest could not exceed the maximum fixed 
by the Usury Act 73 of 1968, and secondly, it was stated that, in any event, ' the discretion 
may have to be exercised reasonably in the sense that it must take into account the rate 
customarily levied by the bank at that particular time in respect of that class of customer' . 673 
Milne JP likewise noted that it was for presumably similar reasons that the customary 
provision in mortgage bonds permitting the mortgagee to increase the rate of interest from 
time to time up to a stated maximum had never been challenged as being unenforceable.674 
The position that a banker may in his discretion validly fix the rate of interest on overdrawn 
facilities subject always to it not exceeding the maximum rate permitted by law, has since also 
been confirmed recently in ABSA Bank Bpk v Saunders .675 The court in this case found this 
practice to be a long-standing usage of commercial banks. 
Milne JP ' s remark regarding interest charged mortgagors was taken perhaps as a cue, as some 
years later, such a provision in a contract of mortgage was indeed challenged. In Boland Bank 
Bpk v Stee[e676 the court, while specifically disagreeing with the approach taken in Nedbank 
Ltd v Capital Refrigerated Truck Bodies (Pty) Ltd,677 nonetheless recognised a power granted 
to a mortgagee to vary the rate of interest and conditions of payment of the mortgage by way 
of written notice at any time. This conclusion was reached, however, not because the court 
regarded such a power as fettered by an implied requirement of reasonableness, but by way of 
interpretation. The court appeared to regard itself bound by authority that a discretion granted 
to one of the parties resulted in the term being deemed vague, and that the contract would 
consequently be null. As the clause was vague, the court thus felt a question of interpretation 
arose, and it accordingly chose to follow the rule of interpretation that in interpreting a 
contract, an approach must be taken that leads rather to validity of the contract than invalidity. 
Accordingly, the court chose to interpret the clause as including the limitation that the power 
was to be exercised in a reasonable manner. As this could be tested against rates and practices 
to be found in the open market, the clause could no longer be declared too vague. 678 Though 
differing in approach to the Nedbank case, it can nonetheless be observed that in the concept 
of reasonableness the court in Boland Bank also found its way clear to the recognition of a 
unilateral power to determine interest rates.679 Developments in the law concerning money-
673 75C. See the discussion of this case by Lubbe 1989 TSAR 173-175 who, while essentially in 
agreement, points out that, at the time of judgement, there existed little authority in South African 
case law for the position taken by Milne JP. 
674 750. 
675 1997 2 SA 192 (NK) 195-197. 
676 1994 I SA 259 (T). 
677 2751. 
678 237F-I. 
679 Kerr (Sale 57) criticises the judgement in Boland Bank Bpk v Steele 1994 I SA 259 (T), stating 
that there is no precedent case in which the principle of interpretation applied had been held to 
validate an agreement 'which lacks consensus on an essential requirement'. Kerr then goes on to state 
that if our courts are to regard a reference in a contract to a determination by one of the parties alone 
of an essentiale as a reference to a reasonable determination, than it would be better for this to be laid 
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lending contracts, and sale and lease, thus appeared to be tracking each other. 
Recent decisions in the Witwatersrand High Court, however, appear to reverse this trend. In 
both NBS Bank Ltd v Badenhorst-Schnetler Bedryfsdienste BK and Another and NBS Boland 
Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive CC and Others680 this Court held as unenforceable a clause 
(identical in both cases as clause 14) which provided that the bank could, notwithstanding the 
original rate of interest fixed elsewhere in the agreement, at any time increase or decrease this 
rate of interest 'to the rate determined by the bank as payable for the class of bonds into which 
this bond falls, provided that the rate as increased or decreased does not exceed any limit 
imposed by any law in force at the time of such increase or decrease'. 681 In the first of these 
decisions, Stegmann J viewed the loan of a sum of money at interest as analogous with the 
lease of movable or immovable property, and thus held that an interest rate, as in the case of 
rental , should either be set by the parties at a particular rate, or be determinable by reference 
to objectively ascertainable criteria. 682 The judge thus observed that parties could expressly 
or tacitly provide for the applicable interest rate to be set by law or by custom, or by reference 
to ' any objectively determinable market rate or other rate that is not dependent on the will of 
either party ' ,683 and referred to the possible linking of interest rates to the rate set by the 
Reserve Bank, or to variations in prime interest rates of some other banking institution.684 In 
casu, however, Stegmann J found the clause in question conferred upon the bank a power to 
determine the interest rate unilaterally, without reference to objectively ascertainable criteria, 
and was to this extent null and void.685 Stegmann J also specifically distinguished the 
position in casu from the 'special case' of a banker fixing charges on an overdrawn current 
account, which was apparently justifiable in that this unilateral power was exercised not 
arbitrarily, but in accordance with long established banking practices. 686 
This decision is sharply criticised by Otto, who finds it unfortunate that Stegmann J failed in 
his judgement to refer to the decisions in Nedbank Ltd v Capital Refrigerated Truck Bodies 
(Pty) Ltd and Boland Bank Bpk v Steele. 687 As Otto correctly points out, the clause at issue in 
the NBS cases would not per se have been found unenforceable if judged in the light of the 
criteria to be found in the former cases. For firstly, the clause could have been subject to the 
criterion of reasonableness. 688 Secondly, even if wary of finding for a sufficient limitation in 
the concept of reasonableness alone, the inherent limitations placed on the bank' s unilateral 
down as a rule of law, and not as an application of a principle of interpretation. It is a pity, therefore, 
that Kerr does not thereafter provide a thorough examination of Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector 
Graphics (Pty) Ltd 1993 I SA 179 (A), as there are certainly indications in this case of the law 
moving towards an identification of reasonableness as an ex lege term in this context. 
680 1998 3 SA 729 (W) and 1998 3 SA 765 (W) respectively. 
681 At 732G and 770A respectively. 
682 734E-F. 
683 736E. 
684 734G. 
685 At 736J-737C. The court did, however, find the clause in question to be severable; consequently 
the entire contract was not vitiated. The equivalent clause in One Berg River was likewise found to be 
severable. 
686 At 731 A and 736A-C. 
687 Otto 1998 TSAR 612; 1988 4 SA 73 (N) and 1994 I SA 259 (T) respectively. 
688 Whether by way of interpretation as in the Boland Bank case or, more directly so, as a possibly 
implied (by fact or by law?) term in the case of Nedbank. 
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power are patently clear: any variation in the rate was required to correspond to the rate for 
the class of bonds within which the bond in question fell , and could not exceed the rate set by 
law. 
The case is also a curious one in that Stegmann J, for example, fails to explain why 
particularly a power to determine interest rates on overdrawn facilities is, as a ' special case ', 
so distinguishable from a similar power to be found in other money-lending contracts such as 
mortgage.689 To say that in the former case such a power may not be exercised arbitrarily but 
is governed by long established banking practice690 is to beg the question. Surely this could 
be argued equally in the case of mortgage. For in ABSA Bank Bpk v Saunders evidence was 
given of a long list of factors taken into consideration by a bank manager in exercising his 
discretion to fix interest rates on overdrawn facilities.691 These included the security offered 
by the debt, the client ' s financial stability, the degree of risk involved in the client ' s business, 
and the client's reputation in the community. Otto, however, as shall shortly be seen, cites 
very similar factors that can be used when testing whether a discretion to fix interest rates in 
other money-lending contracts such as mortgage has been exercised reasonably .692 This 
suggests, of course, that the long-standing business practice upon which Stegmann J places so 
much stock has its foundation, ultimately, also in reasonableness. Reasonableness therefore is 
the defining element of this long-standing business practice. For as Stegmann J himself notes, 
the discretion is permitted because its exercise cannot be arbitrarily performed; that is, that 
ultimately the bank manager must not act arbitrarily, but reasonably. Thus one sees that the 
factors listed in ABSA Bank Bpk v Saunders do not define the long-standing business practice; 
they are (merely) factors to be considered when the interest rate is varied and, importantly, 
serve in the ex post facto testing of whether the discretion has been exercised in a non-
arbitrary fashion i.e. reasonably. The concept of reasonableness can play just as central a role 
as the definitive limit in any other long-standing business practice or custom that has 
developed to set the limits of a unilateral power to determine rates of interest. Thus one 
should expect then that a similar practice would have arisen in the case of interest rates in 
689 This, however, can be explained in one sense if, as pointed out by Otto 1998 TSAR at 620, one 
considers that, in the event of the overdrawn debtor being unhappy with the new interest rates fixed 
by his banker, he is in a greater position to terminate the contract than in the case of a debtor in a 
long-term money-lending contract such as a mortgage. For generally, it should be easier to find the 
means to settle an overdrawn account than to find other finance to pay off a mortgage bond (and thus 
allow one to terminate one ' s contract with the mortgagee over unhappiness with newly varied interest 
rates) . In NBS Bank Ltd v Badenhorst-Schnetler Bedryfsdienste BK and Another 1998 3 SA 729 (W) 
Stegmann J was of the view that should the contract in question have required the bank to give notice 
in the event of a variation in the interest rate, clause 14 would have been unexceptionable. For then 
the position would have been analogous to that in Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Thorburn 1990 2 SA 
870 (C): the debtor could then choose to accept the varied interest rate, or alternatively, reject the 
variation and terminate the contract (7330-1). As pointed out by Otto at 614, this may hold on facts 
such as those found in Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Thorburn (where termination would simply entail 
the cancelling of one's contract for the use of a credit card, and moving one's business elsewhere), 
and possibly in the case of overdrawn facilities, but must be regarded as completely unrealistic to be 
expected of a debtor tied up in a long-term loan and with little chance of finding immediate finance 
elsewhere. 
690 Stegmann J at 736A-C. 
691 1997 2 SA 192 (NK) 1960-F. 
692 1998 TSAR 619-620. 
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other money-lending contracts such as mortgage. Accordingly, this ' special case ' of interest 
rates in overdraft facilities , grounded as it is in reasonableness, does not appear so unique after 
all. 
Be that as it may, the luckless clause 14 suffered no better fate in the judgement of Southwood 
J in NBS Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive CC and Others.693 In this case, however, 
::ounsel for NBS (who had also acted in Badenhorst-Schnetler) had done his homework and 
rook the argument one step further.694 Referring to Boland Bank Bpk v Steele , counsel argued 
that the power afforded to the bank in terms of clause 14 was not unfettered (and accordingly 
unenforceable) because the discretion was required to be exercised arbitrium bani viri. 695 
Nonetheless, Southwood J found the clause conferred an 'unfettered discretion' on the bank to 
vary the interest rate , and consequently held the clause to be unenforceable.696 Notably, 
however, the conclusion that the discretion was 'unfettered' did not follow from any view that 
a limitation arbitrium bani viri could not be a sufficient limitation in itself. Rather, while 
' mindful ' of counsel's approach, Southwood J simply found on the wording of clause 14 no 
intention that the power be exercised arbitrium bani viri.697 Thus while the judgement is 
clearly an obstacle to the recognition of an implied (ex lege) term of reasonableness in such 
cases, it does not, in principle, question the possibility of reasonableness alone serving as an 
adequate limitation (or 'fetter') on a unilateral power. 
Both NBS Bank Ltd v Badenhorst-Schnetler Bedryfsdienste BK and Another and NBS Boland 
693 1998 3 SA 765 (W). 
694 Although somewhat belatedly; counsel ' s new line of approach (i.e. implied term of 
reasonableness) was not raised in pleadings (772F-G). 
695 At 772E-G and 7748-C it would appear that counsel argues that it is a term implied by law that 
clause 14 be exercised reasonably, and that this argument followed specifically from the judgement in 
the Boland Bank case, as referred to above. As already pointed out, in the latter case it was, in fact, 
not specifically held that there was an implied (by law) term of reasonableness, but that the power in 
question be interpreted as being subject to such a term . It is thus interesting to note the manner in 
which little distinction is made between these two - in theory- fundamentally different approaches. 
See here, the criticism of Kerr, referred to at footnote 679 above. 
696 Importantly, Southwood J refers to Murray & Roberts Construction Ltd v Final Properties (Pty) 
Ltd 1991 I SA 508 (A) for the view that it is a general principle of our law of contract that when it 
depends entirely on the will of a party to an alleged contract to determine the extent of prestation of 
either party the purported contract is void for vagueness; thereafter Southwood J noted that it had 
been specifically held in Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd 1993 I SA 179 (A) 
that this rule applies only where it is left to the unfettered discretion of the other party. While it is 
good to note that lower courts are now following the lead given in Benlou towards a qualified 
application of the Westinghouse rule, it is perhaps unfortunate that Southwood J did not consider it 
necessary to examine the possible 'fetters' contemplated by Van Heerden JA in the former case, such 
as the implication of reasonableness. This is particularly so as , as indicated in the text above, a 
possible implied term of reasonableness had been raised by counsel for NBS. Counsel here, however, 
might have done better to have emphasised this point by reliance on the judgement in Benlou, and not 
Boland Bank v Steele 1994 I SA 259 (T). 
697 774C. Southwood J also distinguished the case in question from cases cited by counsel (e.g. 
Bellvil!e-Inry (Edms) Bpk v Continental China (Pty) Ltd 1976 3 SA 583 (C)) in support of his 
argument that there was an implication of reasonableness, in that the cases referred to by counsel first 
required some sort of ' factual determination ' before the party holding the discretion or power in 
question could exercise the latter (774E-F). 
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Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive CC and Others are cuttingly criticised by Otto, who regards 
them as 'om dit sagtens te stel, nie kommersieel verstandig nie ' .698 Otto suggests that the 
effect of these decisions is that clients who do not agree to proposed variations in interest rates 
can oblige their banks to continue levying interest at the rate fixed in their original contracts 
for perhaps ten or twenty years, unless the banks find recourse in some other solution at 
present unknown to Otto. 699 This would be economic suicide as - as clearly demonstrated 
recently by fluctuating interest rates in the South African markets - it is simply not feasible to 
work with fixed, invariable interest rates in contracts such as long-term loans.700 Nonetheless, 
Otto's criticism may be somewhat overstated. On the one hand, Otto incisively points out that 
the clause 14 was probably part of a standard term contract, of which thousands have possibly 
already been registered, with the intention of governing the relationship between mortgagor 
and mortgagee for many years to come. This is certainly a painfully unhealthy situation. 70 I 
On the other hand, however, it can clearly be seen in both decisions that the Witwatersrand 
High Court did not envisage that the interest rate applicable in a long-term money-lending 
contract should be held indefinitely to a fixed level. This can be seen especially in Stegmann 
J' s observation that variations in interest rates could be linked to variations in the bank rate 
fixed by the Governor of the Reserve Bank, and in this way be fully enforceable as being 
determinable by objectively ascertainable criteria.702 The fear in both cases would appear to 
be of abuse of this discretion to the disadvantage of the client, the consumer. Consequently 
one perceives that in both judgements the verdicts reached by Southwood J and Stegmann J 
are motivated by a desire that such objectively ascertainable criteria, which provide the 
safeguard against abuse, be more clearly defined. If this could be achieved, the courts would 
(presumably) not raise an objection to the variation of rates falling in within the (now more 
clearly fettered) discretion of the creditor. 
On the other hand, it can be strongly argued that the necessary objectively ascertainable 
limitations are present already, and simply require to be recognised. This ultimately is Otto's 
point. Aside from any other limitations placed upon a unilateral power to determine a rate of 
interest, any such determination by the creditor can in any event always be subjected to the 
dictates of reasonableness and good faith. 703 Otto finds authority for this approach not only in 
698 1998 TSAR 617 . 
699 Ibid. 
700 614. 
70 I 617. Otto at 614 also points out that a similar clause in ABSA Bank Ltd v Henning case no. 
32954/97 (W) (unreported) suffered a similar fate, the court in this case following by implication NBS 
Bank Ltd v Badenhorst-Schnetler Bedryfsdienste BK and Another 1998 3 SA 729 (W). Accordingly, 
the deeds of mortgage of two different commercial banks are affected. 
702 734G. 
703 1998 TSAR 619. Aside from the invocation of an implied term of reasonableness, Otto at 618 also 
considers that the interpretative approach followed in Boland Bank v Steele offers a solution, as does 
the possibility of finding for a suitably entrenched business practice, which wou ld then permit the 
bank to fix interest rates in its discretion . Otto presumably has in mind here a business practice along 
the lines of that to be found in ABSA Bank Bpk v Saunders 1997 2 SA 192 (NK). As suggested above, 
one would possibly not have to go far to find the concept of reasonableness as an important and 
underlying element of such a business practice. Add to this the observation that little distinction is 
made between interpreting a unilateral power as being subject to reasonableness, and finding for such 
an implied term itself, and one cannot be but struck by the extent to which reasonableness, in 
whatever form we choose to place it, is central to the issue. 
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cases such as Boland Bank v Steele and Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) 
Ltd, 704 and in the approach to good faith in other areas of South African contract law, 705 but 
refers also to its use in other jurisdictions such as The Netherlands and Germany.706 In the 
application of this test, factors such as the risk involved in granting the loan, the class of 
client, the security provided by the debtor and current market rates should all be borne in 
mind; furthermore , debtors should also be required to be given notice on variation. 707 
Moreover, if the determination is found wanting, the current rate should apply until replaced 
by a reasonable one. 708 
It is submitted that Otto's approach is the correct one. It should find useful application not 
only in the context of interest rates, but should also contribute to the argument for clearer 
recognition to be given to reasonableness as a limitation on unilateral powers in other 
contexts, such as in the setting of price. 
6 4 6 2 Powers to fix price ab initio, powers to vary, and the principle of autonomy 
An issue that has received little attention in this study is whether a distinction should be made 
between a unilateral power to determine price ab initio and one where the power is to vary or 
adjust a price which was initially determined ex consensu. As apparent in the section 
immediately preceding, it comes to the fore within the context of a unilateral power to 
determine interest rates, as the power afforded the banker in these cases is invariably one to 
vary a rate of interest set initially by both the banker and the client in their original agreement. 
On the other hand, it is a question not discussed in the series of Appellate Division cases on 
unilateral powers concerning rental and price which have prominently featured in the 1990 ' s. 
Lubbe, however, makes this distinction in the course of his discussion of Nedbank Ltd v 
Capital Refrigerated Truck Bodies (Pty) Ltd: 709 
Die beslissing in die Nedbank-saak kan ook ondersteun word deur te onderskei tussen ' n 
kontrak wat ' n aanvanklike diskresie verleen, en een wat ' n bevoegdheid gee om die terme van 
' n kontrak van andersins bepaalde inhoud van tyd tot tyd wysig. 'n Klousule aangaande 
eensydige wysiging van rentekoerse raak in beginsel nie die bepaaldheid van die 
kontraksinhoud nie. Die moontlikheid van 'n rentekoerswysigingper se doen nie af daaraan dat 
daar wei ' n geldende en bepaalde koers (of huurgeld) deur onderlinge ooreenkoms neergele is 
nie. Die feit dat die een party instem daartoe dat die ander die koers diskresioner eensydig kan 
wysig, doen nie afbreuk aan eersgenoemde se autonomie nie: die wysigingsklousule is immers 
juis ' n uitv loeisel van sy outonome beslissingsbevoegdheid. Daar is dus, mits die moontlikheid 
van kontrole aan die hand van die arbitrium bani viri in gedagte gehou word, vanuit ' n 
704 1994 I SA 259 (T) and 1993 I SA 179 (A) respectively. Otto (604-605), in fact, refers to the 
Ben lou case within the specific context of ' prysvasstelling', and not within the context of the fi xing of 
interest rates . Importantly, however, he recognises that the effect of this decision is that the unilateral 
determination of price can ultimately be tested against the requirements of reasonableness and good 
faith , and would for this reason also not be considered an impermissible unfettered discretion . 
705 608-610. 
706 Ibid . 
707 619-620. 
708 The last suggestion, as Otto notes (619), is Lubbe ' s: 1989 TSAR 175. 
709 1988 4 SA 73 (N). 
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beleidsoogpunt niks wat stry teen die erkenning van die eensydige wysigingsbevoegdheid nie. 
Wysiging, behoorlik oorgedra aan die ander party, bring opnuut sekerheid omtrent die inhoud 
van die kontrak. By ' n aanvanklike diskresie kan daar moontlik geargumenteer word dat ' n hof, 
by weiering van ' n party om die prys to bepaal, voor die probleem te staan sal kom om 'n 
redelike en billike prys vir die partye te moet bepaal, en dat dit moontlik iets is waarteen, in die 
lig van die traagheid van die howe om vir partye ' n kontrak te maak, gestuit sal word. Hierdie 
probleem bestaan nie by klousules wat voorsiening maak vir eensydige wysiging van 'n aspek 
van die kontraksinhoud nie.71 0 
Thus firstly , it is evident that Lubbe finds the arbitrium bani viri as an adequate check on any 
potential abuse of a unilateral power. 711 Importantly, he would not appear to regard this 
check as any less effective within the context of unilateral powers to determine a rate of 
interest or rental ab initio , than in the case where this power extends only to a consequent 
variation of the term fixed initially ex consensu. 712 This would tally with the decisions in, for 
example, Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC and Benlou Properties 
(Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd713 where on the facts, reasonableness was accepted as a 
limit on, for example, the landlord's ab initio discretion to incur costs, and to subsequently 
charge these to the lessee's account. Merely because there is an initial price or interest rate, 
does not make the possibility of a (mere) subsequent variation any less dangerous where this 
power of variation is unchecked. An initial price or rate of interest, as a benchmark agreed 
upon at outset by both parties, may make, of course, a subsequent appraisal of the 
reasonableness of a varied price or rate an easier exercise than in the case where this has been 
left ab initio in the power of a party. In the latter case, for instance, where does the court begin 
in ascertaining whether the party has set a reasonable price? However, in substance, the limit 
on the unilateral power remains the same: it must ultimately be exercised arbitrium bani viri. 
Accordingly, the distinction made by Lubbe between these two types of discretions (i.e. ab 
initio versus consequent variation) is regarded as potentially more important from the view of 
party autonomy. Thus Lubbe observes that it could be argued that in the case of a unilateral 
power to determine a rate of interest (or prestation) ab initio, there is greater risk of effect not 
being given to the autonomy of the parties. 
For as Lubbe has pointed out, in the case of a provision concerning interest in a money-
lending contract, the initial rate of interest ensures that there is (at least initially) certainty with 
respect to the contents of the contract. As Lubbe is moreover of the belief that the abuse of 
unilateral powers can be adequately safeguarded by the requirement of arbitrium bani viri, he 
furthermore suggests that where a consequent variation is found not to be reasonable, the 
initial rate applies until replaced by a reasonable variation. Certainty of term therefore 
remains. There should be no reason in principle why a similar approach could not applied 
with regard to unilateral powers concerning the variation of price and rent. 
On the other hand, the position regarding a unilateral power to determine a rate of interest or 
price ab initio is indeed different. There is, in fact , no initial certainty with regard to the price 
710 1989 TSAR 175. 
711 See here Lubbe's reference to Roman law for the origins of the arbitrium bani viri: 1989 TSAR 
172 n 76. 
712 See also Van der Merwe et at Contract 165. 
713 1992 I SA 566 (A) and 1993 I SA 179 (A) respectively. 
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or rate of interest until the relevant party has exercised this power. And, indeed, where he or 
she fails to do so, the court is then faced with the decision as to whether it may intervene and 
' make the contract for the parties'. Here, immediately, the question of giving effect to the 
autonomy of the parties comes to the fore. 
This, however, is also a real possibility in the previous scenario sketched, viz. of a unilateral 
power merely to vary a price or interest rate initially agreed upon ex consensu. For what, in 
this case, if there is never agreement on a reasonable variation? It would be unrealistic to 
expect the previous rate of interest or price to remain valid and binding indefinitely. Were this 
the case, the debtor, for instance, in a money-lending contract, would have no incentive to 
agree to an upward variation by his bank; he would be content to rely on the previous (lower) 
rate. The parties would then, presumably, be compelled to tum to the courts for clarity on 
what constitutes a reasonable variation, and the court would be faced again with its dilemma 
of whether it should be making the contract for the parties. Admittedly, its wariness may be 
less in these circumstances as, at the least, the parties took initial responsibility for the setting 
of the price or interest rate . Furthermore, as pointed out above, the court is assisted, in its 
attempt to ascertain whether the consequent variation is reasonable, by a benchmark in the 
form of the initial price. In principle, however, this scenario indicates that it not a problem 
restricted to ab initio powers alone, and thus suggests that the distinction between the two 
types of unilateral powers should not be taken too far. 
In any event, this dilemma is not a new one. It has long confronted our courts in the context of 
price-setting by third parties. Here, where a third party sets a manifestly unfair price, our 
courts will substitute its own reasonable determination - though it hesitates to make the latter 
binding.714 But here too, a third party may fail to set a price in its entirety, and the courts are 
faced with the exact same problem: may, and should, it make the contract here? This has been 
discussed at length under Chapter 2.715 It suffices to say that there can be surely little 
difference between the case where a party to a contract fails to set a price or sets one (whether 
ab initio or by way of consequent variation) which is manifestly unfair, and the case where 
this is done by an appointed third party. Thus in the former case it is suggested that, once 
more, the courts will do well to establish the intention of the parties. Where the parties, in 
affording the power to one of them, intended that he or she alone should make this 
determination of price, there may be little room for substitution of a reasonable price by the 
·courts, which would then be held binding upon the parties. This may count likewise where the 
parties (or a party), in the event of dispute or a failure of any price being set at all , clearly 
from outset would have wished to avoid the costs of litigation in the ascertainment of this 
price by the court, and would rather the contract be simply terminated. On the other hand, it 
may be established that the parties did not regard the unilateral power enjoyed by one party as 
the essential mechanism in any determination of price, but desired merely that the latter be 
reasonable. In such a case, there may be something to be said for an approach which holds 
that any reasonable price substituted by the courts may be held binding. 
This discussion also leads one to question the extent to which the issue of party autonomy is 
examined in Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd.716 Here, two situations 
714 See 2 5 4 I. 
715 See especially 2 5 4 I and 2 5 4 2. 
716 1993 1 SA 179 (A). 
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are at issue. The first is to what extent the implication of reasonableness amounts to the court 
making the contract for the parties.717 Indeed Brassey' s main criticism of the Benlou decision 
is the failure of the court to traverse this question. 718 On a general level this, of course, has 
been dealt with in the paragraphs immediately preceding. An examination of this question can 
also be found under the discussion of price ascertainment powers afforded third parties at 2 5 
4 above, and a possible doctrinal justification for this implication is also briefly discussed at 6 
4 6 3 below. 
In any event, Van Heerden JA in the Benlou Properties judgement appears sensitive to this 
fear. This can be seen in the following exception made by the judge. For while it will 
' usually' imply an ex lege term of reasonableness (where this has not already been done 
expressly or tacitly by the parties themselves), the court will not always do so; it recognises 
that there may be cases of an agreement where the parties make clear their intention that the 
unilateral power lies wholly within the unfettered discretion of the one party ,719 In such a 
case it appears there would be no room for the implication of reasonableness, and accordingly 
the unilateral power, is not saved on this ground. Clearly, the court is here giving effect to the 
intention of the parties - although it is probable that the courts would require a very clear 
expression of an intention not to be bound by reasonableness. 
The second and very much related issue is whether public policy permits a party to agree to 
permit his co-contractant the unilateral power to determine prestation, and thereby, 
apparently, to forfeit his autonomy regarding the determination of the consequences of his 
contract. To the extent that this issue concerns the principle of autonomy (and is not merely a 
rephrasing of the fear of abuse of a unilateral power), it presents few problems. As Lubbe has 
clearly stated, where a party agrees to the inclusion of such a power, 'die wysigingsklousule is 
immers juis 'n uitvloeisel van sy outonome beslissingsbevoegdheid' ,720 Provided control 
over this power can be enforced by way of the arbitrium bani viri, there exists no reason in 
717 Strictly speaking, if reasonableness in this context is recognised as an ex lege term, such an 
objection cannot stand. As pointed out by Kerr Sale 54, a court, in identifying and/or formulating or 
reformulating an ex lege provision, does not make the contract for the parties; rather, it tells the 
parties what the law provides in the absence of express or tacit provisions. Thus the objection can be 
framed on a different level: does the law, by recognising and providing for such an ex lege term, 
attempt thereby to make the contract for the parties and undermine its own declared adherence to the 
principle of autonomy? In this regard, one is referred to 6 4 6 3 where it is suggested that the ex lege 
implication of reasonableness is simply the application of the principle of good faith which is well 
recognised as underlying our law of contract. Of course, if the courts go no further than finding for a 
tacit term (which subjects a unilateral power in a particular contract to reasonableness), and it does 
so by implying an objective test, than the court itself opens itself up to the charge of making the 
contract for the parties. 
718 1993 AS 189. Brassey identifies the three problems at issue in this context: (i) the fear that a 
power afforded to a party to determine prestation leaves the amount of that prestation too vague to be 
enforced, (ii) the fear that such a power leads to abuse and potential enslavement, and (iii), the fear 
that the courts will be burdened with the duty of making the contract for the parties. As indicated by 
Brassey, the first two questions are indeed answered in Benlou, but unfortunately, not in such a 
manner so as to indicate that they are separate questions. The third question is identified by Brassey 
as not having been traversed at all. 
719 187J-188C. 
720 1989 TSAR 175, cited also in the extract in the text above. 
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public policy not to recognise the latter. It is therefore noteworthy that Van Heerden JA also 
remarked as follows: 
Nor is there a policy reason why such an undertaking should be void merely because it relates 
to the exercise of a discretion. Although pronounced in a different context, the following oft-
quoted dictum of Sir George Jesse! MR in Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson 
( 1875) LR 19 Eq 462 at 465 is apposite: 
' ... if there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full 
age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their 
contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced 
by Courts of justice'. 721 
Accordingly, whereas critics of the Benlou approach would be apt to place an emphasis on the 
court (or strictly speaking, the law) implying a term in the contract (viz. an ex lege term of 
reasonableness), the court in Benlou would emphasise that it is giving effect to a term of the 
contract (viz. the discretion in favour of one the parties) . The court in Benlou would thus 
argue that by enforcing the unilateral power, although it subjects it to an (implied) limitation, 
it is giving greater effect to the autonomy of the parties than it would by not implying a term 
and holding the unilateral power to be unenforceable. The implication of reasonableness, in 
this light, serves the principle of autonomy. 
Thus, in a case such as Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd we view the 
tension once again: on the one hand, the courts are implored not to make the contract for the 
parties, and on the other, they are obliged to give effect to the autonomy ofthe parties. Thus a 
failure to imply reasonableness wards off the accusation of making the contract on one front , 
but fails on another. As should now be evident, this study is of the view that in the absence of 
indications to the contrary, the law implies a term of reasonableness which, invoked, permits 
parties to express their autonomy by agreement on unilateral powers. 
Finally, it is surprising to find that Kerr remains of the view that the parties may not agree on 
price to be determined by one of them alone, and appears to make no concession to even a 
qualified version of this rule. 722 This is surprising considering that reference is made by Kerr 
to decisions such as Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd, Murray & 
Roberts Construction Ltd v Final Properties, and Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC 
Administrators CC. 723 Kerr does, on the other hand, recognise that the basis for this rule does 
not rest on the requirement of certainty, at least in the sense of vagueness; 724 this should by 
now be well recognised. As a basis for the rule, Kerr suggests that such unilateral powers are 
not recognised because the granting of such a determination to a party indicates that the 
parties 'have not progressed far enough towards consensus for their agreement to be 
recognised as a contract' ,725 As should now be clear from this study, this cannot form a 
justifiable basis for Kerr's support of the unqualified rule. In as much as an agreement on a 
fixed price is an expression of the autonomy of the parties, so too is an agreement on a 
721 187H-I. 
722 Kerr Sale 54-55, 58. 
723 1993 I SA 179 (A); 1991 I SA 508 (A); 1992 I SA 566 (A). 
724 Kerr Sale 58. 
725 59. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
154 
unilateral power- even one which authorises a unilateral power ab initio. In the South African 
law of sale, a term may be certain or objectively ascertainable; thus where parties agree on the 
later objective ascertainment of price, their consensus on this term is regarded as sufficient. It 
has been shown that the granting to a contractant of a power to determine or adjust price is 
regarded as a form of objective ascertainment of price, provided that this power is subject to 
objectively ascertainable limitations. In such a case, there can be no argument that the parties 
have not reached consensus. 
6 4 6 3 The arbitrium boni viri as part of the principle of good faith 
It has already been indicated that the South African law of contract is subject to the overriding 
norm of good faith. 726 As indicated by Zimmermann, many ex lege terms currently 
recognised in South African contract law can be regarded as concrete manifestations of the 
basic principle of bona fides. 727 The ex lege rule requiring a third party who is entrusted with 
fixing a price to exercise his power arbitrio bani viri may be regarded as one such 
manifestation of the latter principle; this rule has strong roots in classical Roman-Dutch law, 
where all contracts were considered bonae fidei. 728 With regard to a similar power afforded a 
party to the contract, recent cases such Nedbank Ltd v Capital Refrigerated Truck Bodies (Pty) 
Ltd and Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector Graphics (Pty) Ltd, and writers such as Lubbe, 
Otto, Christie and Vander Merwe et al ,729 all endorse the application of the arbitrium bani 
viri , or reasonableness, as an implied limitation. It appears, therefore, that that the role of the 
arbitrium bani vir in this latter context finds a similar doctrinal home as part of the principle 
of good faith which underlies and informs the South African law of contract. 730 
6 4 6 4 Analogy with price-fixing by third parties 
As should be evident, when examining the issue of unilateral powers in favour of a party to 
the contractant, the comparative situation of a power granted to a third party may be kept in 
mind. Van Heerden JA himself in Benlou Properties has drawn this comparison. 73 I This is 
particularly so in two respects. 
Firstly, cases involving unilateral price ascertainment powers that have come up before the 
courts have merely involved the courts ruling on whether the power granted in the contract in 
726 See the discussion of good faith in South African law at 5 3 2 above. 
727 Zimmermann Good Faith 245. 
728 For this rule in Roman-Dutch law, see e.g. Machanick v Simon 1920 CPD 333 at 338-339. 
729 Lubbe 1989 TSAR 172, 175; Otto 1998 TSAR 608; Christie Contract II 0; Van der Merwe et a! 
Contract 165-166. For the most recent, and thorough, statement on this, see in particular Otto, ibid. 
730 As noted by Zimmermann Good Faith 245, there is no numerus clausus of ex lege terms; new 
ones may be continuously developed to adjust the law to changing circumstances. The recognition of 
such an ex lege term could be just such a development, particularly in the light of the frequent use 
being made by modern contractants of unilateral powers. On the other hand, it could be equally well 
argued that the implied term of reasonableness within the specific context of a unilateral power to set 
price, is not a new ex lege term at all ; it is only in recent years, however, that our law has seen fit to 
' rediscover ' it. 
731 Above, at 185G. 
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casu results in the nullity of the contract or not. The courts have not had, as yet, to determine 
whether a particular price has been determined unreasonably by a party; consequently, they 
have likewise not yet been faced with the question whether they may set aside a price and 
substitute their own reasonable determination, and whether they could hold the latter as 
binding upon the parties. As apparent in particular from the discussion in 6 4 6 2, these are all 
questions which have already arisen within the context of price-fixing by third parties; useful 
reference may accordingly be made to 2 5 4 1. 
Secondly, it appears that a third party appointed to fix a price need not be entirely independent 
of the parties, but is required, rather, to exercise his or her discretion reasonably . There can be 
little real difference between a power afforded to a party to a contract, and one afforded his or 
her nominee or agent. In as much as in the latter case the co-contractant is protected by the 
requirement that the non-independent exercise his or her power reasonably, this same 
protection may be obtained where a similar limitation is imposed upon a power-holding party. 
For further discussion and authorities, reference may be made to 2 54 3. 
6 4 6 5 The quantification of reasonableness 
Our courts are capable of quantifying the concept of reasonableness. This applies to where a 
court must determine whether a price set by one of the contractants in the exercise of his or 
her unilateral power is reasonable, as well as in the event of the court itself having to supply a 
reasonable substitute hereto. With respect in particular to unilateral powers to set price or rent, 
this is evident in the view of Nicholas AJA in Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC 
Administrators CC. 732 This has also been demonstrated before, particularly in the context of 
prices set by third parties, 733 and in the discussion as to whether South African law 
recognises sale for a reasonable price. 734 Furthermore, while reservations have been 
expressed with respect to the difficulties encountered by a court in determining a reasonable 
price well after performance was envisaged to have taken place,735 it has likewise been 
pointed out that these constitute challenges to be faced, not avoided. In this respect the court is 
well aided by the judicial process; the court makes its decision on the basis of evidence 
established before it. This ensures that an arbitrary, judge-made valuation (as to what would 
constitute a reasonable price) is not foisted upon the parties.736 This furthermore alleviates 
the fear of the courts making the contract for the parties. 
6 4 6 6 The approach inforeignjurisdictions 
Finally, as observed by Van Heerden JA, various overseas jurisdictions recognise that a 
unilateral power to fix or vary price may be afforded to a party to the contract. Thus in the 
United States, it is not fatal if one of the parties reserves the power of fixing or varying the 
price, if the exercise of this power is subject to prescribed or implied limitations, such as that 
732 1992 I SA 566 (A) 577G-578C. 
733 See 2 54 I above. 
734 See 2 3 2 above. 
735 See e.g. Maceys Consolidated (Pvt) Ltd v TA Holdings Ltd 1987 I SA 173 (ZS) 180. 
736 Lubbe 1987 AS 138. 
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the variation must be in proportion to some objectively determined base or must be reasonable 
or in good faith. 73 7 Where the transaction in question is in any event a contract for the sale of 
goods, Corbin notes that all doubt as to the validity of the contract is removed by § 2-305 (2) 
of the Uniform Commercial Code which provides that a 'price to be fixed by the seller or the 
buyer means a price for him to fix in good faith ' _738 Likewise, in German law, § 315 I BGB 
provides that one of the contracting parties may determine performance. 
6 4 7 Unilateral powers: concluding remarks 
What therefore is our law on unilateral price adjustment or determination powers? From the 
above study, it is clear that the Appellate Division today permits parties to afford a contractant 
the power to ascertain or adjust prestation (and thus price), provided that the power is not 
completely unlimited. Moreover, there are indications in decisions by this court that in the 
final resort, the necessary limitation may in any case be supplied by the notion of 
reasonableness - provided, that is, that an intention by the parties not to bound by this latter 
limitation cannot be deduced. 
This view is furthermore supported by most recent commentators on the South African law of 
contract.739 Thus Vander Merwe et al state that 
a power to vary an aspect of the performance [e.g. price] should be effective if it is not 
completely unlimited (if only in the broadest sense), and provided the power is exercised 
according to the standards of reasonableness and good faith ... 740 
Furthermore, commenting on the Benlou decision and that the traditional rule that a sale is 
invalid if the price is to be determined by one of the parties to the agreement is due for 
welcome reconsideration, Christie notes that 
[a]ssuming our courts would follow other legal systems in imposing a duty of good faith on 
the party fixing the price ... there would be no ground of public policy on which the law could 
invalidate the barga in the parties had made with their eyes open.74I 
Such a development is welcomed. This is particularly so when one considers that, in 
recognising that a party to a sale may vary price by the exercise of a limited unilateral power, 
contractants are afforded yet another tool in providing for some form of contractual adaptation 
closer in time to the occurrence of contingency. 
6 5 Price adaptation in long-term contracts 
737 Corbin On Contracts § 4.4. 
738 Ibid. 
739 Aside from Van der Merwe et al and Christie cited below, see also Lubbe I 989 TSAR 175 and 
Brassey 1993 AS 188. 
740 Contract I 66. 
741 Contract I I 0. 
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6 5 I Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 4, two parties may involve themselves in a long-term relationship, in 
their capacities as buyer and seller.742 This may result from the deliberate creation from 
outset; the parties may, for instance, expressly agree to engage in business together for a 
period of fifteen years. Alternatively, the relationship may be de facto ; it may result from 
regular interaction between the parties over a period of time.743 During the duration of the 
relationship, contingencies may arise which may threaten the balance of reciprocal 
performance established by the parties. The buyer, for instance, may no longer regard the 
rendering of his performance (payment of price) as adequately compensated by the goods 
which he receives in return, or alternatively, the seller may feel the price he receives as no 
longer commiserate with the performance he renders (viz. departing with the goods). If the 
relationship is to be maintained, such a balance between performance and counter-
performance should be restored, and this should be possible on a continuous basis throughout 
the relationship. 
In such cases, parties in a relational contract may simply elect to enter into a series of 
contracts of sale, with each new contract being entered into as the need arises. No one contract 
of sale is said therefore to govern for the entire duration of the contract. Consequently, if a 
contingency materialises which threatens the balance between price and the value of the goods 
being sold, the parties simply enter into a new contract, with the terms of this contract being 
provided on an ad hoc basis. A great deal of flexibility is consequently accorded the parties in 
these arrangements, in that the terms of the new contract may be made significantly different 
from the previous contract. At the same time, however, such an arrangement would appear to 
provide little security of tenure for the parties. Following the termination of one contract, a 
party is at liberty to refuse to agree on the next, and the relationship is terminated as a 
consequence. 
This problem may, however, in some cases be more apparent than real. Although lacking in 
strict contractual security, such a relationship may be maintained by the operation of other 
non-legal forces . The relationship may be maintained by an economic dependence by both 
parties on the continuation of the business relationship. The transactions between the two 
parties may, for example, involve resources which are highly specialised. The seller of the 
goods in particular may be the one of few manufacturers of the latter, whilst the buyer may be 
one of the few distributors with the expertise and organisational capacity to distribute such 
goods, and may have invested heavily in infrastructure in order to manage such distribution. 
Clearly, both parties have a strong financial interest in maintaining the relationship. Likewise 
there may exist a mutual confidence and trust between the parties that has built up during the 
course of many years of successful and profitable co-operation. As circumstances change and 
contingencies arise, there may be an accompanying gradual adaptation in behaviour by both 
parties, and the consequent adoption of compromises, in the expectation that the relationship 
will continue. A businessman, where confident that his or her co-contractant shares a similar 
interest in the maintenance of a relationship beneficial to both, will frequently adopt the 
pragmatic approach of working out the fine working detail of a contractual relationship as the 
742 Goetz & Scott Principles 153 mention the follow ing as examples of long-term relational 
contracts: distributorships, franchises , joint ventures, and employment contracts. 
743 Bell Long-term Contracts 195 . 
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need for it arises.744 Accordingly, whether operating individually or cumulatively, such 
economic and social forces may function to ensure that contractants provide for adjustments 
whilst remaining in relationship. 745 
On the other hand, this security might not be regarded as adequate, especially given the 
presumption of opportunism which has been suggested to constitute a primary source of 
transaction costs, and the fact that the effect of such relational forces may often only be felt 
after a period of considerable time. This is perhaps especially true of parties who envisage 
entering into a long-term relational contract. Consequently, they may seek to enter into a 
contract which binds them for some considerable period, and thus affording them both a 
measure of contractual security, whilst providing for some flexibility or latitude with respect 
to its terms. This may be achieved by the creation of a broad contractual framework which 
thereby establishes a contractual nexus between the parties, with flexibility provided by 
allowing the parties to agree and enter into 'smaller' agreements on specific aspects of their 
relationship (and which are not covered by the framework agreement) on an ad hoc basis. In 
South African case law, this has been illustrated by the recent Appellate Division decision of 
H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd and Another. 746 
6 5 2 The Merks case 
6 52 1 Facts and approach of the court 
In H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd and Another, 747 Merks (or its 
nominee company or close corporation) was appointed by the B-M Group to be the exclusive 
sales agent, distributor and purchaser of Clairol products in South Africa for a period of five 
years. By way of advance annual and quarterly forecasts agreed upon between the parties, 
Merks undertook to purchase from B-M a certain amount of the above product each year, 
which Merks in turn would distribute for its own account. The agreement was entered into and 
commenced from approximately the beginning of 1989, and the prices of Clairol products for 
1989 were fixed by agreement by both parties. The contract stated, furthermore, that prices 
could thereafter be increased by mutual agreement, and it was common cause that this could 
be done so on an annual basis. 
Accordingly, little problem was encountered during the first year of the relationship. When, 
however, Merks towards the end of 1989 provided certain provisional forecasts of the stock it 
would require for the following year (and thus purchase), it was informed by the B-M Group 
that prices had been increased. The new prices quoted by B-M were between 36% and 150% 
higher than the previous year's prices. Merks objected and B-M adjusted the prices further, 
744 See e.g. the attitude of the parties in Build-a Brick BK en 'n Ander v Eskom 1996 I SA 115 (0) 
129E. 
745 On non-legal relational forces in general see Bell Long-term Contracts 200; Macneil Contractual 
Relations 70-71, 81-82; McKendrick Regulation 309-310. See also in particular the dynamics of 
dependence created by transaction-specific exchanges: Williamson Contract Analysis 52-55 . Also the 
discussion at 3 3 3 above. 
746 1996 2 SA 225 (A). 
747 Above. 
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but on average the new prices were still a little under 50% higher than the previous year. 
Merks still did not agree to this and a stalemate ensued on this point. Under these 
circumstances, B-M purported to terminate the relationship, with the consequence, amongst 
others, that B-M was sued by Merks for repudiation and damages in the amount of R8 ,2 
million. The pith of Merk's argument was that the alleged attempt by B-M to adjust 
unilaterally the price amounted to repudiation, whilst B-M pleaded that the failure to agree on 
a price increase merely had the effect that no contract had for that year come into being, and 
that consequently, the relationship between the parties had been terminated. 
In an analysis of the contractual relationship between the parties, termed by the court a 
distribution or concessionaire agreement, Nestadt JA noted that that encountered in casu was 
not an uncommon arrangement.748 Its effect had been to create a reciprocal contractual 
relationship, and in this respect a vinculum juris had undoubtedly been created: the contractual 
relationship, for instance, afforded Merks a remedy if B-M had during the course of the five 
years appointed some other company to market its goods, or had attempted itself to sell 
Clairol products directly to the public. With respect to the parties' disagreement over price, 
the judge of appeal noted further that although the contractual relationship undoubtedly had a 
flavour of sale, the agreement was to be more properly regarded as providing a contractual 
framework for the conclusion of a series of purchases (that is, a series of individual contracts 
of sale) which would be entered into on an ad hoc basis between Merks and B-M, and 
grouped together on an annual calendar year basis. Nestadt JA accordingly held that the 
agreement amounted to a species of pactum de contrahendo , that is, an agreement to make a 
contract in future , namely, a contract (or contracts) of sale. The agreement as pactum would 
likewise be enforceable if the price of these contracts of sale were certain or ascertainable. 
This would be so because the contract which is envisaged to be made by the pactum is a 
contract of sale. For a contract of sale to be enforceable, price must be certain or ascertainable. 
Consequently, in that these prices were still to be agreed upon, the agreement as pactum could 
not be said to be enforceable. Following the logic of the court, it followed therefore (although 
this was not stated directly by the court) that although Merks could argue that it had accepted 
and exercised a right arising from the pactum, it could not oblige B-M to contract on the basis 
of the price set out in the pactum. This was so because there was in fact no price set out in the 
pactum; the pactum was unenforceable. Accordingly, in the absence of agreement on price, no 
new contract of sale had been entered into for 1990, and Merks ' claim for damages was 
doomed to failure . 
748 The court referred here to the English Court of Appeal decision of Decro-Walllnternational SA v 
Practitioners in Marketing Ltd [ 1971] 2 All ER 216 (CA). In this case, the defendants were appointed 
sole concessionaires for marketing a certain product in England, and which was to be supplied to 
them by the plaintiffs. The agreement entered into between the parties was oral, and no express 
mention had been made with respect to the duration of the relationship, other than that it could be 
terminated on reasonable notice. Three years into the relationship, during which time the defendants 
had sunk great costs into the relationship, much of which could only be recouped at a later stage, the 
plaintiffs suddenly saw fit to appoint another company as its concessionaire. Disputed, among other 
aspects, was the length of period which could be said to constitute reasonable notice within the 
relational circumstances. A similar arrangement is to found in Evans Marshall & Co Ltd v Bertola SA 
and Another [ 1973] I All ER 992 (CA), where a distributorship agreement for the supply of sherry 
was entered into for an initial period of five years , and thereafter a further period of five years unless 
term ina ted at the end of the first period . 
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6 5 2 2 Critical analysis 
The judgement by Nestadt JA is a useful one. It indicates that in a contractual relationship of 
the type entered into by the parties in the case above, the arrangement may be said to 
constitute two parts. 
Firstly, the contractual relationship constitutes a fully enforceable vinculum juris, with a 
content comprised of the reciprocal rights and duties created between two parties in their 
capacities as seller and purchaser-distributor/concessionaire. A seller, such as the B-M Group, 
could be contractually compelled to refrain from supplying any other distributor with the 
goods in question, while the concessionaire could likewise be prevented from distributing any 
other manufacturer's goods. 749 
Secondly, this same contractual relationship constitutes a pactum de contrahendo in that it 
also amounts to an agreement to make another contract (or contracts).750 Here, the 
contractual relationship itself, the vinculum juris, provides a framework for the conclusion of 
a series of contracts of sale. The view of Nestadt JA in this case, however, was that the 
contractual relationship as a pactum de contrahendo is unenforceable. For it to be enforceable, 
the pactum 's content must be enforceable; accordingly, all the terms of the contracts of sale 
envisaged by the pactum must be certain or ascertainable, including price. Thus as there is no 
agreement from outset in the pactum (i .e. the general contractual framework) on any price 
which can then be incorporated as forming a term of a contract of sale, at most it envisages the 
creation of the latter. By itself, however, it does not bring about this creation, as for each 
successive contract of sale, fresh agreement on price is required. Thus unless some other 
construction can be afforded to the words of the contract (namely, that the 'price may be 
increased by mutual agreement from time to time'),751 this agreement is lacking. The 
contractual relationship forms a framework for this possible agreement, no more, no less.752 
The contractual relationship between the parties in the Merks case may thus be said to be as 
follows: a broadly enforceable vinculum juris (the concessionaire or distribution agreement) 
which likewise constitute!:> a pactum de contrahendo, and which whilst not enforceable as the 
latter, nonetheless provides a framework towards the conclusion of further contracts of sale. 
The real effect of this agreement should not be understated. 
Firstly, as backdrop to the framework agreement, lies an established legal nexus between the 
749 See for instance the remarks by Nestadt JA at 232G as to the fact that a remedy is provided when, 
in a distributorship or distribution agreement, this long-term contractual relationship is broken when 
some other party is appointed as distributor, and see in particular, the facts of Decro-Wall 
International SA v Practitioners in Marketing Ltd [ 1971] 2 All ER 216 (CA), where such an 
agreement was broken, and the remedy granted herein. These cases indicate that although often (as 
will appear below) described as a 'framework', such a relational contract has real legal force . 
750 On the enforceability of a pactum de contrahendo in general, see Van der Merwe et al Contract 
56 ff; Christie Contract 39 ff. 
751 This will in fact be argued later- see 6 5 5 below. 
752 This is indeed stated by the court at 2330, but, it is submitted, is not afforded the attention it 
deserves. 
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parties. This legal nexus, the concessionaire agreement, has an effect similar to that of a 
restraint of trade: neither party may pass his or her business to another. Thus the seller may 
not look to pass on his wares to another distributor, and in turn, the latter may not act as 
distributor for some other. The parties would appear locked into relationship. Consequently, 
by being already contractually bound to each other, the next step to a further nexus, namely, 
by agreeing on a new price and therefore the creation of a new contract of sale, is conceivably 
that much more easily taken. The existing vinculum juris thus encourages further agreement, 
namely, on the new prices for the following four years. Indeed, this was probably the view of 
the parties in the Merks case; that is, they expected agreement. 753 It is possible, for instance, 
that they regarded as the real achievement the very fact that they had entered into a complex 
concessionaire agreement. Details such as price were expected to be accomplished during the 
working out of the contract. 7 54 
Secondly, there may also be cases where, in addition to the above, economic and social 
relational forces give momentum to any move towards fresh agreement on price. In a long-
term contractual relationship, for instance, it may be of the utmost economic importance for 
both parties that the relationship is maintained, and this may encourage parties to consent 
more easily to compromising agreements. 755 
Accordingly, and especially in a relationship characterised by mutual economic dependence, a 
framework agreement is, to some extent, itself a adaptation mechanism. This it achieves not 
by effecting by itself adjustment of price on the materialisation of contingency, but in its 
encouraging of the parties to effect such adjustment, namely, by renegotiating and contracting 
afresh. 
The extent to which this type of arrangement proves adequate for the purposes of the parties 
remains, however, to be seen. 
6 5 3 Relational contracts and the efficacy of price adaptation 
6 5 3 I The current state of contractual adaptation in contracts of the type ofMerks 
With respect to the topic of this study, namely, certainty of price and price adaptation, the 
important feature of H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd is that despite the 
apparent efforts of the parties to create a sophisticated agreement to govern their relationship 
for a period of five years (and one has no reason to doubt that the parties fully intended to be 
engaged in the relationship for this period of time 756), their efforts foundered once more on 
the requirement of certainty of price. In particular, the development of the distributorship 
relationship was thwarted by the requirement that for this relationship to be maintained for the 
753 See 234J-235A of the judgement. 
754 See again e.g. the attitude of the parties in Build-a Brick BK en 'n Ander v Eskom 1996 I SA 115 
(0) 129E. 
755 See 6 5 I above. 
756 This point, naturally, would more likely be argued by Merks. On the other hand, the case report 
gives no indication that 8-M itself had any other intention at outset than to engage with Merks for a 
period of five years. 
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full five years, fresh agreement was required every year on one aspect of the relationship, 
namely, price. The crucial authority cited by the court, consequently, is not case-law 
illuminating the concept of a distribution agreement, but old war horses such as Westinghouse 
Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Hattingh v Van 
Rensburg. 757 This is in itself revealing. 
On the one hand, one could argue that this is the correct conclusion. If contingencies arose 
over the course of a year which B-M had not foreseen and which obliged it to raise its selling 
prices, it would be disastrous for B-M were it to be held to much lower prices for the full 
period of five years. By requiring agreement afresh each year, the parties were protected from 
being locked into long contractual relationships governed by terms they did not anticipate. 
The requirement of certainty of price is consequently fulfilling the task for which it was 
designed, namely, to ensure that parties are only bound to terms with respect to which they 
consent. Each year, the parties may tailor a fresh agreement on price to match any change in 
circumstance which may have arisen during the course of the previous year; there is therefore 
adaptation of price. 
On the other hand, one must consider whether this is quite the most appropriate manner for 
achieving this small measure of contractual adaptation. More specifically, one might wonder 
if there is any point in entering into a contractual relationship with the complexity of the one 
entered into between Merks and B-M and with the expectation that it will endure for five 
years, if the relationship can be thwarted with the ease of manner as occurred in the Merks 
case. The price of Clairol products to be purchased every year was a crucial term, and being a 
term perhaps most close to the pockets of both parties, a contentious one. Even if there was 
expectation on the part of the parties that there would be agreement on price, there must 
likewise have been the realisation that mere disagreement on this term, a prospect by no 
means unforeseeable, and the entire contract was sunk. Could optimism really have blinded 
them to this fact? For this, the court decided, was the intention of the parties. The heavy 
investment costs incurred by Merks in the expectation of a contract enduring for five years, by 
for example, the setting up of a selling organisation, would seem therefore to count for 
nought. Of course, it might be argued here that Merks, as the distributor, is the weaker partner, 
and that B-M was less d~pendent on the continuation of the relationship than Merks: there 
existed other distributors who could be contracted to replace Merks. Consequently security of 
tenure would be a greater issue to the latter, rather than B-M. This, however, would be to 
underestimate the disruption that would be caused to B-M' s business in the event of it being 
forced from the relationship with Merks by the failure to agree on new prices for the coming 
year. The intention of B-M was surely that for a minimum period of five undisrupted years, 
provision had been made for the marketing of its goods. 
The conclusion to which one is inevitably drawn, therefore, is that the agreement, as complex 
as it no doubt was, nonetheless proved unsatisfactory. Perhaps if circumstances had been 
slightly different, the parties would have had less difficulty in reaching agreement on price. In 
this case, the prices agreed upon for the first year were in fact already two years old; the stock 
sold during this year was warehouse stock, with prices based on their original manufacturing 
cost. 758 It is possible that the significance of this upon the respective expectations of the 
757 1986 2 SA 555 (A); 1964 I SA 578 (T). 
758 See 230G-H, 231H. 
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parties regarding future prices was not adequately considered by the parties. In any event, the 
effect of their agreement was the following. For five years, both parties could compel each 
other to comply with the mutual obligations incurred by the distribution agreement, but for 
five years this complex arrangement depended entirely on one crucial point: the parties 
reaching fresh agreement on prices each year. This same problem, therefore, of providing 
flexibility in the face of contingency whilst simultaneously offering security, is encountered as 
much here as elsewhere. 
Flexibility, of course, refers to the ability of the contract to adapt and thus provide adequately 
for contingency; in the language of that used earlier it refers to the dimensions for adjustment. 
Security, once more, is referred to here in both senses. In the first sense, it entails the security 
afforded to parties by the knowledge that will not be obliged to give effect to an adjusted price 
with respect to which price they would have no intention of agreeing. In this sense, the 
arrangement provides adequately for security: neither party may at any stage be compelled to 
accept a price with respect to which it was not happy; if indeed unhappy, it need simply refuse 
to agree on a new price. This is indeed what happened in Merks. The arrangement, however, 
appears a little less successful in its provision of security of tenure, namely, that despite a 
flexibility being created with respect to price, both parties may be confident that they remain 
contractually bound to each other. In the Merks case, the confidence of the parties would not 
be successfully tested beyond a year. Importantly too, relational forces such as an economic 
dependence and a common need to maintain the business relationship failed to provide 
adequate security of tenure, and shore up the certainty of future agreement. 
6 5 3 2 Conclusion 
In sum, therefore, a contract of the type encountered in H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M 
Group (Pty) Ltd does not provide for adequate adaptation of price. Of the core elements said 
to constitute adaptation, only one is truly satisfied, namely, security in the first sense 
mentioned above. Flexibility is provided to a degree, because the parties - thanks to the 
requirement that they agree afresh on a new price from time to time - may well happen to 
agree upon such a price in the event of contingency, and one particularly responsive to the 
change in circumstance. 
But at what cost? For this flexibility counts for little if it is not coupled to security of tenure. 
The parties must be confident that consequent to a new price being calculated by whatever 
mechanism the parties may have agreed to utilise, they will remain nonetheless bound in 
contractual nexus. If this is not the case, there is little point in binding oneself for a lengthy 
period of time with respect to other terms. One is reminded here once more of the argument 
by counsel for Merks that it would have been unthinkable for its client to have incurred the 
costs of setting up a selling organisation with no security of tenure beyond the first year of the 
agreement. 759 The expectations of the parties, or at least that of Merks, would seem here not 
759 234J. In similar vein, see the remarks of all three law lords in Decro-Wall International SA v 
Practitioners in Marketing Ltd [ 1971] 2 All ER 216 (CA) at 224C, 2300 and 234C as to the 
improbability of a concessionaire entering into a relationship wherein which a great deal of time and 
capital would be invested, and much of it in the expectation of the relationship enduring for a 
significant length of time, without the safeguard that the relationship could not be terminated anon. 
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to match the strict legal realities of the contract. 
Accordingly, it must be determined what other means of adaptation may therefore be 
incorporated in such relational contracts. In this respect, the usefulness of hardship and 
intervener clauses has already been discussed above at 6 3. Secondly, parties may incorporate 
a contractual clause along the lines of the ' matching clause' found in Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v 
Corbitt and Another.760 Thirdly, it will be suggested that the solution may be found in the 
long-term relational contract itself. By this it is meant that the particular relational context 
within which the contract of sale is encountered may permit the implication of reasonableness. 
Brief attention is thus afforded firstly to the Shell case, and thereafter to the question as to 
whether an alternative construction may be given to the interpretation of the contract in the 
Merks case so as to import this desired aspect of adaptation. 
6 54 The 'matching clause ' in Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another 
In Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another76l applicant, a petroleum company, and 
respondent, the purchaser of such fuel, entered into a written agreement in March 1980. The 
agreement was originally intended to expire on 30 April 1984, but it was common cause that 
it had been renewed until 30 April 1989. 
In terms of the written agreement, it was expressly provided that the respondents were to 
purchase their entire petroleum gas requirements from the applicant, and from no other 
person, during the currency of the agreement. Over the years, the respondent did indeed 
comply with this requirement, and it was only in November 1984 that it placed a substantial 
order for gas with a rival company to the applicant, and informed the latter that they would no 
longer be doing further business with the applicant. Accordingly, applicant lodged an 
application for an interdict restraining respondents from purchasing gas from any other source 
other than the applicant during the currency of the written agreement. 
Respondents opposed this application, but ultimately, on one ground only. This was that the 
contract was void for vagueness and unenforceable because the price of gas to be supplied to 
the respondent had been left to the arbitrary discretion of the applicant, or, alternatively, 
because the price to be paid for such gas was in any event undetermined or 
undeterminable.762 In this respect, respondent referred to clause 3 ofthe agreement: 
Prices according to Shell ' s [i .e. applicant ' s] latest price list ruling at time. Discounts as 
arranged . 
With regard to the argument that the price of gas was undetermined or undeterminable, the 
court, per De Kock J, firstly examined the law concerning certainty of price, and noted that 
price must be either fixed in the contract itself, or that it must be determinable by the 
application of some external standard on which the parties have agreed. Consequently the 
court held that by clause 3, the parties had provided the machinery for the fixing of price: they 
760 1986 4 SA 523 (C). 
761 Above. 
762 525F. 
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had agreed that the price of gas would be applicant's ruling or current price for such gas as 
published from time to time in applicant ' s price list. Price was accordingly determinable. 763 
More interesting, however, would appear to be the primary reason upon which the court based 
its rejection that the determination of price by reference to the applicant's price list permitted 
arbitrary price fixing by the applicant.764 Here De Kock J referred to the so-called ' matching 
clause ' found in the agreement. This clause entitled the respondents to submit to applicant 
offers by competitors of applicant to supply gas at a lower price. If the applicant preferred to 
match the lower price, the agreement remained valid at this lower price, but if the applicant 
was not prepared to match the competitive price, the respondents had the right to terminate the 
agreement without incurring any liability. Moreover, the 'matching clause' contained an 
additional formula by means of which the price could be worked out in the event of 
respondents wishing to dispute the price fixed by the applicant. 
The import of such a clause is an interesting one. Throughout the tenancy of the agreement 
there is a determinable price; this is constantly ascertainable by reference to the applicant ' s 
ruling price list. Accordingly, the contractual relationship is provided with security of tenure: 
the relationship cannot be scuttled by any disagreement on price. The price list, however, is 
the applicant's. Accordingly, the risk such security of tenure brings is that of possible abuse 
(which concerns, in the terminology of price adaptation, security in the first sense, viz. the 
security of not being held to a price to which one would not have intended to have been 
bound); the applicant could conceivably hold the respondent to unduly high prices contained 
in the price list. Such abuse however is curtailed by the fact that any price set by the applicant 
must be competitive. Thus if the applicant is not prepared to set a competitive price (which is 
surely closely related to a market price), the respondent may withdraw from the agreement 
without incurring liability. Furthermore, a further limit is placed upon the applicant ' s price-
setting power by the additional formula providing for the working out of price. 
The 'matching clause' in Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another is, accordingly, a 
763 526G-527E. 
764 527H-I. While it is submitted, with respect, that the judgement in Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and 
Another is a most sound one, it is unfortunate that De Kock J does not distinguish the argument of 
uncertainty of price from that of the arbitrary fixing of price, as perhaps he could have more clearly 
done. Thus De Kock J, whilst appearing to regard the reference to the applicant ' s price list as a 
reference to an external standard which is required to determine a price without further recourse to the 
parties, also recognises that the reference to the applicant's price list essentially involves the affording 
of a price-fixing power to one of the parties. Perhaps the regret is merely that De Kock J did not apply 
his approach on the facts to the authorities he cites on pretium cerium (525G-526G). The latter 
accordingly remain entrenched authority on, for instance, the rule against unilateral powers of price-
fixing when, in effect, De Kock J moved considerably down the line towards a qualification of such a 
rule. See also Evans Marshall & Co Ltd v Bertola SA and Another [1973] 1 AllER 992 (CA), referred 
to under 6 5 2 above, where a distributorship agreement for the supply of sherry was entered into for 
an initial period of five years, and thereafter a further period of five years unless terminated at the end 
of the first period. The contract provided that the prices charged by Bertola, the manufacturer, were 
subject to market fluctuations, but the court held at 997B that these were effectively fixed by Bertola, 
although subject to the provision that they were to be fixed in conformity with the practice of the 
Association of Sherry Shippers. It is clear that the court had no objection to this method of price-
fixing - see 999D. 
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sophisticated price adaptation mechanism. In the Shell case, moreover, it withstood litigation 
to enable one party to hold another to a contract which had been intended to be of a long 
tenure, when the latter party had seized upon the 'lawyer's point'765 of uncertainty in an 
attempt to escape the provisions of a contract which it clearly regarded it as binding. De Kock 
J was clearly not impressed by the respondent's grab at an escape offered by a technical 
reading of the certainty requirement, and held the parties to their intentions on contracting.766 
Clauses of somewhat similar effect have been found elsewhere in South African case law. 
Thus in contracts of sale subject to confirmation, the court will enforce a clause by which the 
seller, in anticipation of cost increases before delivery, stipulates a right to demand an 
adjusted price in the place of a price agreed upon, but subject to the purchaser' s right to 
withdraw from the contract if the adjusted price should be unacceptable to him. 767 The 
' matching clause ' in Shell, however, goes somewhat further in that while it too allows a seller 
(i .e. such as the applicant in She![) to adjust price in the event of cost increases, it is also more 
likely to ensure that the purchaser will not feel itself compelled to withdraw from the 
relationship (because it is dissatisfied with such increases) by way of the fact that it may 
require such adjustments to match competitors ' prices. Accordingly, a clause such as the one 
to be found in Shell is more likely to provide for the maintenance of the contractual 
relationship. 
6 55 The implication ofreasonableness: an alternative approach to Merks 
6 5 5 1 The arguments of the appellant 
The arguments of Merks, the appellant and concessionaire in H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The 
B-M Group (Pty) Ltd, were two-fold. 
Firstly, it was argued that in the absence of agreement by the parties on an increase, the 
previous price remained. 768 Thus if the parties could not reach agreement on an increased 
price for 1990, the 1989 price would continue to apply. This argument was, of course, 
dismissed with comparative ease. On both a linguistic and contextual interpretation, this was 
shown not to be the intention of the parties. 769 If this argument had been accepted, it would, 
for instance, have had the result that Merks would have had no incentive to agree upon an 
increased price. This follows from the fact that Merks would have been well mindful that in 
the event of it refusing to attempt to reach some agreement, resort would inevitably have to be 
made to the previous year's price - which would, of course, be unaffected by any increase. 770 
765 See e.g. Namibian Minerals Corporation Ltd v Benguela Concessions Ltd 1997 2 SA 548 (A) 
5570. 
766 See especially 5281-529E. 
767 Van der Merwe et al Contract 164; Steens v J Brockhouse (SA) Ltd 1950 I PH A4 (C); Barry 
Colne & Co (Transvaal) Ltd v Jacksons Ltd 1922 CPO 372. Also Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v 
Thorburn 1990 2 SA 870 (C) for a clause with a similar effect, albeit in a different context. 
768 234A-B. 
769 234C-H. 
770 234E; 2341. 
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The alternative argument raised by Merks is a more interesting one, namely, that on a proper 
interpretation of the agreement or on the basis of an implied term, any increase had to be a 
reasonable one. 771 This constituted an objective yardstick by which the increase could be 
measured, and that therefore the prices for the years following 1989 were ascertainable, and 
the agreement enforceable. Nestadt JA, however, rejected this contention by stating that even 
if it was entitled to assume that sale at a reasonable price was a valid one, the terms of the 
contract expressly negated such an interpretation. The contract expressly stated there was to 
be agreement on any price increase; the court was accordingly not entitled to substitute this 
specifically chosen price ascertainment machinery (namely, agreement) with machinery of its 
own (namely, a reasonable increase, which it in any event regarded as difficult to 
determine) . 772 
On the one hand, this reasoning is, with respect, clearly incorrect. Counsel for Merks did not 
argue that the parties had agreed upon machinery to ascertain price, and where this machinery 
fails , had then argued that the court was permitted to substitute machinery of its own, and set 
a price, because the parties, though agreeing specifically on machinery, intended merely that a 
reasonable price (or increase) be set. Rather, counsel for Merks argued that by an agreement 
that all price increases subsequent to 1989 were to be reasonable, price was objectively 
ascertainable, and that accordingly it was enforceable by the court - much like, counsel no 
doubt added in argument, any other objective price ascertainment machinery such as, for 
instance, a reference to the market price. There is certainly a difference between the two. 
Moreover, even though South African courts currently hold that the court may not substitute 
machinery agreed upon by the parties for their own, when such machinery breaks down (i.e . 
Nedstadt JA ' s version ofMerk's argument),773 the decision upon which Nedstadt JA relies in 
support of this proposition, namely the Court of Appeal in Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v 
Eggleton, had already been overturned by the House of Lords precisely on this point. 774 
On the other hand, Nedstadt JA's view that there is no room for the implication of 
reasonableness is, no doubt, correct on a first reading of the contract. In the words of the 
contract itself, and thus on a linguistic treatment of the contract, there is no reference to 
reasonableness. The contract states there is to be agreement, and in accordance with freedom 
of contract, the parties would therefore be entitled to agree upon an unreasonable increase. In 
direct contrast, however, to the approach taken by the court to the first argument raised by 
Merks (namely, that in the absence of agreement, the initial or previous year's price held), the 
court failed to approach the argument of reasonableness from the perspective of contextual 
771 2358-C. 
772 2350-F. 
773 See e.g. 2 5 5 above and cases such as Heyman 's Estate v Featherstone 1930 EDL I 05, and Faatz 
v Estate Maiwald 1933 SWA 73 . 
774 Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton [1981] 3 AllER 105 (CA); [1983] I AC 444, [1982] 3 
All ER I (HL). Ironically, the very line cited by the Appellate Division in the Merks case (at 235E) 
from the Court of Appeal judgement is shown by the House of Lords to involve a fundamental fallacy 
(i.e. that the court cannot intervene and substitute its own machinery where the party's machinery has 
failed to set a price, because, apparently, there is not yet a complete agreement as there is not yet 
agreement on price! Agreement on price was of course reached (and the contract subsequently 
complete) on the parties agreeing on the objective ascertainment of price) . See the discussion at 2 5 4 
I I above, and the submission that the principles set out by the House of Lords should likewise 
pertain to South African law (to which see 2 5 4 2 and 2 5 5). 
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interpretation.775 Could therefore, a different conclusion be reached from a contextual 
interpretation to that reached as a result of a linguistic treatment? 
One drifts here into tricky waters. Although one is implored to give business efficacy to the 
interpretation of commercial contracts, one must not nonetheless be seen to make the contract 
for the parties . Caution notwithstanding, it nevertheless cannot be ignored that the contract 
was concluded within the context of a mutual intention to create a long-term, relational 
contract. 
6 5 5 2 Reasonable increase 
One cannot know what evidence was cited by Merks in its argument that any increase was to 
be a reasonable one. Counsel's argument was not cited in the court report, and moreover, it 
appears that the argument may not have been a highly substantiated one. The court of appeal 
noted that it was led as an alternative argument which had not been foreshadowed in the 
pleadings or raised in the court a quo.776 This may be, conceivably, the reason why it did not 
enjoy significant examination, at least to the extent as that afforded by Nestadt JAto Merks ' 
first argument. Accordingly, if indications are to be found to validate this particular argument 
of the appellant ' s, one must glean them from the court report oneself. 
Firstly, contractual context has already been mentioned as an important indication that the 
parties tacitly agreed that price increases were to be reasonable. There are no indications in the 
case report other than that both parties envisaged the embarking upon a long-term 
distributorship agreement. If both parties from outset accepted that there were to be no limits 
as to what each party might demand at the price increase negotiations each year, than clearly 
either of the parties could have demanded to pay, or be paid, some absurd sum and thereby 
deliberately destroy the relationship. Such an interpretation offers absolutely no security of 
tenure. The application of the so-called bystander test would surely have elicited the reply: no, 
there must be some limits. These limits would surely be defined by the concept of 
reasonableness. 
Here an analogy could possibly be made with a contract of first refusal, which in the context 
of sale is usually referred to as a contract involving a right of pre-emption. In terms of the 
latter type of contract, a party (the potential seller) grants to another a right of pre-emption. By 
this, the grantor of such a right is not compelled to sell the merx concerned, but should he or 
she decide to do so, he or she is obliged to give the grantee the preference of purchasing, and 
is accordingly prevented from selling to a third person without having given the grantee the 
so-called right of first refusal. 777 In Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd a term of a lease 
775 At 235E-F the court concludes as follows: 'In our case the determination of a reasonable increase 
(a difficult task I would have thought) is an alternative which, on the wording of the agreement, is not 
available, either by way of an interpretation or an implication' (my emphasis). See, in contrast, 2348-
H where Nestadt JA specifically examined Merk's first argument from the perspective of both 
linguistic and contextual interpretation. 
776 2358. 
777 Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd 1985 2 SA 922 (A) 932 B-E. See in general Vander Merwe 
et al Contract 62 ff. 
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provided that the lessee would have ' the first refusal of entering into an extension of this lease 
... upon such terms and conditions and at such rental as may be mutually agreed upon ' _778 
The Appellate Division per Nicholas JA (Botha JA dissenting), having held firstly that there 
was no difference in principle between a right of pre-emption in the case of sale, and a right of 
first refusal of a lease, rejected the contention that the clause in particular amounted to an 
unenforceable agreement to agree and was thus void for uncertainty. Rather, the effect of the 
contract of first refusal was that the lessor was obliged to make an offer, which the lessee 
could either accept (in which case the terms and conditions and the rental would be mutually 
agreed upon), or reject. 779 In this light, the court remarked as follows: 
Poyntons 's was accordingly under an obligation to offer Soteriou a new lease of shop 18. 
Plainly any offer had to be one which was capable of being turned into a contract by 
acceptance. It had therefore to state a rental and any other terms and conditions which 
Poynton's required. Nothing was said in clause 2 (b) as to the method of determining the rental 
to be stated in the offer, but Poynton 's was not free to fix any rental it pleased ... Plainly 
Poynton ' s must act bonafide. Cf. Corbin On Contracts ... : 
The law will require performance ' in good faith' and the term 'offer' will be interpreted as denoting one 
that is not beyond the bounds of commercial reason and practice and made for the purpose of inducing a 
rejection . 
The court thereafter referred to Manchester Ship Canal Co v Manchester Racecourse Co, a 
decision of the English Court of Appeal, whereby a similar clause was held to require the 
making of a 'fair and reasonable offer' by the grantor. 780 
It is thus suggested that a similar implication could be made in the case of H Merks & Co 
(Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd and Another. For to permit the grantor of a right of pre-
emption to make an offer at an unreasonable price would make nonsense of any claim that a 
contract of first refusal or pre-emption was intended to have any real contractual effect. 
Likewise, in the light of their envisaged long-term contractual relationship, it would surely be 
similarly nonsensical to hold that it was not tacitly agreed upon that, in negotiating fresh 
agreement on a price increase each year, both parties were obliged to act bona fide and were 
not to make offers beyond the bounds of commercial reason that would induce rejection. 
At this point, however, a word of caution. In Soteriou v Retco Poyntons (Pty) Ltd Nicholas JA 
held that the grantor of a right of first refusal was to act bona fide in the fixing of rental in his 
offer. In the light of Nicholas JA's consequent references to Corbin and the Manchester Ship 
case, it would appear that by this he meant that the grantor would not be permitted to make an 
unreasonable offer. While for most intents and purposes, the making of a bona fide offer and a 
reasonable one may amount to much the same offer, a distinction might be that an agreement 
to make the latter would appear enforceable, while an agreement regarding the former would 
be not. In the Merks case, for instance, one might argue that the parties tacitly agreed merely 
on negotiating fresh agreement in good faith . And even were such an agreement to be 
recognised in South African law (which would appear not to be the case), it would appear that 
in any event, both parties in casu did in fact make bona fide offers.781 Accordingly, in the 
778 Above. 
779 933J-935A. 
780 [1901] 2 Ch 37; at 933A-E. 
781 See the discussion at 6 5 6 below. 
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event that following these genuine bona fide efforts, there is still no fresh agreement on price, 
the contract must fail: the parties have not agreed upon a reasonable increase, but merely that 
their suggestions as to an increase be bona fide. On the other hand, should the parties be said 
to have tacitly agreed upon the making of reasonable offers, this can be held to constitute tacit 
agreement that, ultimately, a reasonable increase must be set. Thus should the parties fail to 
achieve such agreement themselves, the court may step in and ascertain the latter. 782 In the 
latter case, an objectively ascertainable price is set, and in the former case, none . As indicated 
however, Nicholas JA does seem to indicate that by a bona fide offer he entails a reasonable 
one. In any event, it will be argued below that the parties did not tacitly agree that they were 
merely to negotiate on an increase in price in good faith, but that any increase would be a 
reasonable one. 
A further analogy may be made with the another decision of the English Court of Appeal , 
namely, F&G Sykes (Wessex) Ltd v Fine Fare Ltd, where the parties had, similarly, entered 
into a five year contract, but under which the plaintiffs were to supply boiler chickens to the 
defendants. In the first year of the contract, the number to be supplied each week would not be 
less than 30 000 and not more than 80 000, and thereafter, ' such figures as may be agreed 
between the parties ' . This clause is not unlike that of the price clause in H Merks & Co (Pty) 
Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd and Another, in that it concerns likewise an essentiale, viz. the 
merx. Furthermore, in a similar manner to that of the South African case, the contract ran for 
one year, after which the defendants cancelled and the plaintiffs sued for breach. In the 
judgement of the Court of Appeal, however, the clause in question was held not to make the 
contract unenforceable for want of certainty. In the words of Lord Denning MR: 
In a commercial agreement the further the parties have gone with their contract, the more ready 
are the Courts to imply any reasonable term so as to give effect to their intentions. When much 
has been done, the Courts will do their best not to destroy the bargain ... [W]hen an agreement 
has been acted upon and the parties, as here, have been put to great expense in implementing it, 
we ought to imply all reasonable terms so as to avoid any uncertainties.783 
Likewise, and as a dictum frequently cited by our courts, 784 the words of Lord Wright in 
Hi/las & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd are illustrative : 
Businessmen often record the most important agreements in crude and summary fashion ; 
modes of expression sufficient and clear to them in the course of their business may appear to 
those unfamiliar with the business far from complete or precise. It is accordingly the duty of 
the court to construe such documents fairly and broadly, without being too astute or subtle in 
finding defects; but, on the contrary, the court should seek to apply the old maxim of English 
law, verba ita sunt intelligenda ut res magis va!eat quam pereat. That maxim, however, does 
not mean that the court is to make the contract for the parties, or to go outside the words they 
have used, except in so far as there are appropriate implications of law, as, for instance, the 
implication of what is just and reasonable to be ascertained by the court as a matter of 
782 See the discussion of a reasonable price at 2 3 2 above. 
783 [1967] I Lloyd ' s Rep 53 at 57-58. Lord Denning MR did, however, also note that in the case in 
question, there was less difficulty than in others as it contained an arbitration clause which, liberally 
construed, he regarded as sufficient to resolve any uncertainties the parties had left. Nonetheless, the 
principle above applies. 
784 See e.g. Namibian Minerals Corporation Ltd v Benguela Concessions Ltd 1997 2 SA 548 (A). 
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Ondernemingsbestuur 
Already during the 1950's there existed a strong economic need for ownership in 
apartments. In practice developers tried to satisfy such need by means of share block 
schemes which gave occupants a personal right of use with regard to an apartment by 
means of shareholding in a company which owned the apartment building. There were, 
however, certain disadvantages inherent in such personal right compared to genuine 
ownership. The legislator accordingly intervened and promulgated the Sectional Titles 
Act, 66 of 1971 , which came into operation on 3 0 March 1973. This Act created an 
exception to the maxim superficies solo cedit and authorised the acquisition of ownership 
and other limited real rights with regard to part of a building. In terms of a sectional title 
scheme part of a building utilised as an apartment, business premises or an office can 
now be acquired in separate ownership. In the course of time certain deficiencies in the 
original legislation were exposed with the result that while retaining the basic features of 
the Act of 1971 the Act as such was overhauled in 1986 by the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 
1986 which came into operation on 1 June 1988. In these notes we will concentrate on 
the position in terms of the new Act. 
in the vicinity of national parks. 
Can be exchanged for residential or office units in a sectional title complex. 
(flat or commercial unitO 
calculated according to the participation quota of the section (see infra) 
adjacent plots of land 
because one deals with an intensified community of home-owners in these circumstances. 
common or collective owner of the common parts of the sectional title complex namely 
the land, the common facilities such as the swimming-pool and the tennis court and the 
common parts of the building which fall outside a section such as the passages, staircase, 
the lift, foyer etc. 
the management of the sectional title community 
The trustees can appoint a managing agent and delegate certain of their powers to him or 
her. The legislative authority rests with the general meeting, which regulates the affairs of 
the sectional title community by means of resolutions. Each sectional owner has in 
principle one vote at such meetings except when a poll is demanded in which case the 
value of a vote corresponds to the participation quota of a section. The annual general 
meeting must approve the budget for the next year as well as audited financial statements 
for the past year and elect trustees. A sectional title scheme is controlled by rules. Section 
3 5 provides for management rules (dealing amongst others with the election and duties of 
trustees and the conduct of general meetings) and conduct rules (which deal amongst 
others with the keeping of animals, the parking of vehicles, the hanging up of laundry and 
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the disposal of rubbish). A set of model rules is prescribed by regulation. These can be 
amended by unanimous (management rules) or special (conduct rules) resolution. 
In addition to this, the Sectional Titles Act created anew system of registration of 
ownership 
Instead of a land register as in the case of the registration of land, a sectional title register 
is opened for every sectional title building with a subfile for every unit in the scheme. 
Ownership of a section as well as any other real right with regard to a section is 
registered in the sectional title register. Each sectional owner receives a certificate of 
registered sectional title as proof of his ownership of his unit. A sectional owner can also 
register a sectional mortgage bond with regard to his unit as security for a loan from a 
building society. 
the value of the vote of a sectional owner where special resolutions are put to the 
vote or where voting is by poll; 
the remuneration of auditors or managing agents. 
6 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECTIONAL TITLE SCHEME 
Subdivision of a plot of land zoned for residential purposes 
Mostly (but after 1997 not necessarily) for the purpose of additional facilities . 
In terms of the old Act, a building had to be divided into at least two sections, with the 
result that a sectional title scheme could not consist of a number of free-standing 
rondawels. Section 2(a) of the new Act now provides that if a scheme consists of more 
than one building, any such building can be divided into a single section and common 
property. On account of this, the above restriction is no longer applicable. A building is, 
however still required with the result that mooring spaces to a jetty can not be sold as 
sections. 
(iv) The developer must consider carefully how the scheme will be financed. In terms of 
section 26 of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981, the developer is only allowed to 
receive payment from the purchaser of the unit after the sectional title register has been 
opened. This can not occur before the buildings in the scheme have been virtually 
completed. The developer of a large sectional scheme may therefore consider to develop 
a scheme in phases since the Act allows registration of each phase as soon as it is 
completed. 
(v) 
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to prepare a draft sectional plan of the land and the building(s).The draft sectional plan 
must be prepared from actual measurements which presupposes that the buildings must 
be virtually completed. (section 6(1 )) 
indicates the location and floor area of each section in the building 
and he is allowed time to consider whether he wants to purchase his flat. Afterwards he is 
allowed a period of grace of 6 months to look for alternative accommodation. 
(vii) Since the Sectional Titles Act Amendment Act of 1997 the local authority need no 
longer approve the scheme. However, if the scheme contravenes an operative town-
planning scheme or if the building has not been erected in accordance with the applicable 
building regulations, the developer still have to approach the local authority for a 
condonation of contraventions. 
(viii) The Surveyor-General must then approve the draft sectional plan. This requirement 
was introduced by the new Act of 1986 in order to ensure that sectional plans are 
correctly drawn up. 
Such as a sectional mortgage bond, a lease etc 
Die nuutste wetgewing op die gebied is die Wysigingswet op Deeltitels 44 van 1997 wat 
die bepalings van die Wet sroomlyn en op sekere punte moderniseer. 
Sedert 1997 kan uitsluitlike gebruiksgebiede in die modelreels van die skema of aan die 
begin deur die ontwikkelaar of later deur die regspersoon by wyse van eenparige of 
spesiale besluit gevestig word. In sodanige geval verwerf die houer van die reg bloot 'n 
persoonlike reg en nie 'n saaklike reg nie. 
Die wetgewende gesag van die regspersoon berus by die algemene vergadering wat die 
deeleiendomsgemeenskap deur middel van reels bestuur. 
Daarna word 'n grasie-periode van drie maande aan hom toegelaat om alternatiewe 
huisvesting te soek. 
(viii) Die Landmeter-Generaal moet dan die konsepdeelplan goedkeur. Hierdie vereiste 
sorg dat deelplanne uiters noukeurig opgestel word. 
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machinery where the contractual intention is clear but the contract is silent on some detail. 
Thus in contracts of future performance over a period, the parties may not be able nor may they 
desire to specify many matters of detail, but leave them to be adjusted in the working out of the 
contract. Save for the legal implication I have mentioned, such contracts might well be 
incomplete or uncertain ; with the implication in reserve they are neither incomplete nor 
uncertain, As obvious illustrations I may refer to such matters as prices or times of delivery in 
contracts for the sale of goods .. .785 
It is clear, therefore, that there is precedent for the courts finding for the tacit implication of 
reasonableness. Nor, furthermore, should this be as the result of a court's application of an 
(unduly?) objective test for tacit terms.786 For in the case report of H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v 
The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd and Another itself, there are additional factors which cumulatively 
point to a conclusion that the parties tacitly agreed that the any increase in price would be a 
reasonable one. Here one may refer to the evidence of an employee of Merks that in previous 
dealings with the B-M Group, price increases had always been reasonable increases in line 
with inflation. 787 In this respect it would appear that, prior to the sole distributorship 
agreement entered into in late 1988, Merks had been a distributor for B-M for approximately 
two and a half years. 788 
Moreover, the tone of the contract throughout indicates the primacy of the five-year 
distributorship agreement, and that agreement on price was expected to comply with this long-
term intention. Accordingly, clause 3 begins: 
This agreement shall have a tenure of five years. 
In contrast, clause 4 states as follows: 
The transfer price may be increased by mutual agreement from time to time. Such increases 
will only be effected at reasonable intervals, taking cognisance of the effect they may have on 
the prevailing market conditions ... 
Clearly, there are limits on any price increase. Whereas the distributorship agreement shall 
have a tenure of five years, it is stated that there may be price increases. The supremacy of the 
five-year distributorship agreement is established. These increases, moreover, were only to be 
at certain times and crucially, had to take into account market conditions. Any price increase, 
in other words, had to be market-related; a limit is clearly placed on the increases 
envisaged. 789 That Merks had market conditions in mind throughout is evident in its constant 
785 [1932] AllER 494 (HL), (1932) 147 LT 503H-J. 
786 See 5 3 I above on the court's use of an objective test for tacit terms so as to import an element 
of price adaptation . 
787 234H. 
788 2281-J . 
789 There is admittedly an ambiguity in the second sentence of clause 4. Market conditions might, for 
instance, only need be taken into account with respect to the intervals chosen when introducing the 
price increases. The price increases themselves could be interpreted as not being subject to the 
market-relatedness limit i.e. no limits are placed on the price increases. Even if this is the true 
construction, it sti II indicates that the parties agreed that the prices, after such increases had been 
taken into account, were to remain competitive - for why otherwise should these conditions then be 
considered? The parties must obviously have had competitiveness in mind. Competitiveness, 
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reference, during its price negotiations with B-M, to whether the consumer would be able to 
afford the increased prices. 790 
Accordingly, therefore, the whole tenor of the agreement indicates that neither party had carte 
blanche in proposing a price. There were limits imposed upon any price increase, and these 
limits were imposed by market conditions and the recognition that the primary intention of the 
parties was to engage in relationship for a period of five years. Both parties had to bear in 
mind that, ultimately, any price agreed upon had to relate to prevailing conditions in the 
market. This is not to say that the new price had to be the current market price; the latter; 
however (or at least market conditions), appears to be a determinant of the price increase, and 
can usually be regarded as an important indication of a reasonable price. 791 
In sum, it would therefore seem that there are indications that the parties may be said to have 
tacitly agreed that price increases were to be reasonable. If this is indeed the case, and 
provided that our law's position with regard to a reasonable price (or increase) follows the 
approach set out in 2 3 2 (and thus confirms Nedstadt JA's apparently reluctant assumption) , 
there would appear to be much to be said for the alternative argument advanced by Merks : 
viz. that there would consequently be an objective yardstick by which to judge price, and that 
the price for the years following 1989 were accordingly ascertainable. A final obstacle, 
however, stands in the way of such recognition. This would be that the approach above has to 
be reconciled with the express stipulation by the parties that prices ' may be increased by 
mutual agreement from time to time' .792 If, as suggested, there existed agreement by the 
parties on price increase from outset, namely, that all increases were to be reasonable, what 
would be the function of this later agreement by the parties? What is there to agree upon if 
there is already tacit agreement on price increase? 
The answer to this depends upon the crucial recognition that a reasonable price does not 
necessarily constitute one specific price only. On the contrary, it constitutes a range ofprices. 
Corbin on Contracts in this respect observes the following: 
It cannot properly be assumed that only one price or wage is reasonable under the particular 
circumstances of any case. 793 
however, is not just a function of strategic timing i.e. when the new prices are introduced; it depends 
at the same time on the amount of the increases. For it would serve very little purpose if the parties 
took into consideration prevailing market conditions (e.g. a bonanza season) when determining at 
what period of time they would introduce the new prices if these prices were then ridiculously high 
and out of all proportion to those asked by competitors. There would then be simply no point to this 
clause in the contract. In any event, it was common cause that such intervals had already been set, viz. 
intervals of twelve months. If then this had been agreed upon in advance, it could not be said that the 
intervals had been determined by taking into consideration prevailing market conditions. What then 
was to be determined with such conditions in mind? There can only be one answer: the increases 
themselves. 
790 2311-J . 
791 See e.g. Lobo Properties (Pty) Ltd v Express Lift Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1961 1 SA 704 (C) 709A. 
Also the incisive observations of Corbin On Contracts 580. 
792 230G. 
793 Corbin On Contracts 595, where it is noted, further, that reasonableness is a matter of opinion , 
and opinions differ, even though they are equally honest and well-informed. Nonetheless Corbin (at 
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Consequently, the later act of agreement by the parties fulfils two roles. 
Firstly, it does not dispute that there already exists agreement on price, namely, that all 
increases are to be reasonable. Its function, rather, is to delegate the final act of quantification 
specifically to the parties. In other words, the task of specifying what precise amount 
constitutes a reasonable increase is left to the parties, and not to, for instance, the courts . 
Secondly, and very closely related to the first function as mentioned above, this specific act of 
agreement (which in the Merks case can be expected to occur once a year) constitutes a 
refinement of a price already agreed upon. It constitutes selection from a range of prices which 
collectively comprises what we term a reasonable price. It might thus be regarded as the final 
fine-tuning of an earlier agreement. 
Here , this second function referred to immediately above discloses an important point. 
Refinement by way of later agreement contributes to price adaptation, in that it culminates a 
process of price adaptation originally initiated by the parties agreeing on a reasonable price. 
For the moment the parties agree, whether tacitly or expressly, that any price adjustment must 
be determined by the concept of reasonableness, they immediately incorporate a measure of 
price adaptation. Agreement on reasonable price constitutes a near perfect price adaptation 
mechanism. What may be said to constitute a reasonable price one year may be very different 
from what might be regarded as a reasonable price in another; for in the interim a host of 
contingencies may have arisen. It is, however, this apparently fickle nature that is precisely 
the value of a reasonable price. It tracks the ebb and flow of circumstance, and as a 
consequence, adjusts and adapts continuously and automatically so as to reflect perpetually 
throughout what might be termed a reasonable price in any circumstance, and at any given 
time. Accordingly, the act of selection from the price range said to constitute a reasonable 
price amounts to the final refinement of this process of price adaptation. 
6 5 6 The Merks case and price adaptation: final synopsis 
In H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd it was envisaged that a more 
comprehensive agreement would replace the parties' original contract document.794 This , 
however, was never concluded. One speculates as to what the parties might have stated 
therein, and how this might be viewed against what the analysis in this study suggests the 
intentions of the parties had been. Nonetheless, the above analysis is submitted to be a useful 
one, if not specifically with regard to the contract contained in Merks , then to relational 
contracts of similar kind. 
Amongst other things, it reveals, firstly , that reasonable price itself constitutes a useful price 
adaptation tool. As observed above, reasonableness keeps abreast of contingency and adjusts 
accordingly. Its strength is its flexibility . An agreement, for instance, on a reasonable price is a 
e.g. 568, 580) regards a reasonable price as generally ascertainable. On the recognition that an 
agreement on a reasonable price or rental may constitute agreement on a price range or bracket, see 
also Kerr Sale 239. 
794 229E. 
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simple enough contractual mechanism for the ascertainment of price that year by year may be 
incorporated into a contract unchanged; but year by year, even day by day, its application 
might result in a figure remarkably different from its previous ascertainment. If one has 
confidence in the various authorities set out earlier in this study, namely, that a reasonable 
price (or a reasonable adjustment) is an objective yardstick sufficiently ascertainable, 795 then 
agreement on a reasonable price provides a flexibility most useful for price adaptation. 
It might be argued, of course, that even given the authority indicating reasonableness to be a 
sufficiently ascertainable standard, such an approach is blind to the practical difficulties 
encountered in attempting to determine what amounts precisely to a reasonable price, or a 
reasonable increase . This, for instance, may help to explain the apparent reluctance of the 
court in H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd to delve more deeply into the 
question of reasonableness. The court in this case remarked in passing that the determination 
of a reasonable increase appeared, in casu, to be a difficult task indeed. What for instance was 
to be regarded as the decisive factor in this determination? Merks argued this to be inflation. 
B-M, on the other hand, referred to the fact that prices for 1989 were already two years old, in 
that the goods sold during 1989 were warehouse stock, with prices based on their original 
manufacturing costs . Most products to be sold during 1990 were, however, no longer 
warehouse stock; they had been recently manufactured. The new prices were thus not to 
reflect inflation; they reflected the rise in manufacturing costs since the original warehouse 
goods had been manufactured, and effectively represented the cost of the goods currently 
being sold. It is clear therefore that both parties believed they had good grounds to believe that 
they were being reasonable in their demands. 796 
In general, however, this problem is more apparent than real. An important point, after all , is 
to appreciate that reasonableness needs seldom be determined by the court. Relative to the 
number of contracts which do incorporate a reference to reasonableness, the court is not 
frequently faced with a situation as that faced by it in Merks . On the contrary, the court only 
has a role to play when it is made aware that there is disagreement between the parties on this 
aspect. It is therefore only on those few occasions where agreement cannot be achieved, and 
the court is in fact approached, that the court will be obliged to provide an indication as to that 
which amounts to a reasonable price (or a reasonable price adjustment) under the 
circumstances. This it should be permitted to do because, in principle, depending upon the 
particular circumstances of each case, the latter is ascertainable or determinable by the 
court.797 
795 See again 2 3 2. 
796 This observation allows one to point out that it is not necessarily the point of view of this study 
that the price increase proposed by Merks should be taken as the reasonable, and hence binding, 
increase. If the alternative approach set out above was followed the court may well have found that 8-
M' s price adjustments were reasonable in the circumstance, and Merks ' demands unreasonable. This 
might follow, for instance, by the neglect, in particular, of Merks to consider that, knowing the 1989 
prices to reflect out-dated manufacturing costs, consequent price increases (for the second year at 
least) could not be expected to reflect merely inflation. By refusing to agree on a reasonable increase, 
therefore, Merks might have been held to have repudiated, and the court could have ordered, for 
example, specific performance on the basis of the price increases proposed by 8-M. This, however, 
one cannot know because the court found it unnecessary to determine reasonableness in the 
circumstances. 
797 See again the discussion of agreement on a reasonable price at 2 3 2 above. 
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In this eventuality, the task of the courts, in any event, may be greatly eased by requiring the 
parties to lead evidence as to an accurate estimation of a reasonable price. Having presumably 
engaged in a period of negotiation in an attempt to reach consensus on price, one may further 
presume that the parties, during the course of this negotiation, will have exposed most factors 
which might have a bearing on this calculation. 798 
Secondly, by accepting the construction that the parties in Merks (or contractants in similar 
circumstances) had tacitly agreed on a reasonable price (or alternatively, on reasonable 
increases) , the required security of tenure so evidently lacking in relational agreements of the 
strictly framework type is imported into the relationship. Consequently, . in the event of the 
parties failing to reach agreement on a price increase, the entire relationship is not negated, as 
the court may ascertain what constitutes a reasonable price or a reasonable price increase in 
question. 
This, in fact, was the successful argument used by the B-M Group in the Merks case; B-M 
simply made use of this lack of security of tenure and proved that the contract had been 
terminated - an event which consequently destroyed the entire relationship existing between 
the two parties. In the alternative approach to Merks set out above, irrespective of whether 
there is a later act of refinement by the parties (that is, final selection by the parties from the 
range of prices said to constitute a reasonable price) or not, there still , and always, exists the 
original, residual agreement, namely, agreement on a reasonable price/price increase. 
Consequently, security of tenure does not depend upon a continuing series of individual 
agreements on price. Accordingly, rather than viewing the relationship as comprising of a 
framework agreement and in addition a series of contracts of sale, one might instead envisage 
a framework incorporating a single long-term contract of sale. The crucial difference now, 
however, is that adequate provision has been made for adjustment of price. This allows the 
parties to be confident that they will be bound throughout this period within a relationship 
based on reasonable terms (that is, terms with respect to which they would have agreed upon; 
security, in other words, in the first sense), and incorporating a contractual term governing 
price which might be regarded as flexible enough to cover most contingencies. In short, 
adaptation has been provided for in the fullest sense of the word. 
6 5 7 Conclusion 
In long-term relational contracts of the type encountered in the Merks case, planned and 
controlled adaptation in the face of contingency whilst ensuring that both parties enjoy 
security of tenure, and the security of the knowledge that they will not be held to terms with 
respect to which they would never have an intention of agreeing, is, it is submitted, a realistic 
assessment of the outlook of the parties. Where possible, it is this intention of the parties to 
which effect should be given. Parties, especially lay businessmen, should not be penalised for 
their lack of sophistication in their attempts to reflect this. 
798 See e.g. Kerr Sale 51 ; Lubbe 1987 AS 138. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
176 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CERTAINTY RECONSIDERED 
7 1 Introduction 
In Banque Brussels Lambert SA v Australian National Industries Ltd the New South Wales 
Supreme Court expressed itself as follows: 
[t]he whole thrust of the law today is to attempt to give proper effect to commercial 
transactions. It is for this reason that uncertainty, a concept so much loved by lawyers, has 
fallen into disfavour as a tool for striking down commercial bargains.799 
It is hoped that such sentiment can now be said to reflect the attitude of the South African 
judiciary. Judging by remarks to be found in a recent Appellate Division decision,800 this 
may well be the case. However, it was not long ago that a case such as Burroughs Machines 
Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd granted relief to a party who based his defence on 
the nullity of his contract as a consequence of uncertainty of price, in a judgement which, 
ironically, was regarded of being of such soundness, that it has since come to be regarded as a 
leading decision on the rule of pretium certum. 801 That such technical points could be taken 
indicates the discrepancy that has existed, and yet not necessarily judicially identified, 
between what the parties may perceive as a certain price, and that perceived by the court, and 
that the perception of the latter has been regarded as the sound one. 
Much of the cause of this problem is possibly not of the courts ' own doing. The courts have 
inherited a collection of the general principles of contract which, as has been pointed out by 
Eisenberg, were developed for a model of contract which, in the modern commercial world, 
must be judged to be the exception, not the norm. 802 The rule of pretium certum was 
developed by the classical law with the idea of the discrete contract in mind; accordingly, it 
reflects the intolerance of classical law for indefiniteness. Granted, much can still be said that 
in the fixing of such a rule, the law wished to protect parties from being bound to terms in 
contracts with regard to which there was no consensus; hence the requirement that terms be 
certain or objectively so. On the other hand, however, the commercial world is no longer a 
large Roman forum, and contracts are not overwhelmingly of the discrete type. The 
contractual environment is increasingly characterised by contingency, and parties find 
themselves frequently involved in contractual relationships that extend beyond the mere 
exchange of performance. 803 As relationships extend into time, and the parties find the 
balance they established at outset between performance and counter-performance increasingly 
threatened by some change in circumstance, parties often feel the need to provide for their 
799 (1989) 21 NSWLR 502. 
800 Namibian Minerals Corporation Ltd v Benguela Concessions Ltd 1997 2 SA 548 (A); see the 
discussion of this case at 7 3 2 below. 
80 I 1964 I SA 669 (W); and see in particular the discussion at I 2 4 above. 
802 Relational Contracts 298. 
803 That is, that modern contracts are increasingly relational, and not discrete: again, Eisenberg 
Relational Contracts 299. 
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future performance with flexibility. In trying to do so, however, a party may find his or her 
attempts come up against the requirement of certainty. It is a delicate balance. On the one 
hand, parties may see much sense in the law's insistence that for the parties' own sakes, it 
does not give effect to contractual consequences with regard to which the parties never 
intended. Accordingly, it would not be in their interests for the certainty requirement to be 
dispatched too hastily in entirety. At the same time, however, they do not wish to be landed 
with contractual obligations which reflect the circumstances of an environment since passed, 
i.e. the one under which they contracted, where circumstances have since changed drastically. 
In Chapter 3 these various considerations said often to be in the minds of the modern 
contractant were termed, collectively, as the desire to provide for contractual adaptation; that 
is, for controlled planned contractual adaptation in the face of a contractual relationship 
involving the threat of contingency. In the chapters that followed, an overview was given of 
the various means by which either the law or the parties themselves have attempted to provide 
for this in the particular sphere of price in the contract of sale. Thus in Chapter 5 the focus 
was on price adaptive measures provided by the law; in Chapter 6 the focus was on those 
provided by the parties themselves. 
What can now be noted, therefore, is that instances in which price has been held to be 
uncertain, and the contract accordingly void, often concern attempts by parties to provide for 
contractual adaptation. Here then in practice the rule of pretium certum has been of direct 
effect on price adaptation. Thus in Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA 
(Pty) Ltd it was an uncertainty of price resulting from the loose-ended nature of price 
adjustment clauses that resulted in the contract being held void. 804 That similar price 
adjustment clauses could, on the application of the rule of pretium certum, suffer this same 
fate was raised by the Appellate Division in Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v 
Bilger Engineering (Pty) Ltd.805 Likewise in H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) 
Ltd and Another, by the drafting of a detailed concessionaire agreement, it has been argued 
that the parties certainly intended some form of price adaptation.806 Here too, however, the 
contractual relationship is terminated for want of certainty on price. On the other hand, 
however, there have been cases of contracts which feature some attempt by the parties to 
provide for contractual adaptation, but where parties have made unsuccessful claims of 
invalidity on the basis of supposed vagueness of price. Importantly, not only have many of 
these courts not been fooled by the lawyer's point of uncertainty, but, simultaneously, have 
contributed substantially to the development of a more refined rule of pretium certum. Thus, 
for instance, in Genae Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC the Appellate 
Division has finally opened the way for the recognition of an agreement of sale at a reasonable 
price. 807 Murray & Roberts Construction Ltd v Final Properties (Pty) Ltd, Proud Investments 
(Pty) Ltd v Lanchem International (Pty) Ltd, and Benlou Properties (Pty) Ltd v Vector 
Graphics (Pty) Ltd all indicate a more flexible approach to the unilateral power of a party to 
fix or adjust price, whilst also preventing parties from escaping from the consequences of their 
contractual liability on the basis of uncertainty.808 Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt and Another 
804 1964 I SA 669 (W); see the discussion at I 2 4 above. 
805 1986 2 SA 555 (A); see the discussion at 6 4 3 2 above. 
806 1996 2 SA 225 (A); see the discussion at 6 5 3 above. 
807 1992 I SA 566 (A); see the discussion at 2 3 2 above. 
808 i 991 I SA 508 (A); 1991 3 SA 738 (A); 1993 I SA 179 (A). See the discussion at 6 4 5 3 above. 
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likewise refuses to be taken in by the claim of uncertainty and, instead, gives recognition to a 
particularly sophisticated adaptation mechanism. 809 Thus it is often so that in redefining the 
hitherto undoubtedly restrictive scope of pretium certum, these courts simultaneously indicate 
to parties the ways in which they may import a greater measure of flexibility with regard to 
their agreements on price; that is, they indicate the means by which they may safely provide 
for price adaptation. 
Consequently, one must conclude that there has been welcome development in our courts ' 
application of the rule of pretium certum, and this directly affects the opportunities afforded 
parties to provide for price adaptation. Our courts do appear, in general, to be more receptive 
to the parties' motivations in wishing not to be bound too awkwardly, and too soon, to a fixed 
price. This is, in fact, all that perhaps is necessary, viz. that the courts take into greater 
consideration the intentions of the parties, and not to remain fixated on the idea that flexibility 
cannot exist alongside a sufficiently strict requirement of certainty of price. McKendrick, for 
example, is convinced that parties are on their own capable of inserting in contracts their own 
provisions which will provide the necessary flexibility to adapt their contract to changing 
circumstances. 81 0 All that is asked is that the courts be aware of the reasons why parties 
create these provisions, and consequently, that they will not be too astute in striking out such 
clauses on the grounds of uncertainty. This seems to be a fair call. 
On the other hand, in South African law as it stands, a judgement (or perhaps more accurately, 
an outcome) such as that found in H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd and 
Another will remain possible. In substance, Merks might appear sound in law. On a linguistic 
treatment of the contract at issue, there was no ambiguity, and the contract explicitly provided 
for the further agreement on price. Perhaps the only fault of this case is that it failed to take 
advantage of methods of importing the adaptation potential - such as the recognition of a tacit 
or ex lege implication of reasonableness - which, it seems, was intended by the parties. This, 
perhaps, was open to it if it had gone a little further in ascertaining the intentions of the 
parties, or their motivations in entering into the concessionaire agreement. But in the absence 
of ambiguity, it may well be that it was not necessarily required to do this. 811 Nonetheless, if 
greater emphasis were required to be placed on the intentions of the parties, and in particular, 
that they had intended to contract for five years, a more realistic, even inevitably fairer 
solution to this case could perhaps have been found. 
Accordingly, in the remaining sections of this final chapter, it shall be seen if the rule on 
certainty of price can be restated in such a way that the insights gleaned from the examination 
of the concept of contractual adaptation will take on a greater prominence in our court's 
approach to certainty, and to pretium certum in particular. Here it is interesting to note that 
Eisenberg has called for a restatement of the general principles of contract, or rather, that they 
be made to fit the relational, and not exclusively the discrete, contract.812 The former (which 
he distinguishes from the latter in that it involves a relationship between the parties and not 
merely an exchange) he calls the 'bread and butter of contracting'. Consequently, amongst a 
host of suggestions, he proposes that the general principles of contract recognise rules that 
809 1986 4 SA 523 (C); see the discussion at 6 5 4 above. 
81 0 Regulation 332-333. See the discussion at 5 5 above. 
811 See e.g. Delmas Milling Co Ltdv DuPlessis 1955 3 SA 447 (A). 
812 Relational Contracts 298-299. 
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would soften the bite of the classical law's intolerance for indefiniteness and agreements to 
agree. 813 McKendrick, on the other hand, seems to think that a general rule in the form of § 
2-204 of the American Uniform Commercial Code might provide a unifying basis in English 
law to combat the piecemeal approach to certainty by the English courts. 814 According! y, a 
good start may be to view the American approach to certainty. 
7 2 Pretium cerium in the law of the United States, and its application to South African 
law 
7 2 I The Uniform Commercial Code 
In the United States of America, the enactment in almost all states of the Uniform 
Commercial Code has served to ameliorate many of the apparently harsh decisions of pre-
Code common law on price.815 Under pre-Code common law, the position was much like 
South African law at present: broadly speaking, for a contract of sale to be enforceable, price 
was required to be certain or objectively ascertainable. 816 Pre-Code commercial law was, 
consequently, replete with litigation concerning the uncertainty of price, and such litigation 
was accompanied by a high degree of frustration experienced by the parties and inconsistency 
in judicial interpretation. 817 The position in pre-Code American law may thus perhaps be said 
to match the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the current South African law of sale. Today, 
however, the position is such that this particular aspect of the law of sale is noted for the 
paucity of litigation it produces. 818 Accordingly, the provisions governing price in the 
Uniform Commercial Code bear repeating. Section 2-204, subsection (3) of which pertains to 
all terms in contracts of sale, provides thus as follows: 
Formation in General 
(I) A contract for the sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, 
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract. 
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the 
moment of its making is undetermined. 
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for 
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain 
813 Ibid. He also suggests that rules could be introduced to impose upon parties to a relational 
contract a duty to bargain in good faith to make equitable price adjustments when changed 
circumstances occur, and perhaps even impose upon the advantaged party a duty to accept an 
equitable adjustment proposed in good faith by the disadvantaged party. A further submission is that 
courts be permitted to adapt or revise the terms of ongoing relational contracts, including price terms, 
based on changed circumstances in such a way that a loss that would otherwise fall on one party is 
shared, by reducing the other party's profits (299). 
814 Contract 54. 
815 Williston On Contract 425. 
816 On the position in pre-Code law, see Williston On Sales 317-322. 
817 See e.g. Williston On Sales 317. 
818 See e.g. Williston On Sales 326. 
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basis for giving an appropriate remedy. 
§ 2-305 thereafter provides as follows: 
Open Price Term 
( 1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the price is not 
settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery if 
(a) nothing is said as to price; or 
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree; or 
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard as set or recorded 
by a third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded. 
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for him to fix in good faith . 
(3) When a price left to be fixed otherwise than by agreement of the parties fails to be fixed 
through fault of one party the other may at his option treat the contract as cancelled or himself 
fix a reasonable price. 
(4) Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless the price be fixed or agreed and it 
is not fixed or agreed there is no contract. In such a case the buyer must return any goods 
already received or if unable so to do must pay their reasonable value at the time of delivery 
and the seller must return any portion of the price paid on account. 
In the view of Williston, §§ 2-204 and 2-305 follow the overall philosophy of the drafters of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, that is, to establish and adopt a set of rules that was 
practicably workable for the ordinary businessman in a contemporary business 
environment.819 With regard in particular to§ 2-204 (3), two questions are asked, viz. (i) did 
the parties intend to contract, and (ii) whether there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an 
appropriate remedy. This section applies to all terms in the contract of sale, and may be 
regarded as the general rule on certainty;820 as shall shortly be seen, the rule on pretium 
certum in§ 2-305 is a development upon this general rule. 
The primacy enjoyed by the intention of the parties is apparent in § 2-204. Accordingly, the 
Official Comment to this section observes that if the parties intend to enter into a binding 
agreement, subsection (3) recognises the agreement as valid in law, despite missing terms, if 
there is any reasonably certain basis for granting a remedy. It is suggested that this statement 
of the primacy of the intention of the parties is an important pointer to the proper perspective 
to be taken of the certainty rule in South African law. 
On the one hand, it may be said that in principle, the point of departure in South African law 
on certainty differs little from that found in UCC § 2-204. In Chapter 1, it was emphasised 
that, in accordance with the principle of party autonomy, South African courts will strain to 
819 Williston On Sales 323. 
820 See here § 2-204, Official Comment, and the view that this section provides for commercial 
standards to govern on the question of indefiniteness or uncertainty. 
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give effect to the intentions of parties, where such parties intend their agreements to have 
binding, contractual effect. As in American law, the intention of contractants appears to enjoy 
primacy. At the same time, however, the test for certainty in South African law has 
consistently been held to be whether the terms of an alleged contract are enforceable by the 
courts; this, as indicated in 1 1 5, is the one and only test for certainty. Such a test, on a broad 
level, amounts much to the same as asking, as asked in the Uniform Commercial Code, 
whether there is a reasonably certain basis for giving a remedy, on the terms disputed as 
uncertain or indefinite. In South African law, however, it is the latter test which is regarded as 
the only test; the requirement to give effect to the intentions of the parties is, at most, a 
directive (albeit well-recognised as a fundamental one). Thus it may be that, unwittingly or 
unintentionally, in the application of the test for certainty in South African law, undue 
emphasis is given to, in terms taken from the Uniform Commercial Code, whether there is a 
reasonably certain basis for a remedy to be given, at the expense of whether the parties 
intended to contract. 
In 1 1 5, questions were raised as to the basis of the test for certainty in South African contract 
law. On the one hand, the test was recognised as understandably and sensibly a practical one. 
Where, for instance, a party to a contract refuses to perform, his or her co-contractant may 
turn to the court for enforcement of their agreement. The contract must be therefore of a 
reasonably certain basis for the court to provide a remedy. The court's view in this sense as to 
what is uncertain or indefinite is indispensable. On the other hand, it was queried why, in the 
light of the underlying principle of autonomy, the decisive view in the test is entirely that of 
the court, and not of the parties '. On an application of the test for certainty as it now stands, it 
appears a court primarily looks to see whether from its perspective, the terms of a contract are 
certain enough to be enforceable, and not necessarily whether from the perspective of the 
parties', the contract is exigible. A court may, of course, on its own initiative, and in 
accordance with the directive to give effect to the intentions of the parties, consider the view 
of the parties as to certainty of terms. But such consideration is not expressly or adequately 
emphasised in the test for certainty in its present form. And a failure by the courts to make 
such a consideration, and possibly to conclude that, despite the court's own initial views on 
the indefiniteness of terms, the parties are happy to continue the relationship on the basis of 
these terms, may result in a court not going that little bit further in any attempt to find for a 
reasonably certain basis for the enforcement of the contract. Yet this what courts should be 
doing: they should strain to give effect to agreements on terms intended to be binding by the 
parties. Thus the test for certainty in current form does not emphasise the importance of 
intention to the extent that this is done so in the Uniform Commercial Code, or the degree to 
which the courts should endeavour to find a reasonably certain basis for a remedy. 
Accordingly, it is not suggested that the test for certainty in the South African law of contract 
is wrong, but that in its expression, too little emphasis is placed on, where possible, giving 
effect to the intentions of the parties. 
In § 2-305 , the so-called open price term in the Uniform Commercial Code, the primacy of 
intention is likewise evident, especially in subsections (1) and ( 4 ). The section applies where, 
while price is not settled, the contract of sale is nonetheless intended by the parties to be 
binding. Thus parties may conclude a contract of sale under circumstances anathema to the 
traditional rule of pretium certum in both pre-Code American law and South African law. A 
sale is consequently recognised, for example, where nothing at all has been said or tacitly 
agre~d upon with regard to price, or where they agree to agree later on price, or even where 
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one party is afforded the unilateral power to set price. 821 Accordingly, the Official Comment 
to this section states that recognition is thus given to the dominant intention of the parties to 
have the deal continue to be binding upon both. 
Such a position, of course, presents little problem where the contract of sale is not required to 
be enforced by the courts, and the parties perform satisfactorily, despite the basis of price 
1 ~ing one which traditionally the courts would not regard as certum. This would seem to 
confirm the observation in 1 1 5 that there appears to be little sense in a substantive test based 
upon a price's enforceability by the courts where despite agreeing on a price term which 
would fail such a test, the parties nonetheless perform. But where such a contract does indeed 
come before the court for enforcement, and the court finds that no price was settled upon, § 2-
305 provides in any case for a reasonable price at the time for delivery. Thus, in the event of 
the contract being brought before the court by one of the parties for enforcement, in terms of§ 
2-305 (1) the court is afforded- in the language of§ 2-304 (3)- a 'reasonably certain basis for 
granting an appropriate remedy', i.e. it may hold the price to be a reasonable one at the time 
for delivery. 822 Thus where the parties omit to include a price in their agreement, leave price 
to be agreed at some later stage and fail to do so, or provide for price to be fixed by some 
agreed market or other standard or by a third party and the price is not set in such a manner, 
the contract of sale may nonetheless be enforced on the basis of a reasonable price. 
The threshold for this gap-filling function823 of the Code is whether the parties intended to 
contract, despite this absence of settlement on a price. 824 Thus not every agreement with an 
open price term (e.g. where price is not settled) will result in the law substituting a reasonable 
price; the parties must intend to be bound despite the absence of a settled price. Thus under 
some circumstances the postponement of agreement on price between two parties (i .e. an 
agreement to agree), or the omission of price may rather mean that no deal has in fact been 
concluded. 825 In such a case, the Code will not provide for a substitute reasonable price. This 
is likewise emphasised in subsection ( 4 ). Indeed, Williston observes that this subsection 
guarantees the parties full freedom to contract, i.e. the freedom to contract under the 
stipulation that they will not be bound until price is in fact settled, and not when the Code 
' settles' such price itself by the substitution of a reasonable price. 826 In all cases of course, 
the intention or lack of intention to be bound is a question of fact to be determined by the 
court.827 
Thus what may be learnt from UCC § 2-305 , bearing particularly in mind that there are 
certainly similarities between the position in pre-Code American law and the general rule of 
pretium certum in South African law today? In this respect, Williston notes as follows: 
821 Where one party is afforded the power to set the price, this must be done in good faith: § 2-305 
(2). 
822 The concept of a reasonable price has been developed further by the courts. Thus in e.g. 
Lambert a v Smiling Jim Potato Co 25 Agricultural Dept 1181, 3 UCC R S 981 (I 966) the court took 
cognisance of not only the time but also the place of delivery in determining a 'reasonable price ' . 
823 Williston On Contracts 426. 
824 Williston On Sales 323. 
825 § 2-305 , Official Comment 2. 
826 Williston On Sales 325. 
827 Williston, ibid., at 323 . 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
183 
A principal advantage of this particular Code section over the pre-Code law is the consistency 
of decisions falling within § 2-305. The Code set out specific guidelines for judicial 
interpretation that make possible greater consistency in the determination of similar cases. 
Where, under the common law, a court would conclude an indefinite price term contract 
enforceable only if an objective, observable, ascertainable standard could be found, the courts 
are now faced with the less difficult problem of determining if the parties intended to make a 
contract. Once this preliminary question is disposed of, the price may then be found by 
reference back to the Code. 828 
The switch in emphasis is obvious, and crucial. Under pre-Code law, and current South 
African law, parties are, in effect, required to step into the shoes of the courts and to make 
price ascertainable from the point of view of the latter. The extent to which they achieve this, 
and not their intention as to their agreement, is the decisive factor as to the enforceability of 
their agreement. In a sense, parties to a sale are obliged to keep one eye always on the courts . 
Under § 2-305 , on the other hand, the court jumps ahead and determines, firstly, whether -
despite the apparent uncertainty of price - the parties intended to contract. Having ascertained 
this intention, the court is then in a position to decide whether it may assume that the parties 
intended to contract on the basis of a reasonable price at the time for delivery (which will then 
be supplied for the parties in terms of§ 2-305 (1)) or whether, on the basis of§ 2-305 (4), the 
parties did not intend to be bound in the absence of their own self-caused final settlement of 
price. Clearly, such an approach goes some way in acknowledging that the agreement is 
essentially that of the parties', and that it is primarily to the intention of the latter that the 
courts should bow, and not the other way round. 
7 2 2 Sections 2-304 and 2-305 and price adaptation 
What then are the implications of§§ 2-304 (3) and 2-305 for the concept of price adaptation? 
And are any of application to price adaptation in South African law? Here, a number of points 
spring to mind. 
Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, § 2-305 greatly reduces the possibility of uncertainty of 
price leading to the striking down of the contract. As a settled price is no longer a prerequisite 
(provided the parties intend to conclude a contract), the parties have much greater flexibility 
in arranging their affairs (including any agreement, or lack thereof, as to price) without fear 
that this flexibility will lead to their contract being deemed void. In particular, § 2-305 places 
at the parties' disposal a whole host of adaptation mechanisms. Thus parties may freely 
provide for consequent contingency by, for example, agreements to agree, or that one party 
may fix price in his or her discretion. Provided the parties had the intention to conclude a 
contract, such contracts can in no way be deemed ab initio void. Should such a contract be 
challenged in court, and should it be established that despite their valid contract, there is no 
settled price, the court may find for a reasonable price; accordingly, no problems of practical 
enforcement need necessarily be experienced by the courts as a result of the law allowing the 
parties such flexibility regarding price. 
828 Williston , ibid. , at 326. 
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South African contract law, of course, does not take as a point of departure that in a contract 
of sale, there need not be settlement on price. Accordingly, in adaptation mechanisms such as 
those mentioned above, the onus is rather on the parties to construct mechanisms that fit 
within the scope allowed them by the rule of pretium certum (i.e. that there must be settlement 
on price). Consequently, South African contractants will invariably not enjoy the same 
flexibility in constructing adaptation mechanisms to the extent enjoyed by contractants in the 
T Tnited States. 
On the other hand, what can be learnt from the American approach, and indeed applied in this 
country, is the importance attached to the intentions of the parties. This has been clearly 
demonstrated by the lengthy citation of remarks by Williston under 7 2 1, and in particular, 
that § 2-305 firstly requires that the courts dispose of the relatively straightforward question of 
the intention of the parties, before establishing the price by reference back to the Code. The 
effect of this emphasis on price adaptation can be practically illustrated by its application to 
the facts of H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd and Another. 829 
In the Merks case, if§ 2-305 were of application, one would firstly note that no price had been 
settled upon. Accordingly, the task of the court would then be to establish if the parties 
intended to conclude a contract, despite the absence of a settled price. An examination of this 
intention was made in some detail in 6 5 5; suffice to say that given especially the overall 
intention to remain in a contractual relationship as parties to a concessionaire agreement for a 
minimum of five years, it can be strongly argued that the parties intended, each year, to enter 
into a (fresh) contract of sale, and that agreement on price increases was not to stand in the 
way of this primary intention. 
Accordingly, having established the intention to enter into a (fresh) contract of sale each 
consecutive year, price may now be found by reference back to the Code. Here it must be 
noted that the parties specifically included a contractual provision that 'price may be increased 
by mutual agreement from time to time'. Thus the court, in terms of§ 2-305 (1) (b), may hold 
there to be a reasonable price at the time of delivery as 'the price is left to be agreed by the 
parties and they [had] fail[ ed] to agree'. On the other hand, were the court to conclude 
differently to the analysis in 6 5 5 with regard to the intentions of the parties, a court could 
also, in terms of§ 2-305 (4), hold that the parties did not intend to be bound unless they had 
agreed in the manner for which they had made provision. The important point, however, is 
that, in both cases, the intention of the parties is the decisive factor. In the Merks judgement, 
for instance, it appears that part of the reason why the court was loathe to find that the lack of 
agreement on price did not lead to the termination of the contractual relationship was that, if it 
found that the agreement continued, it did not know how it was then to enforce it. 830 The 
concern of having to find ' a reasonable certain basis for granting an appropriate remedy ' lay 
more heavily, perhaps, than concern for giving effect to the intentions of the parties. 
Of course one could point out that, in contrast to a South African court, an American court can 
afford to stress giving effect to the intentions of the parties, and not to be overly concerned 
with how the courts should give effect to a contract of sale which contains no settled price; 
after all, § 2-305 provides, in any event, the remedy of a reasonable price. But this is to miss 
829 1996 2 SA 225 (A); for a detailed analysis of this case, see in general 6 5 above. 
830 See especially 2358-D. 
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the point. After all , it should be remembered that the intention of the parties is equally 
strongly emphasised in § 2-304 (3), and there no ' appropriate remedy' is provided ex lege , as 
done in § 2-305 (1). The point is merely that the Uniform Commercial Code achieves a 
balance between giving effect to the intentions of the parties and requiring, for practicality ' s 
sake, a reasonably certain basis for an appropriate remedy. It has been argued strongly above 
that this balance should be achieved in our own law. This would also lead to a more 
accommodating approach by our courts to price adaptation. 
Finally, the manner in which UCC § 2-305 (1) assumes the parties intend to contract on the 
basis of a reasonable price, in the absence of any other intention, 831 is also indicative. For as 
has been pointed out before, 832 if our courts firstly make an adequate examination of the 
parties' intentions, it should be able to make a similar assumption regarding whether it too 
may find for a reasonable price. Thus our law may not have the ex lege imposition of a 
reasonable price available in§ 2-305 (1), but then it does not necessarily need it. For South 
African courts, having determined firstly that the parties intend to contract despite the 
apparent uncertainty of price, and being thus obliged to strain to find for a contract on terms 
enforceable by itself, could thus possibly find for tacit agreement on a reasonable price. In this 
way, it could find ' a reasonably certain basis for an appropriate remedy ' . The doubts raised in 
i\lferks about the possibility of a sale at a reasonable price have, in any event, long since been 
shown to be unconvincing. 833 
7 2 3 The challenge ofthe Uniform Commercial Code 
An analysis of§§ 2-204 and 2-305 of the Uniform Commercial Code indicates the balance 
achieved by the Code between giving effect to the principle of party autonomy, and the 
simultaneous recognition that, at least for reasons of practicality, a contract of sale must 
contain a price that may be enforceable by the courts. Thus the decisive perspective as to what 
constitutes a certain price is neither entirely the parties' nor the courts ' . Parties are given the 
freedom to agree on whatever form of price term they so want, or to agree even upon nothing 
at all. Where, however, the contract of sale is required to be enforced by the court, and the 
price is not settled, the Uniform Commercial Code provides, in any event, for a reasonable 
one, in the absence of indications of an intention to the contrary. 
Following the discussion of UCC § 2-204 at 7 2 1 above, it was suggested that South African 
courts, in applying the test for certainty, should firstly attempt to ascertain whether the parties, 
despite the apparent indefiniteness of terms, nonetheless intended to be bound by their 
agreement. If so, the courts should attempt to give effect to such agreement by straining to 
find for a reasonably certain basis for the enforcement of the agreement. As the test for 
certainty is currently expressed, the impression is created that the courts may progress to the 
second part of the test immediately i.e. that they may test whether the agreement is 
enforceable without an adequate enquiry as to the intention of the parties. In the final section, 
which follows immediately, it shall be seen to what extent recent South African case law 
confirms or denies this impression, and accordingly, whether the test for pretium certum 
831 See al so e.g. the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 s. 8. 
832 See the discussion at e.g. 2 5 4 1 1 above. 
833 See the discussion at 2 3 2 above. 
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requires some form of restatement. 
7 3 Recent South African case law: the extent to which consideration is given to the 
intention of the parties 
- 3 I Edging towards a balance 
As observed in the section above, the Uniform Commercial Code places particular emphasis 
on the intention of parties to be bound by their agreement, despite the apparent uncertainty of 
the agreement's terms. This emphasis is, however, balanced by the requirement that 
accompanying this intention, there should exist a reasonably certain basis for giving an 
appropriate remedy. 
It has been likewise demonstrated in 1 1 3 that in South African contract law, there is nothing 
new in the approach to consider the intention of the parties in any examination of alleged 
vagueness of a term. Recently, in Lewis v Oneanate (Pty) Ltd, the Appellate Division has 
reiterated once more that in considering the question as to whether a contract is void for 
vagueness, regard should be had to the fact that at issue is a commercial document which has 
been executed by the parties with the clear intention that it should have commercial 
operation.834 Even more recently, this approach appears to be broadly endorsed by Harms 
JA ' s majority judgement in Namibian Minerals Corporation Ltd v Benguela Concessions Ltd, 
where the judge of appeal observed: 
Once a Court is called upon to determine whether an agreement is fatally vague or not, it must 
have regard to a number of factual and policy considerations. These include the parties ' initial 
desire to have entered into a binding legal relationship; that many contracts (such as sale, lease 
or partnership) are governed by legally implied terms and do not require much by way of 
agreement to be binding (cf Pezzullo v Dreyer and Others 1992 (3) SA 379 (A)); that many 
agreements contain tacit terms (such as those relating to reasonableness); that language is 
inherently flexible and should be approached sensibly and fairly; that contracts are not 
concluded on the supposition that there will be litigation; and that the Court should strive to 
uphold - and not destroy - bargains. 835 
This is clearly a sensible approach. By the recognition of terms implied by law, and the 
possible tacit implication of reasonableness, a contract may be saved from an unnecessary 
fatal uncertainty. More particularly, Harms JA shows an appreciation for the significance of 
the initial desire of the parties to enter into binding contractual relations, and that the court 
should strive to uphold bargains. By remarking that parties do not contract on the supposition 
that there will be litigation (and that language is inherently flexible) , Harms JA clearly 
recognises the obvious but not insignificant point that parties write their contracts for 
themselves, and not for the courts. Parties should not, after all, in the drafting of their 
contracts, be expected to keep one eye always on the courts. Thus there is, in fact , much to be 
said for all of these points, and they should provide valuable assistance to future courts faced 
834 1992 4 SA 811 (A) 818G-8191, and particularly 819E-F, where the dictum of Colman J in 
Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 I SA 669 (W) is approved and 
applied. 
835 1997 2 SA 548 (A) 561 H-I. 
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with the question of uncertainty. 
On the other hand, however, there are other indications in Harms JA's judgement that, all 
things considered, he is of the opinion that the approach to certainty should be defined 
essentially as an objective one, and that ultimately, the question remains whether the content 
ofthe alleged contract is enforceable by the courts. This is illustrated, firstly, in his remarking 
as follows: 
Businessmen are often content to conduct their affairs with only vague or incomplete 
agreements in hand. They tend to rely on hope, good spirits, bona fides and commercial 
expediency to make such agreements work. But when they are at loggerheads, it appears to be 
futile to consider whether they would have been able to do so.836 
Ultimately, Harms JA suggests, where a term is in fact disputed, it is pointless to consider that 
the parties intended the contract to be binding, or considered the agreement as capable of 
implementation; in such cases, the problem is simply foisted upon the courts. It is 
understandable, then, that the test is one enquiring as to the enforceability of the term by the 
courts. 
This is, of course, an important consideration. In American law, this factor is accorded 
consideration in the provision that whatever the intention of the parties, there must also exist a 
reasonably certain basis for the provision of an appropriate remedy. In § 2-305 this is largely 
accounted for by the Code providing for a reasonable price. Significantly, however, Harms JA 
also makes the following observation: 
In addition, the question of vagueness of an agreement is an objective consideration and it is of 
no avail to have regard to the subjective intentions and desires ofthe respective parties ... 837 
One questions, accordingly, whether the Appellate Division does itself any favours by 
returning to this insistence on an objective test. To say that it is of 'no avail' to have regard to 
the parties' subjective intentions is strongly stated. One's feeling might be that it destroys the 
balance towards which the judgement was edging in the list of factors initially mentioned by 
Harms JA. For yes, parties do at times believe themselves to be ad idem, and intend to be 
bound by their agreement, and yet not realise that in fact they have not reached consensus on 
price. In such cases, the courts should not be swayed by such an intention.838 On the other 
hand, if the court finds that the intention of the parties is to be bound by their agreement, 
despite the apparent uncertainty of, for example, price, this may equally be an important 
indication that the parties are indeed ad idem. The court should therefore in such 
circumstances strain to find for a reasonably certain or ascertainable price, whether by tacit 
term, conduct or custom. This is surely the lesson of the Uniform Commercial Code. At the 
least, the intentions of the parties should be regarded as of such significance that the courts 
should refrain from continuing to describe the test for uncertainty or vagueness as objective. 
836 561G. 
837 563A. 
838 See e.g. Lambons (Edms) Bpk v BMW (Edms) Bpk 1997 4 SA 141 (SCA); Titaco Projects (Pty) 
Ltd V AA Alloy Foundry (Pty) Ltd 1996 3 SA 320 (W); Kenilworth Palace Investments v lngala and 
Another 1984 2 SA I (C). 
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In sum, the Appellate Division should simply expressly recognise that an enquiry into the 
certainty of a term such as price is not such a simple task that it may tag the issue as objective. 
For there are clearly other factors - which Harms JA himself has recognised - which indicate 
that it is simplistic to continue to regard the test for certainty as, essentially, whether the term 
is enforceable by the courts. Harms JA's dictum cited immediately above, therefore, is 
unnecessary, and misleading, albeit possibly unintentionally so. 
7 3 2 The minority judgement in Namibian Minerals: the suggested approach 
In so far as it sets out the various factors to be considered when faced with the Issue of 
uncertainty, the majority judgement in Namibian Minerals Corporation Ltd v Benguela 
Concessions Ltd839 is undoubtedly a useful one. Where it falls back, however, would seem to 
be where it rather unexpectedly dismisses reference to the subjective intentions of the parties 
as of ' no avail ' . In contrast, the minority judgement in this same decision endorses 
unequivocally an approach which places great stock on the intentions of the parties. Thus 
whilst a minority judgement, it is submitted that the approach of E M Grosskopf JA is 
illustrative. 
Thus at issue in this case, amongst other points, was whether a so-called farm-in clause to 
certain diamond concession areas held by the respondent and granted to the appellant on the 
fulfilment of certain conditions was valid and not void for vagueness. As is clear from the 
case report and the remarks of E M Grosskopf JA, the respondent, following the granting of 
the farm-in clause, discovered it was no longer in its interests to permit the appellant to 
exercise its rights accruing from the clause, and thus denied that it was bound by it. This it did 
by its representative firstly tearing off from the original contractual documents pages on 
which the signatures appeared, and thus denying that its representative had signed them, and 
later by disputing the validity of the clause on the grounds of vagueness. E M Grosskopf JA 
held thus as follows: 
Before performing this exercise myself it is necessary to state some general principles. First, 
the parties clearly considered that the clause was capable of implementation. Even before the 
conclusion of the July agreement the appellant was claiming rights under the farm-in clause. 
Although there were disputes between the parties about its implementation (and, in particular, 
on what area in the South African concessions is 'of similar attraction' to the Namibian area), 
there was no suggestion from the respondent that the clause was too vague to be enforced. And, 
in August 1992 when the respondent wanted to get out ofthe contract, Wilson [a representative 
of the respondent] adopted the extreme expedient of mutilating the documents and falsely 
claiming that he had not signed them. Quite clearly, he had no doubt as to the contract's 
enforceability. Moreover, as I have already stated, the contention that the clause was void for 
vagueness was inserted into the respondent's plea by amendment and formed no part of the 
original formulation of the claim. We are here dealing with a lawyer's point rather than a matter 
of practical importance for businessmen. We should not be astute to destroy a contract which 
the parties seriously entered into and considered capable of implementation. 840 
Importantly, the judge of appeal clearly recognises the appeal to vagueness as a tactic of one 
839 1997 2 SA 548 (A). 
840 5561-5570. 
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party to escape the consequences of his agreement by taking recourse in a technicality. The 
respondent in such a case attempts to exploit the discrepancy between what a court may view 
as uncertain and the possible view of the parties in this regard. In his minority judgement, 
however, E M Grosskopf JA ensures that such a discrepancy does not arise and is thus not 
exploited, by ensuring that his own view of what might be regarded as an uncertain term takes 
cognisance of that which the parties themselves would regard as uncertain. This he achieves 
by specifically taking into consideration the fact that the parties considered the clause capable 
of implementation. 
This is regarded as an important factor by E M Grosskopf JA. Moreover, it is even one step 
beyond an enquiry as to whether the parties intended to be bound by the allegedly uncertain 
terms. Thus the judge of appeal remarks that one should not be astute to destroy a contract 
which the parties seriously entered into and considered capable of implementation. Parties 
may enter into contractual relationships with, from an objective viewpoint, only vague or 
incomplete agreements in hand and yet genuinely intend such an agreement to be binding. As 
noted by Harms JA in the majority judgement in the same case, parties thereafter tend to rely 
on hope, good faith and commercial expediency to make such an agreement work. 841 Thus 
the basis of such an intention may also be a misplaced confidence in the success of some later 
process of removing the vagueness and of making the term workable. Accordingly, while 
useful , the intentions of the parties alone cannot be regarded as a decisive indication that the 
term in question should not be regarded as irredeemably vague. 
More useful therefore, may be an enquiry not merely with regard to whether the parties 
intended the disputed term to be binding, but with regard to whether the parties also believed 
the term to be capable of implementation. 842 The distinction between the two enquiries is, of 
course, merely one of degree. It is suggested, however, that the latter enquiry is the more 
focused one, and consequently, one that is more likely to give the court an indication that it 
too might be regard the term capable of enforcement. For the parties may intend the disputed 
term to be binding, but only in the sense of a general, well-meaning intent, one rooted in the 
abstract and not necessarily cognisant of its practical implications. A finding , on the other 
hand, that the parties considered the term capable of implementation indicates that to some 
extent, they have put their minds to the implications of the term in practice. Accordingly, if 
the parties regard the term as capable of implementation, the indication is a powerful one that 
so too should the courts. Thus the court would in such circumstances be obliged to delve 
deeply into all the circumstances governing the contract, including the possible existence of 
tacit terms, naturalia, custom, conduct, and other extrinsic evidence, in an effort to find for 
some reasonably certain basis upon which the term in question may be found enforceable. 
This, in fact, is the approach taken thereafter by E M Grosskopf JA on the facts of the case. 
The farm-in clause is examined section for section, and eventually held not to render the 
contract void and unenforceable. 843 The pragmatic, party-orientated approach of E M 
841 At 561 G, cited above. 
842 See the similar approach in Pezzutto v Dreyer and Others 1992 3 SA 379 (A) 393A-B, and 
Bantjies v Kuntze and Another 1998 4 SA 20 I (C) 206C-D. 
843 It is, in fact, on the point of what is meant by an area of ' similar attraction ', or more specifically, 
to whom it must be attractive, that the majority and minority judgements part ways . E M Grosskopf 
JA, at 5590, had no hesitation in holding that it must be attractive to a businessman proposing to 
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Grosskopf JA is most clearly illustrated by the following observations made by the judge. 
These were made in the course of determining whether reasonably certain effect could be 
given to that part of the farm-in clause which referred to the offering to the appellant of a 
farm-in right to a concession area 'of similar attraction': 
There is considerable evidence before us as to what the parties knew, believed and hoped about 
the Namibian concession area. Technical evidence could show what the attributes and 
potentialities are of any area offered in terms of the farm-in clause. Of course, the defects in the 
offered area would also have to be taken into account. Whether the South African area is, on 
balance, of similar attraction would be determined by weighing up all the different factors. 
Here, too, I expect technical evidence would be necessary. It does not in principle seem to me 
to be beyond the capacity of a Court to perform such an exercise. In a particular case it might 
of course be impossible to say on the evidence whether or not the offered area is of similar 
attraction to the Namibian area. In such a case the party burdened by the onus of proof would 
lose. I do not think, however, that similar attraction is intrinsically incapable of proof. And I 
would here repeat that the parties, who were intimately concerned with the technical and 
financial aspects of the respective concession areas, clearly entertained no doubt about the 
enforceability of the provision.844 
With respect, the approach taken by E M Grosskopf JA is a most sound one, and one that 
bears repeating by all courts faced with an agreement hit by an alleged vagueness of term. 
This is especially so when recourse to the argument of vagueness has been made purely as, in 
the words of E M Grosskopf JA again, a lawyer's point, as a means of escaping a liability 
which has arisen from an agreement that party entered into with serious intent. In the 
Namibian Minerals case, E M Grosskopf JA does not discard the test traditionally followed 
by our courts for certainty. On the contrary, the test he applies is clearly whether the disputed 
term in question is capable of enforcement in the view of the court. At the same time, 
however, and to an equal extent, the judge takes direction from the fact that the parties 
themselves regarded the disputed term as capable of implementation. Thus one perceives a 
determination on the part of the judge to find, if at all possible, that the term is likewise 
sufficiently certain as to be enforceable by the court. 
Thus the minority judgement in Namibian Minerals Corporation Ltd v Benguela Concessions 
Ltd achieves a balance. On the one hand, there is recognition that the agreement belongs to the 
parties. Thus there is the realisation that the agreement ought not be hi-jacked by subjecting it 
to a requirement of certainty that fails to consider that the parties, whatever the courts might 
prima facie think, regard the terms of their agreement as sufficiently certain so as to be 
capable of implementation. Such an approach is one rooted in the principle of autonomy 
fundamental to our law; that is, that a contract is ultimately the tool of the parties. On the 
other hand, the perspective of the court is likewise not neglected. Thus consideration is given 
to the court's concern that as the body which, in the final instance, must be able to attach to 
invest in the area; his test is thus objective (i.e. the reasonable businessman test) and allows him to 
hold that by admitting technical evidence, 'similar attraction' is capable of proof. Harms JA, on the 
other hand (at 567D-568I), found that it had to be interpreted as meaning a subjective attraction i.e. 
the degree to which it would be found attractive to other investors was irrelevant; it simply had to be 
attractive to the party in question, i.e. Namco. As this was not objectively ascertainable, this term 
resulted in the contract being void for vagueness. 
844 559F-H. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
191 
the disputed term precision, it may be required to give judicial effect to the contract 
containing that term. Admittedly, the court may have to work harder as it endeavours to find 
that such precision does indeed attach to the term - but then, the contract is the parties, and the 
courts are, if possible, to serve the genuine intentions of the parties. It is not to be the other 
way around. Furthermore, E M Grosskopf JA will clearly also draw a line where, despite all 
diligent efforts, the court finds the term in question is not capable of enforcement. 
7 4 Certainty reconsidered: concluding remarks 
In § 2-204 (3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, a balance is achieved between giving effect 
to the intentions of the parties, despite the apparent uncertainty of terms, and the need, 
nonetheless, to be able to find a reasonably certain basis for an appropriate remedy, before the 
court will give effect to the contract in question. South African law does not have any 
equivalent of § 2-204 (3). What it does have, however, is a test which states that in 
determining whether a term in a contract, such as price, is certain or objectively ascertainable, 
it must be seen whether that term is capable of enforcement by the courts. Thus in the current 
expression of our test, the need to find a reasonably certain basis for enforcement of the term 
predominates. 
In this chapter, therefore, it has been asked whether this test should be restated. In the 
statement of this test, the answer is, possibly, yes . As has been demonstrated, the intention of 
the parties to enter into a binding contract, and especially their belief that a price is capable of 
implementation, are important considerations. Not only may such factors be important 
indications that a reasonably certain price can be found, but in terms of the principle of 
autonomy, the courts should attempt to give effect to the intentions of the parties. These 
considerations need to be reflected in the expression of this test. Thus it is suggested that the 
test should be restated to hold that a term will be held as uncertain where, having given due 
regard to the intentions of the parties, the court is still unable to find a reasonably certain basis 
to give enforcement to this term. 
On the other hand, if the judgement of E M Grosskopf JA in Namibian Minerals Corporation 
Ltd v Benguela Concessions Ltd may in any way be taken as a standard, and if courts in the 
future are prepared to take their cue from the latter, there is no need to call for any change in 
the exercise of the test. As demonstrated in this judgement, all relevant factors can already be 
taken into account so as to achieve a balance between giving effect to the intentions of the 
parties, whilst not losing sight of the practical challenge of giving effect to an apparently 
uncertain term. 
Thus if our test on certainty could (and perhaps in the way suggested above) be restated so as 
to emphasise that the question of certainty is not simply one that can be solved by - to 
overstate the matter somewhat - the casual glance of our courts, our law will have moved 
some way to ensuring that the requirement of certainty is never again used as a lawyer' s point, 
or to thwart needlessly attempts at price adaptation. For at the courts' disposal, moreover, are 
increasing means of finding for, in the language of the Uniform Commercial Code, reasonably 
certain bases for providing appropriate remedies . Previous chapters have indicated this: the 
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validity of sale at a reasonable price, for example;845 the implication of reasonableness, 
whether tacitly or ex lege, and whether in the case of a unilateral power846 or whether under 
circumstances akin to those found in H Merks & Co (Pty) Ltd v The B-M Group (Pty) Ltd and 
Another;847 or perhaps in the recognition that a court may substitute its own reasonable price 
following the distinction it has made between essential and non-essential price ascertainment 
mechanisms, as revealed in Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton.848 Increasingly, 
t: .erefore, where a court has determined that the parties intend to enter into a binding 
contractual relationship despite the apparent uncertainty of terms, there are plentiful means at 
the courts ' disposal to ensure that this intention can be given effect to, and the contract saved. 
Thus (i) a new emphasis upon the intentions of the parties, and (ii) a greater willingness to 
look beyond for some reasonably certain basis for a remedy, can only be good news for 
parties who attempt to provide for price adaptation. For too long, perhaps, certainty may have 
been a choke upon parties' efforts to arrange their affairs with the flexibility it seems is so 
often required in modern commerce. 
845 At 2 3 2 above. 
846 At 6 4 above. 
84 7 1996 2 SA 225 (A); at 6 5 5 above. 
848 [1983] I AC 444, [1982] 3 AllER I (HL); at 2 5 above. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
From a distance, the rule of pretium certum in the South African law of sale appears clear-cut 
and uncontroversial. This impression misleads. 
On the one hand, a lack of certainty as to price may indeed indicate that the parties are not ad 
idem on an essentia!e of sale, and do not wish to be bound until agreement is in fact reached. 
So too , the court, as the institution which in the final instance must enforce obligations arising 
from a contract, must be in a position to give precise effect to such liability. In this enquiry, 
however, while the test remains whether price agreed upon is sufficiently certain as to be 
enforceable by the courts, the courts should not lose sight of the fact that while their view of 
certainty may differ from that of the parties, the parties may, nonetheless, regard price as 
capable of implementation. As the courts are obliged, where possible, to give effect to the 
intentions of the parties, the courts should strain to find a reasonably certain basis for an 
enforceable price. Not to do so, and to be content with an enquiry that fails to move beyond 
the prima facie view of the court as to certainty, neglects to respect the reality that the parties 
may well have reached agreement. In striving to find such agreement, and a reasonably certain 
basis for an enforceable price, the court does the parties no favour: it is its duty to do so , as 
required by the principle of party autonomy underlying our law of contract. In this regard, the 
approach of the minority judgement in Namibian Minerals Corporation Ltd v Benguela 
Concessions Ltd should be followed.849 It may also be worthwhile to restate the test for 
certainty so as to emphasise that significance of the intentions of the parties in this enquiry. 
On the other hand, however, it must also be acknowledged that a buyer or seller may be loathe 
to fix a price with certainty from outset. Contingencies may arise in the period following the 
fi xing of price which may upset the balance between performance and counter-performance 
established by the parties, as represented by the exchange of goods for the price. Parties 
accordingly attempt to import a measure of price adaptation; that is, they attempt to provide 
for a price which, though to be found in a contract of sale which continues to be binding, may 
be adjusted to provide for later contingency, and to a degree with regard to which both parties 
would find satisfactory. In this regard, price adaptation has traditionally been provided for by 
the application of the rule that price need not be immediately certain, but may be determined 
later by a process of objective ascertainment. The usual example here is that of a price 
escalation clause. This study, however, has indicated that price adaptation mechanisms have 
increasingly become more sophisticated, and have made use of measures which, inevitably, 
have been drawn into conflict with any rigid application of the rule that price must be 
objectively determinable, and the related prohibitions against agreements to agree and price-
setting by one party alone. 
South Africa, unlike certain overseas jurisdictions, possesses no specific legislation or 
doctrine which explicitly provides for the adaptation of price. On the other hand , it has been 
demonstrated that parties themselves have not been slow in creating their own means of 
849 1997 2 SA 548 (A) . 
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importing price adaptation. Moreover, while in some textbooks and case law the rule of 
pretium certum continues, as a principle, to be cited without qualification, one detects in case 
law that in particular circumstances, our courts are willing to be not overly rigid in its 
application of the latter rule where this will deprive parties of the flexibility, typical of price 
adaptation, which they wish to import with regard to price. Such an accommodating attitude, 
and a tendency not to be too astute in striking down such contracts for uncertainty, is to be 
encouraged; moreover, such an attitude is, in the view of McKendrick, all that is necessary for 
an adequate party-managed response to changing circumstances and contingencies which hit 
price. 850 This attitude in South African case law is evident, for example, in moves towards 
the recognition of sale at a reasonable price, of the acceptance of unilateral powers of price 
adjustment where subject to objective limitations, and the greater willingness to imply, 
whether tacitly or by law, the standard of reasonableness so as to bring a price within the 
scope of objective ascertainment. Furthermore, on an application of the distinction between 
essential and non-essential price ascertainment machinery as revealed in the House of Lords 
decision of Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton, 851 South African courts may also find 
themselves in a position to intervene and substitute a reasonable price more often, and in cases 
falling outside of those involving third parties, in instances where the agreed upon price 
ascertainment machinery has failed . 
Such developments in our law take cognisance of the fact that today, buyer and seller contract 
in an uncertain commercial world, and that any application of the rule of pretium certum 
which fails to appreciate such modern circumstances, permits the rule to be afforded a 
significance never intended it. After all, in the final instance, a contract of sale is a tool to be 
utilised by the buyer and seller for the furtherance of their individual interests. The rule of 
pretium certum undoubtedly contributes to the efficacy of this type of contract. But where any 
objections the rule raises to new forms of price ascertainment or new forms of price 
adaptation are satisfactorily provided for, it should not be permitted to obstruct an 
arrangement on price agreed upon by the parties and entered into with seriousness. 
850 McKendrick Regulation 3 1 1. 
851 [1983] 1 AC 444, [1982] 3 AllER 1. 
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